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Foreword

TheWar

International

Law

Book"

Studies "Blue

series

was

initiated

by the Naval

College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises and articles that contribute

to the broader understanding of international law. This, the eighty- third volume of

the series, contains the proceedings from a scholarly conference entitled Global

Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications and Natuhosted here at the Naval War College on June 28-30, 2006.

Legal Challenges:
ral Disasters,

The

conference's mission

to these challenges

and to

was

identify

to

examine

common themes that could guide those responsible for
By initiating a dialogue between the responsi-

addressing these challenges in the future.

government

ble

legal standards (or lack thereof) applicable

officials (military

and

civilian)

and the

legal

who

personnel

advise

them, the conference developed a number of practical suggestions in the form of lessons learned.

One

striking aspect of these lessons

apparently diverse topics, the solutions have
tics.

In the truly "global" world in which

we

and

international scholars

that,

though the panels

dealt with

many common threads and characterislive,

solutions that are equally global, coordinated

Renowned

is

the challenges

and consistent

practitioners,

must be addressed by

across the board.

both military and

civilian,

representing government, non-government and academic institutions from

throughout the world participated in the event. The conference and

this

"Blue

Book" were cosponsored by the Lieber Society on the Law of Armed Conflict and
the Roger Williams University School of Law, Bristol,

Rhode Island, with generous

War College Foundation and the Israel Yearbook on Human
Rights. The International Law Department of the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies, United States Naval War College, hosted the conference.
support from the Naval

On

behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the

Commandant of the Marine Corps,
participants

I

extend to

all

the cosponsors

and supporters, the

and the contributing authors, our thanks and gratitude

able contributions to this project
gal issues involved in

and

for their invalu-

to the better understanding of the

complex le-

meeting and responding to future global operational challenges.

JACOB

L.

SHUFORD
US Navy
Naval War College

Rear Admiral,
President,

Introduction

The US

Naval War College hosted

its

sixth annual International

ence during June 2006. The purpose of these conferences

international scholars
legal issues

and

practitioners, military experts

impacting military operations of the day.

Law

June, 2006, the Naval

sasters.
•

and students

to

examine

Commencing with the

inau-

Studies ("Blue Book") series has been devoted to the conference

subjects. This edition of the "Blue

Challenges:

to bring together

War College's internationally acclaimed Inter-

gural conference in 2001, the Naval

national

is

Law Confer-

War

Book" continues

that tradition.

During 28-30

College conducted a conference entitled Global Legal

Command of the Commons,

Strategic

Communications and Natural Di-

Three main challenges were explored by the conference:

Threats emanating from the global

commons and

the need to identify and

counter those threats;
•

Combat

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, events that occurred during

those operations and worldwide perceptions of the
for those events;
•

US

role in

and

responsibility

and

Natural disasters of such magnitude international responses were required,

including within the United States of America.

This volume of the International

made during the colloquium and
lated during the

Law Studies series

articles

is

a compilation of remarks

which expand upon the thoughts

articu-

colloquium by the authors.

The conference was organized by Professor Jane Dalton, the Naval War College's Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, and Major Richard
Jaques, US Marine Corps, of the International Law Department. The conference
was cosponsored by the Lieber Society on the Law of Armed Conflict of the American Society of International Law, and was made possible through the support of
the Naval War College Foundation, Roger Williams University School of Law and
the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. Without the dedicated efforts and support
and assistance of these individuals and organizations the conference would not
have been possible.
I

also

thank our editorial team, Professor Emeritus Jack Grunawalt and Captain

Ralph Thomas, JAGC,

US Navy

(Ret.).

Their dedication, conscientiousness, and

perseverance were principally responsible for the production of this excellent addition to the International

Law

Studies series. Major

Mike Carsten, US Marine

Corps, of the International

Law Department served as managing editor of this vol-

ume. His dogged perseverance

in

communicating with contributing authors, mar-

shaling author contributions, packaging the volume,

and overseeing the complex

publishing and distribution process also are deserving of special thanks. Without
their efforts,

completing

Often forgotten when

this
it

volume would not have been

possible.

comes time to acknowledge efforts are the personnel re-

sponsible for supervising and executing the expenditure of funds.

I

thank Colonel

US Army, of the International Law Department and Budget Analysts Ms. Jamie Price and Ms. Mary Ann Hall for their efforts in managing
Leo "Chip" Boucher, JA,

and executing the budget

for the conference

and

this

volume.

Additionally, special thanks go to Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, president of

the Naval

War

College; Dr. James F. Giblin,

Jr.,

the College's provost;

Barney Rubel, dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, for

and support
this

in the planning

and Dr.

their leadership

and conduct of the conference and the publication of

volume.

The

International

Law Studies

series

is

published by the Naval

War College and

US and international military commands, academic institutions and libraries. This publication reflects the Naval War College's
distributed throughout the world to

commitment to

scholarly discourse

and

a better understanding of legal issues.

The

2006 conference and the publication of this volume of the "Blue Book" continue
that tradition.

MANDSAGER
Professor of Law & Chairman
DENNIS

L.

International

xn

Law Department

Preface

Jane Gilliland Dalton

Though

it is

early in this twenty-first century, a

large-scale events

unanticipated,

—

—some

face-to-face with the "global"
•

number of

man-made, others natural have brought us
nature of the world in which we live:

Threats emanating from the global

commons and

the need to identify and

counter those threats;
•

Combat

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, events that occurred during

those operations and worldwide perceptions of the
for those events;
•

US

role in

and

responsibility

and

Natural disasters of such magnitude that international responses were

required, including within the United States of America.

Though these apparently unconnected events could be viewed in isolation, embedded within each were
single

issues that could not

be addressed by a single nation or a

government agency. The hallmark of these events

global reach of legal, policy and operational issues,

and the

is

the complexity

interrelationships

them. In developing the theme and identifying the participants for

and

among

this conference,

Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications, and
Natural Disasters, hosted at the Naval War College on June 28-30, 2006, the conference organizers hoped to initiate a dialogue between those who have to meet these
global challenges and the lawyers who advise them. We sought to explore the role
that law plays in shaping policy, how policy influences legal analysis, and how the
Global Legal Challenges:

The goal was to idento learn from past events

interaction of law and policy affect the operational outcomes.

—

common themes and lessons for future exploration
and experiences how better to approach future challenges.

tify

In addition, this conference did not focus primarily
rather

on the laws of war, but

on legal issues that confront the military commander when engaged in oper-

ations that

do not fit the traditional concept of warfighting

—protecting the home-

land from threats, whether natural or man-made, in the post-9/11 environment;

ensuring the message one's forces convey through words and deeds

is

consistent

Preface

with law and policy; and conducting disaster relief operations in a conflicted or insecure area, though not necessarily in a war zone.

The recurring theme of the conference, and, thus, this volume of the "Blue
Book" series, is that in an interdependent and complex world of post-9/1 1 global terrorism, neither policymakers nor military commanders can focus only on domestic
or international issues, only on law or policy or operations, only on performing the
mission or communicating the message rather, they have to accomplish all at
once. They have to interconnect and interact. The challenges are global and complex. The solutions must be sophisticated and nuanced. From the two keynote
speakers and the five panels emerged a number of lessons learned to inform the
debate and to assist in developing solutions for the future.

—

Competing Interests: Striking the Balance
Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Homeland Defense Paul McHale's opening key-

note address captured one of the primary themes that resonated throughout the
three days of the conference

—

with complex issues and competing
ance

is

when

the importance of striking a balance

McHale's

priorities. In Secretary

dealing

case, the bal-

not unlike that America's founding fathers struck between security and

lib-

The founding fathers had to guard against creating a system that relied
disproportionately on the military to provide internal security, lest the citizenry's
erty.

lack of confidence in civilian law enforcement lead to a voluntary relinquishment

of those capabilities in favor of the military, and to a threat to the civilian character
of the

US government. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, a similar issue arose. The

rapid and effective military deployment to the Gulf Coast
fastest

deployment of military

McHale

—

led

some

capabilities in

US

—arguably the

history, according to Secretary

to argue the military should be in charge of future

responses to domestic natural disasters. Secretary

largest,

McHale found

emergency

that identifying

the proper domestic role of the military requires "constant, sobering judgment."

"We ought not blindly commit

military forces to missions that should remain in-

herently civilian in character. If we use the military within our
every mission that the military in theory could achieve,

we will,

ance towards security and pay a price in terms of liberty."

US government

complex

is

State legal adviser

John

in fact, tip the bal-

executive department

seeking to strike the proper balance

issues with partners, allies

borders for

1

The luncheon keynote address demonstrated how one
of the

own

when

addressing

and others around the world. Department of

B. Bellinger III, at the request

of the secretary of state, has

taken a leading role in the secretary's public diplomacy dialogue. This dialogue

designed to garner support around the world for

xiv

US

policies

and the

is

legal

]ane Gilliland Dalton

theories underlying those policies related to the global

war on

and treatment of detainees and other post-9/11

Mr. Bellinger noted that

issues.

terror, the status

some of the challenges in this arena involve dispelling myths that are not based
on fact or law and identifying and responding to policy differences that are recast as disputes about the law. Mr. Bellinger's main goals have been to explain
with precision and clarity the legal basis for policy decisions and to place unfounded and emotionally laden criticisms in perspective. "Unfortunately," commented Mr. Bellinger, "it is easy to capture a criticism about a complex legal
matter in a pithy sound bite

how

scribe

Through

.

the United States

.

but

.

requires paragraphs of explanation to de-

it

complying with

in fact,

is,

his dialogues with legal advisers

ministries, the

its

legal obligations." 2

and other representatives from foreign

European Union and international organizations, he has encour-

aged responsible

officials

and commentators

own

anced discussion within their
United States about the

Europe

in

nations,

among

to

"promote more

bal-

themselves and with the

issues." 3

Mencken once said that for every complex
problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat and wrong." 4 Just as there is no simSecretary McHale recalled that "H.L.

ple correct solution to the

complex issues surrounding the proper

tary in a domestic context, so there
issues

no simple

is

Mr. Bellinger addresses when he meets

role of the mili-

correct solution to the

complex

his counterparts overseas. Likewise,

the five panel discussions of this conference identified the complexity of the global
issues each panel

was assigned

clear-cut, easy answers.

to address

The solution

competing interests are balanced
icy

and recognized

no simple,
be found only if

that there are

to these global issues will

in a thoughtful, sober analysis of the law, the pol-

and the operational imperatives. The reader of the contributions in this volume

submitted by the panel participants will appreciate the crosscutting themes that

animated the discussions and the practical lessons the panelists offered based on
their experiences. Following

is

a short

summary

of the major themes and lessons

learned from the panelists.

See, Understand, Share:

"It

seems

sport.

safe to say that global

." 5
.

.

maritime security

is

now

Thus the panel moderator, Professor Craig H.

Perspective."

6

first

Allen, succinctly captured

—

panel,

intelligence perspective

challenges presented

simply not a

seen by most as a team

"Command of the Commons The United States
Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, US Navy (Ret.), explained why that is so

the primary lesson of the

from an

Developing Partnerships

—

it is

a

problem of scale, scope, complexity and the

by a highly accomplished

realistic goal. "I

foe.

"Command of the commons" is

take this position," said Vice Admiral Jacoby, "based

xv

Preface

upon what I believe is a realistic appreciation of what intelligence can achieve. If we
attempt to know everything about everything all the time ... we will fail
Rather,
and dominate those portions of the 'commons' that
are integral to our priority objectives. The key is to be selective and to prioritize our

the key

is

our

to focus

efforts

needs." 7

The "see, understand, share" paradigm offered by Rear Admiral Joseph L.
Nimmich, US Coast Guard, provides a means to multiply the effectiveness of the
focused efforts Admiral Jacoby suggests the intelligence community must pursue.
Sharing what is known and understood with all who are stakeholders in ensuring
maritime security (federal, state and local governments; agencies of foreign governments; industry partners; etc.) "empowers each player and fosters unity of effort in

dozens of ways.

thority, experience

.

and

.

.

This enables each to bring the

expertise to the overall effort."

This panel recognized that
teractions will best

full

force of its unique au-

8

new kinds of partnerships involving new kinds of in-

meet the requirements

to see, understand

and share knowledge

about the maritime domain and other areas of the global commons. Admiral
Jacoby noted with appreciation the close partnership that has to exist between intelligence professionals

and

legal

counsel

throughout the intelligence process.

It

—

a partnership that

"must be

in place

must begin with the development of the

plan and continue throughout the operation. That partnership needs to be part of
the overall plan.

Nimmich noted
will

can't be attached at the

It

that true awareness

end if it is to be

effective." 9

Rear Admiral

and understanding of the maritime domain

only be achieved through a partnership of

many government

agencies

and

through the dissemination of information between agencies and other stakeholders. 10

Professor Allen also recognized the need for
multilateral

and interagency, combined and

by

who have

all

those

maritime security
Security Initiative

new sorts

joint,

and

that involve shared efforts

a stake in global maritime security.

initiatives

and

risk-specific

of partnerships that are

"The advent of regional

approaches

like the Proliferation

may portend the new modalities that will replace command and

control approaches." 11 But Professor Allen also sounds a cautionary note for legal

who advise maritime strategists and policymakers, particularly when
the strategists advocate unique and undefined concepts such as "command of the
commons." "[C]ommand of the commons advocates must be alert to several key
12
legal limits on their sea command, control and denial strategies," and it is their legal advisers who must not hesitate to engage and alert them to these limits. Vice
Admiral John G. Morgan, Jr., US Navy, during his remarks, likewise encouraged
professionals

the legal professionals to engage actively and aggressively in seeking answers to the

many

questions that arise in the maritime context

xvi

—how

to respect claimed

Jane Gilliland Dalton

exclusive

economic zones, how to patrol those zones and determine what

are authorized within them,

and how

activities

to maintain "unfettered" access to the

world's oceans.
In advocating creative partnerships to enable policymakers
gists to see,

security strate-

understand and share their knowledge about threats emanating from

commons,

the global

and

the moderator

and

panelists for this first panel

repeatedly to the theme of the two keynote speakers

complex and global

issues

must be addressed by

peting forces and competing interests.

The need

all

—the imperative

striking a balance
for security in the

returned

that these

between commaritime do-

main must be balanced with the need for freedom of movement and action there;
the need for information must be balanced with the impossibility of knowing everything about such vast areas; and the need for command and control must be
balanced with the need to work cooperatively with others who have interests in
those same areas. As Rear Admiral Nimmich noted during his remarks, what is required is a change from a "need to know" culture to a "need to share" culture, from
operating on a national basis to operating on a global basis. These challenges will
the oceans, airspace, outer space and
face those operating in the global commons
cyberspace now and into the future.

—

—

Threats from the Global

Commons: Closing Gaps and Seams

—

The second panel of the conference, "Command of the Commons The International Perspective," carried forward the themes of balance and partnership and
provided an international perspective on how best to close the gaps and seams that
exist in our ability to effectively counter threats from and in the global commons.
Based on a rich discussion of several specific issues, this panel identified a number
of "gaps and seams" in the current legal regime and developed a mosaic of practical
suggestions for those concerned about security in the maritime domain and in the
global

commons

as a whole.

Professor Stuart Kaye highlighted the considerable legal authorities that nations

have

at their disposal to protect their ports, their

attack.

He

shipping and their nationals from

surveyed several recent international conventions and protocols that

have enhanced the authorities available to port, coastal and

flag States.

Yet he cau-

tioned that "States have yet to create protection for the totality of activities that take
place

beyond the

territorial sea.

Adequate jurisdictional mechanisms

to ensure an

on submarine cables and undersea pipelines do not exist, nor does it appear there are international efforts in progress to remedy the situation." 13 Professor Kaye's theme is that international law provides States with the
tools necessary to respond to these threats, but States must move cooperatively to
effective response to attacks

xvn

Preface

actually put in place legal measures designed to protect
lines

submarine cables and pipe-

from terrorist threats, and to better cooperate in sharing data and intelligence.

Rear Admiral Jorge Balaresque, Chilean Navy

(Ret.),

and Professor Francisca

Moller offered the Chilean "Mar Presential" as a precedent for the recent

US Mari-

Domain Awareness strategy. Consistent with the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea and freedom of navigation rights on the high seas, the Mar
time

Presential represents Chile's efforts to protect national interests

economic

activities that

and take part

in

contribute to national development. Quoting the Chilean

Defense White Book, these panelists explained that
to be present in this part of the high seas with the

" [t]his

concept expresses the will

aim of projecting maritime inter-

regarding the rest of the international community, watch over the environ-

ests

ment, preserve the natural resources, with exact adherence to International Law." 14

But they also

stress that

mere presence is not enough. Like Professor Kaye, they rec-

ommended more multilateral cooperation to create a legal regime that addresses a
problem

particular

—

regime that would make proliferation of

in this case, a legal

weapons of mass destruction

a global crime, like slavery or piracy.

Professor Yann-huei Song discussed

maritime cooperation by the

some very encouraging developments

littoral States

in

of the Strait of Malacca. Since July 2004,

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have launched the Malsindo Coordinated Patrol

(MCP) program

(routine sea

zations of these three States)
Strait) to

and

air patrols

and "Eyes

by the maritime security organi-

in the Sky" (air patrols over the

Malacca

among several other multilateral
response to the increasing demand

curb piracy and increase security. These,

bilateral initiatives,

from Malacca
tive

and

were undertaken in

Strait user States

and the international community

for

more

effec-

law enforcement measures to deal with the problem of piracy and possible

maritime

terrorist attacks.

The

tripartite patrol is

portunities for the international
to assist.

community to

"an open arrangement with op-

and India has offered

participate"

15

Yet there are numerous gaps and seams that require more effective multilateral
cooperation: cross-border hot pursuit, maritime patrols in each other's territorial
seas,

and sharing information and

and seams

still exist, it

intelligence.

When considering why those gaps

becomes apparent that sovereignty must become an enabler

of security, not a barrier to

it.

Professor Song quoted the secretary- general of the

International Maritime Organization,

who noted

gard to the question of security versus sovereignty
fully respect the sensitivity

States

of any State over the

September 2005: "[w]ith

in
.

.

.

,

while

issue,

I

nity and their international engagements.

own

can understand and

also believe that, whilst

have the right of non-interference in their internal

concurrent responsibilities towards their

I

re-

affairs,

they also have

people, the international

commu-

Whatever the answer to this, there can be

xvin

.
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no excuse

for inactivity,

future possibility."

whether the danger

is

clear

and present or perceived

Sovereignty was also a dominant issue in Professor Bakhtiyar
analysis of the

as a

16

Tuzmukhamedov's

2006 Russian Federation law, "On Counteracting Terrorism." "In a

conspicuous departure from the Soviet-era

official

and doctrinally strict,

row, interpretation of the right of self-defense, Russian
increasingly been indicating that

it

i.e.,

officials have, since

nar-

2002,

might be permissible to use armed force against

extraterritorial sources of imminent threat to

Russian security, even in the absence

of an actual armed attack originating from those sources." 17 The law appears to be

aimed,
gia,

coming from the Pankissi Gorge in Georbelieve to be "an area where Georgian law and

at least in part, at potential threats

an area some Russian

order was nonexistent."

18

officials

Professor

Tuzmukhamedov

by its terms, contemplates preemptive actions
essarily

imminent. Whatever the

letter

analyzed whether the law,

to deal with threats that are not nec-

of the law, however, some, such as Defense

Minister Sergey Ivanov, appear to believe the spirit of the law provides sufficient

grounds for "unilateral and preemptive" use of force against
foreign

soil. If that is so,

Professor

terrorist targets

on

Tuzmukhamedov poses a provocative question:

"As more nations, some of them bearing enormous might, submit that they would
use armed force in self-defense not only to react to an actual attack, but also to pre-

empt imminent
it

assault, or

even prevent

it

from materializing

in the future,

would

not give impetus to claims that a customary rule of international law has already

been conceived?" 19
Professor

Yoram Dinstein,

occurring in that part of the

in his remarks, identified

commons known

computer network attacks

as cyberspace as a relatively

new

method of warfare and an area that represents a lacuna in the law. A computer network attack does not appear to fulfill the generally accepted requirement that an
"attack" constitute an act of "violence." 20 Thus, with respect to the jus ad helium (or

law governing the resort to

force), the crucial question

work attack by itself can amount to an "armed attack"
cle 51

of the United Nations Charter.

is

as

whether a computer net-

contemplated under Arti-

Of course, the Security Council, acting under

Chapter VII of the Charter, can determine that any act, including a computer net-

work attack,

constitutes a threat to the peace.

However, absent a Security Council

determination, the question arises whether a computer network attack against a
State can trigger a lawful forcible response in individual or collective self-defense

under Article 5 1
Yet, in addition to serving as a

emy and

otherwise disrupt

its

method to gather intelligence or to blind

the en-

communications, a computer network attack can

also

produce devastating and deadly

trol

of an opponent's computer network (such as by launching the opponent's

effects if a belligerent party gains actual

xix
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missiles against

its

own assets, opening the sluices of dams to cause a flood, or even

causing a meltdown of the adversary's nuclear power reactors). Further, identifying the party actually responsible for a computer network attack can be time con-

suming and fraught with
attack

from an

difficulties.

ostensible source

is

very dangerous, for a terrorist organization

could use a computer network attack

work

—with

a

Hence, responding promptly to such an

—through

a third party's

computer

view to inducing State A to respond against State B, which

is

net-

actually

an innocent party.

On the whole, concluded Professor Dinstein, the computer network attack issue
is

complex, the

behind

possibilities are

in their study of the full

enormous and

international lawyers are decidedly

dimensions of this new phenomenon. In truth, the

same could be said about all the gaps and seams identified by these panelists. There
is much work to be done to close them and the lawyers who advise policymakers
and operational experts can play

a

major

role in shaping appropriate solutions.

The Military and the Media: Shaping the Public Debate
The second day of the conference
municate one's

dealt with

communications

legal theories, policies, strategies

situations to a public that

best to counter a "pithy

is

and goals

—how

in these

accustomed to instant access and instant

sound

understand and convey. The

bite"

first

on an

comvery complex
best to

analysis:

how

issue that requires pages of analysis to

panel of the day, "Public Perceptions and the

Law," concluded that public discourse today is marked by "more heat than light." 21

Though

the panelists differed concerning

creating that equation, they

who bears the

unanimously agreed that

all

greatest responsibility for

stakeholders have an im-

portant role to play in shaping improvements.
U.S.

News

& World Report senior writer Linda Robinson commended the mili-

tary for adopting "effective policies that help provide
battlefield, senior officials

news media with

access to the

and other events and voices that merit coverage." 22 Pro-

viding more access and information assists the press in producing "better informed

and more in-depth coverage and

analysis." 23 It

is

then incumbent upon the media

to conduct the necessary sustained research to enable only the

most accurate and

unbiased reporting. Professor Harvey Rishikof looked to the courts to help pierce
the "fog of confusion"
essary balance

on some of these complex legal

among leaks, information flow,
24

issues

and

to strike the nec-

national security, the First

Amend-

The resolution of some of these contentious issues
will help shape the debate for the future, hopefully in a more calm and studied
manner, and may inform the public more accurately on these complex legal

ment and

the right to know.

matters.
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Colonel James

P. Terry,

US Marine Corps

media to work together to find practical solutions to areas of friction
"

tion between the two.

[O] ur ultimate quest

and the

(Ret.), called for the military

communica-

in

must be how can we maintain a vibrant,

robust freedom of expression while protecting the nation's capacity to fight our

wars

effectively."

25

Colonel Terry challenged the media to make a more concerted

effort to

understand and to explain the

between

"terrorists"

actively

and

and why
the

and "insurgents," how

women and

such as the difference

a civilian family providing safe

haven for a

who

children

directly in support of combat activities themselves

participate

become combatants,

home

terrorist in its

subjects

26

home to a loss of protected status. As Ms. Robinson pointed out, " [t] he public

policy debate

what

is

would

greatly benefit

an extremely complicated

Professor Robert
it is

legal issues involved,

possible to

F.

from more sustained

efforts to

conflict that has eluded easy answers." 27

Turner recalled that the Vietnam conflict demonstrated that

win every major battle and nevertheless

lose a

called "political struggle." Professor Turner, in his remarks,

rance

—including

critically

is

if the

enemy de-

noted that having the

important to Americans and their widespread igno-

that of members of the legal profession

of armed conflict

war

through propaganda, public diplomacy or what Leninists

stroys the national will

moral high ground is

understand

a major impediment.

The

—about

principle that

applicable laws

enemy combatants

maybe lawfully detained without charge for the duration of the hostilities is lost on
many. While public and media education about the law of armed
as relevant constitutional

and statutory law)

equally important that the government
ligations

this support, the

is

a

important to

and the armed

under international law. Public support

tained conflict and the media

maintain

is

is

conflict (as well

this process,

forces strive to

crucially

it is

obey their ob-

important in every sus-

primary source of information for the public. To

country needs to have moral authority on

its

side and,

when mistakes are made, needs to be honest and open and promptly correct them.
The major theme and lesson learned from this first panel on communications
was that all those involved the media, the judiciary, the government, the armed

—

forces, the lawyers
lic

—must make

who

advise these organizations

a concerted effort to fully

to accurately appreciate

and convey the

and

institutions,

understand the

full

and the pub-

legal issues involved

and

extent of the legal complexities as they

address the issues. Recalling State Department legal adviser John Bellinger's lun-

cheon remarks,

it is

imperative that

Strategic

The second panel on

all

engage in a "more balanced discussion."

Communications: Converging on a Message

this topic,

"Challenges of Strategic Communications," very

quickly identified a primary lesson for policymakers, legal advisers and those

xxi

who
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conduct operations

—the imperative

to have a single national process to

move with

singular purpose to promulgate a consistent message.

Rear Admiral Frank Thorp IV,

US Navy, likened this process to a symphony: ev-

ery element of national power, everything the government says and does,

must be

synchronized. The professional communicators alone cannot successfully direct

—

and those who carry out the policy must be involved. Policy and actions must agree, because inconsistency means failure. The
this process

the policymakers

greatest strategic

the

first

communication

The

place.

legal

ensure that the policy
those

who

challenge, however,

community's

is

role

is

legally sustainable

to create

is

good policy

in

crucial to the success of this effort to

and supportable and

to ensure that

carry out the policy are trained in their legal obligations. Rear Admiral

Thorp

identified three objectives essential to a successful

for the

Department of Defense. He suggests that the department must:

communications process
1 )

create a

comand 3)

"culture of communication" within the department; 2) develop a strategic

munication doctrine that defines

roles, responsibilities

and

relationships;

provide the military services and the combatant commanders with the necessary

them

resources to enable

to create the processes to properly

conduct

strategic

communications. Then, the Department of Defense must work with the other el-

ements of national power to coordinate information, themes, plans, programs

and

actions.

Professor

Gene

Bigler concurred that successful strategic

quire a unified process.

simply getting
sages are in

all

He

communications

called this process "convergence,"

the messages

harmony with

on

the

which

is

re-

more than

same page, but involves insuring the mes-

people's expectations about those delivering the

messages.

Thus

it is

not just that the messages from the White House and

be consistent with those from the presidency, as that these
people's

expectations

all

DoS and DoD need to

need to harmonize with

about the actions and values that America represents.

Convergence, then, speaks to the coincidence between message and behavior in order

communications to achieve the persuasive capacity or provide the

to enable strategic

desirable model.

28
.

.

.

Particularly given the complexity of legal issues
Bigler suggested that the

and lawyerly discourse, Professor

Departments of State and Defense must present a more

balanced and unified message, one that takes into account the audience's capacity
to understand the issues

and

its

expectations of the values for which the United

States stands.

Brigadier General Mari K. Eder,

concern that too often "the

US Army, echoed this

US Government
xxii

sentiment by expressing

sends 'mixed messages' or

fails

to

Jane Gilliland Dalton

clearly

and consistently communicate policy." 29 Brigadier General Eder repeatedly

stressed the

need to forge a more

resilient partnership

sionals, warfighters, policymakers,

United States to communicate

its

among public affairs profes-

even the private sector, to better enable the

policies quickly

and effectively in

a

way that reso-

nates with the intended audiences. Likewise, Rear Admiral Michael A. Brown,

Navy, espoused "an

through

cally

sponsibility

agile

and coordinated approach both horizontally and

of government.

all levels

US

verti-

We can no longer focus on single areas of re-

—every action or inaction has the potential

to be global in nature." 30

Rear Admiral Brown also stressed the importance of developing a rapid response
system: "Slow

'official'

even-

is

We must plan from the beginning with an effects-based model de-

tually released.

rived

response damages credibility and undermines what

from our

strategic goals." 31

Professor Craig Allen's article in this volume, concerning the conference's

panel on

"Command

of the

Commons,"

envisions a worst-case scenario where the

synchronized strategic communications process

falls

out of sync. In his example, an

communications plan, lacking appropriate

ill-advised

first

legal

and policy

contexts,

could result in unanticipated negative reactions from the international community.

He suggests that just as the US Navy uses war games to analyze the efficacy and viability
of various

political

and military

too could war games be used to analyze

strategies, so

whether a strategic communications plan

is,

in fact, synchronized with a singular pur-

pose to convey a consistent and appropriate message. Decisionmakers could subject
a catchphrase such as

"command of the commons" to

red-teaming to

understanding the possible reactions worldwide to such a statement.
suggestion, resulting

32

assist

them

in

This practical

from the dialogue among the conference participants and pan-

how the three major topics of the conference are connected and
learned in one area of global challenge may have benefit for

elists,

demonstrates

how

lessons

policymakers and the operational forces responsible for

activities in

other areas.

Disaster Response: Harmonizing Legal Structures

The

fifth

and

itself could

last

panel of the conference, "Global Disasters," tackled an area that

dominate an

The

entire conference.

issues involved are so

complex, so

urgent and, unfortunately, so intractable that one wonders whether there will ever

be a coherent

legal structure capable

stricken country

of meeting the needs of both the disaster-

and those seeking to provide

in other panels arose again in this context

—

relief.

Many of the themes discussed

that assertions of national sovereignty

often prevent effective and rapid response, that unity of command
give precedence to unity of effort.

mon

The law

as

must

inevitably

an enabler of operations was a com-

theme, though more often than not the various legal structures

xxin

(local,
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national and international) are not harmonized to optimize the

number of lives

amount of suffering relieved. And within the United States and throughout the international community there is considerable debate whether the military
saved or

is

the

most appropriate organization

and policy reasons. This debate

legal

similar to that concerning the proper role of the

is

"command"

commons, where

Fisher, of the International Federation of Red Cross

and Red Crescent

communications and

and policy considerations

Mr. David

both

of the

military in strategic
similar legal

to provide disaster assistance, for

Societies, explained that despite the

global, regional

and bilateral levels

in

arise.

number of international instruments

—and important non-binding

—

guidelines,

at the

models

and codes, there still is no coherent international disaster relief system. As a result, legal obstacles to the entry

toring, coordination

and operation of international

relief often exist

and regulation of international aid

These problems bedevil not only those seeking to provide

is

and moni-

generally inadequate.

relief to

underdeveloped

parts of the world but also prevented the delivery of humanitarian aid to the United
States in the aftermath of

Hurricane Katrina. 33 The island nation of Fiji, however,

proves that progress can be made. After
tory structure for international

few coordination problems.

34

relief,

Fiji

established a detailed legal

and regula-

subsequent disaster operations experienced

Fortunately, international disaster relief

where lawyers can take and are taking the lead

is

an area

to bring coherence to the process.

The International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent is to take up a series of recommendations on these issues in November 2007 and the United Nations International Law Commission has placed the "protection of persons in natural disasters" on its long-term program of work. 35
Speaking as one whose nation had recently experienced a disaster of global magnitude, Brigadier General Ikram ul Haq of Pakistan reflected on the institutional
and informational vacuums that resulted immediately after the October 2005
earthquake. 36 A lesson learned from that experience is that those vacuums could be
more effectively managed if mechanisms were already in place in the form of
peacetime agreements with friends and allies. Such agreements could address not
only the specific capabilities that a particular nation could bring to the

but also could establish procedures and schedules for joint
ercises. Brigadier

General ul

Haq

mock disaster relief ex-

also suggested that a "multinational

share disaster relief and recovery experiences"

who have

relief effort,

forum

to

would be helpful in enabling nations

suffered such disasters to learn through others' experiences. 37

Lieutenant Colonel Evan Carlin, Australian Defence Force, observed firsthand
the difficulties in monitoring, coordinating and regulating international relief efforts after the
tralian,

2004 Boxing Day tsunami in Indonesia.

Singaporean and American military

xxiv

A primary concern of Aus-

relief forces, a

concern unfortunately
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not shared by

providers, was "to ensure that the relief effort

all relief

dance with Indonesian
" stated

required

priorities.

." 38
.

.

"Indonesians

Lieutenant Colonel Carlin.

39

was

in accor-

knew best what Indonesians

Like Brigadier General ul Haq, he

emphasized the importance of sharing information. Those involved in the
forts

relief ef-

needed to know "the progress of the mission, road conditions, security con-

cerns, aid priorities, bottlenecks
greater, challenge

and expectations." 40 But an important, and even

was to inform the

vent well-intended but misguided

rest

of the world of Indonesian needs, to pre-

efforts.

Both Captain Kurt Johnson, JAGC,

US Navy, and Mr. Gus Coldebella of the US

Department of Homeland Security reinforced the importance of coordination and
cooperation in arriving
uation and addressed

and coordinating

at practical solutions to pressing

some of the

relief efforts.

speed of communications
character,

all

disasters to
ble.

disasters are

gives almost

The National Response

first

that, while the

local.

The US approach

work together. Given

Plan, adopted only eight short

mented

on

the plan before the plan actually

in a disaster. Further,

least for a time, there

was no

nate federal assistance, which caused

to be impleat

apparatus to request, accept and coordi-

initial difficulties.

Response Plan contemplated such a situation,

it

But because the National

allowed federal assets to be

moved

for a state request.

Captain Johnson elaborated on a theme

and discussed by other

had

oppor-

little

Hurricane Katrina caused a situation in which,

state or local

where needed without waiting

for

months before Hurriand local governments

the plan's adoption date, however, there was

tunity for exercises based

is

instance at the lowest jurisdictional level possi-

cane Katrina struck, provides the structure for federal, state
to

nature and

large natural disasters a "global"

all

profoundly and basically

be handled in the

disaster sit-

challenges involved in monitoring, regulating

Mr. Coldebella observed

now

problems in a

panelists

first

introduced by Secretary McHale

from an international perspective

—the proper

role of the military in providing disaster response. His analysis of the various do-

mestic laws involved clarified the careful legal analysis that will be required, based

on the specific facts of each situation, to determine the Department of Defense role
and authorities in the wake of future major natural disasters. He also acknowledged
that challenges attended the acceptance of international assistance, such as medical
credentials for international medical personnel,

regulations concerning food

from foreign

rules for the use of force that foreign troops

Department of Agriculture food

nations, gift acceptance authority

on

the

ground were

to employ.

and

41

The harmonization of legal structures in the disaster relief area will be complicated and time consuming. It will require efforts at the international, national and
local levels, and must be tailored to accommodate the governmental system, cultural mores and social priorities of each country. Lawyers, policymakers and those
xxv
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who

on developing coordination and unity of
effort rather than seeking unity of command. The appropriate role of the military
should be addressed, as well as the most effective way to monitor, coordinate and
regulate the provision of aid from the international community. Sovereignty concerns should be proactively harnessed to facilitate the rapid and comprehensive decarry out the policies should focus

livery of relief, rather

than serving as a barrier thereto. In this area of global

challenge the law truly can serve as an enabler of all that
to

mankind. Lawyers can, and should, take the lead

and

local leadership to constructive

and

is

desirable

and beneficial

in this area to guide national

creative solutions.
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Domestic Security and Maintenance of Liberty:
Striking the Balance

Paul McHale*
Introduction

We

have seen extraordinary changes in the role of the military within do-

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 created the office that I now hold. The statutory
mission assigned to the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense was
and is to supervise all of the homeland defense activities of the Department of
mestic American society since September 11, 2001.

—

Defense. In short, to supervise the domestic role of the
the warfighting defense of the United States
tivities
ties.

of the Department of Defense

That

is

a sobering mission.

and the consequence management ac-

when providing support

It reflects

to civilian authori-

the intent of Congress to bring a special

paramount security considerassociated with the immediate defense of the American people. It is a mis-

geographic focus to the department that
ations

US military, to include both

sion that sobers

me

reflects the

every morning.

Constitutional Principles

When I was asked to take this position I thought seriously about the role of the military within

domestic society, the historic and statutory constraints upon that role

and the appropriate opportunity within the boundaries of those constraints
* Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Homeland

Defense.

for the

—
Domestic Security and Maintenance of Liberty: Striking the Balance

US armed

forces to

people.

required

It

ernment and the

make

me

a contribution to the physical security of the

to re-examine

effective protection

some

first

American

principles of constitutional gov-

of civilian democratic principles so deeply

embedded in our US Constitution.
With that as motivation, I returned to the Federalist papers. I served three terms
in the House of Representatives in the 1990s. When I left the House, I decided to
read the Federalist papers in their entirety. Like

had read portions
eighty-five

—

Federalist 10

from beginning

and

many

Federalist 51

political science majors,

—but

I

had never read

I

all

to end.

think most of you participating in this conference are familiar to at least

some
degree with the Federalist papers. For those of you in the international community
who may not be familiar with them, just let me briefly set the stage. Over the summer of 1787 the Constitution of the United States was written in the city of Philadelphia. The framers of the Constitution finished their work in September 1787.
Then the question became whether or not the required nine of the original thirteen
states would ratify the framers' work. As in any political context there was serious
debate, on this occasion between the federalists and the anti- federalists. That debate was carried on in the newspapers of the day. Between the time of the completion of the draft and the ultimate ratification of the Constitution, Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay principally Hamilton and Madison
wrote eighty-five op-ed pieces. Those commentaries were ultimately bound together into the published work that we know today as The Federalist}
There are legal scholars who believe that The Federalist may be the finest work
I

—

of legal literature ever written in the English language.

Chapman

Bernard Schwartz,
Tulsa,

came up with

his

list

language; at the top of the
far,
I

A few years ago Professor

Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of

of the top ten legal books ever written in the English

list

was The Federalist. 2 I'm not sure

that

I

would go

that

but I knew when I retired from Congress I wanted to read the Federalist papers.

knew that the only way in which I would have the discipline to do

volunteered to teach a course on the Federalist papers

at

so

would be

one of the colleges

in

if I

my

hometown. So I returned to Pennsylvania and taught a course on the Federalist papers for a year or so staying about three papers ahead of the students and developing

my expertise in explaining their meaning.

Federalist Paper

No. 8

talks

the borders of our nation;

Hamilton's words

I

it is

with specificity about the role of the military within
a cautionary message.

When

thought they were an anachronism.

I first

read Alexander

He was concerned that the

role of the military would

become too intrusive within domestic American society.

He

were to be too powerful the character of our nation and

feared that

if

that role

.
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would be adversely affected. Those fears
were expressed in the following words (to which I have added my own thoughts):
the core principles of the Constitution

most powerful director of national conduct. Even the
way to its dictates. The violent destruction
of life and property incident to war [think September 11], the continual effort and
alarm attendant on a state of continual danger [think al-Qaeda], will compel nations
the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have
a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length
Safety from external danger

is

the

ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give

become willing

run the

to

risk

of being

less free.

3

Later in Federalist 8 he talks very specifically about the
that,

I

think,

was

at the Federalist

prescient.

US military in a manner

When I studied government in college and first looked

papers and

first

considered the role of the military,

was concern among our founders related to

I

knew

there

The implication
was that a large standing army would by brute force impose military values upon a
civilian government and a republican Constitution. The force of arms would be
a large standing army.

seen as the danger.

That

is

not the rationale of Federalist 8

more nuanced.

It is

not about brute force;

in order to achieve security.

—

it's

it is

much more

sophisticated,

about the choice to

much

sacrifice liberty

Hamilton wrote about nations that are

internally se-

cure from external attack, as opposed to nations which remain internally subject to

The twenty-first-century reality, at least from
our perspective within the Department of Defense, is that the United States is now
an inherent, integrated element of a global battlespace from the vantage point of
transnational terrorists. 4 Indeed, I think it could be argued successfully that, from
foreign attack; again think al-Qaeda.

the terrorist standpoint,
intent

is

we are the pre-eminent element

not to achieve victory through a war of attrition but to bring brutality into

the internal confines of the United States.
citizens,

of that battlespace. Their

By bringing death and destruction to our

they believe they can affect our political will. Well short of success in terms

of attrition, they believe they can shape our political conscious by acts of brutality

and

if

they can succeed in engaging in such acts within the United States they will

have achieved pre-eminent success.

Alexander Hamilton wrote of nations that must fear that kind of internal attack
versus those that are relatively secure within a domestic setting. Let
in reverse order the

way Hamilton

did.

He wrote,

a

[t]here

is

me take those

a wide difference

between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to
ternal invasions.
States during the

." 5
.

.

Cold

A

there was

tory. In this, the first case, the civil state

little

.

in-

would be the United
danger of attack upon our terri-

recent example of such a country

War when

.

remains in

full vigor:
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The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community an
overmatch for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for
protection, or to submit to

them with

its

oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view

a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary

evil.

6
.

.

.

Hamilton then goes on to address, by contrast, the state of a nation that is "often
subject to

September

and always apprehensive of them." 7 Since
2001 we in the United States, on a daily basis, remain uncertain as a

them
11,

[internal invasions],

matter of harsh reality as to
terrorist adversaries

when and under what circumstances our transnational

might again

strike us internally.

Three thousand people were

on our own soil on September 1 1th. Another attack could conceivably occur
tomorrow so we remain subject to that continuing threat. Describing a nation in
that circumstance, Hamilton wrote (again with the insertion of my thoughts):
killed

In a country, in the predicament

last

described, the contrary of

all this

happens. The

perpetual menacings of danger [al-Qaeda] oblige the government to be always

The continual necessity for their services enhances the
importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen.
The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants ... are unavoidably
subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense
of those rights; and by degrees, the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only
as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of
considering them as masters, is neither remote, nor difficult. But it is very difficult to
prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold, or effectual resistance,
8
to usurpations, supported by the military power.
prepared to repel

>

it.

.

.

.

Hamilton's concern was that if we allowed ourselves to get to the point where we

were disproportionately dependent upon the military for internal security then we

would become the saviors of society and citizens would no longer
government to provide for their physical security. The citizenry

in the military
trust civilian

would conclude, perhaps correctly, that only the military could provide for its internal security. Once that recognition occurred, the military would be seen as the
masters and, ultimately, the leaders and superiors of society. In short, not brute
force but rather the voluntary relinquishment of the civilian character of our gov-

ernment would

raise the role

of the military disproportionately and ultimately

threaten the civilian character of our Constitution.

It

would not be by force but by

choice that the character of our nation would change because of the core mistake of

allowing a disproportionate dependence
rather than a core dependence
ties to

upon military power for internal security,

upon civilian law enforcement and civilian capabili-

guarantee that same security.
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Striking the Balance

Those were sobering thoughts
which

I

now

serve

for

me when I was nominated

and

civilian

within our

government and

consider the roles of the mili-

civilian capabilities

own borders. Obviously when we begin
power projection and the

sues in terms of

me and

and those have remained sobering thoughts guiding

many others with whom I work. On a daily basis we
tary

for the position in

when

achieving security

to address national security is-

enemy

ability to take the fight to the

overseas, the role of the military historically has been dominant. In

my judgment

When we seek out terrorists and their supporters in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, men and women in military uniform are at the vanguard of our
nation's effort to achieve physical security. We send men and women in the armed

that

is

correct.

forces forward in a lead role to engage the

But within our

enemy and

defeat such

own country, it remains an issue of constant,

remain loyal and committed to the preservation of the

enemy

attacks.

sobering judgment to

of our

civilian character

government and the democratic nature of our Constitution, and, within that
ance, properly

employ the

while ensuring

it

thority,

which

military in a

that will

enhance our

remains ultimately subordinate to clear and decisive

in turn will ensure the civilian character of our

the nature of the challenge. There are

within our

manner

own

many things we

security,

civilian au-

government. That

is

can do with military power

borders in order to achieve the security of the American people

while not endangering the civilian character of our Constitution. But that

continuing issue of sober assessment.
forces to missions that should

the military within our

could achieve,

bal-

we will,

We

is

a

ought not blindly commit military

remain inherently

civilian in character. If

own borders for every mission that the
in fact, tip the balance towards security

we

use

military in theory

and pay a price

in

terms of liberty.
Thus, the question becomes

my

remarks

will

how do you

touch upon certain

The remainder of
of operational activity where

strike that balance?

specific areas

there are significant legal implications. But as

I

go through these challenges, both

operational and legal, in each and every case

I

urge you to consider them in the

continuing context of that balance between security and liberty and between the
role of the military

and the

role of civilian

government within the boundaries of

domestic American society. Underlying the determination of that balance

is

the

overarching requirement that those roles be consistent with the civilian core principles of the

US

Constitution.
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Homeland Security

—

—

became operationally clear indeed it was instinctively obvious that in light of
the attack we had experienced on September 1 1th there was a need for enhanced
It

physical security within the borders of our nation; the

do so

again.

The Department of Defense,

enemy had struck and might

acting with operational prudence, created

rapid reaction forces that could act within our

own country. US Army and Marine

Corps forces, in a classified number, were placed on alert for potential domestic de-

ployment of military force
clear that

in order to defeat a follow-on al-Qaeda attack.

It

was

having struck us once the enemy might strike us again and that there was

a role for military

When I was

power

in defeating

such a foreign attack on our

soil.

homeland defense
and began to exercise the responsibilities and authority of supervising the homeland defense activities of the Department of Defense, I determined that having
rapid reaction Army and Marine Corps ground forces on alert for domestic deconfirmed

as assistant secretary of defense for

ployment was a reasonable course of action. But
constitutional?"

as a lawyer

the ground deployment of US

Is

Posse Comitatus Act of 1878?

9

How

asked myself,

I

Army forces

do we deploy

consistent with the

on our own

soldiers

"Is that

soil in a

when to do so may potentially conflict
with the posse comitatus statute? 10 How do we reconcile the need to defend against
mariner consistent with the Constitution

another potential al-Qaeda attack with the Constitution and the law?
I

know

there are individuals in the audience today

today an extremely close friend and
State

—

States.

I

am

ally

of the United

not going to say which one

Those ground forces

left,

shall

from

States.

we

say, a lasting

at

defend our

forces to the United

impact upon the Capitol
capital,

US Marines were

Bladensburg, Maryland to defend against that attack.

quite as successful as

own

we hoped we would be, but we

soil

utilized

US

We were

American

lives

not

military forces to

under the same Constitution with which we

against a foreign attack in order to save

is

But in 1812 that nation-

—deployed ground

of our nation. While those forces were en route to the

employed

a nation- State that

live

today

and defend American

property.

The Constitution has not fundamentally changed
Constitution provides "The President shall be

Navy of the United

States.

."
.

.

in that regard. Article 2 of the

commander in

chief of the

u That executive power remains

Army and

essentially the

same

today as it was 1814 when the defense of the capital occurred. As I thought it through,
I

turned to the

US Army's Domestic Operational Law Handbook where
12

I

read about

The Military Purpose Doctrine states that the Posse
Comitatus Act does not apply to those missions which are being executed primarily for a military purpose. The use of force for purposes other than arrest, search

the Military Purpose Doctrine.

8
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and

seizure

is

not proscribed by posse comitatus.

When

those Marines were de-

ployed in Bladensburg in 1814 they weren't there to arrest anybody and

when we

wake of September 11th the purpose was
not law enforcement but warfighting on our own soil as it had taken place during
the War of 1 8 1 2 and, some would argue, as Lincoln exercised that power during the
established quick reaction forces in the

War.

Civil

our own

It

was not that the power was not

soil for a military

that the Military

it

was that we had not used it on

purpose in quite a long time. But I personally concluded

Purpose Doctrine allows us to have

continue to have them on

alert

—prepared

United States to defend, for instance,

power

there;

for

Army units on alert

—and we

ground deployment within the

critical infrastructure,

perhaps a nuclear

plant, against a transnational terrorist threat.

We do not anticipate, however, that the first several layers of our defense against
a foreign attack on our own soil would be military in character. We emphasize that
the primary dependence

is

upon

civilian

law enforcement. But

if federal, state

and

local

law enforcement authorities and ultimately the National Guard cannot physi-

cally

defend American citizens against a foreign threat on our

tary

Purpose Doctrine and consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act, we do have

soil,

under the Mili-

quick reaction forces ready to be deployed, not for purposes of law enforcement,

but for purposes of warfighting under Article 2 of the Constitution in defense of
the

American people.
Responding to Natural Disasters

Having considered and addressed the use of military forces

we then encountered

US

for defensive purposes,

the issue of the utilization of US military capabilities within

borders in the event of a natural disaster. Hurricane Katrina emphasized the

challenges associated not with warfighting but the statutory authority related to in-

cident

management. Arguably the worst natural

disaster in

American history took

on August 29, 2005 when Hurricane Katrina came ashore along the Gulf
Coast. Nearly two thousand lives were lost; the damage is measured in the billions
of dollars. The performance of the US military in response to what were truly hor-

place

rific

circumstances was by most accounts superbly competent. That

that the response to catastrophic events cannot be
fact is that the military response to
est

fifty

10, the

not to say

improved upon, but the simple

Hurricane Katrina was arguably the largest,

deployment of military capabilities

tember

is

in

fast-

US history. Between August 29 and Sep-

United States deployed seventy- two thousand military personnel

thousand National Guardsmen, twenty-two thousand active duty

Gulf Coast to provide humanitarian

relief.

Out of that

—

to the

military response came,

I

believe, a significant respect for military capabilities, while simultaneously fairly
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harsh criticism was being directed, often with justification, towards some civilian
response authorities.

The discussion began immediately

thereafter as to the appropriate role of the

Stafford Act 13

and the

as well as other provisions of statutory law, provide the

Depart-

military in response to a catastrophic natural event.

Economy

Act,

14

ment of Defense authority to

assist a lead civilian

The

agency in responding to a natural

man-made event. The issue then becomes: if the military does well in
such circumstances, why not put the military in charge? That, again, raises some of
disaster or a

the issues that were

raised in Federalist

first

thoughtful discussion on that issue in a

We were

8.

President Bush sparked serious and

way that I think he consciously intended.

able to think through both the opportunities

and the challenges

associ-

ated with the use of military capabilities in providing such a response. There was
discussion in the media and at senior levels of government with regard to the possibility

of designating the Department of Defense as the lead federal agency replac-

on

ing, at least

a temporary basis, the

Department of Homeland Security

providing a federal response to a disaster. Then the lawyers got into the
I

in

act.

have learned something from the Department of Justice with regard to the

scope of the executive power under Article 2 of the Constitution and frankly it surprised me;

it

might not have surprised Hamilton and Madison but

The Department of Justice

in a series of opinions, the

goes back to 2002, concluded that

it

surprised me.

most fundamental of which

when the Congress of the United States assigns a

certain responsibility by statute to a particular cabinet-level department, the presi-

dent lacks the authority thereafter to re-delegate that responsibility from the designated agency to another. That theory of law came into play in preliminary analyses
of the issue of whether or not the authorities assigned to the Department of Homeland Security under the

Homeland

Security Act of 2002 15 could be re-delegated

the president to the Department of Defense.

including

some within

could not do

Some

by

very thoughtful legal scholars,

the Department of Justice, concluded that the president

that.

The Department of Homeland

Security has been uniquely

and

specifically as-

signed the responsibility as the lead federal agency in responding to catastrophic
events and in consequence

makes operational sense
ken on the

issue, in the

management

Whether or not it
because Congress had spo-

related to disasters.

to reassign that responsibility,

absence of follow-on congressional reconsideration of the

Homeland Security Act of 2002, it would appear,

at least for the

time being, that by

law the lead federal agency in responding to natural disasters must remain the De-

partment of Homeland Security.

As lawyers
fession

I

had on

ask you to consider what a profound impact the law and your proa significant public policy debate.
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The outcome of that

debate, at

Paul McHale

least in the first phase,

close the
will
is

was conclusively determined by legal

door on a more robust military

remain,

at least

role,

but

it

means

analysis.

That doesn't

that that military role

under current law, subordinate to a lead federal agency which

Whether or not one would agree with him,

civilian in character.

ander Hamilton would

The position of the

feel pretty

good about

suspect Alex-

that result.

Office of General Counsel of the

amend

I

Department of Defense

is

The Defense Department has concluded the act does not impede in any significant way the military
missions that the Department of Defense has been assigned to execute nor does the
act present an unreasonable impediment to foreseeable military missions within
the United States. Senator Warner and others have, from time to time, said as a
matter of due diligence and prudence that a statute drafted in the Reconstruction
that

we do not need

to

the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.

era perhaps ought to be re-examined for

its

continued

utility in

the vastly different

context of transnational terrorism of the twenty-first century.
I

believe without question the terminology of the Posse Comitatus Act

date.

We

found ourselves,

is

out of

for instance, in the aftermath of Katrina dealing with

on the streets of New Orleans. If we were to experience a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction, it is entirely possible that the social
chaos inevitably associated with such a catastrophic event would generate substancivil

disorder

tial civil

disorder. In those circumstances,

Posse Comitatus Act would

come

it

might well be that the principles of the

into play in terms of the use of Title 10 active-

duty military personnel in providing immediate protection of constitutional rights

and enforcement of federal statutes

in circumstances where, for a limited period of

time, civilian law enforcement authorities found themselves incapable of guaranteeing those constitutional rights or enforcing those federal statutes.

Counterterrorism

It is

those circumstances that authorize the federalization of the National

and the use of the armed

forces

under the Insurrection Act of 1807.

examine transnational terrorism
really dealing

16

Guard

But when we

we are not
At a minimum, we need to

in the context of the Insurrection Act,

with an insurrection as that act defines

it.

re-examine the archaic terminology of the Insurrection and the Posse Comitatus
acts in order to ensure that their

the threat that

language remains consistent with the character of

we face in the twenty-first century. The Defense Department's posi-

tion has been that the Posse Comitatus Act does not need to be substantively

amended, but that the terminology of both the Posse Comitatus and the Insurrection acts should be reconsidered in order to ensure the principles of law reflected in

those statutes remain relevant to the twenty-first-century threat.
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Can we

use the National

Guard

for domestic counterterrorism missions in

support of civilian law enforcement?

I

am

not certain the law

That too must be examined, probably by

point.

clear

is

legislative authorities.

on

that

Congress

about a year ago amended the law to provide that a joint task force (JTF) engaged
in counter-narcotic activities, typically along the borders of the

could engage in counterterrorism

was

law enforcement.

It

legislative history,

we

itary forces, like
activity in

a very brief

are

in that statutory change,

activities

still

United

States,

domestically in support of civilian

amendment

to the law.

With

virtually

no

trying to figure out the legislative intent reflected

now provides that Title 10 active-duty milPaso, Texas, may engage in counterterrorism

but the law

JTF North

in El

support of civilian law enforcement authorities. There

is

no analo-

gous provision of law empowering the National Guard to engage in similar missions.

As

a result,

we now have

a disparity in the

law in which

Title 10 forces

may

may

not,

on such counterterrorism missions, but National Guard
even though they may be colocated.
take

In the absence of other specific legislation,

we

forces

find ourselves straining, under

pre-existing authorities not particularly well suited to counterterrorism missions,
to

shoehorn what are

at least in

appearance and perhaps in substance counter-

terrorism activities into other statutory authority.

What

and deliberative manner,

dertaken, in a sober, serious

is

suggest needs to be un-

I

an

effort to better define the

counterterrorism mission assigned to Title 10 joint task forces and the parallel authority, if any,
activities in

granted to the National Guard to also engage in counterterrorism

support of civilian law enforcement.

Intelligence Support

Another

issue that I'm going to be unable to resolve in

pose for your consideration,
forces.

When

is

ment

for intelligence, as

is

own

the case for

all

military missions.

they had military intelligence requirements, such

how are

are they

moving towards our

as:

positions?

I

at

Where

armed

borders for certain

and force protection missions, there

Marines defended against those unnamed invading forces

By what means

but want to

intelligence support for domestic uses of the

military forces are used within our

warfighting, counterterrorism

my remarks,

is

suspect

a require-

when

those

Bladensburg in 1814

are the

enemy forces?

How many are there and

they equipped? In short, the information needed to better anticipate and

respond to the enemy

attack.

That requirement is

as necessary today as

it

was then. As we look at the domestic

warfighting responsibilities of both the Title 10 military forces and, under the recent statutory

amendment

to Title 32, the National Guard, the question arises,

12
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how, consistent with the
of domestic

civilian character

civil liberties,

of our government and the preservation

do we acquire the

intelligence information necessary to

no easy answer

support our domestic military missions? There

is

and determining the answer

judgment.

will require sober

We

to that question

in the military see

ourselves as consumers, not collectors, of domestic intelligence.
sees us as

consumers

strained, that

as well.

believe the law

There are provisions of the law, very

do allow certain military units, such

tary intelligence units

I

and general utility forces,

But, for reasons that are obvious

tightly con-

as counterterrorism units, mili-

to collect intelligence domestically.

and fundamental

to the character of

the role of the military in collecting domestic intelligence

is

our nation,

very tightly and, in

my

judgment, appropriately constrained.

The

military has statutory authority to collect domestic intelligence that relates

to anti-terrorism force protection.
earlier,

Our

terrorist adversaries

do

see, as

indicated

the United States as a part of the global battlespace. In the context of the

past precedent of the September

1 1

attacks

tack, anti-terrorism force protection

and a continuing threat of domestic

at-

requirements for the military have been

heightened as a military mission as a matter of immediacy.

The question to be considered is, given the force protection mission of conducting an active defense against the transnational terrorist threat within our borders

and given the parameters of existing statutory authority that allow us
telligence domestically for

such a purpose,

how do we bring to

that

to collect in-

framework an

appropriate degree of clarity and detail that both enables the successful intelligence

support of those military missions, while avoiding an intrusive and improper en-

gagement

in domestic intelligence collection activities

of the balance that

I

addressed earlier.

It is

by military

a balance that

sessment because of the nature of the threat that we

is

forces? It

is

part

subject to continuing as-

now face domestically and the

role of the military in defending against that threat.

Employment of Non-lethal Weapons
In response to Hurricane Katrina

we deployed

for either active or contingent

military missions about fifteen thousand security personnel.

personnel were deployed to the

Most of those military

New Orleans area. You may recall that about four

came ashore, the president deployed twenty-two thousand Title 10 military forces on a humanitarian mission. They were there in conformity with the Posse Comitatus Act and also available for service in anticipation
of invocation of the Insurrection Act if civil disorder had continued within New
Orleans. The soldiers from the Army's 82nd Airborne and 1st Calvary divisions
and Marines from the 1st and 2nd Marine divisions deployed to New Orleans for a
or five days after Katrina
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humanitarian mission. But they also established a military presence and were
missions

able, subject to presidential authority, for security

if

avail-

the president

had

chosen to invoke the Insurrection Act. In addition, we used seven thousand National

Guard

forces,

law enforcement
lice

who

actively

Fifteen

which were not subject

roles,

to the Posse

Comitatus Act, in direct

including over four thousand National

and lawfully engaged

in

Guard

law enforcement-related

military po-

activities.

thousand men and women in uniform were deployed in the aftermath of

Hurricane Katrina into an area of civil disorder, either directly engaged in security
missions or potentially engaged in such missions. They were neither trained in the
use of nor equipped with non-lethal weapons. In

and we need

from

my judgment that was a mistake
you will,

a

need to respond

to a larger catastrophic event, perhaps a terrorist attack involving

weapons of mass

destruction,

to learn

where

loss

that experience. Imagine,

of

life

if

and physical devastation might be

far

worse than

what we experienced during the very difficult and tragic days of Hurricane Katrina.

We

could and should anticipate

that, in the context

of related

civil

disorder, the

military may have a role to play and that role might include the use of lethal force.

But, again in

my judgment, we should not limit the range of options available to

our military commanders. Commanders on the ground should have the
to restore civil order, protect constitutional rights

and preserve

flexibility

federal statutory

authority with a proportionate degree of force which, in their determinations,

would be

sufficient to fulfill

sivity versus lethality.

sufficient in

mission requirements. The choice should not be pas-

We have non-lethal weapons in our inventory that would be

many circumstances to

sarily threatening the actual loss

maintain or restore

civil

order without neces-

of life.

Certainly the legal issues associated with that are profound. If we deploy soldiers
civil

on our own

disorder and

streets in a catastrophic

circumstance reflecting a character of

we do execute such a deployment for the purpose of preserving

if

constitutional rights, equal protection of the law for instance,

statutory authorities,

what

legal authority

and enforcing other

should be provided?

visions should be enacted in order to ensure the proper

What liability pro-

employment of such non-

lethal capabilities?
I

spoke

earlier

about

critical infrastructure protection. If

forces to protect critical infrastructure such as nuclear
tential al-Qaeda attacks,

we have

the

—microwave beams

life.

same circumstances with

for instance

Defending domestic

rifles

power plants

against po-

Some of those capabilities are quite well devel-

in terms of technology

without risking the loss of

use military

non-lethal capabilities those forces can employ

that are very high tech in character.

oped

we

—and can be used

critical infrastructure

and machine guns would pose obvious

under

risks to

the surrounding civilian community. But what are the public policy issues related
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weapon systems? What are the legal issues? What liability questions are created? What if we were to use interlocking microwave beams to defend a
nuclear power plant as a humane alternative to the use of deadly force, such as

to use of non-lethal

Ml 6s and

.50 caliber

machine guns?

Non-lethal weapon systems certainly have the potential to effectively defend
critical infrastructure. Lives,
nities,

could be saved through the use of such systems. But

that an innocent person
to

including innocent lives in the surrounding
it is

would be struck by a microwave beam.

commu-

almost inevitable

It

seems preferable

me to be struck by a beam as opposed to a bullet from an Ml 6, but what are the

liability issues?

with so

What are the public policy questions

many of the

need to be examined? As

that

questions involving the domestic use of military forces, inte-

gration of non-lethal

weapons

into use-of- force capabilities

must be preceded by

public debate and legislative deliberation. In that way we can develop a legal frame-

work

that properly supports the domestic use of non-lethal

weapons

as a

humane

alternative to lethal force.

Who's

in

Charge?

The Hurricane Katrina experience witnessed multiple layers of local, state and federal government authorities (civilian and military) involved in the response without clarity of intent and perhaps with some insensitivity to constitutional history. I
therefore ask the rather straightforward question, "Who's in charge?" I know there
are individuals in this audience from Israel. In Israel the answer to "who's in
charge" in responding to a disaster

is

pretty clear

—

it's

the Israeli Defence Force

When disaster occurs, the on-scene IDF commander is in charge.
I spent some time with the Home Front Command in Israel and have some fa-

(IDF).

miliarity with the system of government in Israel.

It is

a system that

is

not funda-

mentally federal in character.

Looking back to the historic events of 1 787,

more complex web of authorities
grated into the

US

that

is

Constitution. Ours

it is

consciously
is

tion

—

The theory of our Constitution
is

that

we

—

embedded and

carefully inte-

and balances, which

effective response to a catastrophic

the wonderful theory of our Constitu-

preserve liberty through competition.

throughout the federal government. But by federal
ter

our founders created a

a system of checks

sounds pretty good until you have to mount an
event.

clear that

I

also

We

decentralize

power

mean the federal charac-

of our government, which includes not just the national government but the

fifty state

and thousands and thousands of local governments.

order to have a system of checks and balances.
three equal branches of government so that

15

We defuse power in

We have a Constitution that created

no one branch of government would

Domestic Security and Maintenance of Liberty: Striking the Balance

become too powerful and we gave

powers to the national government and

certain

reserved the remainder to the states.

We

have provisions in the Constitution, including the Tenth Amendment,

guaranteeing certain authorities to the

government. So we recognize
sistent

—

at least

with the Constitution, the issue

states,

and others from the

recognize

I

is

really

—

that

if

we

states to local

are to

remain con-

not "who's in charge." Under our

we will never have absolute unity of command. Our founders in their
wisdom didn't want that. They dispersed power in a decentralized manner
Constitution,

throughout the various

levels

and branches of government. So our challenge

to achieve unity of command;

our challenge

is

is

not

to achieve, in military terminology,

unity of effort within that system of decentralized authority, those checks and bal-

ances created by our founders. That requires very close coordination and detailed,
integrated planning
ties

and military

H.L.
is

among all levels

of government and between civilian authori-

forces.

Mencken once said that for every complex problem, there is a solution that

simple, neat

tion of checks

and wrong. There
and balances.

It

is

no simple solution

consistent with a Constitu-

requires hard work, integrated planning, a

common

understanding of the threat environment and careful consideration of foreseeable
missions in advance of a

crisis

so that in the context of checks

and balances we

nonetheless achieve a unity of effort.

Conclusion

Forgive

me for going on at such length, but I wanted to give you some sense of both

the complexity of the issues

and the seriousness and purpose

brought to those issues since September

11,

2001.

that have been

We know that the US

military

has a tremendous ability to provide for the physical security of the American people,

including the contingent missions related to domestic warfighting against for-

eign adversaries

on our own

soil if civilian

law enforcement authorities are not

capable of meeting the perceived or very real threat. And, as was obvious in Hurri-

cane Katrina,
in providing

we

in the

Department of Defense have a very important

consequence management

vilian authorities.

capabilities to

reinforce ci-

But in the overall context of enhanced core missions evolving for

the military domestically in the twenty- first century,

we have not

forgotten the

The achievement of security while maintaining
remains our fundamental commitment and our core responsibility.

cautionary words of Federalist

our liberty

augment and

role to play

8.
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PART II
COMMAND OF THE COMMONS
THE US PERSPECTIVE

II

Command of the Commons Boasts:
An Invitation to Lawfare?

Craig H. Allen*
Roll

on thou deep and dark blue ocean

—

roll!

Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain
Man marks the earth with ruin his control

—

Stops with the shore

Lord Byron, Childe Haroldes Pilgrimage

1

Introduction

Lord Byron's humble respect for the sea contrasts sharply with the commonly
held view of the tenth-century Danish King Canute. Canute
enly) said to have believed that he could hold

royal will. 2

To

silence a

back the incoming

group of courtiers prone to excessive

said to have agreed to place his throne at the

is

low tide

line

often (mistak-

flattery,

on the shore

to demonstrate the absurdity of their suggestion that he could

by dint of

tide

the king
in

is

Bosham,

"command the obe-

dience of the sea." Royal will failed to keep his majesty dry as the tide rose. "Justso," as Kipling

might

*

start

would

say. 3

What might we

learn

from the King Canute

by expressing our envy for the ancient

king,

Judson Falknor Professor of Law, University of Washington,

Stockton Professor of International Law,
are the author's

and

US Naval War College

who

Seattle,

at least

We

had the good

Washington. Charles H.

(2006-07). The views expressed

are not to be construed as reflecting the official views of the
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fable?

US Navy or any
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fortune to face a "predictable" threat environment. Even in the tenth century, the
daily tidal cycle

was probably well known. The challenge facing the king in

telligence preparation of the

his "in-

environment" was therefore minor. The same cannot

be said for the threat environment we face in the twenty-first century, which

is

ev-

erywhere described as one characterized by its uncertainty and accelerating pace of
change. As one astute observer of our current situation might put
expect to be surprised
attention.

4

next,

you

Second, one must admire the king's practical modesty.

accepted the

known

—even shocked—by what happens

it:

flattery,

but he

knew he could not "command"

if you

do not

are not paying

He

could have

that great

commons

as the sea.

The first panel in this, the 2006 Naval War College, International Law Department conference on "Global Legal Challenges: Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications, and Natural Disasters," has been asked to offer a US
perspective on current assertions regarding the US command of the commons. It is

my privilege to moderate the discussion by a distinguished panel that includes Vice
Admiral Lowell

US Navy (retired), the immediate past director
Agency; Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, Jr., US Navy,

E. ("Jake") Jacoby,

of the Defense Intelligence

deputy chief of naval operations for plans and strategy (N3/N5); and Rear Admiral

Nimmich, US Coast Guard,
policy and planning.

Joseph
for
-

It is

L.

noteworthy that

this

assistant

commandant of the Coast Guard

conference takes place

at a

time when the intelligence

community has reliable indications that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) has fueled one or more Taep'o-dong 2 missiles, in apparent preparation
for a test launch of the DPRK's new intermediate-range weapon. In response, the
US missile defense system has been activated and two Aegis-equipped cruisers are
stationed off the Korean peninsula. How did we obtain our information on missile
preparation going on within one of the world's most closed societies? Why are US
warships deployed to the far western Pacific to erect a missile defense thousands of

US mainland? What does the story unfolding on the Korean peninsula tell us about claims to a "command of the commons"?
As the sole lawyer on the panel, the task fell to me to identify the most salient legal
issues raised by claims to command of the commons. But I was also invited to
miles from the

weigh in on the involved factual and policy questions.

My goals in this short article

are modest. After setting out a lawyer's response to claims of

commons,

I

command

over the

turn to a brief legal analysis of the problems raised by this so-called

hegemonic approach. The

first

and most obvious problem

is

that

any assertion of

command over the commons collides head-on with the relevant international law.
The second problem

mind

—

is

—and the one

would do well to bear in
response from lawfare practitioners, a

strategy drafters

that such assertions could invite a

22

—
Craig H. Allen

move that could jeopardize the freedom of access and maritime mobility on which
our national security depends. 5

I.

The organizers of this

The Panel's Precepts
might well have been moved to include a

year's conference

command of the commons topic after seeing a banner to that effect displayed in the
Pentagon. 6 The text of that banner

is

reproduced in the appendix to

this article.

Our panel is asked to focus on the perspective of the United States to command of
the commons. We were provided a list of questions in advance. We are first asked,

"How

broadly should the global

commons be

conceived (space,

air,

surface,

we are asked, "What are the primary threats emanating from the global commons?" Our third issue is "What role should elements
of the Intelligence Community play? How should they be integrated into a plan for
'command of the commons'?" Finally, we are told that "The CNO and the National
Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness call for a 'persistent' Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability in the global maritime commons,"
and then asked to consider "What obstacles will we face in achieving that? Are any
subsurface, seabed, cyber)?" Next,

of those obstacles legal ones?"

commons," the Pentagon banner lists the sea (including
undersea), air, space and cyberspace. As our discussion unfolds, the three panelists
appear to adopt a somewhat broader definition of the spatial dimensions of the
commons, which includes the airspace, waters and seabed and its subsoil outside
national jurisdiction, along with outer space and the electromagnetic spectrum. 7
In

its

reference to "the

(Cyberspace was occasionally
privately or publicly

mons.

8
)

It

takes but

listed separately,

owned cyberspace components

little

pervasive usage of the

and pipelines or to

commons. Some

fall

outside the comutility

and

serve as a buffer (particularly for insular

highway of transit and transport, a place to lay ca-

orbit satellites,

and

—infrequently

9

a battlespace. Outside of naval planning circles,

mons

that

imagination to appreciate the wide-ranging

nations, like the United States), a
bles

though without distinguishing the

it is

for the last six decades

also recognized that the

com-

are an important source of protein, a recreational arena, a key regulator of

our planetary carbon cycle and climate, and, not nearly often enough, a place of
scientific discovery.

The importance of the commons

in

an era when the globaliza-

tion "mega-trend" penetrates nearly every corner of the planet

In addition to questions about the spatial dimensions of the

is

undeniable.

commons,

it is

nec-

more difficult temporal and conceptual dimensions of "command." By temporal, I mean whether the command referred to is meant to prevail
essary to address the

in times of peace

and war

(to the extent that

23

dichotomy any longer has meaning).
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By conceptual, I mean the dimensions or degree attached to the claim of control. In
the law of the sea context, the relationship between the State and a body of water is
variously described in terms of "sovereignty," "sovereign rights," and "jurisdiction." 10 Assuming that "command" means something less than sovereignty over
the sea (or any other common), what are its conceptual dimensions? The goals of
sea command or control are relatively easy to identify. They typically include the
goal of ensuring freedom of access and movement for warships, auxiliaries and
supporting merchant vessels. Such access is essential to a power projection strategy. The National Defense Strategy appears to stop here; calling only for a capability
to "operate from" the global commons, not to control them. 11 At times, however,
claims to access take the form of presence, persistent presence, seabasing and perhaps even "global

fleet stations."

And

at

times sea

command

or control strategies

include denying use of the sea to one's adversaries, at least during periods of
conflict.

bounds of what might be included in a "command" of the comrecourse was to a common dictionary. Were I to attempt to explain

In assessing the

mons,

my first

meant by command of the commons to a layperson, I should assume that
person would apply the common definition (a point we lawyers often forget). In
the dictionary I consulted, the most relevant definitions for "command" included

what

I

"to have authoritative control over; to rule; to have at one's disposal; to

by position."

12

"Authoritative" control implies for

ercising such control. "Rule" carries unfortunate

dominate

me some legitimate basis for exconnotations for many. On the

assumption that usage of the term in the actual national strategy documents or literature was also relevant, particularly in the present audience,
a cursory literature search.
its sister

phrases) were

all

The

I

decided to conduct

command of the sea (and
reflecting on the US Navy's "Sea

resulting definitions for

over the board. After

Power 21" concept papers and the Australian Naval Strategy, 14 1 came to the conphysical or
clusion that the most useful definition of "command" over a space
virtual
would have to focus on the putative commander's capability, 15 capacity 16
and intent. It also became clear to me that one could distinguish the fact of "command" from the grand strategy that might lead a country to pursue such a com13

—

—

mand. 17
Although
concept

is

it

might have been easy to declare that the

command of the commons

too vague to serve as an organizing principle amenable to legal analysis,

I

chose instead to craft a working definition that focused mainly on the sea com-

mand and would capture what appeared to be the commonly held attributes of
command constructs. For this article, I ultimately settled on a definition that includes the requisite capability and intent to ensure freedom of movement for one's
vessels

(power projection) during times of peace and war; and, during times of

24
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armed
that

conflict, to

deny such movement

to one's

enemies (sea denial); and to exert

measure of control over neutral or unidentified

permits (sea control).

II.

Assessing the Claim to

The claims espoused

craft that the

law of neutrality

18

in the

US Command of the Commons

Pentagon banner find support in the 2003

article

"Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," by
MIT professor and Strategic Studies Program Director Barry Posen. Indeed, one
suspects the banner authors

had

carefully studied Posen's works. Writing in Inter-

national Security, Professor Posen described his concept of command of the

mons

as the capability to effectively

and to

deny use of the commons

any military contest

prevail in

for the

commons.

that the United States already enjoys de facto

he means the

sea,

19

to

com-

any other nation

He then went on to argue

command of the commons; by which

deep seabed, space and international airspace, and that com-

mand of the commons has supported the hegemonic grand strategy pursued by the
late 1990s. 20 In

United States since the
equated

explaining his use of the term, Posen

"command of the sea" with what the historian Paul Kennedy referred to as

"naval mastery"

—more than mere

"rule" over space.

21

superiority, but certainly less than claims to

Posen admits that "command of the commons" does not mean

that other States cannot use the

commons in peacetime, nor does the concept gain-

say that there will be contested areas

—

the littoral

and

riverine regions, continental

urban centers and jungles (but none of those areas are within anyone's working
definition of the

commons

manded, under

his definition,

warning that "U.S.

by the United

States.

He

asserts, are

com-

then concludes with a

command of the commons provides an impressive foundation

for selective engagement.

A.

anyway). The true commons, Posen

It is

not adequate for a policy of primacy." 22

The Claim to De Facto Command of the Commons

Applying the chosen test of capability, capacity and intent to claims of command of
the

commons

claims. Vice
trary,

it

leaves

me with

considerable doubt regarding the accuracy of those

Admiral Jacoby's warning only increased that doubt. 23

seems to

On

the con-

me that the claims to a command of the commons reflect a trou-

bling combination of unjustified confidence regarding a very uncertain threat

environment 24 and a tin ear regarding the

effect

such claims are likely to have upon

much of the audience of greatest concern to us. I could add that assertions that the
United States presently enjoys command of the commons failed to impress the
conference attendees

I

overheard, who, like skeptical Missourians, insisted on

proof. Indeed, the reaction

by one attendee to the title of this panel went something
25

Command of the Commons Boasts: An Invitation
like:

"We couldn't 'command'

be expected to do

merchant

25

fleet?"

commons with

the

Another asked,

"If

Lawfare?

a 600-ship navy.

with 280 ships, 200,000 fewer

it

to

and an ever-shrinking

sailors,

we command

the

How could we

commons, why

can't

we

stem the flow of illegal migrants and narcotics into our country?"

A quick look at the numbers is not likely to instill confidence in the Missourians.
The seas cover 71% of the planet. The Pacific Ocean alone covers 64 million square
miles (admittedly, some of which falls within the national waters of coastal States).
If all 12 US Navy aircraft carriers were available to patrol the Pacific, each would
still be responsible for an area of more than 5 million square miles (if you assume
six-month deployment rotations, you must double that number). Those who suggest that the focus should be on targets of potential interest, not surface area, would
do well to consider the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's
recent annual report on shipping, which puts the number of merchant vessels in
the world at more than 600,000. 26 That would cut down the carrier workload to
just 5,000 vessels each.

manned vehicles
sure,

I

Of course,

thought back to the 2004 Northern

Command (NORAD)

tification

fleet

Command Homeland

was emphasized that the United

it

time surveillance system anything

has been

growing

of un-

operating on, under and over the seas. As a final feasibility mea-

Symposium, where
fense

that does not include the

Defense

States plainly lacks a mari-

one the North American Aerospace De-

like the

some progress
and Long Range Iden-

provides for the air domain. Although

made using Automatic Identification System

(AIS)

and Tracking (LRIT) systems, maritime domain awareness still has a long

way to go.
The lawyers among us will be quick to point out that any assessment of our "capability" to

command

the

commons must

As the 2003 So San incident demonstrated, 27 military capability

thority to act.

unaccompanied by an adequate
times utterly

to

fail

bilities are plainly

and enforcement regime

prescriptive

produce the desired end

powerless to achieve a goal where the law

mand" them

include an assessment of our legal au-

fell

some-

state.

Spanish Marines proved to be

short.

Our legal authorities and capathe commons, let alone "com-

not adequate to even "secure"

sufficiently to protect us against

mass destruction

will

maritime terrorism or weapons of

(WMD) transport. The fact that the common four-part "DIME"

inventory of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military

and economic) omits our law enforcement
partly to

blame

Capability

is

capabilities

and

capacities

may be

most maritime strategy thinking.
function of vulnerability. Ex ante claims to command of

for this blind spot in

also a

international airspace
tions have access to

must be reassessed

unmanned

missiles capable of taking

in

an age when even

aerial vehicles

one of

(UAVs) and

terrorist organiza-

missiles

—including

most modern warships out of

Israel's

26

action. 28
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Similarly,

any claim

to a

"command"

of outer space must be tempered by the

knowledge of the vulnerability of satellites
nuclear explosion, or
cess

our adversaries

jamming from

to laser or missile attack, a high-altitude

the ground, 29

and

now have to commercial satellites

to the

growing ease of ac-

such as Google Earth™ and

The vulnerability of vital communication cables strung across the
deep seabed and of critical military and commercial networks to "cyber-attack" 30
Digital Globe®.

similarly renders doubtful

ther of those domains.

ment

that connects

any claim that the nation has attained "command" of ei-

On the contrary, we can only hope that a defense establish-

and leverages

now

its

lighter

and more dispersed

forces

through a networked information and communications grid has studied the "unrestricted warfare" battle plan

and has not thrown out

its

semaphore

flags.

31

In re-

who might argue that such vulnerability represents only the
potential to lose command of the commons, and does not diminish present command, I would be tempted to respond by asking how they distinguish "command"
sponse to those

from the more temporally limited concept of "superiority."
In short,

my initial look at the

numbers

fails

the Missouri

"show me"

test.

In-

moved to remonstrate that the only reason that a claim to
"command" of the commons is plausible at present is because no one is out there
contesting the commons. The interest has moved to the littorals, ports and land

deed, one might be

domains. Witness China's so-called "String of Pearls" ambition, to ensure access to
sea lines of

communication connecting

string of bases stretching

mains

—

it

to the Persian Gulf oil fields through a

from Gwandar, Pakistan

to

Hainan

Island. 32 In these do-

the favored battlespace of the fourth-generation warfare practitioners

USS Stark, USS Cole, USS Kearsarge and USS Ashland, 33 and the INS
Hanit belie any notion of command. Here, there be dragons, and their riders are
reading Mao and Ho Chi Minh, the Small Wars Manual 34 and the Sling and the
the fates of the

Stone

B.

35

Command of the Commons as a Hegemonic Grand Strategy Element

The Pentagon banner includes

a citation to Rear

Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan,

suggesting that the banner authors' concept of command of the
roots in a larger strategy.

will

its

calling for

command

of the com-

be found in the old "foundations of strategy" that were "laid upon a

rock"? Did
"their

has

Why Mahan, and why that particular passage? Is the De-

partment of Defense suggesting that a strategy

mons

commons

Mahan

believe that the United States

freedom to navigate the

sea, air

or space,"

trepidation any lawyer should feel before

decided to see just what

Mahan

stood

for.

27

would "guarantee" other States
as the banner claims? With the

wading into national defense

strategy,

I
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took

as

commons.

window into

the evolutionary path of maritime

the

linear (Justice

common

a nation's intent with regard to

What do the US strategy documents
the commons? My brief study of the

36

with respect to

been

Lawfare?

my point of departure the belief that grand strategy, including its for-

eign policy elements, can be a useful
the

to

law

Holmes made

37

a similar

demonstrates

It

).

and naval

say about the nation's intent
literature persuades

to the evolution of

of the characteristics of the dialectic,

while occasionally producing what economic historians might

what Thomas Kuhn described

as a revolutionary

paradigm

call a logistic surge,

shift,

38

or what evolu-

tionary biologists refer to as punctuated equilibrium. Essentially
structs describe a cycle of peaceful interludes

Futurist Alvin Toffler

warned

longer be surprising.

such a

shift in

40

grand

—by which he means

such con-

is

rising sharply. 39

discontinuities

—should no

Current indications suggest we might be on the verge of just

strategy, as the

mass of antithetical evidence and sentiment

grows. Justice Holmes, a battle-tested Civil

Over the

all

punctuated by dramatic revolutions.

that the frequency of that cycle

Peter Schwartz adds that surprise

that

strategy in the United States has not

remark with regard

many

me

years, naval

and maritime

adopted a variety of terminology to

The choices

War veteran, would likely agree.

strategy

refer to the

documents and

treatises

have

ends and means that make up the

by history, policy, capability and perhaps even a little bit of law. Navies (and merchant fleets) figure prominently.
The Greek historian Herodotus makes it clear that the Athenian navy's defeat of
the much larger Persian fleet at the Battle of Salamis (480 BC) was a decisive victory for the Greeks. Indeed, Athens' naval "superiority," obtained more by stratgrand

strategy.

egy and

are informed

than by relative

skill

nearly eight decades

(it

was

fleet size,

was the

city-State's signature strength for

when Athens executed most of its naval leaders,
Moving forward from the Greek and Roman expe-

lost

leading to a defeat by Sparta).

41

modern era, we see several shifts in the ends and means elements in
strategy documents. They raise questions regarding distinctions between "superiority" in a given domain and "control" or "command" of that domain, and be-

riences to the

tween the concept of "naval" superiority (or
(or strategy),

strategy)

and "maritime" superiority

and whether these are ends or means, and whether they

notional or aspirational.

are merely

And finally, is it only the primacists who seek to "control"

commons?
Any examination of "sea

the

control" and the correlative opportunity for "power

Mahan and
Rear Admiral Stephen Luce, first president of the US Naval War College. Mahan
was a naval officer and Naval War College professor (and later president) who
characterized the sea as a "wide common." 42 The commons included potential
projection" begins with Captain (later Rear Admiral) Alfred Thayer

battlespaces,

where the naval combatants would mass and meet, and sea
28

lines

of

Craig H. Allen

communication, through which both warships and merchant
magisterial 1894 book, The Influence of Sea

naval strategist

who saw sea

rejected the coastal defense
in

its

control as the

Power Upon History,

and commerce raiding

the sea

sea control

was

strategy of the

tions; rather, they looked for

In his 1911 treatise
a broader

sea.

In

be assured of access to

much challenge Mahan's assump-

ways to circumvent the adversary's control of the seas.

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

',

and slightly less aggressive approach,

"big-battle fixation"

from "maritime

To

Sir Julian

Corbett took

rejecting what he considered to be a

by writers who advocated the principle of concentration. 45

Corbett distinguished "naval strategy," which focuses on
strategy,"

command

of the

sea,

which focuses on the interplay between naval and land

Corbett, naval strategy was but a subset of the maritime strategy, the

purpose of which was to accomplish the sovereign's broader goals.
that

of the

and freedom of mobility, while denying such access or movement to the op-

ponent. 44 Later asymmetric strategies did not so

forces.

day and offered

command

essential for a belligerent to

Mahan as a
strategy. 43 He

reveals

paramount goal of naval

place a vision of naval warfare as a contest for

Mahan's view,

vessels traveled. His

He admonished

command of the sea was not a proper goal in and of itself but rather a strength

that could be

concluded

employed to support the nation's overall military objective. 46 Corbett

(as

does Vice Admiral Jacoby) that

control of the sea.

it is

rarely possible to achieve full

He argued that a belligerent must always attempt to either secure

command of the sea or prevent its opponent from doing so. 47 Nevertheless, he concluded that the "most common situation in naval war is that neither side has the
command; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea." 48

young Samuel Huntington penned an unsettling article announcing that, in his view, the Mahanian strategy based on the clash of great fleets
massing against each other was obsolete. 49 Viewing the Soviet Union as a massive
land-force power that posed little or no naval threat, Huntington concluded that
the US Navy force structure should be reshaped to prepare it for littoral warfare
and power projection ashore. 50 John Keegan, in his Price of Admiralty, carries the
In 1954, a very

upward and downward? Looking back to World
War II, and demonstrating how technology can quickly reshape the meaning of
command of the commons, he concludes that the US Navy's aircraft carriers were
concept forward; or should

I

say

the "supreme instrument of command of the sea" in that war. 51 But, then, turning
to the present, he falls prey to the sin of presentism, asserting that

sea in the future unquestionably lies beneath rather than

acknowledged, however

—

—

quite prophetically

be fought close to land, where there

is less

29

on the

"command of the
surface."

Keegan

that future naval battles will likely

maneuvering space. 52
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Command

of the sea reached

John Lehman to serve

Lehman

is,

of course,

its

to

Lawfare?

most recent apogee with the appointment of

as President Reagan's secretary of the

known

as the

Navy. Secretary

author of the 600-ship Navy and "the" mari-

time strategy. Writing in his autobiography,

Command of the Seas, Lehman reports

considerable pushback in response to his maritime superiority strategy by those

who

considered

too ambitious and too provocative. 53 Nevertheless, some give

it

considerable credit to the aggressiveness of Lehman's strategy and force buildup
for the eventual capitulation of the Soviet

Union.

As the Reagan era came to a close and with it the Cold War, naval strategy took a
decisive turn inland.

and Forward

.

.

.

Two capstone documents of the

From

the Sea in 1995, 55

1990s,

From

the Sea in 1992 54

demonstrated that the focus on

command

of the sea had given way to a need to establish "forward presence," and that

Mahan's blue-water

battles

between major combatants would give way to green-

activities

looked

defense and blockades were back in

like coastal

more than

a decade ago:

sea 'system' that has

a

and "maritime

security operations." 56 For some,

and brown-water

From

style.

As one analyst put

the Sea writes the epitaph to the

dominated naval

strategic

command

it

it

of the

thought since the sixteenth century

when, thanks to the growth of seaborne commerce and the development of warships capable of keeping the sea, 'true naval war' replaced 'cross-ravaging' as the

main purpose of military power at sea." 57 The intervening years have mostly borne
.that out, as

naval forces have been extensively engaged in maritime security opera-

tions in the littorals of the Greater Mideast
into the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan

As we

and

and

in "projecting"

power from the

Iraq.

back on a history that includes Salamis, Trafalgar, Midway, the

reflect

Barbary Pirates and Cole, and briefly consider the various naval and maritime
egies that

mand

have competed for adherents, the lesson

of the

sea

commons

is

strat-

may be that any notion of com-

held hostage by the competition for the strategic vision.

Professor Posen makes a strong case for his claim of US hegemony. 58

He traces the

path to our current hegemonic posture to the late 1990s, while recognizing that the

hegemonic character of the strategy got an injection of steroids with the 2002
National Security Strategy 59 (though only for contested areas or with respect to
specific threats,

hegemonic
is

not for the commons). But, as noted

status,

earlier,

he concludes that the

while sufficient for an effective strategy of selective engagement,

not adequate to support a policy of primacy (elements of which are contained in

the 2002 National Security Strategy). 60 In the dialectic of grand strategy, there are
clear signs that

Whether

it

lands

US

thinking

on Posen's

important for the

backing away from

selective

ancing or strategic restraint
strategies

is

is

its flirtation

with primacy.

engagement or some variant of offshore bal-

an open question. Are the differences

legal analysis that follows? Perhaps.

30

To

among

the

the extent that

Craig H. Allen

both primacy and
of the

selective

engagement rely on some level of hegemonic command

commons, they both

raise legal questions.

likely to

is

is

good reason

to be

others consider

com-

also

command what

concerned that a strategy that purports to

mon

There

be opposed; and the opposition might well draw on

all

of the in-

struments of national (and non-State) power, including lawfare to frustrate the

hegemon's design.

1.

The National Security Strategy Capstone Documents

Current

US

high-level strategic plans

embrace some elements of primacy, along

with cooperative security and selective engagement. The 2002 National Security

on the Department of Defense to ensure its current military dominance was not challenged. 61 The 2006 National Security Strategy reiterates that
"[w]e must maintain a military without peer." 62 The Clinton-era Department of
Strategy called

Defense Joint Vision 2020 established the goal of "full spectrum dominance," which
Strategy. 63

was carried into the 2004 National Military

At the same time, however,

both the 2006 National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy ac-

knowledge that the United

States lacks the capability to address global security

alone. 64 Moreover, the National Defense Strategy expressly disclaims

achieve "dominance" in

of presently

all

commanding

And far from a pretension

asserts that

"[w]e will operate in and

areas of military capability.

the

commons,

it

from the commons by overcoming challenges

and cyberspace operations."

any intent to

65

to our global maritime, air, space

66

Other national strategy documents embrace a cooperative, multilateral ap-

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 67 and the
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 68 both rely on cooperative, multilateral
and interagency approaches. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction recognizes that "it is vital that we work closely with like-minded countries on all elements of our comprehensive proliferation strategy." 69 Similarly, the
proach.

The National

Strategy to

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

calls for

strengthened coalitions and

partnerships, including partnerships with international organizations. 70
liferation Security Initiative 71

navy

72

similarly

and the concept once referred

The Pro-

to as the 1,000-ship

embrace the multilateral approach.

National Security Presidential Directive 41 on maritime security policy clearly

emphasizes the need for cooperation

—combined,

pursuit of security in the maritime domain.
for Maritime Security
"all areas

and things

73

joint

—

and interagency

In calling for a

in the

new National Strategy

(NSMS), the president described the "maritime domain"
of,

on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering

ocean, other navigable waterway, including
structure, people, cargo,

and

vessels

all

maritime-related

and other conveyances."

31

74

on

as

a sea,

activities, infra-

The

NSMS and its
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supporting plans were promulgated in 2005. 75 Rear Admiral Joseph

eight

Nimmich and Dana Goward, writing in this volume,
the national strategy for maritime security are

its

explain that the hallmarks of

commitment to obtaining mari-

time domain awareness, sharing the intelligence, providing a
picture,

and

a layered defense. 76 In the

and enabling

establishing

common

way

operating

words of many,

coming months to "information
sharing" (a concept that might not sit well with primacists). The president's directive also makes it clear that the strategy will be carried out in a way that respects the
rule of law and does not unnecessarily, impede legitimate maritime commerce.
"information superiority" will give

in the

Has Command of the Commons Given Way
Awareness" of the Maritime Domain and the Emerging Global Maritime

2.

The Coming Maritime

Strategy:

to

11

Partnership?

At the 2006 Current Strategy Forum held shortly before our conference, the Chief
of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, called for the development of a

maritime strategy to guide the Navy in the coming years.

new

77

The new strategy document will join three other capstone planning documents, including Sea Power 21™
the Navy Strategic Plan 19 and the CNO-CMC Naval Operations Concept* along
with the forthcoming revision to the Naval Doctrine Publication on Naval Warfare

(NDP-1). The strategy

is

1,000-ship navy concept
tional Fleet Policy.

82

also likely to

81

(now

embrace what was once referred to

the Global Maritime Partnership)

as the

and the Na-

And the strategy will be consistent with higher-level plans, in-

cluding the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Maritime
Security.

At the time

this article

maritime strategy would
security84
as a

was prepared,

all

"competition of ideas" that seeks to
strongly advocated

and others appear

It

seems

sport,

clear

what path the new

being examined in what has been

cull the best

balancing, 85 while Posen

to favor a return to Clinton- style selective engagement.

and global

stages.

moved beyond

maritime security

but one that involves States of disparate

is

ability

now seen by most as a team
and

willingness.

Malaccan

Whether

the threat

like the

Pro-

comes from regional armed

pirates, this increasingly globalized

from a maritime security approach
for peaceful navigation,

The advent

may portend the new modalities that will replace com-

control approaches.

conflicts or

de-

naval planning circles to both

of regional maritime security initiatives and risk-specific approaches

mand and

The

86

safe to say that global

liferation Security Initiative

known

from the "wisdom of groups."

some version of offshore

bate over grand strategy has clearly
the national

was not

Primacy, selective engagement, 83 cooperative

take.

and offshore balancing were

Some have

it

world plainly benefits

that protects the sea lines of

communication

commerce and overflight. While those common
32

rights are
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protected by international law,

sword are but words.

it is

sometimes said that covenants without the

87

Command of the Commons and the Law

Ill,

Turning from an amateur's examination of the policy questions presented to our
panel to the legal question, two issues present themselves. The
gality

of any claim to control over the

commons,

first

concerns the le-

particularly if control takes the

form of sea denial or assertions regarding access or presence exceeding those pro-

by the law. The second is one well suited for the Naval War College audience
and concerns the potential lawfare use of a maritime strategy that purports to com-

tected

mand the commons.

Command of the Commons and the International Law of the Commons

A.

Lord Bryon was not available to the young Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, who wrote
his

famous Mare Liberum

tainly

(the sea

is

free) in 1608, 88

have appreciated Byron's respect for the

but Grotius would almost cer-

sea. Grotius'

Mare Liberum was

the

opening salvo in the "battle of the books" with the Englishman John Selden. Selden

opposed Grotius' freedom of the
is

closed) ten years later.

seas.

89

seas concept with his

Grotius eventually

won

Even England eventually repudiated Selden's

own Mare Clausum

(the sea

the battle for freedom of the

thesis. In

one of Lord

Stowell's

most often-quoted decisions while on the English High Court of Admiralty, he

ex-

plained that two principles of public international law are recognized as

"fundamental":

One

the perfect equality and entire independence of

is

magnitude

creates

no

all

distinction of right; relative imbecility,

distinct states. Relative

whether permanent or

no additional right to the more powerful neighbour; and any advantage
upon that ground is mere usurpation. This is the great foundation of public law,

casual, gives

seized

which

it

mainly concerns the peace of mankind, both in their

politic

and private

capacities, to preserve inviolate.

The second

is,

that

all

nations being equal,

all

have an equal right to the uninterrupted

use of the unappropriated parts of the ocean for their navigation. In places where no

where the subjects of all states meet upon a footing of entire
and independence, no one state, or any of its subjects, has a right to assume or
authority over the subjects of another. I can find no authority that gives the

local authority exists,

equality
exercise

right of interruption to the navigation of states in

that

which the

rights of war give to

amity upon the high

both belligerents against neutrals.

33

seas,
90

.

.

.

excepting

Command of the Commons Boasts: An Invitation
Modernly, the sovereign equality of States

freedom of the seas

—

at least

is

enshrined in the

of the high seas

—

is

to

Lawfare?

UN Charter, and the

codified in articles 87

and 88 of

on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention).
Military strategists are regarded by most international lawyers as contemptuous
of the law and legal institutions. Clausewitz's canonical text for strategists refers to
91

the 1982 Convention

the "certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning,

known

law and custom." 92 Foreign policy pundit George

as international

Kennan

F.

remembered for his attack on what he saw as an excess of "legalism"
(and moralism) in American foreign policy during the Wilson presidency years. 93
Although international and constitutional law scholar Philip Bobbitt has come to
Wilson's (and FDR's) defense, 94 few from the strategy community have joined
is

him. Unfortunately, too

many international lawyers are unwilling to engage the se-

curity strategists directly.

Clausewitz would

Most

They

call "friction."

international lawyers

therefore have the potential to create

what

95

would

likely agree that,

under the law, the phrase

"command of the commons" is an oxymoron. It is in the very nature of a commons
that no State has sovereignty over it. Indeed, such commons as the seabed beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction are often referred to as the "common heritage of
mankind." 96 That said, it must also be admitted that freedom within the commons
in peacetime does not necessarily prevail when the drums beat the call to quarters.
Accordingly, a distinction must be drawn in this analysis between laws applicable
in peacetime

and those

largely set out in the

that control in times of

UN

Charter and 1982

LOS

armed

conflict.

Convention. The

The former
latter is

is

taken

from a variety of sources including the conventional and customary law of armed
conflict, the
visit

and

No

search. 98

command
their sea

law of neutrality, specialized doctrines of blockade, 97 and the right of

of the

exhaustive treatment of either

commons

command,

is

attempted here; however,

advocates must be alert to several key legal limits on

control and denial strategies.

The UN Charter rests on the principle of the sovereign equality of all States
and prohibits the use of force or the threat to use force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of another State. 99 Under the 1982 LOS Convention, neither the high seas nor the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction are
subject to any nation's sovereignty. 100 The same is true for international airspace.

—

Over the

years, the

—

United States has jealously guarded high seas freedoms against

coastal State encroachments, 101 as the recent

US

reaction to Australian measures

extending pilotage requirements to the Torres Strait demonstrates. 102 The high

and the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction are also reserved for "peaceful purposes." 103 And what of those 600,000 merchant ships plying the oceans?
While on the high seas, merchant vessels (and warships) come under the exclusive
seas

34
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and control of their respective

jurisdiction

flag States,

thus limiting the extent to

hegemon can exert denial or control strategies against them. 104
Under relevant laws applicable during armed conflicts, neutrals generally enjoy

which

a

most of the same freedoms that prevail during peacetime, so long as they do not aid
any of the belligerents or carry contraband on their behalf. That general statement
is

two important

subject to

and

search,

105

qualifications, including the belligerents' right of visit

and the somewhat unsettled regime of maritime "zones." 106

ever, sea denial

reserved only for times of armed conflict, and

is

is

howimplemented in
If,

accordance with the international law governing the rights and obligations of neutrals,

the law cannot be said to preclude

ways that

conflict with those laws.

this brief

comment

will

not focus on the outer space commons,

command of outer space

worth mentioning that any claim to
cile

in the sense of the ability to

in

deny uses of the sea
Although

"command"

is

with the legal regime established by the Outer Space Treaty.

on Open

107

It is

recon-

also inter-

between the "command" notion and the

esting to note the stark contrast

provisions of the Treaty

difficult to

it is

Skies, 108

which permit overflight of even the na-

tional territory of each party, to provide potential adversaries a "confidence build-

would do well to consider why a global hegemon with
"command of the commons" would permit Russian military aircraft to overfly and

ing measure." Primacists

photograph
sures as a

its

naval and air bases. But the logic in such confidence-building mea-

means of enhancing national

In closing,

powers and

it is

security

is

likely to elude

United

States. Boasts that the

Navy has

timidate a hostile or potentially hostile coastal State or

carry with

group or expeditionary

them

primacists. 109

important to acknowledge that our Janus-faced law both em-

limits the

carrier battle

most

a risk that the law

strike

is

its

the capability to in-

government by parking a

group 12 miles off the

State's coastline

neither as clear nor as stable as the boaster

might hope.
B. Assertions of

The foregoing

command
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analysis focused

of the

commons

transit rights protected

to

on the
deny

legal limits

by international

and motivate other

commander's
that

when

law. This section

command

States to undertake

access or transit rights.

the stronger naval

It

of the

is

posture

may

measures to reduce the would-be

begins with the often heard assumption

power controls the

sea, the "correct" strategy for the

The concept of lawfare might provide one means
sea.

designed to alert the

commons

weaker power is to attempt to deny its opponent use of the sea

hegemon's use of the

to exploit putative

vessels or aircraft of another State access or

reader to the danger that an aggressive
backfire

on attempts

111

35

as

much as possible.

1

10

to deny, or at least to limit, a
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The term "lawfare" was apparently coined in the 1970s, but initially lacked a coherent definition. Today the concept is most often associated with Air Force Major
General Charles Dunlap,

who

defines lawfare as the strategy of using or misusing

law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.

112

It is

noteworthy that lawfare

tactics are

included in the Chinese book on

113

The authors suggest an approach that applies international law asymmetrically: binding the more powerful nation, but not its less powerful opponent. The authors also recognize the important role of a sympathetic
media to a lawfare strategy, as did Hezbollah during the 2006 conflict with Israel.
To be sure, the United States has never hesitated to use what has been described
"Unrestricted Warfare."

as lawfare to

advance

its

national interests. Witness the

that British boardings of US

new republic's complaints

merchantmen to impress seamen for duty in the Royal

Navy violated international law. 114 Professor Davida Kellogg, among others, advocates a principled, proactive use of lawfare. 115 But she warns that we must also be
on guard against false or misleading versions of the law contained in the "pronouncements of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and

apologists,

Concern

and uninformed reporters with political agendas."

for lawfare tactics

found

its

way

sympathizers

terrorist
116

one high-level strategy

into at least

document. The 2005 National Defense Strategy appears to expect that lawfare
will

be used against the United

States,

warning in

its

section

on

tactics

"vulnerabilities"

that " [o] ur strength as a nation will continue to be challenged by those

who employ

weak using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism." 117
"Judicial processes and terrorism"? Putting tactless juxtapositions to one side, 118
the secretary is probably right to be concerned. A few suggestions show why.
If I were giving advice to a client seeking to bind a would-be maritime hegemon
a strategy of the

through lawfare moves, several come to mind.

First,

I

might advise the

client to

identify those States that

most resent claims to command of the commons and seek

their support within the

United Nations General Assembly

(UNGA)

for, inter alia,

a request that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issue an advisory opinion

condemning any attempt
Charter, the 1982
tion,

which

Law

to

"command of the commons"

as a violation of the

UN

of the Sea Convention and the 1967 Outer Space Conven-

collectively stand for the proposition of equal access for all States to

commons. Next I would suggest that the client work through the UN Informal Consultative Process on Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea to propose a

those

General Assembly resolution defining "due regard for the exercise of the freedom
of the high seas" and "peaceful use" under articles 87 and 88, respectively, of the

Law of the Sea Convention in a way that renders illegal any claim to "command" of
those seas or "sea control" by any nation's warships. 119 At the same time, the client

might move for a resolution defining "innocent passage" to exclude any passage by
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warships (or

unmanned

tion) the flag State of

vehicles,

which are nowhere mentioned

which purports

to

command

in the

conven-

the seas in ways that conflict

with the freedoms of other States, or to vessels en route to a "sea base" assignment

(where the vessel will, in the minds of some, "threaten" the use of force, in violation

UN Charter and the Law of the Sea Convention). Another tactic that sure
to attract the support of a number of coastal States would utilize the ICJ or UNGA
of the

is

commons, by legitimizing "security zones" of up to 200
within which no foreign warship, military aircraft (manned or un-

to effectively reduce the

nautical miles,

manned) or

intelligence gathering platform could operate without the consent of

the coastal State,

and only then when

in full

compliance with any applicable

restric-

weapons and means of propulsion, along with pos-

tions

on vessel numbers,

itive

requirements to carry transponders and disclose to the coastal State any

speed,

information gathered during the

transit.

A final tactic might be to build upon the

who argued in an

volume of the "Blue
Book" series that naval warfare doctrines like blockade and neutrality are no longer viable in the post-UN Charter era, 120 and would thus provide no authority for
interfering with shipping in a manner inconsistent with the 1982 LOS Convention.
suggestion of prominent publicists

Lest the reader think

assure

my goal here is to feed ideas to the nation's enemies, let me

you I have no such

intent.

My goal is to alert public and military officials to

the risk that their assertions, whether in strategy

can have serious unintended consequences.
of service

members

earlier

documents or banner

A message intended to raise the morale

or garner service support in congress might lead to legal

pushback from opponents within and beyond the nation,

welcome and avoidable
strategies.

Why

friction over access to the

in

ways that create un-

commons. The Navy war games

not war game strategic communications?

team's legal expert to

displays,

Why not

ask your red

game a response to any proposal for a "command of the com-

mons" campaign?
Conclusion

De facto command of the commons will be seen by many as an unattainable goal in
an age of asymmetric warfare against amorphous enemies who operate through
dispersed cells. Those who confidently speak of having such command must be
prepared to answer the practical questions regarding how the putative "command"
would fare in response to an adversary's war plan that calls for the targeting of all of
the satellites

and submarine cables on which the elaborately networked command

depends in the

first

96 hours. The

command advocates must also

address the eco-

nomics of obtaining and maintaining command. The cost of restoring the Army
and Marine Corps to their pre-Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi
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Freedom readiness

levels will

almost certainly

maintain the resources effective

world will soon
shares.

realize the

make

command would

it

Lawfare?

to

impossible to build and

require.

It is

unlikely that the

dream that we will beat our collective swords into plow-

But the coming budget showdown in the United States does suggest that

coming decade four Navy aircraft carriers might,
121
effect, be turned into armored Humvees for the Fleet Marine Force.
Law is a vital enabler for liberal democracies and an important safeguard for our

there
in

is

a

growing

risk that in the

military forces. That law respects the sovereign equality of States
State

from

asserting

dominion over the commons.

and precludes any

Strategic statements that sug-

gest a cavalier disregard for legally protected rights will almost certainly generate

resentment and produce undesired

banners announcing

what
Part
is

is

III

to be learned

effects.

Those who might be tempted

to post

"command of the commons" would also do well to reflect on
from the

of this volume.

"strategic

communications" panel that follows

in

To make such a claim in peacetime, while the United States

simultaneously lobbying other States to join in a 1,000-ship navy to meet the ur-

And in an age when
much of the world and virtually all of the media seem bent on discrediting the US
defense establishment, claims to a "command of the commons" seem unnecessargent need for maritime security, disserves the national interest.

ily

provocative. 122
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Appendix
Command of the Commons*
Command of the Commons is the key military enabler of the
The United

States

now

(including undersea),

enjoys

air,

command

of the

commons

United States.

—command of the

sea

space and cyberspace. While other States can use the

commons in peacetime, the United States guarantees their freedom to navigate the
sea, air or space. Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the
United

States' global

including our
tary

power position.

It

allows us to utilize other sources of power,

own economic and military might, as well as the economic and mili-

might of our

allies.

How do we maintain command of the commons?
Maintaining
ject

command

of the sea/undersea.

Command

of the sea allows us to pro-

our national power and influence, and also enhances our country's economic

prosperity.

99%

of the volume

—and 80% of the value—of

the world's interconti-

moves by sea. The Air Force provides battle space management, precision navigation, weather services, close air support targeting and air refueling for
both military and commercial users to solidify United States control over the sea.
nental trade

From time

to

time the superstructure of tactics has

to

he altered or wholly torn down; hut

the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid

upon a

rock.

Alfred Thayer

Mahan

Maintaining command of the air. Unsurpassed by any nation, the United States Air
Force maintains joint air and space dominance across the globe. Specialized attack,

jamming and
sional

electronic intelligence aircraft

combined with

airmen allows extensive control and exploitation of

well-trained, profesair,

space and near-

space domains. Given the superior capabilities the Air Force possesses, the United
States

is

able to deter

enemy

threats

and ensure forward operations providing an

essential contribution to global security.

Approximate text of a display in the Pentagon

in

39

2006 (any formatting errors are mine alone).
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Freedom from attack; freedom to attack.
Maintaining

command

of space. Maintaining

command

of space allows the

United States to see across the entire globe in order to gather vast amounts of useful
information. Over the

last

50 years the United States has invested $830 billion in

space assets. Through capabilities developed and executed by the Air Force, the

United States can track and identify military targets with
this actionable

Maintaining

tional

is

and communicate

information in a timely fashion.

See

21st century

fidelity

first

command

—understand

of cyberspace.

cyberspace. Like

domain of trade and

its

The new

—

act

first.

strategic

communication of the

conceptual predecessor, cyberspace

intercontinental

the Internet but an area of information

mass media and finance.

first

communication

and cognition

is

an interna-

that connotes not only

that includes the channels of

Command of cyberspace can increase, sustain or diminish a

nation's position of power in economic, diplomatic or military terms.

A new medium for communications, command and control.
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Notes
George Gordon (Lord Byron), Childe Haroldes Pilgrimage (1812-1818). The term
"childe" was a medieval title for a young man who was a candidate for knighthood.
2. King Canute has been unfairly maligned for centuries. The "authoritative" version of the
1.

king's apocryphal encounter with the sea

hold back the

makes

it

clear that the king never believed

he could

tides.

Rudyard Kipling, The Crab that Played with the Sea, in JUST SO STORIES (1902) (attributing tidal cycle to Pau Amma, the disaffected crab).
4. Peter Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises: Thinking Ahead in Time of Turbulence
(2003). Schwartz argues that we live in a time of "perpetual discontinuity," a time in which
"bombshells and shockers" are part of everyday life.
5. See generally Department of Defense, National Security and the Convention on the Law
oftheSea(2ded. 1996).
6. My thanks to the 2006 International Law Department Conference Chair, Rear Admiral
and Stockton Professor Jane Dalton, for her notes on the text of the Pentagon banner. They are
reproduced in the appendix. Any errors in recording are mine alone.
7. The National Defense Strategy limits its definition to "space, international waters and
airspace, and cyberspace." Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United
States 13 (Mar. 2005). Vice Admiral Jacoby argues for a broad definition of the global commons
3.

"if it

is

to be a useful construct in this era of globalization, rapid information age advancements,

and the threats to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." Interestingly, he would add "ungoverned areas," like parts of Somalia where there is no effective government and may therefore
serve as a haven for terrorists, as part of the global commons. Lowell Jacoby, The Global Commons and the Role for Intelligence, which is Chapter III in this volume, at 51.
8. The Department of Defense Dictionary defines "cyberspace" as "the notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer networks." Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms 138 (Apr. 2001, as amended through Aug. 2006) [hereinafter DoD Dictionary].
9. "Battlespace" is defined as "the environmental factors, and conditions which must be
understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This
includes the air, land, sea, space and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather,
terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest." DoD Dictionary, id. at 64. The principal battlespace long ago shifted to
the littorals and landward, where asymmetric warfare is the most effective. See the discussion below on naval and maritime strategies of the 1990s.
10. Lawyers fond of the bundle-of- sticks analogy explain that "sovereignty" denotes the full
bundle of sticks, while usufructuary rights of innocent or transit passage represent far fewer
"sticks." A variety of legal labels have been attached to the seas and the interests of the States in
those seas. One debate that concerned the deep seabed divided those who held the res nullius
view from those who espoused the res communis approach. In his dissent in United States v. California, Justice Frankfurter concluded that the majority was confusing the concepts of imperium
and dominium. He explained that the Roman law concept of dominium was concerned with
property and ownership, while imperium related to political sovereignty. United States v. California,
11.

12.

332 U.S. 19 (1947) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
National Defense Strategy, supra note 7, at 13.

Webster's

II

New Riverside University Dictionary
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Vern Clark, Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
Proceedings, Oct. 2002, at 32.
14. Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine - RAN Doctrine l 2000 (2000), available at http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/amd/amdintro.html [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN Maritime Doctrine]
15. The DoD Dictionary defines "capability" as " [t] he ability to execute a specified course of
action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.)" DoD Dictionary, supra
note 8, at 76. The National Defense Strategy adopts a capabilities-based planning approach that
13.

.

links capabilities to joint operating concepts across a

Strategy, supra note 7, at 11.

One

broad range of scenarios. National Defense

writer defines military capability as "simply the ability to

achieve a desired effect in a specific operating environment."
as

having three

excerpted

pillars: readiness, sustainability

and

He also

defines military capability

force structure. Alan Hinge, Preparedness,

http://www.defence.gov.au/RAAF/organisation/info_on/operations/military

at

_capability.htm.
16.
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amount of that
17.
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18.

In

understood to

ability that

refer to the nature of the ability, "capacity" refers to the

can be delivered in a particular period of time.

command the commons does not necessarily imply a primacy strategy.
section on "command of the sea," the Australian doctrine concludes:

intent to

its

A modern analyst

commentators were interested in war and
they were concerned with dominance. They were acutely conscious of the historical
[*]

has noted that

all

these

advantages that lay with the utilisation of the sea to further national power.
first

products of their thought was the concept of

command

One

of the

of the sea, which was

considered to be the principal objective of naval forces operating in a maritime

campaign. This

own

is

defined as the possession of such a degree of superiority that one's

operations are unchallenged by the adversary, while the latter

utilising the sea to

is

incapable of

any degree.

Australian Maritime Doctrine, supra note

14, at 37.

*The "modern analyst" referred to is Rear Admiral J. Richard Hill (Royal Navy, ret.), author of
Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (1986).
19. Barry R. Posen, Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,
28 International Security, Spring 2003, at 5-46. See also Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (1992).
20.

Definitions of "hegemony" vary, and

stitutes a

hegemonic grand

strategy.

was not able to find a clear definition of what conOne source describes hegemony as the dominance of one
I

group over other groups, with or without the threat of force, to the extent

that, for instance, the

dominant party can dictate the terms of any intercourse to its advantage. It seems clear that the
term has accumulated a distinctly sinister connotation over the past ten years.
2 1 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (1976). Posen observed that Kennedy distinguished "naval mastery" from a temporary, local naval superiority.
Posen, supra note 19, at

8.

22.

Posen, supra note 19,

23.

Vice Admiral Jacoby concluded that

particularly given the limits

about everyone
24.

all

the time,

at 44.

command of the commons was not a realistic goal,
on intelligence. As he put it, "If we attempt to know everything

we will

fail."

Jacoby, supra note

The secretary of defense asserts that uncertainty is

7, at 53.

"the defining characteristic of today's

strategy threat environment." National Defense Strategy, supra note 7, at

2.

In assessing claims to

command of the commons, the entire threat environment, including threats from irregular, catastrophic and disruptive threats,

must be considered.
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25. Navy ranks have dropped below 350,000 (down 220,000 from its 1991 level). Active duty
Marine Corps strength is about half that number. See also Summary of Remarks by Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, at West 2006, January 12, 2006, in Neal Thompson, West
2006 Wrap Up, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Feb. 2006, at 42 (reporting that the Navy's
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and weapons

trafficking,
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Marine Transport,
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26.
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In late 2002, Spanish warships intercepted the freighter So San while

27.
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seas off

was suspected of transporting missiles to an unknown destina-
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A boarding team of Spanish Marines from the Navarra, later joined by US Navy personnel,

conducted a non-compliant boarding of the So San, and during the subsequent search discovered North Korean-made Scud missiles and components hidden beneath the vessel's cargo of
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When it was determined that there was no basis to seize the vessel or her cargo,

the vessel was released. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea: U.S., Spanish Forces Seize Scud

Shipment, Dec.

11,

2002,

available
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30.
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would wipe out US
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COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael N.
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31.
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33.
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Global

Commons and the Role for
Intelligence

Lowell E. Jacoby*
Introduction

This

article

attempts to answer four questions concerning the global com-

mons and

the role for intelligence in the evolving circumstances in which

transnational terrorism has replaced the military capabilities of a small set of potential adversarial States to
interests. First,

become

the primary threat to the United States

how broadly should the global commons be conceived

surface, subsurface, seabed, cyberspace)? Second,

commons?

anating from the global

gence community play?
the

commons?

Finally, the

stacles will

we

what are the primary threats emintelli-

command

of

Chief of Naval Operations and the National Strategy

to

Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness

and reconnaissance (ISR)

its

(space, air,

Third, what role should elements of the

How will they be

and

1

integrated into a plan for

call for a persistent intelligence, surveillance,

capability in the global maritime

face in achieving that?

commons. What ob-

Are any of those obstacles

legal ones?

Domains of the Global Commons
In a

more rule-driven time, one or more of the space,

air,

surface, subsurface, seabed

and cyberspace domains might be excluded from the commons. Concepts such
sovereignly, control of airspace or the seas, nation-State identity
Vice Admiral, United States Navy (Ret.)

and

as

prerogatives,

Global

and

territorial

Commons and the Role for Intelligence

waters had great meaning.

and many of the accompanying

What

forces have

changed

of the meaning of those concepts

rules are obsolete.

this situation? Globalization, the

and weapons

the threats of terrorism

Much

proliferation are

information age,

some of the

factors at work,

along with associated concerns over narcotics trafficking, smuggling and move-

ments of illegal

The

aliens, just to

name

a few.

commons.

threats have redefined the

We

speak of "ungoverned spaces"

such as Somalia, or portions of nation-States where the government does not have
effective control,

which

is

a relatively

common occurrence in today's world. These

commons. They become potential havens for terrorists,
or the source of other threatening activities. In the past, when nation-States lost
control of some of their territory it was typically of concern to that State and maybe
areas are part of the global

to

its

neighbors. Today, these situations are of far broader concern because of their

association with the global

commons.

The information age has had

a

tremendous

effect.

Cyberspace

define, but an absolutely essential element of the global

potential for both

good and

a largely

evil. It's

is

a difficult-to-

commons

with great

ungoverned space apparently devoid

of strong international conventions, an extensive body of legal opinion and precedence, and effective enforcement mechanisms.
States over domestic surveillance

cyberspace and

mation

its

The debate within the United

a manifestation of the issues concerning

is

position as the nexus of the

commons and threats

in the infor-

age.

The components of the global commons are interconnected, interdependent
and mutually reinforcing, making the associated issues very complex. Consider the
following illustrative example. The threat is terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the coordination of the planned operations occur over the
Internet using advanced commercial technologies combined with use of multiple
obscure dialects by a security conscious group with haven in ungoverned space.

The movement of associated personnel is through established smuggling routes,
the transportation of components for the weapon is facilitated by a narcotics network and the final movement of
to the planned attack location takes advantage of containers embedded in legitimate maritime trade. When viewed in this
context, both the scope of the problem, and the need to master the global com-

WMD

mons

situation,

come

into focus. This scenario also captures the difficulties at-

tached to the intelligence problem
challenges presented

by

—

a

problem of scale, scope, complexity and the

a highly accomplished foe.
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The Primary Threats

Two conditions must exist for a threat to exist. An entity must have both the capability

and intent

to

do harm.

The primary concerns are terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The worst case situation is the one where the two interconnect and terrorist

groups with broad reach possess

capabilities

The

and intent combine

global

It is

them

to present a threat of major proportions.

commons may play a key role

for intelligence

enable

WMD attack capabilities. In this situation,

is

in this threat scenario.

to present the information required

to defeat this threat.

important to

realize that a

well-being, international

It is

by decision makers that

will

an awesome challenge and responsibility.

broad range of challenges to

commerce, health and welfare

commons. Again,

abetted by employing the

The challenge

stability,

economic

also originate or

can be

the intelligence challenges are

immense.
Finally, there's

an additional capability that deserves great attention, and that

the capability to disrupt or destroy the ability to
that's the lifeblood

of today's world and

communicate and

modern

is

access the data

military capabilities.

Major

dis-

ruption or destruction of these capabilities could threaten the global economy.

The Role and Integration of the Intelligence Community

Command

of the

commons

is

not a

realistic goal, if

the global

broadly defined. The ability of the adversary to hide and disguise
ited value of traditional techniques

globalization

the problems,

commons

activities,

are

the lim-

such as deterrence and dissuasion, the pace of

and information technology changes, the interconnected nature of

combine

to

make

the concept of command of the

commons

in the

traditional sense of command of the sea unachievable.

upon what I believe is a realistic appreciation of what
intelligence can achieve. If we attempt to know everything about everything all the
time, which is what command of the commons would entail, we will fail. The result
will be that we know some things about some things all the time and we will have
I

take this position based

spread ourselves too thin to be effective in providing requisite knowledge to decision makers. Rather, the key
the

commons

is

to focus

that are integral to

our

efforts

and dominate those portions of

our priority objectives.

The key is to be selective and to prioritize our needs. Rather than control of the
commons, we should focus efforts on achieving domination of those portions of
the commons that are important at a specific time and place. This is akin to what is
typically done in counter-narcotics interdiction operations. Intelligence collection
53

Global

and

Commons and the Role for Intelligence

analysis, plus the operating forces, are focused

fied period of time. This focus

is

overlaid

on

on

a specified area for a speci-

a fundamental understanding of the

problem and operating patterns which has been achieved over time.
Intelligence

must be

agile

and responsive

sion makers priorities in this expansive
to simultaneously provide breadth

the effort.
all

It

to changing circumstances

common space.

and

and depth. Breadth provides the foundation for

allows intelligence professionals to

to

inform decision makers

Intelligence needs to be

deci-

That requires intelligence

know something about everything

the time. This breadth then enables the focused efforts needed to

bilities

and

employ capa-

as priorities are established.

an integral part of the plan. The plan must establish pri-

orities. It is essential that intelligence

planners work with operators and decision

makers to ensure that the intelligence capabilities are resourced and that the expectations are realistic.

The

resultant intelligence plan needs to be an integral part of

the overall plan. And, as unforeseen circumstances are encountered, the agility and

upon intelligence breadth and depth will be tested. A key element is that intelligence capabilities need to be in place early. They cannot be created after the priorities change. By then it is too late.
Finally, intelligence capabilities must span from unclassified data that is available in the public domain to highly sensitive data collected by highly classified
means. These capabilities must encompass the data and expertise that friends and
allies can contribute to assist in solving these very difficult problems. The data must
be presented using the most modern information management techniques available and must reside on protected networks that employ the most advanced tools
and capabilities. And, since the output of the processes is knowledge, the data must
be processed through the minds of highly talented, dedicated and trained men and
women.
responsiveness based

A Persistent ISR Capability
Persistent surveillance
as

it

is

the capability to linger

on

a specified

takes to fully understand the issue or solve the problem.

to track an individual ship.

problem

for as long

The problem may be

The problem maybe to monitor activities

in a specified

The problem may be to understand the activities of a particular shipping
company that is potentially involved in illicit activities. The problem may be to understand the intentions of a specific individual. The problem may come down to
identifying and tracking a single container that is in intermodal international commerce. Obviously, these and other problems that are encountered are great in
terms of magnitude and complexity. It really is the issue of finding, and then maintaining contact on that often-discussed needle in the haystack.

port.
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come from a variety of sources ranging from

solutions to the problems will

satellites in space, to

E.

intelligence collectors, to

examination of legal docu-

financial records, to whatever sources of information

may contribute to

solving the problem. Tracking that container, for example, requires a great deal of
international cooperation.

point of departure so

it

The

goal

is

to identify

can be interdicted

at the

and begin the tracking

optimal point during

its

at the

move-

ment. Once the target enters that intermodal transportation system, the surveillance problem

There

will

becomes

be

very, very difficult.

legal issues

close partnership that

threaded throughout.

must

counsel. That partnership

exist

must be

I

have great appreciation for the

between intelligence professionals and
in place

legal

throughout the intelligence process.

It

must begin with the development of the plan and continue throughout the operation.

end

That partnership needs to part of the overall plan.

if it is

It

can't be attached at the

to be effective.

Conclusion

The concept of global commons must be very broadly defined and encompass the
domains of space, air, surface, subsurface, sea beds and cyberspace if it is to be a
useful construct in this era of globalization, rapid information age advancements,

and the

threats of terrorism

and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The

domains of the global commons

are interconnected, interdependent

and mutually

reinforcing.

The

US

community, and those of friends and
allies, are integral to efforts to dominate the global commons. These intelligence
capabilities must be simultaneously broad and deep. Intelligence required to succapabilities of the

cessfully operate in the global

intelligence

commons will be derived through a broad variety of

sources from unclassified data that
lected

by highly

classified

is

publicly available to highly sensitive data col-

means. The most modern information management

techniques must be applied to the data and the data must reside on secure networks

employing the most modern tools and

Key to dominance

in the global

persistent surveillance. Persistent
will

be achieved by

capabilities.

commons will be an ability to provide
surveillance in the global maritime commons

maritime

fully integrating a

broad variety of information sources into a

coherent, agile capability that allows analysts to generate the knowledge needed to

make informed decisions with respect to the global maritime commons.
The expanse and complexity of the global commons presents problems of scale,
scope and a convenient operating space for highly accomplished, sophisticated and
dedicated foes. Only by recognizing the broad expanse of the
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focusing our intelligence efforts

on those portions

that can yield the information

necessary to counter the wide array of threats can we address the

new and emerging

security challenges of the twenty- first century.

Notes
1.

Department of Homeland

Awareness

(Oct., 2005), available at

Security, National Strategy to Achieve

Maritime Domain

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf.
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Maritime Domain Awareness:

The Key to Maritime Security

Joseph

L.

Nimmich and Dana A. Goward*

Maritime security is burdened by thousands ofyears of history and tradition.

We

in the Coast

Guard

particularly poignant

teen

months

basis.

One

reminder came in October of 2002, a scant

thir-

middle of a weekday afternoon, a

fifty-

are

reminded of this truism on a daily

after the 9/11 attacks. In the

up near the Rickenbacker Causeway in Miami, Florida and
offloaded 220 illegal aliens directly into the heart of downtown. Naturally, a news
helicopter was overhead and the event was almost instantly broadcast nationwide.
The US Coast Guard is supposed to play a leading role in preventing these kinds of
foot long boat pulled

1

incidents,
Collins,

and the commandant of the Coast Guard

at the time,

Admiral Thomas

ended up briefing the secretary of transportation. After he was told of the

some disbelief, asked Admiral Collins, "How in the
through?" The Admiral's reply was "Sir, with all due respect,

incident, the secretary, in

world did they get

how did they get through what?"
This

is

have long

an amusing story for those of us in the maritime community because we

known and

and coastal areas.
two important

It

accepted the openness and vulnerabilities of our

many port

should be an instructive story for us as well, though, as

points. First,

it

it

makes

dramatically reminds us of the vulnerability of these

Nimmich, US Coast Guard and Captain Dana A. Goward, US Coast
of this article was published in the April 2007 issue of the U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings and is republished with permission.
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our transportation and economic systems. Our ports are

trans-shipment nodes that are responsible for 95 percent of our trade.
highly specialized;
frastructure.

Most

all

have high concentrations of expensive,

ports are in population centers

—and

all

essential

Many

are

difficult to replace in-

are

economic engines.

Yet security has often been seen as an expensive obstacle, rather than an essential
contributor, to the long-term, uninterrupted free flow of commerce.

Second, the incident in Miami, and the Secretary of Transportation's reaction,
tell

us that

we maritime

professionals

fall far

short of the expectations of govern-

ment leaders and the populations they represent. The great majority of our leaders
and citizenry are landsmen with no maritime experience at all. They are familiar
with air travel, as a large portion of the population has traveled at least once by airplane. They know from movies and television that aircraft, airports, and the skies
are

monitored by radar operators, and that

aircraft off course or in trouble

quickly identified and assisted. Their experience at airports

of air

traffic is orderly, efficient, fairly

secure and

much the

can be

them that the flow
same from one place to
tells

the next. Because few have experience with maritime transportation, they unconsciously

assume

—and expect—

aviation also exists at seaports
trary,

that the kind of orderliness

and on the ocean.

When

they are disappointed, and often wonder why it

nity has not entered the

modern

is

and security they see

in

they discover to the con-

that the maritime

commu-

age.

A part of the answer is again that maritime security is burdened by thousands of
years of history

and

tradition. Unlike aviation,

which sprang to

life

as

we know

today in less than a hundred years and which has a coherent, relatively complete
chitecture of policies

and supporting systems, maritime

it

ar-

practices have evolved

over centuries. Maritime policies and supporting systems have likewise evolved

and have developed ad hoc. Unlike aviation where transparency has been the

hall-

mark of safety and has been improved even more for security purposes, the maritime domain has long been marked by a culture of secrecy that now works against
both individual community members and society as a whole.
Policy

and Systems Architectures

The world's aviation system has a clearly articulated policy architecture and is supported by a well-developed systems architecture designed to monitor compliance
and aid enforcement of the rules regulating flight operations. Maritime transportation, while there are local exceptions

the centuries into a

around the globe, has generally evolved over

hodgepodge of interconnecting, often disparate

policies, sup-

ported by semi- or completely incompatible sensor and information systems.

58

Joseph

L.

Nimmich and Dana A. Goward

made even more complex by
highly fragmented, some might say near chaotic, governance. A National Academy
domain

In the United States, the maritime

of Sciences study determined there were

at least

is

eighteen federal agencies that have

some aspect of US maritime transportation and
no formal method of coordinating their efforts. 2 Add to these

responsibility for regulating

that

there

fed-

is little

to

eral agencies a variety

of agencies and organizations from the individual

coastal cities, specially

commissioned port

facility operators, etc.,

authorities,

states,

marine exchanges, private

and you have a truly dizzying picture.

It

explains the old say-

ing that, "if you have seen one port, you've just seen one port." There are 361

mercial seaports in the United States and

com-

have different combinations of

all

geography, governance, sensors, operating rules, ownership, mix of activities and
so on.

It is

not a situation that easily lends

itself to

improvements in

safety, security,

or the efficient flow of commerce.

While the attacks of September

were conducted through the aviation

1 1

sys-

tem, the pre-existing aviation systems and policy architectures allowed for an ex-

and coordinated response. Near real-time

ceptionally rapid

visibility

of the

means of communication throughout
the aviation system meant that the threat could rapidly be contained. Over five
thousand aircraft were safely landed in less than two hours. Afterward, those same
policy and system architectures provided forensics and made it very easy to insert
policy changes and systems modifications to prevent further attacks. While one
airspace of the United States

and

effective

can debate whether or not those changes were the correct ones, once decided

upon, they were
policy

easily

and systems

and

effectively

implemented

as a part

of overall, coherent

structures.

We do not have the same advantages in the maritime domain. There is no maritime equivalent of the National Airspace System Plan 3 that details the various parts
of the system and

how they are to work together and ensure that each is appropri-

ately considered in governance.

different federal agencies, have

gaps.

Maritime system

no uniting

policies,

structure and, in aggregate, have huge

As one example, over thirteen million recreational

tered access to the nation's commercial
states require that these boats

making boat

registration

craft

have virtually unfet-

and military harbors. While the individual

be registered,

much

developed by eighteen

many have no

or lax titling practices,

easier to obtain legitimately or fraudulently.

And,

motor vehicle registrations, vessel data is not easily exchangeable and accessible by enforcement officials. An enforcement officer in Florida, for example, has a
unlike

very difficult time,

if it

can be done

at

all,

verifying information for a vessel that ap-

pears to be registered in Michigan. Further, and
currently required to

most importantly, few boaters

are

know how to safely operate their vessel and understand mari-

time rules and regulations. Most

states

do not even require that a boat operator
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carry personal identification. Imagine the impact

to
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on highway

safety

and law en-

forcement if drivers were not only untrained and unlicensed, but not even required
to carry

photo

identification.

Compounding the lack of a complete and coherent maritime policy structure is
a lack of systems to enforce those policies we do have. In 2003, four Cuban Coast
Guard members decided they no longer wanted to work in Castro's Cuba. One
night they drove their small patrol boat north until, at about three o'clock in the

morning, they found the Hyatt Hotel marina in Key West, Florida. They walked

around Key West
surrendered.
that their
strict

4

for

two hours

until they located a patrolling police officer

One can imagine them handing over their side arms and explaining

AK-47s were

still

in the boat. Despite

requirements for international maritime

comprehensive laws that establish

arrivals,

our lack of adequate mari-

time surveillance results in an average of fourteen successful,

We

cursions into the United States each and every week.

damage

is

and

illegal,

malicious in-

can only hope that the

and the occasional

limited to landing illegal migrants, tons of narcotics,

well-armed Cuban Coast Guardsman.

A

Culture of Secrecy

Another part of the burden of maritime history and tradition is a culture of secrecy.
Dealers in commodities don't want competitors to
tions of their cargos.

Fishermen don't want others to

ship of commercial vessels

paper corporations.

mons
from

is

know

the sources

and destina-

fish their favorite spots.

Owner-

often concealed through a network of contracts

and

On the vast and largely ungoverned and unpoliced global com-

that are the world's oceans, being difficult to find has
pirates, the navies

been key to protection

of hostile nations, and others that would do a vessel harm.

This tradition of secrecy, along with the nature of the sea and ships, has led to

maritime transportation being the preferred vector for some of the world's most

infamous and
start a

evil cargos. Slaves,

contraband, narcotics, conventional weapons to

new war, or a weapon of mass destruction to inflict terror, all these and more

can be transported in greater quantities, and often with greater secrecy, by sea than

by any other mode. Maritime commerce brings near
but

its

The

culture of secrecy has allowed

international

minimize the

evil

it

limitless

good

to the world,

to bring significant evil as well.

community has always

struggled to maximize the

brought by maritime transportation.

good and

We want to take advantage

of the sea's bounty to feed our children but don't want to destroy the fishing

grounds and starve our grandchildren.

merce but don't want

illegal

We want to

ensure the free flow of com-

substances and people smuggled ashore.

freedom of navigation, but are concerned that a
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mere miles

from one foreign port

off our coast, en route

no obligation to report its position or course, or obey our directions. We are concerned that some day such a vessel will be transiting off one of our
and
ports or a defense facility or a large city when it suddenly turns toward shore
to another, with

—

disaster will strike.

We

understand that in an information age security

transparency.

not in secrecy, but in

lies

And we are becoming convinced that it is time to begin shedding the

burden of thousands of years of maritime history and

tradition.

So how shall this be done? Improving governance with a more coherent and systematic approach to maritime regimes (policies, rules, regulations, statutes)
tainly required.

and respond

to violations of those policies. First

most though, we must understand the maritime domain and what
it,

cer-

We must also ensure that sufficient patrol and enforcement assets

are deployed to deter

within

is

so that we can formulate

good policy,

effectively

is

and

fore-

going on

deploy assets and ensure

the uninterrupted free flow of commerce.

Maritime Domain Awareness

—

See,

Understand, Share

Our goal must be to achieve " [a]n effective understanding of anything in the maritime environment that can

ment of the United

effect [sic] the safety, security,

economy, or environ-

of "maritime domain awareness" in the

States," the definition

5

National Strategy for Maritime Security. Achieving awareness will require that

maritime

activities

erly understood,

possible

and actors become more transparent,

and

that this visibility

among members

that

what

is

seen

and understanding be shared

is

prop-

as widely as

of the maritime community.

See.

We must overcome the traditional culture of secrecy and make all activity and actors

more transparent. Evil can dwell only in dark and hidden places. Transparency

leads to self-correcting behavior by shining a light that exposes
forces the ethic of good ones.

moving his advantage.

It

It

levels the playing field

bad actors and rein-

by revealing the cheat and re-

improves safety and commerce by better informing users

of hazards, conditions and routes.

And

it

helps us focus scarce enforcement re-

sources in the most important areas.

Understand.

Watching the flow of maritime

activities

and actors

is

of little use unless what

is

being seen can be understood. Decision makers must be able to differentiate a nor-

mal and innocent scene from one containing anomalies
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When

to

available, intelligence, analysis
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and pattern recognition must

be integrated into a context of broad situational awareness to understand motives

and intent. The goal

and prevent all threats and all hazards. Without understanding, the best surveillance system in the world will only be able to docu-

ment adverse

is

to deter

events as they unfold.

Share.
If we are to

be successful in our maritime

safety, security,

and stewardship

efforts,

we will need to harness the abilities, authorities, time and efforts of all stakeholders.
"Unity of command" among various levels of our federal, state and local governments, agencies of foreign governments, industry partners,
undesirable. Rather,

and

interests

we must foster "unity of effort"

unachievable and

in pursuit of our

mutual goals

through proactive, aggressive information exchange. Sharing data,

analysis, operating pictures

security

etc. is

and permissions)

and the

will

like as

broadly as possible (given appropriate

provide multiple benefits and help with

at least

two

significant problems:
•

We

don't

know what we know. Information needed

decisions often exists but

is

Data that showed multiple
purchased

to

make

critical

not available and correlated by those who might use

men

it.

of foreign origin traveling with no luggage had

time on four different airlines

airline tickets shortly before flight

on the morning of September 11, 2001. Had this data been available and
shared widely in an aviation safety and security community that understood the

existed

potential threat, the world today might be a far different place.
•

The challenge of complexity. The pursuit of maritime

safety, security

and

stewardship involves widely diverse players with far different sets of authorities,

and

responsibilities

capabilities

—and

these players operate in unique

and varied

geographic and maritime locations. Shared awareness empowers each player and
fosters unity of effort in

dozens of ways, from better informing individual

missions and avoiding "blue on blue" conflict, to drawing on the unconscious

knowledge of

local experts.

Done

properly,

it

enables each

member

of the

maritime community to use shared data and knowledge to create a unique picture
in support of its

own needs and missions.

This enables each to bring the

of its unique authority, experience and expertise to the overall

The

full

force

effort.

Way Ahead

Domain Awareness (MDA) is a state of being, a goal that
will never be completely obtained as we strive for ever greater understanding. More
In the abstract, Maritime
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something that mariners have been obtaining, to a degree, since the

dugout canoe was launched and people

felt

the pull of the current and the

pressure of the wind.

As now envisioned, Maritime Domain Awareness
fuses,

and analyzes data about

activities in,

is

a process that collects,

and the conditions

of,

vironment and then disseminates the data gathered and analysis
makers. Put another way,
is

it's

that's the threat, fuse the

results to decision

the ability to gather the information to detect

what

it

information to truly know that it is a threat, analyze it so

that the necessary corrective action can be determined,

that information to a

the maritime en-

command and

the necessary action to be taken.

It is

control

mode

and then be able

(the decision

move

to

maker) to order

a process that will be heavily

dependent on

some of which currently exists, some of which will require development. The "observables" on which information is collected include the characteristics of the vessel and its history, information on the passengers, crew and cargo,
infrastructure, sea lanes, threats and weather. The collection portion of the process
technology,

wide variety of sources: sensors, both short and long range; open

will involve a

source; private sector; law enforcement; intelligence agencies; and, of course, our

international partners.
sive.

Our surveillance

capabilities

must be

persistent

and perva-

Some of the sensor technology to meet this requirement already exist, e.g., radars,

cameras and space-based imaging systems; however, nearly all existing systems

re-

quire upgrades. Other technologies, including high-altitude, long-endurance un-

manned
and

air vehicles;

aerostats

remotely piloted,

unmanned

and buoys equipped with

surface

and subsurface

vessels;

a variety of sensors are possibilities for the

future system.

The next

step in the

MDA process

is

to fuse

and analyze data gathered. Unless

that can be accomplished in a timeframe that permits effective action to be taken

against identified threats, the utility of the data will be limited. Processing the
sive quantities of data in a timely

manner to create actionable information presents

an enormous challenge. Advanced, automated data-fusion technologies
critical to

the task,

velopment
Because

on

is

will

be

and these do not exist today except as advanced research and de-

projects.

MDA can only be achieved through a partnership of many government

agencies, the dissemination of information

holders

mas-

between agencies and other stake-

Today the sharing of information among agencies is dependent
networks and communication processes. Unfortunately most of those

essential.

existing

systems were designed for intra-agency not inter-agency dissemination of infor-

mation.

These communication

difficulties

are

further

compounded when

nonfederal organizations are considered. While progress has been made,

much

needs to be done to develop networked information sharing using Internet-based
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technologies that will be the key to ensuring that the necessary information
sented to operational

commanders and other

decision makers in a

pre-

that en-

dynamic and confident decisions and responses to maritime threats.

ables accurate,

While much remains

to be

done

MDA process of the future, our

to create the

awareness of activities in the maritime domain
history.

manner

is

is

better today than at

any point

in

Much of that progress has been made in the five years since 9/11. We now

require major vessels in international trade to carry Automatic Identification System

transmitters so that

we can

movements. US Customs and Border Pro-

track their

Center has

tection's National Targeting

made huge

progress in understanding the

supply chain and tracking cargoes. The International Maritime Organization has
agreed to a fundamental change in the world's view of information to which a
coastal State
states will

is

entitled concerning ships

and

by up

to 1,000 nautical miles offshore.

activities therein

6

know about ships that

Yet our understanding of

remains highly fragmented and contains huge gaps.

To use an aviation metaphor from 9/ 1 1
a lot of un-reinforced cockpit doors.

To do

international voyages. In 2008 coastal

have the right under international convention to

are just passing

the sea

on

,

in the

maritime environment there are

We have a duty to do better.

substantially better will require unity of effort across the entire maritime

community. The National Plan

to Achieve

Maritime Domain Awareness, 7 ap-

proved by the White House in October of 2005, envisioned such an
vided the

first

few tentative steps forward on what

the two years since

its

and

will

effort

and pro-

be a continuing journey. In

approval, the interagency process has developed an

Concept of Operations that
terprise

still

a national

establishes

MDA

MDA

both a maritime situational awareness en-

governance structure. The new "Director, Global

Maritime Situational Awareness" (GMSA)

is

an interagency position hosted by the

Coast Guard. Along with the Director, Global Maritime Intelligence Integration

(a

pre-existing position within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence), the

GMSA

director will co-chair an inter-department

MDA Stakeholder Board that

has responsibility for identifying needs, advocating for solutions and ensuring coordination between departments and agencies.

Complementing the progress in governance has been the rapid development of
MDA technology and data sharing projects that are blossoming almost faster than
they can be harvested.

One

Community of Interest.
technical advice

the project

is

especially

noteworthy

Jointly sponsored

effort

is

the

MDA Data Sharing

by the Coast Guard and US Navy, with

from the Defense Department Chief Information

Officer's office,

demonstrating the ease of data sharing in a publish-and-subscribe,

members as diverse as local
Even more importantly, it is

network-centric environment that can accommodate

harbor police and national intelligence analysts.
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proving once again that technology is the easy part of the equation compared to addressing political, process

and people

issues.

Conclusion

Maritime Domain Awareness

is

the key to Maritime Security.

Our

—

current

—

we could be and should be given
available technologies and a reasonable willingness to work together. Our national
security depends upon continued progress on a journey that has only begun.
Moreover, the public expects we should already be far ahead of where we are. We
should make best speed to meet, and then exceed, those expectations.
awareness capabilities

fall far

short of where

Notes
1.

For a report of the incident as

Ship and

Walk

visited, Feb.
2.

it

was occurring,

see

CNN.com,

Haitian Refugees

Jump

to Shore, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0210/29/bn.02.html (last

28,2007).

Transportation Research Board of the National

Academy of

Sciences,

The Marine

Transportation System and the Federal Role: Measuring Performance, Targeting Improvement
83 (2004).

The National Airspace System Plan was developed by the Federal Aviation Administrapublished in 1981, and updated several times since then, it is a comprehensive plan to
modernize and improve air traffic control and airway facilities services.
4. See NBC6.net, Four Cuban Coast Guardsman Defect in Key West, Feb. 7, 2003, http://
3.

tion. First

www.nbc6.net/news/1963227/detail.html.
5.

The White House, National

Strategy for Maritime Security 27 (Sept. 2005), available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf.
6.

ited

Long Range
and Tracking, http://www.imo. org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=905 (last vis-

See International Maritime Organization, Maritime Safety Committee,

Identification

Mar.

8,

2007).

Maritime Domain Awareness (Oct. 2005),
available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg-5/docs/MDA%20Plan%20Oct05-3.pdf.
7.

The White House, National Plan

to Achieve

65

PART III
COMMAND OF THE COMMONS
THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

V
Threats from the Global

Commons:

Problems of Jurisdiction and Enforcement

Stuart Kaye*
Introduction

Oceans cover approximately 70 percent of the surface of the Earth. For international lawyers, this has long been an area which lay

beyond the control

of States. Prior to the advent of jurisdiction based on the continental shelf and the
exclusive
diction.

economic zone (EEZ), almost

all

Only a tiny belt of sea of usually 3

rect control of a coastal State.

1

of this area was beyond national juris-

to 4 nautical miles

was subject

to the di-

Even today under the 1982 United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention), 2 where coastal

States

can extend their jurisdiction to the seabed and waters around their

out to

200 nautical miles, and the seabed in limited circumstances to as
tical miles,

3

littoral

much as 350 nau-

two-thirds of the world's oceans are beyond any national jurisdiction.

This article considers the challenges facing coastal States attempting to combat
threats to their security that pass

through

this vast area

of high

seas, in areas

where

no jurisdiction. It will consider the nature of the threats posed
and what tools international law provides States in order to respond

the coastal State has
in these areas,

to these threats.
assist in

It

will

conclude by positing areas where further development

improving the coastal

ion to a threat in the global

State's ability to react in a timely

and

commons. However, before doing so,

consider the limits of the global

commons

Dean of Law, University of Wollongong,

effective fash-

it is

necessary to

for the purposes of the paper.

Australia.

may

Threats from the Global

Commons: Problems ofJurisdiction and Enforcement
The Global Commons

There are a number of different definitions possible for the extent of the oceanic

commons. One would be to limit the commons to areas entirely beyond national jurisdiction and control. This would include the deep seabed, referred to in
global

LOS Convention

the 1982

as the Area, consisting of all of the seabed outside the

continental shelf of any State, and the waters beyond the

commons

are

as jurisdiction

Seabed Authority

by

of any State. 4 These

vested, in the case of the Area, in the International

is

as part of the

the high seas, jurisdiction

EEZ

common heritage

States

is

of mankind, 5 and in the case of

limited to vessels flying their

except in

flag,

very specific and limited circumstances.

Yet in a

number of ways,

restricting the global

commons to these areas does not

adequately indicate the freedom from State jurisdiction that
the waters of the EEZ.

nomic

activity,

marine

The EEZ only

available even in

is

gives a coastal State jurisdiction over eco-

scientific research

and environmental matters. 6

give a coastal State jurisdiction to interfere with

It

does not

freedom of navigation, the laying

of submarine cables or pipelines, or to stop and board vessels unless they infringe
coastal State laws

concerned with the EEZ. 7 This means that even

if a

foreign vessel

had individuals onboard who had committed serious crimes against the
State,

it

would not be open

for the coastal State to apply

its

law to that

coastal

vessel.

In

some respects then, the EEZ remains an area of commons, even though the coastal
State

may

mining.
the

still

be able to regulate economic

A similar

situation

is

activities

such

as fishing

and seabed

reflected for aerial navigation, as the airspace over

EEZ and high seas is international airspace, where there is a right of freedom of

aerial navigation. 8

In the context of this article, the global

commons will be treated as

areas

where

the activities of vessels not subject to effective flag-State control cannot, for the

most part, be

regulated. This will certainly include the high seas, but would also en-

compass the EEZ, where, although the
tect

economic

and

activities

activities, it

coastal State

would possess the right to pro-

would lack the jurisdiction to

regulate

most other actors

from whence a threat may come.
Threats from the Global

Commons

There are two distinct types of threats that come from the high

seas.

The

first

en-

compasses threats against the ports and territory of a coastal State that originate

from the
struction
allies,

sea.

Such threats might be through the shipment of weapons of mass de-

(WMD)

or related delivery systems to a port for use against a State or

its

or the use of a vessel in a direct attack. In the latter case, this could be from a
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naval vessel, or could be accomplished using a commercial vessel which has been

commandeered or hijacked and which is destroyed in the port of a State
cause damage to facilities or human life.
The first type of attack has yet to occur in the West, although it has occurred in the

chartered,
to

Middle East against Western

interests.

9

Even

from shipping have been the

so, threats

amount of planning and cooperative effort internationally.
The Proliferation Security Initiative 10 and the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code) 11 at an international level, or the United States' Confocus of a tremendous

tainer Security Initiative 12 internally, are excellent examples of responses to this direct threat

from the

sea. States

have moved cooperatively to put in place

measures designed to protect shipping and maritime infrastructure from
threats,

and to better cooperate

in sharing data

made in

and intelligence.

13

has been

sidering the scale

and reach of the measures within the ISPS Code and

a relatively short space of time, especially con-

were adopted and functioning well within
first

type of threat in

terrorist

Significant prog-

ress in these areas

The

legal

some ways

five years

is

of the 9/11 attacks.

relatively easily dealt

that they

14

with from a legal

Once a vessel enters the port of a State, unless it is sovereign immune,
becomes subject to the regulation of the port State, whose criminal laws can be

point of view.
it

applied to activities taking place onboard. 15

would attract the jurisdiction of the port
ship could be taken inside the port
is

An

State,

by local

attempt to ship

WMD into a port

and enforcement action against the

authorities.

Even

if the

offending vessel

immune, it can be asked to vacate the port and the territorial waters of
port State, and must comply in an expeditious fashion. Additionally, the ac-

sovereign

the

tions of the offending vessel
flag State for

may give

rise to a valid

claim for damages against the

any breaches of the law of the port State committed by the

Port States can also close the port to international
for failure to

traffic

vessel. 16

or refuse vessels entry

comply with entry requirements. For example, the Australian Mari-

time Identification System requires vessels to provide data to Australian authorities

of the vessel's crew, cargo, route and previously visited ports. This data

sought

when

the vessel

Although there
effective

is

no

is

within 1,000 nautical miles of the Australian continent.

territorial jurisdiction to enforce

because failure to provide the data

entry to the port and subsequent arrest
tion to proceed to

its

is

if it

may

such a measure,

it

has been

result in the vessel being refused

enters the territorial sea with an inten-

intended port. The right of entry becomes tied to additional

conditions, which can be used to improve security

and give operators

ture of the maritime security environment in adjacent waters.

a clearer pic-

17

The second type of threat is one directed at activities in the global commons. Activities in

the

commons

and communications

via

include transportation, fishing,

submarine

cable.
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aircraft

on

a range of levels,

and

it is

appropriate to consider

each in turn.
Attacks on ships at sea have been a feature of maritime transportation since an-

The legal concept of piracy is of great antiquity, and the ability of States
deal with piratical acts against their shipping is quite extensive. 18 The 1982 LOS

cient times.
to

Convention, codifying existing customary international law, provides for universal
jurisdiction over vessels engaged in piracy, provided that enforcement action

is

un-

dertaken by marked government vessels in areas outside the territorial sea of third
19

States.

armed

This potentially gives great freedom of action to flag States to use their

forces to protect their shipping

from

pirate activity.

In practice, the availability of universal jurisdiction to deal with piracy has been
limited

by two key factors.

Firstly, universal jurisdiction

cidents taking place outside the territorial sea.

the

paramountcy of the

over piracy is limited to in-

The 1982 LOS Convention

retains

coastal State's sovereignty within the territorial sea,

and

consistent with the regime of innocent passage, non-coastal State vessels lack the

power

to effect an arrest of a pirate vessel in these waters.

The second

factor

is

of greater relevance to recent concerns over security. The

traditional definition of piracy
profit.

20

is

the attacking of a vessel in pursuit of personal

This motivation for profit distinguishes piratical acts from

activities

with a

purely political motivation. Since terrorists are generally not motivated in their
tacks

by the

possibility of personal profit,

but rather the advancement of a

cause or the desire to frighten and disrupt lawful
terrorist acts at sea

do not

fall

activities,

at-

political

has been accepted that

it

under the umbrella of piracy.

While attacks on shipping present

a threat

from the global commons, there are

other and different threats posed to other activities taking place in the world's
oceans. Oil

pensive

and gas exploitation of offshore fields means that there are large and ex-

facilities

permanently moored

platforms, loading

They

facilities

are exploiting

could be

set alight

in areas

remote from coastal

and pipelines are extremely vulnerable

areas.

These

to hostile action.

and storing quantities of flammable gases or

liquids,

which

by terrorist action, or alternatively could be the source of signifi-

cant environmental harm.
Terrorist attacks against oil

and gas platforms have not taken place, although the

occupation of Brent Spar by Greenpeace in 1995 21 demonstrated the relative ease
with which terrorists could occupy an offshore platform and the
ent in their removal. Attacks against oil

context of armed conflicts, and the

and gas

facilities

difficulties inher-

have taken place in the

facilities are particularly

vulnerable.

The lack of

a terrorist attack has not prevented international concern over the potential threat,

and has

led to international law providing coastal States

to protect such facilities.

72

and others greater powers

Stuart Kaye

Submarine cables and pipelines are
global

commons.

All States

also

an example of vulnerable

assets in the

have the right to lay cables and pipelines along the sea

floor outside the territorial sea.

These cables and pipelines cannot be restricted by

the coastal State, although there

is

a right for coastal States to be consulted with re-

spect to the route such cables or pipelines

might take. As with oil and gas platforms,

a concrete terrorist threat against these facilities has yet to occur, but the possibility

of damage and disruption
in Iraq

is

not insignificant. Terrestrial attacks against pipelines

and Nigeria have caused

tacks against

rises, albeit

temporary, in world

submarine pipelines would have the added

widespread environmental harm, possibly to the

more expensive and
bles, still carry the

difficult to repair.

EEZ

Submarine

oil prices.

difficulties

22

At-

of causing

of another State, and be

far

cables, especially fiber optic ca-

bulk of the world's telephonic and electronic data, and their

dis-

harm world communication in some areas for an extended period. 23
In both cases, the risk of harm from attack is not insubstantial. The locations of
pipelines and cables are marked on commercially available charts and the coordiruption could

nates of cables can be

downloaded from the Internet without

cost.

This because

both pipelines and submarine cables are vulnerable to accidental damage by mariners engaged in lawful activities. Notice of their location reduces the risk of harm.

The

practical

upshot of this legitimate and sensible precaution

geting of such facilities
ties

is

to

make

the tar-

much easier for those engaged in potential terrorist activi-

against them.

Responses
International law has for

many

years permitted ships

and

flag States to protect

themselves from attack. The fact that piracy attracts universal jurisdiction in areas

beyond the

territorial sea

emphasizes

this fact.

Any ship

that

is

subjected to an at-

tack by pirates outside the territorial sea can receive assistance, and the pirates

taken into custody by the warships of any State.
In the context of responding to attacks
flag State

on

its

nationals or ships flying

its flag,

a

has a right of self-defense and can take steps to protect individuals and

would permit naval escort of ships by the flag State and a right to take
action to protect those ships from attack. Difficulties may arise where a State's
nationals are onboard vessels that are flagged to another State. This makes efforts at
ships. This

protection problematic, and

would require the

flag State to

consent to warships of

another State providing protection. However, the provision of protection to other
flagged vessels

cedent for

it

is

by no means impossible with such consent and there is ample pre-

during times of armed

the Iran-Iraq

war when,

conflict. 24

Such

difficulties

after tankers entering the Persian
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from Iran, the United States Navy (and navies of other neutral nations) formed
convoys of neutral-flag merchant vessels, or escorted or accompanied neutral-flag
fire

merchant

vessels carrying cargoes to

and from neutral

In the context of protecting shipping

from

States.

25

terrorist attack, a separate instru-

ment was negotiated under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to facilitate a response. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 26 (SUA Convention) was negotiated as a direct result of the 1985 hijacking of the Italian liner Achille Lauro. 27 The
necessity for an international response

community as

ences within the international
racy. This
fact the

was manifested in part because of
to

whether the attack constituted

was because of the requirement that piracy be

group that attacked the

differ-

for "private" ends,

pi-

and the

vessel, the Palestinian Liberation Front, staged the

attack for political purposes. Other States, including the United States, considered

amounted

that the attack

to piracy,

and were concerned

dent of this type might be undermined
Obviously, with this difference of view

instrument to

clarify the

if it
it

that responses to an inci-

were not considered a

piratical act. 28

was necessary to create an international

response to what was

still

manifestly an

The response adopted was the 1988 SUA Convention.

It

illegal act.

dealt with certain acts

against shipping, including seizing a ship, acts of violence against individuals
ship,

damage

ment of the

to a ship or

its

safety of a ship

cargo so as to endanger

by

its

safe navigation,

on

a

endanger-

interfering with maritime navigational facilities or

false signal. 29

The purpose motivating the acts is not relevant, and therefore there would be some overlap with piracy, although the scope of the SUA Convention is necessarily much wider. The SUA Convention applies to ships that have
sending a

journeyed outside the

territorial sea

side the territorial sea.

30

of a single State, or are scheduled to pass out-

Parties to the

SUA

Convention have jurisdiction to deal

with such offenses, based on the ship's presence in their
of their flag or other means.

31

However, the

territorial sea, possession

SUA Convention did not deal directly

with the boarding of vessels where jurisdiction might be asserted by another State.

The Preamble of

the

SUA

Convention provides "matters not regulated by

this

Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law,"

which would

Article 110 of the 1982

limit non-flag State intervention to acts covered

LOS

Convention, in

this context acts

of piracy.

32

under

There are

also provisions to allow for either prosecution or extradition of individuals be-

lieved to have

committed

SUA

offenses. 33

Convention was amended by a new protocol pertaining

to

maritime terrorism against shipping. 34 The focus of the 2005 amendments

is

In 2005 the

weapons of mass destruction

(WMD)

were created, including using a ship

and

their non-proliferation.

35

New offenses

36
as a platform for terrorist activities,
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transportation of a person
tion,

37

who

SUA Conven-

has committed offenses under the

or any of another nine listed anti-terrorism conventions. 38

The 2005

amendments also widen the scope for third party boarding of ships, although flagState authorization
States also

is still

were of the view that maritime terrorism need not be limited to

but could also be directed
tion of a protocol to the
acts

required for such a boarding. 39

at offshore oil

and gas

SUA Convention

applies to "fixed platforms,"

petroleum producing structures.

all

installations at the

same time

as the

41

The 1988 Protocol
clude

adop-

(1988 Protocol) 40 that dealt with similar

committed against offshore petroleum

SUA Convention.

installations. This led to the

ships,

42

It

which

is

liberally defined to in-

also limits application to facilities

on

the continental shelf. This excludes the application of the protocol to installations
in the territorial sea of a coastal State, in the ordinary course of events. 43

fenses

under the 1988 Protocol are analogous to those under the

These include seizing a platform by

The

of-

SUA Convention.

damage threatening the
damage or destroy or en-

force, destruction or

safety of a platform, the placing of a device designed to

danger the safety of a platform, or threats, intimidation, or acts of violence against
persons onboard a platform. 44
States

the

under the 1988 Protocol have a similar jurisdictional envelope

SUA Convention. The

1982

on

fixed platforms

and this is confirmed in the 1988 Protocol.
have jurisdiction

the offender

is

if either

stateless

and

under

LOS Convention makes it clear that States have ju-

risdiction over offenses taking place

also

as

45

their continental shelf,

In addition, under the Protocol, States

the offender or the victim

a habitual resident

tended to coerce the State concerned.

on

of the

is

a national of the State,

State, or if the offense

is

if

in-

46

The 1988 Protocol does not deal with the issue of boarding of fixed platforms,
and as with the SUA Convention, the preamble reiterates "that matters not regulated by this Protocol continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general
international law," apparently limiting direct unilateral intervention against acts
against platforms to the coastal State. This
retain sole jurisdiction over activities

had a

right to

on

was to ensure that a coastal

its

platforms,

and another

State

would

State could not

board a platform, based on having jurisdiction over an

assert

it

fense.

The absence of a boarding provision would not prevent

giving a third State an ad hoc authorization to board

The 1988 Protocol was

also

similar in nature to the 2005

amended by protocol

its

a coastal State

of-

from

installation.

in 2005, 47 with

amendments

SUA Convention amendments. New offenses, includ-

ing using explosives or radioactive material or a biological, chemical, nuclear

(BCN) weapon to cause death, serious injury or damage to an installation; 48 releasing oil or gas from an installation in a manner calculated to cause death, serious
75

Threats from the Global

Commons: Problems ofJurisdiction and Enforcement

injury or damage; 49 or the threat to

commit such offenses, 50 were created. 51

party must take the measures necessary to apply its jurisdiction to
fixed platforms
rest

of the

on

its

its

continental shelf in respect to these offenses.

SUA Convention and the 2005 amendments,

A State

nationals

52

Much

and

of the

in relation to extradition,

cooperation concerning data and evidence, and domestic implementation, are ap-

by the 2005 Protocol mutatis mutandis. 53
The 2005 SUA Convention amendments and 1988 Protocol amendments

plied

enter into force after the twelfth ratification without reservation

Convention amendments
reservation
in the

56

55

for the Protocol

SUA Convention and

Protocol

and ninety days

amendments

amendments.

57

54

for the

after the third ratification

will

SUA

without

Given the current wide participation

1988 Protocol, both the Convention amendments and

are likely to enter into force relatively quickly.

Responses in relation to the protection of submarine cables and pipelines have

been

less

forthcoming. The 1982

LOS Convention

does provide that a coastal State

must be consulted over the route a cable or pipeline on its continental shelf may take,
but not that the coastal State has jurisdiction over the cable or pipeline. 58
pipeline

If a cable

or

owned by a coastal State or its nationals were damaged, the LOS Convention

provides that the flag State of the vessel, or of the nationality of the offender responsible,

has jurisdiction to deal with the

jurisdiction in the event the

damage

harm

caused. 59

A coastal State could only assert

to the cable or pipeline also caused

environment, on the basis of the coastal

State's

EEZ jurisdiction.

harm to

the

60

A coastal State asserting jurisdiction over an attack on a pipeline presents more
options than the situation for submarine cables.

An attack on an oil pipeline would

probably cause environmental damage, and therefore provide a basis for a coastal
State to assert

its

jurisdiction. 61 Article 79(4) of the 1982

LOS Convention

creates

an implication that a coastal State can make laws dealing with leaks from pipelines.

A coastal State might also respond to an attack on a cable or pipeline on the basis of
To do

would need to demonstrate the importance of the threatened infrastructure to itself, and that a use offeree is proportionate in the circumstances. This will always be a question of fact, and would be dependent upon the
self-defense.

so

it

cable being vital telecommunications infrastructure, or a pipeline carrying essential oil

or gas for the national economy. 62 Even in those circumstances, an isolated

attack,

not immediately detected by the coastal

the cable or pipeline, might

make

it

State, or

difficult to justify a

indeed other States using

response involving the use

of force.

One way to

increase the ability of States to respond to attacks

submarine cables might be to base an argument upon Article
2005

SUA

on

pipelines

3fois(l)(a)(iii)

and

of the

Convention amendments. This provision creates an offense where an

individual "uses a ship" to cause damage. 63 If the

76

employment of

a ship to aid
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terrorists in attacking a cable or a pipeline

could be described as a "use" of a ship

in the context of Article 3bis, then there could

be jurisdiction.

It is

submitted that

almost certainly beyond the anticipated scope of the of-

such a wide definition

is

fense. If the definition

could sustain such stretching, the consent of the

would

still

be required to

effect a

2005 Protocol amending the

boarding,

64

and the

flag State

flag State

be a party to the

SUA Convention.

Placing jurisdiction over pipelines and submarine cables outside the territorial
sea in the control of the flag State of the offending vessel

Convention, problematic.

registry.

action, as

it is

under the 1982 LOS

attacked a pipeline or cable with a chartered

perhaps a fishing trawler, the vessel

vessel,

open

If terrorists

is,

may well

be flagged in a State with an

This would substantially undermine the prospects of enforcement

number of States with open registries that have attracted
Georgia, Togo or Equatorial Guinea, 65 have no capacity to

clear that a

fishing vessels, such as

deal with attacks even close to their coasts.

Reliance on flag-State jurisdiction in the context of cables and pipelines
serves to highlight a broader problem, that

is,

the limitations of flag-State juris-

diction over vessels. While the jurisdiction of a flag State remains the para-

mount mechanism
States with

open

to determine the applicable law aboard a vessel, in the case of

registries the

connection to

meaningless. In that circumstance,

ment

at sea

their laws

it is

flag States

difficult to

can be so diffuse as to be

conceive that effective enforce-

can take place. Flag-of-convenience States have no capacity to enforce

on

ships flying their flag

to cooperate with other States to

around the world, and may have

remedy the

deficiency.

little

The United

incentive

States has

sought to tackle the problem in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative
with boarding agreements with a
Liberia

and Panama;

66

they

fall

number of States with open

registries,

including

short of permitting boarding in a wider range of

circumstances.

Conclusion

The

community has shown great energy in tackling threats in the
commons. The SUA Convention and Protocol in their 2005 iterations rep-

international

global

resent a substantial

and

platforms in the global

positive step forward in the legal protection of ships

commons beyond

the territorial sea. However,

it is

and

appar-

ent that States have yet to create protection for the totality of activities that take
place

beyond the

effective
ist,

territorial sea.

Adequate jurisdictional mechanisms

to ensure

an

response to attacks on submarine cables and undersea pipelines do not ex-

nor does

it

appear there are international

11

efforts in progress to

remedy the
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can only be hoped that

not the reality of an attack that acts as the

it is

produce positive change in these

areas.
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1988
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1

.

This definition includes

artificial islands, instal-

in exploration or exploitation of the seabed or

some other

eco-

nomic purpose.
43.

Id., art. 1(2).

44.

Id., art. 2(1).

The offenses include attempting,

abetting

and threatening to commit an of-

fense. Id., art. 2(2).
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VI
Preemption by Armed Force
of Trans-boundary Terrorist Threats:

The Russian Perspective

Bakhtiyar R.

A

zealous legalist

would argue

Tuzmukhamedov*

that Russia, or rather

Union, has repeatedly demonstrated

the absence of an actual attack against

include the "Winter

Hungary in 1956 and

itself.

War" of 1939-40

its

its

predecessor the Soviet

armed force in
would likely be cited

inclination to use

Precedents that

and the interventions

against Finland,

in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

in

Some might add the deployment

to Afghanistan in 1979 or, in paradoxical contradistinction to those examples, the

Wehrmacht

attack against the

USSR which was launched

in 1941, at least as

claimed by Nazi leaders and some contemporary historians, to forestall an immi-

nent Red

Army assault.

Whatever the merits of those alleged precedents,
formal

acts, the Soviet

Union abided by a

tion of the principle of non-use of force.

* Professor,

declaratory policy

and

acceded to the Treaty for the Renuncia-

tion of War (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) of 1928 1

classical source, Justice

its

rather narrow, or restrictive, interpreta-

It

for the Definition of Aggression of 1933.

in

2

and was

a party to the

Although the

latter

Convention

might seem a

Jackson in his opening address for the United States

less

at the

Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, Russia. The views expressed herein are solely those

of the author.
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Nuremberg

Military Tribunal described

sources of international law

on

as

it

this subject."

"one of the most authoritative

3

In a conspicuous departure from the Soviet-era official and doctrinally
i.e.,

narrow, interpretation of the right of self-defense, Russian

2002, increasingly been indicating that

it

strict,

officials have, since

might be permissible to use armed force

against extraterritorial sources of imminent threat to Russian security, even in the

absence of an actual armed attack originating from those sources. Those state-

ments,

made by

politicians, senior military

president, were enthusiastically endorsed

The

qualifier that usually

Russian

official

ceptive."

As

ultimately

by the

by a handful of Russian legal academics. 4

accompanies the term "use of force"

is

"preventive,"

and

statements do not seem to be sensitive to nuances of meaning be-

tween that and other
5

commanders and

adjectives,

such as "preemptive," or "anticipatory," or "inter-

and nature of the sources of those

to the location

targets of the preventive use of force, while earlier declarations

threats

and the

announced an

in-

them globally, 6 their personality notwithstanding, eventually the
came to express a readiness to deal with sources of terrorist threats in

tention to engage
declarations

the space adjacent to the Russian territory.

The earlier remarks that caught international attention had been made in July
and August 2002 by Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov and other military commanders, and several ranking parliamentarians. These statements, incidentally, were
made soon after President George W. Bush broached preemption in his commencement address at the US Military Academy. 7
Those statements were prompted by the events that occurred on the RussianGeorgian border. Russia claimed that Chechen insurgents found refuge in the
Pankissi Gorge in Georgia, an area where Georgian law and order was nonexistent.
The area was convenient for insurgent rest and recreation, and to regroup and reenter Russian territory. Those allegations had been vehemently denied by Georgian authorities, although apparently the US "Train and Equip" mission to
Georgia 8 had, as one of its principal objectives, the establishment of viable indige-

nous law-enforcement units that could regain control over the mountainous and
hard-to-reach Pankissi Gorge area. Russian politicians asserted that even though

Georgian authorities could not be implicated beyond doubt in providing shelter to
insurgents, they definitely lacked the capability
to

and freedom of insurgent

and determination

to

deny access

activity in the area.

President Putin in his statement

on September

11,

2002 commemorating the

victims of the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States looked for legal sup-

port for the Russian position.

He said that "should the Georgian leadership be un-

able to secure the area adjacent to the border

and continue

Resolution 1373 of 28 September, 2001

we

.

84

.

.

,

to ignore the

UN SC

shall reserve the right to act in

"
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accordance with Article 51 of the

UN Charter that entitles every member-State of

the United Nations to enjoy an inherent right to individual or collective selfdefense." 9 President Putin went further and instructed the uniformed services to
draft

engagement plans "to pursue terrorists and destroy their bases that have been

reliably located

and

identified." 10

That statement by President Putin prompted an angry response from the Council

of Europe whose Parliamentary Assembly insisted that "Article 5 1 of the

UN Security Council, as well as Resolu-

Charter and Resolution 1269 (1999) of the
tion 1368 (2001) of the

UN

UN Security Council of 12 September do not authorize the

use of military force by the Russian Federation or any other State on Georgian territory." 11 It further called

on the Russian authorities to refrain from "launching any
military action on Georgian territory as expressed by the President of the Russian
Federation on 11 September 2002. 12

Not only was
dent Putin,
cil

the Parliamentary Assembly's declaration rather unfair to Presi-

was

it

also inaccurate.

Resolution 1373 for authority,

the Council of Europe.

It

The Russian president looked to Security Counand that reference was conspicuously ignored by

should be recalled that Resolution 1373 specifically urged

UN member-States to deny terrorists movement across borders and to ensure that
refugee status

not granted to persons suspected of terrorist

is

activity. 13

Russia was

concerned that Georgia was unable or unwilling to abide by those and other provisions of the resolution. Additionally, President Putin
diate military action be undertaken

had not ordered

on the territory of a sovereign

that

imme-

State. Rather,

ordered that contingency plans be made, conditional on Georgia's capacity to

own territory.
Putin's statement may also be interpreted as an implicit

fectively control

he
ef-

its

extrapolation, whether

conscious or not, of the right of hot pursuit from the realm of the law of the sea 14 to

trans-boundary law-enforcement. His phrase about "pursuit of terrorists" obvi-

when

would be pursued and apprehended, or
accounted for, either on the Russian territory, or, pursuit having commenced on
the Russian territory and continued across the border, on the territory of an adjaously alluded to situations

cent State. 15

It is

also

culprits

worth noting that the Russian president construed

Article 51

of the

UN Charter as entitling a State to the right of self-defense against an armed

attack

by actors other than

It is

an

a State.

true that Article 5 1 does not unequivocally refer to a State as a perpetrator of

attack;

however,

ited, Article

members of

51

if one

what

is

were to accept that "Article 2

permitted,"

16

and

the United Nations, that

States, too. It

is,

should be recalled that in

(4) explains

what is prohib-

Article 2 (4) refers to relations
States,

its

between

then Article 51 should apply to

Advisory Opinion on the Legal Conse-

quences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the
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International Court of Justice uttered a dictum, albeit argumentative, that "Article

51 of the Charter recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the
case of armed attack

While suspected
tive targeting

by one

State against another State." 17

terrorist bases in certain

neighboring countries and prospec-

of those bases have been a recurring theme in remarks by Russian se-

nior officials since 2002, most often they have not been country- specific. 18
In

most

instances, the statements describing situations that

would

justify the

employment of the armed forces beyond Russian territory to preempt an attack are
related to a terrorist threat. Occasional references to threats to lives

numbers of Russian

large

citizens or a "Russian-speaking population"

tary support for their evacuation

ian disaster.

and

from a zone of an armed

Even fewer statements are

also

made

that

conflict or a

it is

security of

imply milihumanitar-

admissible to use force

preemptively to meet the demands of unspecified "Russian interests" or of its

alli-

ance commitments.

The declared

targets of forceful action are individual terrorists, organized

groups of terrorists and their bases. The means to be used in a preemptive
against those targets are almost unrestricted, nuclear

arms being the only clear

ception. According to the defense minister, such a strike

fledged

As

combat

to the

action, but

would be delivered

geography of preemptive action,

to Russian territory.

strike

would not amount to

ex-

full-

"to avert a single terrorist threat."

it is

realistic to

look

at areas adjacent

An utterance by the chief of the General Staff that those strikes

could be delivered "anywhere on the globe" 19 appeared inconsistent with the

ments of the commander-in-chief addressing "interdiction of organized

state-

terrorist

groups attempting to penetrate our territory" and "pursuing and engaging terrorists."

20

Official declarations always
ists

and

State

their infrastructure, rather than persons

on whose

not, this

underscored that Russian forces

territory the

and

institutions of a sovereign

former found refuge. Whether done consciously or

seems to be an attempt to stave off prospective charges of committing an

act of aggression.

It is

worth noting that

political

and military leaders never miss a

chance to underscore that armed force would be used in
constitution, statutes

So

far

will target terror-

and international

strict

compliance with the

law.

those declarations have not comprised a comprehensive

official

doctrine

explaining under what circumstances and according to what criteria Russia would

be inclined to use a military tool to meet a ripening threat. The constitution, however, addresses

"an imminent threat of aggression" 21 against the Russian Federation

(Article 87.2), in

which case the president shall introduce martial law by a decree.

A

decree on the introduction of martial law and a decree on the introduction of the
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state

of emergency are the only acts by the president that require approval by the

Council of Federation;

The

all

other decrees remain his unilateral prerogative.

federal constitutional law

"On Martial Law"

describes the

imminent

threat

of aggression as "activities by a foreign State (States) committed in violation of the

UN Charter

and generally recognized principles and norms of international law

that immediately indicate that an act of aggression against the Russian Federation
is

being prepared, including the declaration of war against the Russian Federation"

(Article 3.3). 22

The

gap

legal

acting Terrorism" of 2006,

23

further filled

is

as

by

a recent federal law

amended, which supersedes an

"On Counter-

earlier federal

law

24

"On Combating Terrorism" of 1998, as amended.
The new law explicitly provides for the use of armed force against targets outside
Russian territory, on the high seas and, presumably, in international airspace. In
this context,

it

does not speak about preemption; however, the broad range of tasks

indicates that military

power might be required

to deal with threats that are not

necessarily imminent.

Terrorism
cal

is

defined in very broad terms as "an ideology of violence and practi-

impact on the decision making by bodies of State power, bodies of local

self-

government and international organizations, by way of intimidation of population
and/or by other

when

it

illegal

violent actions" (Article 3(1)).

The law

is

more

specific

further defines "terrorist activity" as comprising such diverse elements as

planning, preparation, funding and perpetration of a terrorist

act;

commit

arming and

a terrorist act; organizing a terrorist group; recruiting,

incitement to
train-

ing of terrorists; complicity in planning and committing a terrorist act; and propa-

gandizing of terrorist ideology and

engage in

calls to

it.

Finally, a terrorist act is

defined as "explosion, arson or other acts intimidating population and putting

human life at risk of death, leading to substantial loss of property, or to other grave
consequences, with an intent to exert impact on the decision making by bodies of
State

power or international organizations,

as well as a threat to

with same purposes" (Article 2(3), as amended).
trators thereof, or

used under the

The law
military

is

It is

means employed to commit them

against those acts, or perpe-

that the

may be ordered to engage a terrorist threat.
it

refers to

an

aircraft

It

forces shall be

does not speak about inter-

"not responding to radio mes-

to cease violating the rules of navigation in the

airspace of the Russian Federation, or to radio messages

transmitted by the aircraft of the Russian
is

armed

conspicuously vague as to the outer limits of the airspace where the

from ground controllers

dressed

commit those acts

new law.

national airspace. Moreover,
sages

25

Armed

Article 3 bis of the

Chicago Convention of 1944.
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visual signals being

Forces" (Article 7(2)).

the question of whether that provision could
26

and

come

Unad-

into conflict with
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Turning to sea space, the law

refers to internal waters

and the

territorial sea, as

well as to the continental shelf and to "national maritime navigation." Obviously,

the continental shelf may extend as far as 350 nautical miles
to "national

maritime navigation,"

plies navigation

it is

from the baselines. As

not immediately clear whether the law im-

within territorial limits or extends to ships flying the Russian flag

anywhere on the

seas,

with a possible exception of those chartered by foreign

entities.

There

is

no need, however,

to read

between the

lines of the

law to deduce

grounds for the use of the Russian military against terrorist targets beyond national
borders. Article 10 specifically addresses the issue of trans-boundary deployment

of units, as well as engagement of targets outside Russian territory without crossing
the border. 27 Remarkably, the law never mentions foreign territory as an area of de-

ployment; rather, the phrase that

is

used in the lead-in paragraph of Article 10.1

"interdiction of international terrorist activity

beyond

territorial

is

bounds of the

Russian Federation."

As
will

to internal procedures, the order to fire at terrorists

from Russian

territory

be given by the president unilaterally in the exercise of his constitutional pow-

ers as the

supreme commander-in-chief. To send troops across the border, the

president

would

While the

original version of the law required that the president

first

need to obtain consent from the Council of Federation. 28
submit informa-

tion regarding the proposed strength of the unit, the areas of deployment

and

its

by the Federal Law of July 27, 2006. 29
The law addresses "the interdiction of terrorist activity," which implies preemption due to the broad range of elements of "terrorist activity" as they are defined by
duration, that provision was deleted

the law.
thority,

armed

The law makes a general reference to international treaties as sources of aualong with Russian legislation, for trans-boundary employment of the

forces;

however, soon

after the

adoption of the federal law

"On Counter-

acting Terrorism," Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov stated that the law by itself pro-

vides sufficient grounds for unilateral
targets

on foreign

This author

is

soil.

not qualified to appraise the true capacity of the Russian military

to engage terrorists
nately,

and preemptive use of force against terrorist

30

who

threaten Russian citizens and assets abroad. Unfortu-

however, the recent drama with Russian embassy personnel in Baghdad

sadly proved that neither Russia nor local authorities, not even the occupying
ers,

were able to control the hostage

crisis

pow-

or save lives of internationally protected

persons. 31

The law "On Counteracting Terrorism" lists several principles, some of which
would sound similar to ones found in the established international law. For example,

consider the principle of "proportionality of measures undertaken to counter
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terrorism to the level of terrorist threat" (Article 2 (2)).

One can immediately trace

the origins of that principle back to the 1837 Caroline incident, in
line,

a vessel used to supply

ablaze

Canadian

and sent over Niagara

Several Soviet,

Falls.

rebels fighting British rule,

One US

it

was captured,

set

citizen perished.

and now Russian, students of international law have

knowledged the Caroline doctrine, and some have given
While

which the Caro-

has not been widely accepted in Russia,

it

at least ac-

a careful examination. 32

some of the

official

statements re-

garding the preemptive use of force could be construed as falling within the pur-

view of the Caroline doctrine, which,

if

properly adapted, could add a degree of

legitimacy to current approaches.
Traditionally, the

most often quoted source

for the Caroline doctrine has

paragraph in the diplomatic note from Daniel Webster, the

been a

US secretary of state, to

Henry Fox, the British minister in Washington, DC, dispatched on April 24, 1841.
It is from this note that current international law derives the principles of necessity
and proportionality. 33 But we might discover no less substantive statements on
questions of law in other parts of Webster's letter, as well as in a later note from
Lord Ashburton, the British minister plenipotentiary on special mission, to Secretary Webster, and in the address of President Tyler to the US Congress in the aftermath of the Caroline case. 34
If the

Russian government were to contemplate putting into

the federal law

armed

"On

on

of

Counteracting Terrorism" that regulate deployment of Russian

forces outside Russian territory,

guidelines

effect provisions

it

the preemptive use of force

portionality. Recourse

might consider several decision-making

—

first

and foremost, necessity and pro-

might be had to Lord Ashburton's allusion to circumstances

under which the principle of "inviolable character of the

territory of

nations" 35 could be suspended. According to the British minister,

"it

independent

must be so

for

the shortest possible period, during the continuance of an admitted overruling ne-

and

cessity,
sity."

36

strictly

confined within the narrowest limits imposed by that neces-

That limitation could be developed further to include severe restrictions on

the choice of target, which should only be the immediate source of the threat,
that that source ought to be in the space adjacent to the State's

own

territory.

decision should also include consideration of the scale of the threat

and the

and

The
ex-

pected gravity of the consequences of inaction.

A decisive argument in favor of a preemptive use of force would be the explicit
consent to or request of a State on whose territory the source of the threat

because that State
sider

is

not capable of coping with

an attack if a neighboring State, on whose

seas or in international airspace the threat

control

it.
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is

it.

soil

It

is

located

might be worthwhile to con-

or under whose flag

maturing,

is

on the high

expressly unwilling to
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A

unilateral resort to force

might have to be considered

if

the

imminence of

threat does not leave time to refer the issue to the United Nations Security Council

or to a regional arrangement, or

if

there

institutions in similar situations, but in

is

a continual record of passivity of those

any case the Security Council

will

have to

be notified to comply with requirements of Article 51 ("Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council
its

gravity

of the

")

and imminence

UN Charter. That means that the existence of a threat,

will

have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and

would necessitate the disclosure of sources and means of collection of
information, bearing in mind that what one party would deem to be waterproof

that, in turn,

evidence justifying a preemptive

strike,

could be strongly rejected by another party.

Resort to armed force would also be proof that other means, including diplomatic

and law-enforcement, turned out

to be ineffective, or

may

have been used

unskillfully.

A

State using

pected to bear

armed

force to divert a seemingly

full responsibility for injuries

persons and their property.

imminent attack

and damages

inflicted

shall

be ex-

upon innocent

A precursor for those injuries might well be inaccurate

information about the exact location of a source of terrorist threat and

pre-

its

paredness for an attack.
Finally, the location

and duration of preemptive action must be

who should be given precise orders and rules of enmay commence without reliable and executable plans of

to the personnel involved in

gagement.

No

action

clearly defined

it,

evacuation.

Those guidelines are general and some are

made

self-evident.

They would need

to

be

specific for a particular contingency.

Russia

is

not the only State that declared

its

intention to use, as an extreme

means, armed force to eliminate an imminent threat of a massive
and, should dire need arise, project

its

force

beyond

its

borders.

terrorist attack

Of course,

those

making such statements should make sure that resolute declarations are supported
by adequate resources and the strong will to use them. Otherwise those declarations are likely to be counterproductive and self-harming.
There is a question that could bother a zealous legalist: as more nations, some
of them bearing enormous might, submit that they would use armed force in

self-

defense not only to react to an actual attack, but also to preempt an imminent assault,

or even prevent

to claims that a

it

from materializing in the

future,

would it not give impetus

customary rule of international law has already been conceived? 37
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movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective bor-

der controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through

measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel

documents"

law, that refugee status
acts,

and

and

(para. 2g),

is

called

upon

all

States "to ensure, in

conformity with international

not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or

that claims of political motivation are not recognized as

facilitators

of terrorist

grounds for refusing requests

for the extradition of alleged terrorists" (para. 3g).
14.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea expounds the

pursuit in the
1.

homonymous Article

The hot pursuit of

right of hot

111:

may be undertaken when the competent
good reason to believe that the ship has violated the
Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign

a foreign ship

authorities of the coastal State have

laws and regulations of that State.
ship or one of

its

boats

is

within the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the

and may only be continued
outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted.

territorial sea or the

It is

contiguous zone of the pursuing

not necessary that,

at the

State,

time when the foreign ship within the

territorial sea or the

contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order should likewise be
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within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone.

If the foreign ship is

contiguous zone, as defined in

may only be

article 33, the pursuit

within a

undertaken

if

there

has been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone was established.

The right of hot pursuit shall apply mutates mutandis to violations in the exclusive
economic zone or on the continental shelf, including safety zones around continental
shelf installations, of the laws and regulations of the coastal State applicable in
accordance with this Convention to the exclusive economic zone or the continental
2.

shelf,

including such safety zones.

The

3.

of its

right of hot pursuit ceases as

own

soon

as the ship

pursued enters the

territorial sea

State or of a third State.

4.
Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself
by such practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued or one of its boats
or other craft working as a team and using the ship pursued as a mother ship is within

the limits of the territorial sea, or, as the case
exclusive

commenced
enables

it

The

5.

may be, within the contiguous zone or the
shelf. The pursuit may only be

economic zone or above the continental

has been given

after a visual or auditory signal to stop

to be seen or heard

right of hot pursuit

may be

other ships or aircraft clearly

and authorized

by the foreign

at a distance

which

ship.

exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or

marked and

identifiable as being

on government

service

to that effect.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec.

10, 1982,

1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

In an attempt to foresee and deal with the consequences of possible intrusions of foreign

15.

law enforcement

officers,

members of the Commonwealth of Independent States negotiated and

signed on June 4, 1999 the Treaty on the Procedures for the Stay of, and Interaction Between,
Law- Enforcement Officers on the Territories of States-Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. While such stays, as a general rule stated in the opening two sentences of Article
6(1), should have the consent of the receiving State, the

remaining provisions of that paragraph

allowed for restricted non-consensual penetration of a foreign territory in "hot pursuit" of persons

who committed

criminal offenses

treaty allowed for such penetration

if

on the

territory of a party

engaged in such pursuit. The

timely and proper notification and a request for permis-

sion was impracticable. While effective February

6,

2001, the treaty was not ratified by Russia or

Georgia. For official publication of the treaty, see SODRUZHESTVO (COMMONWEALTH), THE INFORMATION BULLETIN OF THE COUNCIL OF HEADS OF STATE AND COUNCIL OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE CIS, No. (32), at 27-33. On December 22, 2006 the Chairman of the

Government of the Russian Federation signed an executive order

instructing the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs to notify the depositary of the treaty of Russia's "intention not to become a Party"
thereof. Sobraniye Zakonodatel'stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii

(The Collection of Laws of the Rus-

No. 52 (Part III), art. 5640 (Dec. 2006) [hereinafter SZ RF].
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

sian Federation)
16.

HOW WE USE

IT 240 (1994).

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

1 7.

2004

I.C.J.

56

(July

9),

available

at

http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/

imwpframe.htm.
18.

spective

For a more extensive discussion of statements made by senior Russian officials and recitations, see Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, Uprezhdayushchee Primenenie Sily:

Vozmozhniye
Permissibility),

Dopustimost (Pre-Emptive Use of Force: Conceivable
RUSSIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2005, at 47 (2006).

Kriterii
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Criteria of

BakhtiyarR. Tuzmukhamedov

19.

Supra note

6.

20.

Supra note

9.

The Russian Constitution and statutes apply the term "aggression" at variance with its
use in the UN Charter and with the definition of aggression within the meaning of UN General
Assembly Resolution 3314. Under the latter, the act of aggression is to be established by the UN
Security Council, rather than by a national authority, and until the Council has acted, a transboundary use of armed force remains an armed attack. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
21.

2319th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec.

14, 1974). President

Putin repeatedly referred to

incursions of insurgents from Chechnya, a constituent entity of the Russian Federation, into

Dagestan, another such entity, as "aggression." See,

view on Larry King

Live, Sept. 8,

2000

at

e.g.,

the Russian official version of his inter-

http://president.kremlin.ru/appears/2000/09/08/

0000_type63379_28866.shtml. His words, "direct aggression," were translated into English as

"armed

attack"

direct

in

the

transcript

of

the

show

at

http://transcripts.cnn.com/

TRANSCRIPTS/0009/08/lkl.00.html. However, the term "aggression" applies to a trans-boundary

armed

attack, rather

than to a use of armed force confined to national borders, and

it

should not

be attributed to non-State actors unaffiliated with governments; otherwise, such attribution
might offer extra weight to such actors' claims to official status. President Putin occasionally
demonstrates awareness that the way he applies the term "aggression"

may not be proper in the

legal sense. In the

aftermath of the 1999 insurgent attack into Dagestan, he spoke about the "fear-

less resistance to

aggression" of the Dagestani citizenry. But, according to Putin, "It should be

said that if we abstract ourselves

from precise legal terms, that indeed was an aggression commitby international terrorists." See http://president.kremlin.ru/appears/2000/12/29/0000
_type63376type63378_595 1 1 .shtml.
ted

23.

SZRFNo.
SZRFNo.

24.

SZ RF No.

25.

In the absence of a universally recognized conventional definition of terrorism, the

22.

2, art.

375 (Feb. 2002).

11, art.

1146 (Mar. 13,2006).

31, art.

3808 (Aug.

13, 1998).

Security Council suggested a legal ersatz definition according to

UN

which terrorism may be de-

scribed as

criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror
in the general public or in a

group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a

population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to

from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined
in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no
circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological,
abstain

racial, ethnic, religious

S.C. Res. 1566,

1

3,

or other similar nature.

U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct.

8,

2004).

26. The amendment, known as Article 3 bis, was adopted on May 10, 1984. It was prompted
by the downing nine months earlier by Soviet Air Defense of the Korean Air Lines Boeing 747-

200 Flight

KAL 007.

It

provides as follows:

The contracting States recognize that every State must refrain from resorting to the
use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of
persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered. This provision shall
not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of States set forth
a)

in the

Charter of the United Nations.
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The contracting

b)
is

States recognize that every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty,

entitled to require the landing at

above

some designated

airport of a civil aircraft flying

territory without authority or if there are reasonable

grounds to conclude that
it is being used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention; it may
also give such aircraft any other instructions to put an end to such violations. For this
its

purpose, the contracting States
relevant

rules

may

of international

law,

Convention, specifically paragraph
publish

its

resort to

a)

any appropriate means consistent with

including

the

relevant

provisions

of this

of this Article. Each contracting State agrees to

regulations in force regarding the interception of civil aircraft.

comply with an order given in conformity with paragraph
b) of this Article. To this end each contracting State shall establish all necessary
provisions in its national laws or regulations to make such compliance mandatory for
any civil aircraft registered in that State or operated by an operator who has his
principal place of business or permanent residence in that State. Each contracting State
shall make any violation of such applicable laws or regulations punishable by severe
penalties and shall submit the case to its competent authorities in accordance with its
Every

c)

civil aircraft shall

laws or regulations.

Each contracting State

d)

use of any

civil aircraft

shall take appropriate

measures to prohibit the deliberate

registered in that State or operated

principal place of business or

permanent residence

by an operator who has his
any purpose

in that State for

inconsistent with the aims of this Convention. This provision shall not affect paragraph
a) or derogate

from paragraphs b) and

c)

of this Article.

Amendment of Convention on International Civil Aviation with Regard to Interception of Civil
Aircraft, ICAO Doc. 9437, A25-Res. (May 10, 1984), reprinted in 23 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 705 (1984).
27. The latter is described as "employment of armaments from the territory of the Russian
Federation against terrorists and (or) their bases beyond" the territory of the Russian Federation
(Art. 10.1 (1)).

28.

Article 102.1(d) of the Russian Constitution delegates to the Council of Federation the

power of "making decisions on the possibility of the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of the Russian Federation." Until the adoption of the federal law

"On Counteracting Terrorism," that provision had been invoked to authorize the deployment of
Russian units to international peacekeeping operations. For an in-depth discussion of the

distri-

bution of national defense powers in Russia, see Bahktiyar Tuzmukhamedov, Russian Federa-

pendulum of powers and accountability, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE
USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (Charlotte Ku & Harold K. lacobson eds., 2002).
tion: the

29.

SZRFNo.

30.

Sergey Ivanov, Press Conference (Mar. 28, 2006), http://www.mil.ru/articles/articlel2865

31 (Part

1), art.

3452 (July 29, 2006).

.shtml.
1
Four Russian embassy personnel were kidnapped in Baghdad on June 3, 2006 from a Rusembassy vehicle. A fifth was killed during the attack on the vehicle. On June 25, a group
linked to al-Qaida reported that it executed the four diplomats. See Al-Qaida group claims Russian deaths, UPI, June 25, 2006, available at http://www.arcamax.com/cgi-bin/news/

3

sian

newsheadlines/s-88252-152190review=4.
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national practice, in international
to protect

life,

November

3,
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assert itself in inter-

then Russia shall reserve the right to act in a similar

mode

own national interests," http://www.kremlin.rU/text/appears/2003/l 1/54926. shtml
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VII
Security in the Strait of Malacca

and the

Regional Maritime Security Initiative:

Responses to the

US Proposal

Yann-huei Song*
Introduction

TheThomas

Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), proposed in 2004 by Admiral

the

B. Fargo,

American maritime

gional cooperation

former commander of the US Pacific
security

programs and

designed to promote re-

and improve maritime security in the East Asia and

gion, especially in the straits of Malacca

law, to identify,

Pacific re-

and Singapore. The main goal of RMSI
1

to develop a partnership of willing nations,

and domestic

initiatives

Command, is one of

is

working together under international

monitor and intercept transnational maritime

armed robbery and terrorist attacks at sea. 2 This initianow coordinated jointly by the US Pacific Command and the US Depart-

threats, in particular piracy,
tive

is

ment of State. 3
The Strait of Malacca,

hundred miles long and only one and a half miles
wide at its narrowest point, is a confined stretch of water between Peninsular Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. From an economic and strategic
perspective, it is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world, the
six

equivalent of the Suez Canal or

*

Panama

Canal. The Strait of Malacca forms the

Research Fellow, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. Fulbright Visiting Scholar, the Asia-Pacific

Research Center, Stanford University.

Security in the Strait of Malacca

and Regional Responses

to the

US Proposal

seaway connecting the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the Pacific
Ocean, linking three of the world's most populous nations: India, Indonesia and
China. Annually, approximately

of forty-five

oil tankers,

Europe

of Malacca.

5

to

thousand large

pass through the

vessels carrying everything
cilities in

fifty

strait.

4

vessels,

and

daily,

Daily, about six

an average

hundred cargo

from Japanese nuclear waste bound for reprocessing fa-

raw materials

for China's

booming economy traverse the Strait

estimated that two-thirds of the world's liquefied natural gas

It is

6

(LNG); between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world's sea

trade; half of the

by sea; and over 80 percent of the oil and gas imports
of China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea come through the Strait of Malacca. The
number of ships passing through the strait is projected to increase due to the rapid
economic growth of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. It has been estimated
global oil shipments carried

that within the next twenty years two-thirds of China's petroleum imports will

flow from the Middle East, most probably through the Strait of Malacca. 7 While

two

alternative

waterways are available for international shipping (the Sunda

and the Lombok and Makassar

straits

through Indonesian archipelagic waters),

the Strait of Malacca was closed a detour through these alternative routes

add a

significant

amount of shipping time and

shipping
ical

is

would

become

the target of piracy

This upsurge in the violence directed against

not surprising given the high volume of transiting traffic, the geograph-

nature of the

area,

vessels.

if

cost.

In recent years the Strait of Malacca has increasingly

and armed robbery against

Strait

strait,

the significant political

and economic

instability in the

and the lack of resources and weak maritime law enforcement capacity of the

littoral States.

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States,

increasing attention has been given to the threat of maritime terrorism, proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction

(WMD)

and the

security of the maritime

transport sector in general. As a result of this changed strategic environment in the
Strait

of Malacca area, there has also been a growing conviction

States of the

need to

establish a burden-sharing arrangement, based

of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
tion).

8

among the littoral

Law of the Sea

(1982

on

Article 43

LOS Conven-

Such an arrangement would be designed to help cover the gradually increas-

ing cost of providing essential maritime infrastructure in the Strait of Malacca and,

over the years, to keep the waters clear of pollution, safe for navigation, and free

from the threat of pirate and
User

States, especially

dent on the

strait for

the

terrorist attacks.

China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which are depen-

smooth and

efficient transit

supplies, also raised concerns about the safety

demanded
Strait

that

of cargo, in particular energy

and security of their vessels and have

enhanced security measures be taken by the
9

of Malacca. Other user States that are

98

among

States that border the

the major maritime powers,

Yann-huei Song

such as the United

maritime security concerns regarding the po-

States, also raised

of transnational crimes, maritime terrorism and armed attacks

tential threat

and commercial vessels traversing the strait. As a result, the maritime powers began to explore possible means of becoming involved more directly in
against their naval

the

management of security matters

ever,

were regarded by the

safety

and security of the

in the Strait of Malacca.

littoral States as

Strait

These

efforts,

how-

an attempt to "internationalize" the

of Malacca. In response, the littoral States reiterated

enhancing safety and security and managing environmental

their positions that

is-

sues in the strait are primarily their responsibility.
It is

in

against this

background

when the

that,

Admiral Fargo's speech to the

US

idea of a

RMSI was first introduced

Congress on March 31, 2004, Indonesia and

Malaysia strongly rejected the idea of patrols by foreign powers in the Strait of
Malacca. The governments of these two nations also raised the concern that a

US

would actually attract terrorist attacks and bolster the
appeal of extremists. However, Singapore, with its economy heavily dependent on
global commercial traffic through the strait, sees piracy, armed robbery and marinaval presence in the

strait

time terrorism as major security threats, and therefore supported the RMSI, arguing that

it is

an intensive and complex task to safeguard the waterways against

maritime terrorism and that no single State has the resources to deal

effectively

with the maritime security threat in the Strait of Malacca.
In response to the serious concerns of Indonesia
curity initiative

was modified to

conduct patrols in the

strait.

and Malaysia, the American se-

delete the original proposal to deploy

US forces to

On the other hand, due in large measure to the pros-

pect of foreign intervention in safeguarding the security of the Strait of Malacca,
Indonesia, Malaysia
to curb piracy

of the Joint

and Singapore agreed to carry out coordinated

and armed robbery, and to increase maritime

War Committee (JWC)

sea

and air patrols

security.

The decision

of Lloyd's Market Association in June 2005 to

declare the Strait of Malacca a "war-risk

and

zone" also prompted the

terrorist

three littoral States to take a series of unilateral, bilateral

and

trilateral

cooperative

actions to improve the security environment of the Strait of Malacca.

Malaysia, for instance,
selected tug boats

announced

that

its

armed

and barges traversing the

police will be placed

Strait of

on board

Malacca. In addition, an

escort service will be provided for vessels carrying valuable goods in the strait.

Malaysia also declared that
strait.

lished

10

it

will

begin twenty-four-hour surveillance of the

A new Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) was also estab-

and began patrolling the

Strait

of Malacca in

November 2005.

Bilateral coor-

dinated patrols between Malaysia and Indonesia, and between Indonesia and
Singapore, have also been worked out to bring together their respective agencies

involved in anti-piracy and anti-robbery

99

activities.

In July 2004, Indonesia,

)
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Malaysia and Singapore launched a

new

trilateral

to the

US Proposal

coordinated patrols

initiative

(Malsindo) in the Strait of Malacca, which was seen as another major response of
the littoral States to the increasingly challenging issue of safety

and

security of the

In addition, in August 2005, the three littoral States agreed to implement

strait.

joint air patrols over the Strait of Malacca in a bid to boost security in the waterway,

which has been dubbed the "Eyes
laysia

in the Sky" plan. In April 2006, Indonesia,

Ma-

and Singapore signed an agreement to form a Joint Coordinating Committee

on the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) and Standard Operational Procedures on Coordinated Patrols. 11

The purpose of this article is to examine the development of the US-proposed
RMSI and its influence on national and regional efforts being undertaken to enhance security in the Malacca strait and will focus, in particular, on the littoral
States' responses to the American security initiative. The paper first looks into the
background of the introduction of the idea of RMSI by the US Pacific Command in
March 2004; second, it provides an overview of the RMSI and the implementation
of the

initiative; third,

States that

border the

it

examines the preliminary national responses of the three

Strait

of Malacca to the

US

initiative; fourth,

the views of selected ocean law and maritime security experts
cation

and

by the

littoral States unilaterally, bilaterally

political implications

of the

initiative; fifth,

and June 2006, to enhance security in the
important regional responses and
strait;

seventh,

it

and

Strait

by

summarizes

on the legality, justifi-

addresses the steps taken

multilaterally,

between July 2004

of Malacca; sixth,

efforts to help

discusses the role played

it

it

it

summarizes the

enhance security in the Malacca

existing

mechanisms

in the region in

processes to help develop cooperative efforts to improve security in the
finally,

it

offers the author's observations regarding policy

toral States' responses to the

strait;

and

outcomes in terms of lit-

US-proposed RMSI and the challenges lying ahead for

advancing maritime security in the

Strait

of Malacca.

Background for the Regional Maritime Security Initiative Concept

The September
States

11,

2001 attacks and subsequent anthrax attacks in the United

profoundly changed the Bush administration's strategic thinking on na-

tional security. This

change was reflected in the National Security Strategy of the

United States of America and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of

Mass Destruction, which were released by the White House in September 2002
and December 2002, respectively. 12 This new strategic thinking is defined by 1
the way in which the United States uses force in the post-9/1 1 world, (2) how the
United States defines defense and (3) the way the United States approaches proliferation. 13 Under the new strategy, winning the war against terrorism and stopping
(

100

Yann-huei Song

the proliferation of
forces. In the
tile

WMD have become priority missions of the American armed

maritime domain, 14 preventing

acts has also

emerged

maritime security

tion's

as

one of the key

and criminal or hos-

terrorist attacks

US

policy objectives that guide the na-

activities.

In October 2000, terrorists in a boat laden with explosives carried out a suicide

bombing of the USS Cole (DDG

Yemen. Seventeen US
sailors were killed and over thirty others were wounded. The attack, organized by
Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist organization, was carried out by suicide
bombers Ibrahim al-Thawr and Abdullah al-Misawa. 15 After the September 11th
attacks, the United States became more concerned about potential terrorist attacks
in the Strait of Malacca area, as

67) in the harbor at Aden,

demonstrated in

late

2001 and early 2002

when US

and Indian naval forces collaborated to protect American merchant shipping at the

The US perception of the maritime security threat in
Southeast Asia and the Malacca strait was further reinforced in late 2002 and 2003
by three elements: (1) increasing concerns over the association of piracy with terrorist organizations in the region; (2) US and foreign security intelligence reports
indicating that US-flag vessels, both civilian and military, could be attacked by terrorist groups when sailing through the strait or anchoring at ports; and (3) the increasing number of reports of pirate and maritime terrorist attack incidents that
occurred in Southeast Asia and in the Strait of Malacca.
northern end of the

strait.

16

According to the available evidence obtained by the

Agency (CIA) and other Western
ready considered striking

The video

tapes seized

at

Central Intelligence

intelligence services, terrorist groups have al-

maritime

targets, particularly in the Strait

from the Indonesian

terrorist

which included footage of Malaysian maritime police
rorist

US

of Malacca.

group Jemaah Islamiyya

(JI),

patrols, indicate that this ter-

group was observing security procedures operating in the

strait.

Members of JI

have been trained in seaborne guerrilla tactics, such as suicide diving capabilities and

ramming. A basic diving manual recovered in Kandahar in Afghanistan was seen as
further evidence of a larger plan to launch maritime attacks

by the al-Qaeda

net-

known that JI has links with al-Qaeda. It is believed that other
terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, such as the Free Aceh Movement (also known as
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)), the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), are also en-

works and

it is

17

well

gaging in maritime piracy or terrorist attacks in the region. Following the arrests of
several

JI

operatives in Singapore in

group was plotting to blow up
pore.

18

December 2001,

it

was revealed

that the terrorist

US warships docked at the Changi Naval Base in

Warnings about terrorist groups' plans to

Malacca had also been issued by

US

seize US-flag vessels in the Strait

intelligence services.
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of reports on pirate and maritime terrorist attacks in late 2002 and

2003 also increased US concerns about possible attacks against its vessels transiting
the waterways in the Strait of Malacca

and Southeast

Asia. In

October 2002, the

MV Limburg, a French oil tanker, was attacked by an explosive-laden boat.
organizer of the attack was Abd

al

20

The

Rahman al Nashir, who was also believed to have

been responsible for the attack on the

Cole.

The Limburg

attack not only high-

lighted the vulnerability of cargo ships to terrorist attacks but also confirmed

US

not beyond the capabilities of terrorist groups to carry out assaults

concerns that

it is

on maritime

interests

such as vessels and ports. In March 2003, the Indonesian

chemical tanker Dewi Madrim was boarded by ten pirates from a speedboat in the
congested southern reaches of the Strait of Malacca. The pirates were equipped

with machine guns and machetes and carried
tanker's

VHF

radios.

Having disabled the

communications and tied up the crew, the pirates took the helm and navi-

gated the vessel for about an hour before departing with the master and
as hostages.

fense

and

According to a study by Aegis Defence Services, a London-based de-

security consultancy, the

an attempt by terrorists to learn

temporary hijacking of the Dewi Madrim was

how to pilot a ship, and the kidnapping was aimed

attack

mount

maritime

attack.

The Dewi

was therefore considered the equivalent of the

tactics

of the

at acquiring expertise to help the terrorists

Madrim

first officer

Qaeda hijackers who perpetrated
school in Florida.

21

the September

1

like

it

al-

1th attacks after going to a flight

Singapore's defense minister,

Dewi Madrim incident and others

a

Tony Tan,

also stated that the

were practice runs for a

terrorist attack. 22

Muslim militants of the Abu Sayyaf Group
bombed SuperFerry 14, leaving over one hundred people dead. Philippine president Gloria Arroyo confirmed that the attack was the work of terrorists. 23 In addiIn February 2004, six al-Qaeda-linked

tion to the maritime terrorist attacks, pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca also

increased from sixteen to twenty-eight in 2003 and from twenty-eight to thirty-

seven in 2004. 24 According to the International Maritime Bureau's piracy reporting center, seventy of the 251 global reports of piratical attacks in the

first

nine

25

months of 2004 occurred in the Strait of Malacca.
The US Pacific Command is the headquarters responsible for all American air,
ground and maritime military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The Strait of
Malacca and Southeast Asia are within the area of responsibility of this command,
the mission of which is to promote security and peaceful development in the region by deterring aggression, advancing regional security cooperation, responding
to crises, and fighting to win. 26 Since the September 1 1 attacks, prosecuting and
winning the global war on terrorism has become one of the command's major focus areas. In response to the increasing maritime security threat in the Strait of
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Malacca and Southeast Asia,

demonstrated above, the

as

US Pacific Command de-

veloped the concept of RMSI.

The Development and Overview of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative

On March 31, 2004, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee regarding US Pacific Command posture, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, its commander,
stated that despite notable successes in the

war on terrorism, the United

States re-

mained deeply concerned about transnational threats from terrorist organizations
such as al-Qaeda, JI and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Asia-Pacific region. The
United States sensed increasing synergy between transnational threats
ism,

illicit

drugs, trafficking in

To improve

humans, piracy and

especially

like terror-

WMD proliferation.

international cooperation against these transnational security threats,

President George Bush launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the
State

Department proposed the Malacca

operationalize these initiatives, the
27

US

Straits

Pacific

2003.

Initiative in

Command

To

help

introduced the concept

same

hearings, in re-

sponse to the questions raised by Congressman Rick Larsen about

RMSI and its re-

lationship to the PSI, Admiral Fargo cited the lack of information

and

of RMSI.

During the question and answer session

on the transnational maritime
spread support for

I

just

RMSI and

The Admiral noted

threat.

intelligence

that there

was wide-

stated:

came back from Singapore and had a very solid conversation with the "Sings" and

they're going to help us with this.

[Malacca] and
the

at the

work

its

way

My instinct,

it

probably ought to

start at the Strait

out, because the Straits of [Malacca] are

movement of all of the energy through

the region.

.

.

moving through the sea space. We need to know the
participation from the vast majority of them so that we can

.

We

of

fundamental to

need to know who's
We need

status of ships.
single out

and cue on those

that aren't within the law. 28

It

was Admiral Fargo's

belief that

RMSI would

receive a very

port from the countries in the region, including the three

Malacca

As

strait.

broad range of suplittoral States

of the

29

far as the

means

to

implement the

initiative are

concerned

—

in particular, to

carry out maritime interdiction operations in the Strait of Malacca

—the Admiral

indicated that

We're looking

at things like

high-speed vessels, putting Special Operations Forces on

high-speed vessels, putting, potentially, Marines on high-speed vessels so that

we can

use boats that might be incorporated with these vessels to conduct effective
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.

move about and
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these sea lines of

transit

communications where

throughout the region.

—Indonesia and Malaysia—

US Proposal

terrorists are

known

to

30

This proposal later became the main reason two of the
strait

the

littoral States

of the Malacca

RMSI. In response to the
US ambassador to Indonesia Ralph L.

rejected the idea of

strong reactions from the littoral States,

Boyce clarified the statement in Jakarta in April 2004, saying, "Admiral Fargo never

US was going to send its marines or special forces to the Straits of Malacca.
The AFP story
was misleading." 31 The US embassy in Malaysia also made the
same clarification, adding that the RMSI would be conducted within existing international laws. 32 Having clarified Admiral Fargo's proposal, the US State Departsaid the

.

.

ment continued

.

to call

on the nations

in the Asia-Pacific region to

work more

closely to deal with the transnational threats, in particular, terrorism, piracy

other crimes, including drug trafficking and
tant secretary of state for East Asia

human

Matthew Daley,

trafficking.

for instance,

US

deputy

and

assis-

warned at the Dia-

logue on Security in Asia, held in Singapore in April 2004, that "Asia's waters are

prime

targets for

Al-Qaeda and other

about acts of piracy or

and "[wjhether we are talking

terrorists"

terrorist attacks or

even transnational problems, such as

trafficking of persons or drugs, the terrorist aspect

is

not to be underestimated." 33

Daley also stressed that the concern over the potential maritime

was not simply theoretical but was going to be an

terrorist attacks

essential area of multilateral co-

operation in the Asia-Pacific region in the months and years to come. 34
In

May 2004, Admiral Fargo further elaborated his idea of RMSI at the Military

Operations and

Law Conference held

in Victoria, British

emphasized the importance of conducting the
tional laws, including the laws of war

Columbia, where he also

initiative

and respect

under existing interna-

for national sovereignty.

As he

explained at the conference:

The

goal of RMSI

is

to develop a partnership of willing regional nations with varying

and capacities to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime
threats under existing international and domestic laws. This collective effort will
empower each participating nation with the timely information and capabilities it
needs to act against maritime threats in its own territorial seas. As always, each nation
will have to decide for itself what response, if any, it will take in its own waters.
capabilities

Information sharing will also contribute to the security of international

an environment hostile to terrorism and other criminal activities.

seas, creating

Any RMSI activity in

35
international waters will, again, be in accordance with existing international law.

There were
(1)

five

elements in the

RMSI proposed by Admiral

Fargo. These are

increased situational awareness and information sharing, (2) responsive
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decision-making architectures, (3) maritime interdiction capabilities, (4)

and

security

an alliance and that the

treaty or

He

(5) interagency cooperation.

initiative will

it is

not a global

effort,

undertaken under the

activities

and domestic

laws.

clear that

RMSI

is

not a

not result in a standing naval force
initiative differs

from the PSI

in

RMSI

initiative will

is

not a challenge to sovereignty,

not violate existing international

36

In July 2004, the United States

Threats

it

but will focus on maritime transnational

threats in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover,

and

made

added that the

patrolling the Pacific. Admiral Fargo

the sense that

also

littoral

and the Philippines co-hosted the Maritime

Workshop held in Cebu in the

Philippines.

A major topic of the workshop

was the US-proposed RMSI, which "emphasizes information sharing, providing
cueing of emerging threats, contributing to the security of international

most important, creating an environment
activities."

37

It

was

stated that

deems necessary to protect
collective security.

RMSI

hostile to terrorism

itself in its

and other criminal

empower each nation

could

own waters,

and

seas,

to take action

it

thereby enhancing the region's

While the participants agreed that RMSI could provide

a plan of

action to address the transnational maritime threats in the region, they also recom-

mended

the use of existing fora

propriate to address

RMSI

and international/regional programs

that are ap-

objectives in order to avoid establishing additional

mechanisms. The existing mechanisms include the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), the

ASEAN

Regional

Forum (ARF) and

the Asia-Pacific Eco-

nomic Cooperation group (APEC). 38
In

November 2004, an overview of RMSI was provided on the website of the US

Pacific

Command,

along with links to the

gional Maritime Security

US

Pacific

Command

Strategy for Re-

and other RMSI-related documents. These documents

provide a more accurate understanding of RMSI,

its

strategic intent

and

status.

39

The Strategy for Regional Maritime Security stated clearly in its executive summary that RMSI "is designed to deny the use of the maritime domain by those who
pose a threat to the Asia-Pacific region's maritime security, including transnational
terrorists

and criminals." 40 The nations participating

cross-discipline, interagency

approach to

maritime security capacities and conduct

facilitate

in this initiative will utilize a

the development of regional

activities to establish

and maintain

a se-

cure maritime environment. Implementation of RMSI will be accomplished by coordinating activities between the United States and the participating nations in the
region that support the following

common

elements of maritime security: (1) in-

creased situational awareness and information sharing; (2) responsive decision-

making

architectures;

(3)

enhanced maritime interception capacity; and

agency, ministerial and international cooperation.
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strategy,

to the

RMSI

US Proposal

activities will

be un-

dertaken in the territorial waters of the participating nations and international waters

of the Pacific and Indian oceans to counter "maritime threats" that include

terrorism, maritime piracy, illegal trafficking
illicit

cargo)

and other criminal

(i.e.,

activities in the

implemented through a cooperative

narcotics,

human and
RMSI will be

weapons,

maritime domain.

42

emphasizing interactions with the gov-

effort,

ernments, international organizations and private sectors in the region, and will be

based upon existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements. The international organizations dealing with maritime security issues in the region include, but are not
limited to,

ASEAN, ARF, ASEAN

Security

Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

Community (ASC), APEC, Council

for

(CSCAP), International Maritime Bureau

(1MB), North Pacific Heads of Coast Guard Agencies, United Nations International

Maritime

Organization

(IMO)

and the Western

Pacific

Naval

Symposium

43

(WPNS).
The strategic intent of RMSI is to carry out the four common elements of maritime security mentioned earlier through cooperative efforts. Accordingly, the
RMSI-participating nations will establish procedures, processes and standards to
fuse information

and the means

to share the information; support the develop-

ment of responsive decision-making
capacity through agency, ministerial

architectures

and regional maritime

and international unity of

effort;

security

engage in

appropriate fora to gain the requisite understanding of existing maritime security
capacities;

and develop cooperative arrangements

cept suspect vessels

and transnational

consistent with international
ate elements of national

and domestic

law.

and

and international

threats in territorial

RMSI will

inter-

waters,

also leverage appropri-

and international resources and capabilities and will com-

plement ongoing cooperative security
exercises, the

to monitor, identify

activities

such as

bilateral

and

multilateral

Container Security Initiative (CSI), Counterdrug (CD) Operations,

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), International Port Security

Program (IPSP), International Ship and Port

Facility Security (ISPS)

Code,

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Multinational Planning Augmentation

Team (MPAT), Proliferation Security Initiative

(PSI), Regional

ment on Anti-Piracy (ReCAAP), and Secure Trade
Table

1

in the

Cooperation Agree-

APEC

Region (STAR). 44

(below) illustrates security in the Asia-Pacific maritime continuum.

December 2004, President Bush promulgated National Security Presidential
Directive 41 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13),
which established US policy, guidelines and implementation actions to enhance
US national interests and homeland security by protecting US maritime interests.
The directives also established a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating CommitIn

tee to coordinate interagency

maritime security policy efforts. In recognition of the
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US national security interests, and given the
security, the US government decided to

importance of the maritime domain to

US

potential threat to

[Djeploy the

full

maritime

range of its operational assets and capabilities to prevent the Maritime

Domain from being used by terrorists,

and

criminals,

hostile States to

commit

acts

terrorism and criminal or other unlawful or hostile acts against the United States,
people, economy, property, territory,

maritime security policies are most
considered appropriately.

thus became

with U.S. law,
is

a party,

US

when

effective

the strategic importance of

flow of

free

commerce

all

necessary and appropriate actions, consistent

and other international agreements to which the United

States

and customary international law as determined for the United States by the

President, to enhance security and protect U.S. interests in the Maritime

MDA

PSI

TITLE

are

45

policy "to take

treaties

its

friends, while recognizing that

economic cooperation, and the

international trade,

It

and

allies,

of

Domain." 46

RMSI

CSI

ISPS

&

Proliferation

Maritime Domain

Container

Regional Maritime

International Ship

Security Initiative

Awareness

Security

Security

Port Facility Security

Initiative

Initiative

Code

US Coast Guard

National
Security Council

US Department
of

Homeland

US Department

of

United Nations

State

Security-

US & INTL.
AGENCIES

US Department

of

Customs &

US Navy

State

USPACOM

Border

International Maritime

Organization

Protection (CBP)

US Department

of

Defense

AREA

Worldwide/Global

&

US &

Territories

Attain effective

US-bound

understanding of

shipping cargo

material/delivery

anything

container safety.

systems)

associated with

Deter

disrupt

WMD (& related

proliferation

sea, air

&

ground.

program with

maritime

environment that
could impact the

Reduce

security, safety,

proliferation

by

economy

deterring suppliers

& customers, &
making

&

officers

stationed

more

in

select ports.

Worldwide/Global

Partnership of

Provide a

willing nations

standardized,
consistent framework

enhancing

&

for evaluating risk

About 7

million

containers

enabling governments

capacities through

to offset

unity of effort to

threats with

identify,

monitor

&

in

&

maritime threats

existing

ports annually.
international

difficult.

90%

&

domestic laws.
of global

trade via cargo
containers.

Table

1:

Source:

Continuum
Command, RMSI: The Idea, The Facts 47
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US

Pacific
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changes

in

changes

vulnerability for

ships

intercept

consistent with

US

&

leveraging

transnational

arriving in

proliferation

costly

CBP

or

environment of
the US.

Asia-Pacific Region

capabilities

Exchange

the global

transported on the

FOCUS

Worldwide/Global

port facilities.
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Accordingly, President Bush directed the secretaries of defense and homeland
security to jointly lead a collaborative interagency effort to draft a

National Strategy for Maritime Security.

48

recommended

In concert with the development of the

national strategy, the following actions were tasked:

(

Maritime Domain Awareness,

)

1

Global Maritime Intelligence Integration, (3) Domestic Outreach, (4) Coordi-

(2)

nation of International Efforts and International Outreach, (5) Maritime Threat

Response, (6) Maritime Infrastructure Recovery, (7) Maritime Transportation

System Security, and

Maritime Security

(8)

Maritime Commerce Security. 49 While the term "Regional

Initiative"

Fargo's concept of RMSI

was not found

in the directive,

it is

clear that

Admiral

had been incorporated into NSPD-41/HSPD-13.

In February 2005, Admiral William

J.

Fallon was nominated by President Bush

and confirmed by the US Senate to succeed Admiral Fargo as the new Commander,

US Pacific Command. Thereafter, RMSI continued to constitute an integral part of
command's maritime security strategy. As reflected in Admiral Fallon's
marks at the 4th Annual Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore in June 2005,

the

re-

the

much alive. He noted that RMSI was launched by
his predecessor and reiterated US Pacific Command's concern over the maritime
security threat in the Asia-Pacific region. He pointed out that because knowledge
concept of RMSI remains very

of activities in the sea space
it is

is

incomplete, unseen threats can develop and therefore

among

nations and between maritime

and non-governmental,

in the region. In addition, with

essential to develop close cooperation

organizations, both State

due respect for national sovereignty, Admiral Fallon suggested that organizational

and operational

issues

should be priority items for agreement for the purpose of

enhancing maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. 50
In September 2005, the National Strategy for Maritime Security 51 was issued

the White House, listing the following threats to

US maritime security:

( 1 )

by

nation-

WMD attacks; (2) terrorist threats, in
particular those associated with attacks by possible use of WMD and attacks at or
State threats associated with terrorism

from the

sea; (3) transnational

struction;

and

(5) illegal

terrorist threats

is

and

criminal and piracy threats; (4) environmental de-

US

seaborne immigration. The

perception of maritime

reflected in the following security assessment:

Terrorists can also develop effective attack capabilities relatively quickly using a variety

and light aircraft; merchant
weapons to ram another vessel, warship, port facility, or
offshore platform; commercial vessels as launch platforms for missile attacks;
underwater swimmers to. infiltrate ports; and unmanned underwater explosive
delivery vehicles. Mines are also an effective weapon because they are low-cost, readily
available, easily deployed, difficult to counter and require minimal training. Terrorists
of platforms, including explosives-laden suicide boats

and

.

.

.

cruise ships as kinetic

can also take advantage of a

vessel's legitimate cargo,
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component of an

liquefied natural gas, as the explosive

transport powerful conventional explosives or

alongside an offshore

facility.

attack. Vessels

WMD

can be used to

for detonation in a port or

52

To achieve the objectives of the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the following

five strategic actions are to

willing nations
ation, (2)
tices,

be taken collectively by the United

and international organizations:

maximize domain awareness,

(3)

deploy layered security and

(4)

53

( 1 )

States, other

enhance international cooper-

embed security into commercial prac-

(5)

assure continuity of the marine

management of security in the
Strait of Malacca, it is the policy of the United States to "use the agencies and components of the Federal Government in innovative ways to improve the security of
sea-lanes that pass through international straits." 54 The United States intends to
work with its regional and international partners to expand maritime security efforts. Since regional maritime security regimes are a major international compotransportation system.

nent of the

Specifically referring to the

US national strategy, and are essential for ensuring the effective security

of regional seas, the United States

is

willing to

and international and regional organizations
pabilities

work closely with other governments
to

enhance the maritime security ca-

of other key nations by adopting the following measures:

•

Offering maritime and port security assistance, training and consultation;

•

Coordinating and prioritizing maritime security assistance and liaison

within regions;
•

to

Allocating economic assistance to developing nations for maritime security

enhance security and prosperity;
•

Promoting implementation of the Convention

for the Suppression of

Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and

its

amendment and

other international agreements; and
•

Expanding the International Port Security and Maritime Liaison Officer

programs, and the number of agency attaches. 55
In addition to the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the relevant

US

de-

partments and agencies have developed eight supporting plans to address the specific

threats

and challenges of the maritime environment, which include:
Maritime Domain Awareness; 56

•

The National Plan

•

The Global Maritime

•

The Maritime Operational Threat Response

•

The International Outreach and Coordination

•

The Maritime

to Achieve

Intelligence Integration Plan; 57

Plan; 58

Infrastructure Recovery Plan; 60
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Strategy; 59
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•

The Maritime Transportation System

•

The Maritime Commerce

•

The Domestic Outreach

In

November

the

US Proposal

Security Recommendations; 61

Security Plan; 62 and

Plan. 63

2005, the Department of State submitted the International Out-

reach and Coordination Strategy for the National Strategy for Maritime Security64
to the White House.

The strategy aims to advance the policies set by President Bush

in the National Security Strategy, 65 the National Strategy for

and the National Strategy for Maritime Security and
dent's vision of a fully coordinated

International Outreach

2006,

it

US government effort to protect the nation's in-

and Coordination

works together with the

US

Pacific

Strategy, the

Command

to

strategic goals of the

US Department

of State

implement RMSI. In February

was reported that the State Department has proposed a $4.8 billion military

aid budget for Fiscal Year 2007, in

March

Security66

to help accomplish the presi-

maritime domain. In order to achieve the

terests in the

Homeland

7,

which $2 million

is

allocated to

2006, Admiral Fallon, in testimony before the Senate

Committee, stated that "[w] inning the war on terrorism

mand's highest

priority"

and

is

RMSI. 67

Armed

Services

U.S. Pacific

that Southeast Asia remains the

On

Com-

command's

focal

point in the war on terror. 68

On February 15-17, 2006, the United States held a conference in Alameda, California to discuss ways
in

and means

to help coordinate potential

maritime security efforts in the Malacca

of State and the

strait.

donor contributions

Sponsored by the US Department

US Coast Guard, this meeting was attended by the US Pacific Com-

mand, like-minded countries using the strait, the International Maritime Bureau
(1MB), private sector representatives and other observers. The three littoral States
of the Malacca

strait

—Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore—were not

invited to the

conference. China was invited to the conference but did not attend. Taiwan was

not invited because of sensitive political reasons.

The Alameda conference was an important initiative and was held under the IMO
framework. However, in comparison with the news coverage on the US-proposed
RMSI back in May 2004, surprisingly no reports on the Alameda conference were reported in the media, except an item in the Defense News regarding India's announcement during the conference that its maritime surveillance force would jointly patrol
the Strait of Malacca with the United States, 69 a very brief report
the

on the conference at

US Department of State's Fact Sheet on Maritime Security in the East Asian and

Pacific Region, 70

and the commentary on the

Institute

of Defence and Strategic

Not So Straightforward" by
Alameda conference appeared to

Studies website entitled "Burden Sharing in the Straits:

Sam Bateman.
pre-empt the

71

The

initial

latter

commented

that the

task of the littoral States in identifying
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needs to enhance safety and security and manage environmental matters, and

allo-

cated a leading role to the user States of the Strait of Malacca. In addition, this meeting appeared to attach
that has

been the key focus of the

littoral States

over the past five years and the cor-

IMO initiative that was discussed and agreed to at the Meeting on the

nerstone of the
Straits

LOS Convention 72

significance to Article 43 of the 1982

little

of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental

Protection held in Jakarta, Indonesia in September 2005.

Before proceeding to the discussion of the

US-proposed RMSI,

US Department

littoral States' initial

important to mention briefly a

it is

73

of State,

it is

the

provided by the

mainly because the document describes the

time security policy, especially in the Malacca
sheet,

fact sheet

responses to the

strait area.

US

According to

mari-

this fact

US policy to seek to develop cooperative mechanisms to enhance the
and environmental protection of

safety, security

strategic

waterways in the East

Asia and Pacific region, in particular the Strait of Malacca. The United States will

work with like-minded

countries and those littoral States responsible for safe-

guarding the important strategic waterways in the region. The
provides that

it is

the

common goal of the United States, like-minded nations and

the littoral States bordering the strategic waterways "bilaterally
to develop a partnership of willing nations to
capacities to identify, monitor,
gal authorities

fact sheet further

and

enhance the overall

multilaterally,

capabilities

and

and respond to maritime threats consistent with le-

and frameworks." 74

Especially in the Strait of Malacca, the United States will

ners to ensure

(

1

)

recipient

den sharing of resources,

work with

global part-

and user-State donor coordination based on the bur-

(2) the interoperability

sustainability of the joint strategies

and

(4) the

of the partners'

activities, (3)

prevention of redundancy

the

among

other maritime security efforts. Each of these four aims, as set forth in the fact
sheet,

must match both the

priorities

and needs of

The United
organizations and

recipient States.

work with responsible States, user States, multilateral
private sector partners 75 on planning, capacity building, information sharing, International Ship and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) Code implementation, techniStates will

cal

assistance,

training

and

exercises,

private

sector

outreach,

maritime

environmental stewardship and counterterrorism.

Littoral States' Perceptions of the Regional

It is

clear that right before the

US

Pacific

Maritime Security Initiative

Command's announcement

of the

RMSI

concept, Admiral Fargo had secured support for the initiative from the government

of Singapore, as demonstrated in the question and answer portion of his testimony
before the

House Armed

Services

Committee on March
111

31, 2004.

Admiral Fargo
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came back from Singapore and had a very solid conversation with
the [Singaporeans] and they're going to help us with [RMSI]." 76 The Admiral expected a very broad range of support for RMSI, mainly because "[a] 11 of the counstated that "I just

tries in

the region are concerned about the transnational threat," 77 which includes

and the

terrorism, proliferation

the governments of Indonesia

trafficking in

humans. The

initial

reactions

and Malaysia to the RMSI proposal in May and June

2004 proved that Admiral Fargo's assessment of regional support for the

was

from

incorrect, especially in regard to the notion of putting

US

initiative

Special Operations

Forces or marines on high-speed vessels to conduct maritime interdiction in the
Strait

of Malacca. The three

RMSI

are

littoral States'

perceptions

of,

and

initial

reactions to,

examined below.

Indonesia
Shortly after the media's disclosure of the

US

plan to deploy troops in the Strait of

Malacca, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on the
position of the country in

its

opposition to the plan, arguing that Indonesia and

Malaysia, in accordance with the 1982

guarding the

Strait

official

of Malacca.

78

LOS Convention, were solely responsible for

Nugroho Wisnumurti, former

director general

for political affairs of Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that

Fighting terrorism through regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, or any part of the

globe for that matter,

is

something to be applauded. However, fighting terrorism in the

Malacca and Singapore

by allowing the use of military force by any country
(Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore) is another matter. 79

Straits

other than the coastal states

Indonesian Navy Chief Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh joined the opposition,
calling the idea of sending special operations troops to the Strait of Malacca

RMSI

"baseless." 80

During the Second Indonesia-United

held in Washington,

under

States Security Dialogue,

DC, April 22-23, 2004, the Indonesian delegation sought clar-

US policy towards the Strait of Malacca. In response, the US
delegation clarified the concept of RMSI and gave assurances that the United States
would respect Indonesia's sovereignty over its waters. The US delegation further
ification regarding the

agreed to continue to consult with Indonesia and other regional nations. 81

when

(known as the
"Shangri-La Dialogue") in Singapore, US defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
told a group of Asian reporters that RMSI was an idea in its early stage and would
In June 2004,

attending the 3rd Asian Security Conference

not threaten sovereignty. The Secretary

clarified that

"[a]ny implications that

it

would impinge in any way on the sovereign territorial waters of some countries
would be inaccurate." 82 Admiral Walter F. Doran, the United States Pacific Fleet

112
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commander, who accompanied Secretary Rumsfeld at the conference,

also told re-

porters that Admiral Fargo's testimony did not imply that establishing

bases

and

units or stationing elite forces in the region are part of

new US

RMSI. Admiral

Doran pointed out that the main idea of the initiative was to build on normal navyto-navy contacts and discussions to raise maritime situational awareness in the
Asia-Pacific region. 83

Despite the clarification

made by high-ranking

officials

of the

US government,

including Admiral Fargo and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Indonesia's concerns

over the possible intervention by foreign maritime powers, in particular the United
States, in the

management of the

was displeased with

Strait

of Malacca remained. As reported, Indonesia

joint naval patrols

conducted by the navies of India and the

United States for several months in 2003. 84 The reasoning behind

was Indonesia's worries about

permanent Indian presence
According to another

RMSI was

still

in

its

US

involvement in a broader strategy that favored a

in Southeast Asia, with the

analysis, while the

early stage

this displeasure

endorsement of Singapore. 85

US government

repeatedly stated that

and was mainly concerned with sharing informa-

US troops in the Strait of Malacca, Indonesia continued to raise its objection to the US proposal, largely because of its long-standing
tion, rather

than with deploying

and

policy of seeking regional solutions to regional security problems,

ment's need to appease a

large, anti- American nationalist

political audience. In addition,

and

Indonesia perceived that the

its

govern-

Islamist domestic

US

sented a challenge to regional self-management of security issues.

proposal repre86

Malaysia

The government of Malaysia, taking the same position
jected strongly to the

US

idea of sending troops to help patrol in the Strait of

Malacca under the proposed RMSI. Yab Dato
sia's

as that of Indonesia, ob-

Seri

and Najib Tun Razak, Malay-

deputy prime minister and defence minister respectively, stated in early April

2004 that "[i]n principle, ensuring the security of the
sponsibility of Malaysia
vite the

Straits

of Malacca

is

the re-

and Indonesia and for the present we do not propose to in-

United States to join the security operations we have mounted there." 87

The defence minister continued,

a

[e]ven

if

they [the Americans] wished to

act,

they should get our permission, as this touches on the question of our national
sovereignty." 88 Najib Razak denied that Malaysia
non-littoral States to police the
rates

on smaller cargo

vessels,

Malacca

strait

and Indonesia needed help from

which, despite periodic raids by pi-

was generally

safe for shipping.

Moreover, he

pointed out that while Malaysia maintained good relations with the United States,
including joint military training, and that

US vessels, including warships, were free

to use the strait, to launch military operations in those waters the

113
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obtain permission from the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia. 89

Nazri Abdul Aziz, a minister in Malaysia's Prime Minister's Depart-

ment, warned that
Strait

and Regional Responses

if

the littoral States

of Malacca, foreign powers

matters in the

strait,

do not properly safeguard

maybe prone to

security in the

intervene in managing the secu-

a threat to Malaysia's sovereignty. 90

which would pose

In June 2004, while continuing to reject the notion of the sending of US troops
to the Strait of Malacca, Malaysia agreed to discuss the issue of protecting the strait

from piracy and potential

month

US

at the

with the United States. 91 In the same

terrorist attacks

3rd Shangri-La Dialogue, Malaysia again stressed

military presence in defending the Strait of Malacca

terrorist attacks

its

opposition to a

and Southeast Asia from

but also agreed to the principles of sharing intelligence and block-

ing terrorists' financial

and

logistical

networks. Najib

Tun Razak reminded

the

participating defense ministers of Malaysia's concerns over the negative impact of
a foreign military presence

on

security

and

political stability in the region,

because

would "set us back in our ideological battle against extremism and militancy." 92
The government of Malaysia was aware of Singapore's strong support for the
US-proposed RMSI and accused Singapore of calling on foreign powers to interit

vene in security matters in the

Strait

of Malacca. Malaysia also disagreed with Singa-

pore's security assessment with regard to the link between pirate attacks

and mari-

time terrorism. Malaysia did not believe that the problem of piracy in the

Malacca was

critical;

what occurred were only minor

Strait

robberies, as pointed out

of

by

Rahim Husin, Malaysia's director of the Maritime Security Policy Directorate. In addition, Malaysia claimed that its law enforcement agencies were more than capable
to ensure security in the strait without intervention

from anyone. 93

Singapore
Since the September 11 attacks, Singapore has been working closely with the

United States to deal with the potential threats posed by terrorism and
liferation. Similar to the actions

US-led security

initiatives,

WMD pro-

taken by Japan, Singapore participates actively in

such as the CSI and PSI. In August 2005, Singapore

hosted the multinational PSI interdiction training exercise, Deep Sabre, in the

South China

Sea.

United States for a

Singapore also signed a

new framework agreement with

strategic cooperation partnership in defense

and

security.

the

The

agreement expands the scope of bilateral cooperation between the two nations in
such areas as anti-terrorism, anti-proliferation of WMD, joint military exercises

and defense technology. 94 Based on the close security relations between Singapore and the United States, it comes as no surprise to
see Singapore expressing its strong support for the US-proposed RMSI. As stated
and

training, policy dialogues,
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announcement of RMSI, Admiral Fargo had talks with
95
the government of Singapore and obtained its support for the initiative.
In the area of managing security in the Strait of Malacca, Singapore complained
frequently about the lack of political will to take effective actions and weak law enearlier, shortly

before the

forcement capacities of the other States that border the Malacca

strait to

counter

armed robberies at sea.
To enhance the safety and security in the strait, Singapore has been calling upon regional States and interested extra-regional powers to put pressure on the littoral
the threat posed by transnational crimes, such as piracy and

perception of the maritime security

States, in particular Indonesia. Singapore's

threat has

been greatly reinforced by the attacks on Cole in 2000, Limburg in 2002

and Dewi Madrim
tacks

in 2003.

might be linked to

It

has

become Singapore's major worry that

terrorist organizations that

pirate at-

may launch terrorist attacks in

the Malacca strait area.

Singapore's reactions to the US-proposed

ment made by

its

RMSI were first reflected in the state-

defence minister Teo Chee

Hean

in April

2004 that "the task of

safeguarding the regional waters against maritime terrorism was complex and no
single State

had the resources

to deal effectively with this threat." 96 In response to

this statement, Malaysia's foreign minister

that if Singapore

Datuk

had concerns about security in the

Seri

Syed

Strait

Hamid

of Malacca,

pointed out

it

should first

them with the littoral States of Malaysia and Indonesia. In May 2004, deputy prime minister and coordinating minister for security and defence Tony Tan
Keng Yam further elaborated Singapore's concerns over the threat of maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia and the lack of security in the Strait of Malacca. Tony Tan
stated that "[t]he possible nexus between piracy and maritime terrorism is probably the greatest concern to maritime security." 98 To counter the threat posed by piracy and maritime terrorism, Singapore advocates a comprehensive approach that
covers three overlapping domains, namely domestic, regional and international.
Domestically, each country can tighten its port security by putting in place addi97

discuss

tional or

enhanced measures. Regionally, the responsibility of the littoral

the maritime security in the region
ral States

States for

must be recognized. At the same time, the litto-

should take unified and concerted action to enhance the security of stra-

tegic waterways. Internationally,

key players, such as the United Nations,

IMO and

other nations that have a stake in the safety and security of international water-

ways, must be involved to protect important sea lines of communications (SLOC)
against pirate attacks

and maritime terrorism. 99

At the 3rd Shangri-La Dialogue held

in

June 2004, Tony Tan reiterated Singa-

pore's concern over potential maritime attacks, pointing out that a ship
right spot in the Strait of

Malacca would cripple world

possibility of hijacked ships being

trade.

He

sunk in the

also raised the

turned into "floating bombs" and crashed into
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such

critical infrastructure

as oil refineries or ports. 100 It

Singapore proposed the idea that

which further reinforced the

US Marines

belief of Malaysia

using the terrorist threat as a tool to justify the

Selected

to the

was

later

US Proposal
reported that

help patrol the Strait of Malacca,

and Indonesia

US

that Singapore

presence in the region.

was

101

Ocean Law and Maritime Security Experts' Views on RMSI

In addition to the initial reactions of the three littoral States to the US-proposed

RMSI, there can also be found comments made by ocean law and maritime experts
in the region on the legitimacy, implications and possible impact of the initiative,

some of which

are

summarized below.

Law and Maritime Security Experts
Mohd Zaki Mohd Salleh 102 viewed the US concept of sending its troops to the Strait
of Malacca under RMSI as a political ploy by Singapore. If the United States were
Malaysian Ocean

on grounds of security, he argued, it would indirectly
mean that Malaysia and Indonesia had recognized the presence of a superpower in
allowed to patrol the

the region.

strait

Mohd Zaki expressed the opinion that Singapore was concerned about

Malaysia's efforts to modernize

its

armed

Asia. In addition,

reached a

which posed

To maintain

pore's sense of superiority in the region.

Singapore needed the

forces,

US military presence

that feeling of superiority,

in the Strait of Malacca

critical stage.

The main reason

Hamzah 104 maintained

for the sharp increase of pirate attacks in

that the idea of inviting

of Malacca had no legal basis.

Strait

slowdown in 1 997-98. 103
the US Navy to patrol the

Hamzah argued that since the adoption of the

LOS Convention, which introduced

1982

and Southeast

he did not believe that the problem of piracy in the region had

the Strait of Malacca area was, he argued, the economic
B.A.

a threat to Singa-

transit passage rights in straits

used for

international navigation, the littoral States' control over the Strait of Malacca has

been

effectively eroded, given the fact that Malaysia, Indonesia

and Singapore had

and were bound by the convention. However, while foreign ships and airenjoy the right of transit passage through the straits, they must refrain from

ratified,

craft

any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
independence of the States that border the
aircraft are prohibited

construed by the

strait.

territorial integrity

and

political

In particular, foreign ships and

from taking any military or non-military posture that can be

littoral States as

undermining

their security.

Hamzah

elaborated

and training flights by foreign forces which
are considered inconsistent with transit passage rights. Accordingly, both Malaysia
that such posture includes naval patrols

and Indonesia were
Strait

right in

opposing the

US proposal to send troops to patrol the

of Malacca. In short, in Hamzah's view, clearly there

116

is

no

legal basis

under

Yann-huei Song

LOS Convention, for a third party to conduct
enforcement action in strategic waterways, except when asked or permitted by the
States bordering the strait concerned. He also rebutted the argument that the lack
international law, especially the 1982

of effective enforcement capacity of the bordering States constitutes a justification
for foreign intervention in

He

managing

security matters in the Strait of Malacca. 105

said,

The

idea of a maritime

power putting undue pressure on the bordering countries

to

allow their navy to patrol the Straits of Malacca is ludicrous even if the bordering states
had no adequate capabilities to undertake enforcement on their own. What is more, in
this case, when both Indonesia and Malaysia have adequate military capabilities to deal
effectively

Hamzah

with the current level of maritime threats in the

Straits

of Malacca. 106

United States and Singapore in

also questioned the real intention of the

introducing the idea of sending naval forces to patrol the Strait of Malacca under

RMSI,

" [a] re

he wrote:

as

the

US and its ally looking for a new enemy in the region

using the Straits of Malacca as a pretext? Or, are

hidden agenda?"

Mat Taib Yasin 108
strait.

First,

the

offered five reasons to explain

US

nesia rejected the
109

we

witnessing the unfolding of a

107

why both

proposal of sending troops to help patrol the Malacca

two nations doubted the

sincerity of the

centered around the question of why US assistance would
naval patrols since there are other ways and

hance security in the

Malaysia and Indo-

strait.

means

US

offers.

come only in the form of

to help the littoral States to en-

"Given that deployment of military forces

strued as symbols of intervention and aggression
forgiven for harboring this doubt," he stated. 110

.

This doubt

.

.

is

often con-

the Littoral States should be

The US proposal

also

reminded

Malaysia and Indonesia of the past history of colonialism. Second, Malaysia and
Indonesia opposed the

US

proposal because of the problem of legality. Under ex-

isting international law, in particular the

rationale for foreign
ral States."

control."
ficult to

111

powers to patrol the

1982

LOS Convention,

Straits unless or until

The third reason was the littoral

States' fear

"there

is

legal

requested by Litto-

of "loss of command and

As demonstrated in the past, once foreign powers are in the strait,

persuade them to leave. Fourth, the

no

littoral States

it is

dif-

were concerned that the

may resort to the use of excessive force as demonstrated in its global
terrorism. And finally, Malaysia and Indonesia were concerned about

United States

war against

the spillover effects of geopolitical rivalry between the major powers in the Strait of

Malacca, which includes the
access to the strait.

US

strategy to contain

112

117

China by controlling China's

—
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American Maritime Security Expert

Mark
RMSI
Strait

J.

Valencia 113 viewed the dispute over the legitimacy of the US-proposed

as a clash

between the

littoral States,

which

retain their sovereignty over the

of Malacca under the legal regimes of innocent passage and transit passage,

and foreign maritime powers, which want passage of their naval and commercial
vessels in the strait to be absolutely guaranteed. As the number of pirate attacks and
by maritime terrorism

the concern over the potential security threat posed

in

Southeast Asia, and especially in the Strait of Malacca area, continued to grow, the

United States and other nations such
right to intervene in the

management of the

by the worries

further reinforced

Japan and Australia began to advocate the

as

As a

claim that

fulfill

to intervene

was

—Malaysia and Indonesia

their responsibility to protect the

Singapore, the United States and other like-minded nations

result,

it is

The intention

that the littoral States

either did not have the will or capability to
strait.

strait.

community"

the responsibility of the "international

to intervene.

However, Malaysia and Indonesia believed that the threat has been exaggerated for
the purpose of justifying international intervention.

emptive intervention led by the United

—should

To avoid

and pre-

unilateral

States, the littoral States

—Malaysia, Indo-

The only defense of the littoral States
against the possibility of unilateral foreign intervention in the management of security matters in the Strait of Malacca is to agree to jointly patrol the strait and suppress piracy and the threat of terrorism there. 114
nesia

and Singapore

act proactively.

Chinese Maritime Security Expert
Ji

Guoxing 115 pointed out

will

that

China was concerned that the US-proposed RMSI

exceed transit passage rights and encroach upon the sovereignly and sovereign

rights of the littoral States, in contravention of the 1982
its

rapid economic growth, China relies

imports, which makes

percent of China's
Strait

oil

of Malacca. The

security. Accordingly,

Malacca and who
ful

is

LOS Convention. 116 Due to

more on maritime

transportation and

oil

more important to ensure the security of SLOC. Around 60
imports come from the Middle East and must go through the
it

strait

has been closely linked with China's economic and energy

China

is

very

much

concerned about security in the

in control of the strait.

whether the US-proposed

Ji

Guoxing pointed out

that

Strait

it is

of

doubt-

RMSI aims to block China's energy channel and to

contain China's economic development. China's policy

is

to support global anti-

terrorism efforts, support the idea of enhancing security in the Strait of Malacca

and

participate in regional cooperation to guarantee

SLOC

security.

It is

also

China's hope that the United States and related nations could establish a terrorism

prevention mechanism in the

strait

through consultative cooperation under the

framework of the 1982 LOS Convention

117
to safeguard the strait's security.

118
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Littoral States' Responses to

In response to the

RMSI: July 2004

US-proposed anti-terrorism patrols

and

strait

and Indonesia began

management of security

began to seek US and other user

States'

strait.

involvement in their

mainly by providing training,

strait,

ling vessels, or technological

and

measures and

to take domestic

cooperate with Singapore to enhance security in the

Malacca

un-

a foreign military presence in the region to be a threat to

their sovereignty, Malaysia

curity in the

June 2006

in the Strait of Malacca

der RMSI, and perceiving a foreign intervention in the
matters in the

to

In addition, they also

enhance

efforts to

se-

logistic support, patrol-

financial aids. International organizations, such

IMO, and regional cooperative mechanisms such as ARF and APEC, were
also called upon to provide help. The littoral States' political willingness to take
more effective actions to improve security in the strait was further motivated by a
as the

decision of the Joint

War Committee (JWC)

of Lloyd's Market Association in June

2005, which declared the Strait of Malacca a "high-risk zone" and added

of areas which are
States

were very

at risk to

war, strikes, terrorism and related

much concerned

JWC decision,

over the

perils.

118

to

it

its list

The littoral

mainly because

could

it

premiums for the ships that transit the strait or call at litwhich, in turn, would hurt their economy. While repeatedly

result in higher insurance

toral States' ports,

JWC decision was not justified, the littoral States also realize that

claiming that the
unless

more

effective action

of Malacca, the

strait

was taken to improve

and

security in the Strait

would not be removed from the JWC "high-risk zone"

this section, the national responses

to the

safety

of the three

US-proposed RMSI from July 2004

littoral States

until June

list.

of the Malacca

In

strait

2006 are examined.

Domestic Actions Taken by Littoral States to Combat Maritime Crimes
Indonesia

To improve

capacity to handle the security problems in the Strait of Malacca,

its

Indonesia formed

Belawan

119

and

Malacca and
Indragiri

Ilir

set

Strait

Navy Control Command Centers (Puskodal)
up

six regencies at the

Batam and

in

immediate borders of the

Strait

of

of Singapore, namely, Rokan Hilir, Bengkalis, Siak, Palawan,

and Karimun, which

are believed the

most vulnerable and dangerous

areas for pirate attacks. 120

crease

The main purpose of setting up these regencies was to inthe people's welfare, alleviate poverty, and thus dissuade the local people

from engaging

in piratical activities.

Tens of regencies along the

and Singapore and around the three chokepoints
July 2005, an Indonesian maritime policy unit

and maintain Malacca

security.

122

119

will

be

set

up

straits

of Malacca

in the future. 121 In

was established to help

fight pirates
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In September 2005, Indonesia decided to install radars at nine locations along
the Strait of Malacca to strengthen security in the area

and announced that the

In-

tegrated Maritime Security System (IMSS) in the strait will soon be introduced. 123

Given that most of the cases involving maritime crimes
tional courts often

produce problematic

deterrent effect, the

verdicts,

in Indonesia's

conven-

which do not have the required

government of Indonesia considered

establishing maritime

courts to try criminals operating in Indonesian waters. 124 Anti-piracy and anti-terror
exercises

were also being held to enhance security in the

stance, in July 2005, the Indonesian

Navy launched

of Malacca. For in-

Strait

a

three-month operation,

named Gurita (Octopus) in a bid to fight rampant pirate attacks in the strait 125 and
in March 2006, an anti-terrorism drill was held in the Strait of Malacca. 126
Malaysia

The government of Malaysia has

also

deal with the maritime threat posed

Malacca. In

fact,

announced

in

adopted a number of domestic measures to

by piracy and armed robberies

in the Strait of

some of these measures had been implemented before RMSI was

May 2004.

For instance, in 2003, Malaysia erected a string of radar

tracking stations along the Strait of Malacca to monitor traffic and acquired
patrol boats to

combat

training activities

yond

and

piracy.

127

In 2004, the Royal Malaysian

Agency

Malacca.

This

combat piracy and maritime

be formed to be responsible for patrols in the

new agency began patrolling

laysian maritime police

were

the strait in

its

terror-

Strait

December 2005.

also asked to increase anti-piracy operations

help ensure the safety and security of the Strait of Malacca.

Malaysia announced

its

was reported that the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement

it

(MMEA) would
129

Navy intensified

patrols in the northern reaches of the Strait of Malacca be-

the one- fathom curve in an effort to

ism. 128 In April 2005,

new

131

13 °

of

Ma-

and

to

In February 2006,

plan to step up anti-piracy patrols in the Strait of Malacca

by adding up to fifteen new high-speed police boats and conducting joint maritime
exercises with Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore. 132
Singapore

When undertaking efforts to fight piracy and maritime terrorism, the government
of Singapore encounters a dilemma of conflicting interests between protecting

its

shipping industries and stressing that maritime threats in the Strait of Malacca are
real

and therefore asking the littoral

ment measures

States to

to protect against pirate

adopt more cooperative law enforce-

and maritime

terrorist attacks.

The

basis

JWC to declare the strait a high-risk zone was the security assessment done
by its consultant, Aegis Defence Services. In August 2005, the JWC stated that the
for the

Strait

of Malacca would remain on the "high-risk zone"

120

list

"until

it

was

clear that
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the measures planned

plemented and were

by governments and other agencies

effective."

133

had been im-

in the area

While taking note of shipping industry concerns

over rising insurance costs, the government of Singapore has consistently emphasized the potential

maritime security threat in the

operation from the other two

Strait

of Malacca and asked co-

enhance security

littoral States to

in the strait.

A

number of unilateral anti-piracy and anti- terrorism measures have also been taken
by Singapore, such
two Fokker planes

on board

selected

as

deploying a

for joint

Malacca

of remote-controlled vessels, 134 providing

fleet

strait patrols,

135

deploying armed security teams

merchant vessels entering and leaving

laying high-tech sonar arrays

its territorial

on the seabed across the Malacca

strait.

portantly, Singapore has been very active in pressing Malaysia

agree to a tripartite coordinated patrolling

waters, 136
137

and

More im-

and Indonesia to

program in the strait and to the involve-

ment of other ARF members and user States in the management of security matters
in the

Malacca

strait.

In addition to the selected domestic anti-piracy

and anti-terrorism measures

mentioned above, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have
with the

also cooperated closely

IMO by implementing amendments to Chapter XI-2 (Special Measures to

Enhance Maritime

Security) of the International

at Sea, in particular to the International

also held a special

Convention

for the Safety of Life

Ships and Port Facility Security (ISPS)

Code and to the Automatic Identification System
Strait

as

(AIS). 138 Indonesia

and Malaysia

meeting in Jakarta in September 2005 to enhance security in the

of Malacca. Both joined the

March 2003 and Malaysia
Bilateral Cooperative

in

US

March

Container Security

Initiative,

Indonesia in

2004.

Programs in the

Strait of Malacca

Between Littoral States

announcement of the RMSI concept by the US Pacific
Command, Indonesia and Singapore agreed to establish a bilateral program to patrol the Strait of Singapore, which involved the setting up of direct communication
links between the navies and the relevant agencies of the two littoral States. Coordinated patrols under the program were carried out for three months in the strait. 139
In May 2005, the navies of both Indonesia and Singapore launched Project
SURPIC, which is a sea surveillance system. Under the system, the two navies can
In 1992, long before the

share a

common real-time sea situation picture of the Singapore strait. 140
had

Similarly, bilateral cooperative efforts

also

been made by Indonesia and

Malaysia to help improve safety and security in the Strait of Malacca. In 1992, a

Maritime Operation Planning

Team was established by the two nations to

nate their joint patrols in the

strait,

coordi-

which are conducted four times a year and
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involve maritime institutions such as customs, search and rescue, and police. 141 In-

donesia and Malaysia also carry out joint patrols in the Strait of Malacca under the
agreed Malindo program. In
joint exercise,

November

codename Ex Malapura,

2005, Malaysia and Singapore conducted a
in the

Malacca

strait to

promote

the area, which was the seventeenth joint exercise between the two navies.

security in
142

In April

2006, Malaysia and Indonesia held another joint aerial exercise, code-named Elang

Malindo XXII. 143
Between Littoral States and User States
Bilateral cooperative

programs or agreements have

the littoral States and user States of the Malacca
States. In July 2005, as

mentioned

hanced cooperation

and

States, in

and

been concluded between
in particular, the

United

framework agreement

security

for a

was signed between Singa-

which the two nations agreed to work toward en-

in the areas of

management,

disaster

strait,

earlier, a strategic

closer cooperation partnership in defense

pore and the United

also

anti-WMD,

intelligence

anti-terrorism, search

and rescue

exchange and defense technology. 144 While

both Malaysia and Indonesia raised concerns over the US-Singapore Strategic

Framework Agreement, in particular their perception that a strong US military
presence in the region would constitute a potential threat to their sovereignty, 145
they are willing to improve their military relations with the United States. In 2004

and 2005, Indonesia and the United

States held the

second and third security dia-

logue respectively, in which the two countries exchanged views on a wide range of
security

and defense

issues, including security in the Strait

of Malacca. 146 In

May

2005, joint anti-terrorism exercises between the United States and Indonesia were

held at sea off Jakarta. 147 At the end of 2005, the United States offered to help Indonesia modernize

its

armed

forces

and provide technical

security operations in the Strait of Malacca

In January 2006,

it

assistance to support joint

by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. 148

was reported that Indonesia and the United

evaluate their security cooperation following the lifting of the

November

States

would

re-

US arms embargo in

2005, especially in dealing with terrorism and security in the Strait of

Malacca and in Southeast Asia. 149 In the same month, the government of Indonesia
submitted

its

dar, sensors

request to the United States for technical support in the form of ra-

and improved patrol boat

capability to secure the Strait of Malacca. 150

Indonesia's cooperation with the United States to fight terrorism and enhance security in the Malacca strait
state

was

also discussed during the visit of

Condoleezza Rice to Jakarta in mid-March 2006.

151

US

Later that

secretary of

same month,

Indonesia and the United States conducted a joint exercise on small craft
counterterrorism maritime interdiction techniques. 152 During her
sia in

March

2006, Secretary Rice noted that maritime security

122

is

visit to

Indone-

a top priority in
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Southeast Asia, and that the United States
close the strait to
proliferators.

153

drug smugglers and

early
will

it

working with Indonesia and others to

human

traffickers, pirates

and weapons

$1 million in aid was allocated to Indonesia to help that nation im-

prove security in the
2006,

is

Strait

of Malacca, according to Admiral Fallon. 154 In April

was reported that the United

States

would soon provide Indonesia with an

warning system to support security maintenance

be installed

at several points

in the Strait of Malacca. It

along Indonesia's territory on the waterway and on

maritime patrol aircraft. In addition, the United States also promised to exchange intelligence information with the three littoral States

situation

and condition of the Malacca

cussions

would be held with the United

Security Dialogue in
rity

strait.

155

on various matters

relating to the

Indonesia also announced that dis-

States at the fourth

Washington on April 23-30, 2006 on

Indonesia-United States

issues relating to the secu-

of the Strait of Malacca, anti-terrorism, bioterrorism and cyberterrorism, as well

156
as the security of Southeast Asia generally.

While differences over the question of securing the
concern about an enhanced
also

moved

of Malacca and the

military presence in the strait

to consider accepting help

from the United

still exist,

Malaysia

States to strengthen secu-

through improved military relations between the two nations. In

rity in the strait

May

US

Strait

2005, for instance, Malaysia's deputy prime minister and defence minister

Najib Razak discussed security in the Malacca
tary of state Robert Zoellick.

During the

visit,

strait

with visiting

the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing

Agreement (ACSA) was signed, which provides a framework
military logistic matters between the

US deputy secre-

two nations.

157

for cooperation in

During his visit, Deputy Secre-

tary Zoellick stated that the United States respects the role of the littoral States as

the players with the responsibility for maritime security in the strait but at the

time

is

same

exploring ways to help Malaysia and Indonesia develop their capacities to

deal with piracy

and other crimes

in the strait. 158 In February 2006,

Minister Najib Razak and Admiral Fallon held talks in Kuala

Deputy Prime

Lumpur to discuss pi-

racy and potential terrorist threats in the Strait of Malacca and the waters of

Sabah. 159 In early June 2006, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld urged increased

tween the

militaries of the

also discussed with

ties

be-

United States and Indonesia during his Jakarta visit.

He

Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono enhancing

cooperation between the two nations in the fight against terrorism and the threat

of piracy in the

Strait

of Malacca. They also discussed

how the United States could

provide military equipment to Indonesia to enhance Indonesia's military capability to eradicate

piracy in the Malacca

strait.

160

In addition to the bilateral cooperation between the littoral States

United

States,

cooperation has also been developed between the

other main user States of the Malacca

strait,

123

and the

littoral States

and

such as Japan. In March 2005, in
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response to a pirate attack against a Japanese-owned tugboat in the Strait of Malacca,

Japan advised the

and

littoral States

of the

combat piracy. This

aircraft to

and Indonesia.

161

May

In

strait that

offer

it

was ready

to send patrol vessels

was met with objections by both Malaysia

2005, Indonesia's navy chief of staff Admiral Slamet

welcomed any assistance from foreign nations in securing the Strait of Malacca, including from Japan, as long as it was not in the form
of military force. In response, Japan sent a team to Indonesia tasked with studying
what type of patrol ships Indonesia needed to deal with maritime crime in the
162
strait.
In June 2005, during bilateral trade talks, Japan and Indonesia agreed to
Soebijanto said that Indonesia

strengthen their cooperation to enhance the safety of navigation in the Strait of

Malacca. 163 In July of that year, Indonesia announced that four patrol boats pro-

vided by Japan would carry out patrolling missions in the Malacca
tion,

was

strait.

In addi-

Japan donated US$50 million to Jakarta to help safeguard the waterways. 164

also reported in

drew up

December 2005

that Japan

and the three

electronic sea charts of the Straits of Malacca

vent accidents or piracy in the areas.

165

It

littoral States jointly

and Singapore

to help pre-

In February 2006 the government of Japan

pledged again to grant technical aid consisting of detectors and patrol boats to protect the

also

Malacca

strait

from possible

announced its decision

ongoing

efforts to

Malacca.

166

terrorist attacks. Japan's

Nippon Foundation

to donate a patrol training vessel to Malaysia as part of

reduce piracy and improve maritime security in the

In June 2006, the Japanese government announced that

it

Strait

of

would do-

nate three patrol boats to Indonesia to help fight terrorism and piracy. 167 In April

2006, Malaysian and Australian naval forces conducted a five-day exercise, code-

named Mastex,
tensive talks

on

Malacca

in the

strait.

168

In

May 2006, Japan and Indonesia held in-

security in the Malacca strait. 169

Programs of the Littoral States
It seems safe to point out that the most important development in terms of enhancing security in the Strait of Malacca is the establishment of routine sea and air
patrols by the maritime security organizations of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. As stated earlier, the main motivations for reaching the tripartite cooperative

Tripartite Cooperative Patrolling

patrolling agreements

from the user

States

among the

three littoral States were the increasing

and the international community

for

more

effective

demand
law en-

forcement measures to deal with the problem of piracy and possible maritime
rorist

attacks,

the

increasing

concern of the

littoral

States

ter-

over possible

intervention of foreign powers by sending their troops to the area and the decision

of Lloyd's

JWC that declared the Strait of Malacca a war-risk area. In July 2004 In-

donesia, Malaysia
as the

and Singapore launched a coordinated patrol program, known

Malsindo Coordinated Patrol (MCP). Under the program, seven warships
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from Indonesia,

from Malaysia and

five

five

from Singapore

However,

tain security in the Strait of Malacca.

it

are deployed to

should be noted that the warships

of the participating nations are prohibited from carrying out patrolling

another participating nation's

under the
sia),

MCP,

Lumut

territorial waters.

up

control points have been set

main-

170

activities in

In securing the Malacca strait

in

Belawan and Batam (Indone-

(Malaysia) and Changi (Singapore). Another control point, Phuket

(Thailand), will be set

up when Thailand joins the "Eyes

in the Sky"

program. 171

In addition to the tripartite coordinated sea patrol program, the three littoral
States also reached

agreement to begin

air patrols

over the Malacca

strait to

curb

piracy and increase security in the strategic waterway under the "Eyes in the Sky"

program. The

initiative for

multinational maritime air patrols was proposed by

Malaysia's deputy prime minister and defence minister Najib Razak at the Shangri-

La Dialogue held
ral State

the

in

June 2005. 172 Under the "Eyes in the Sky" program, each

of the Malacca

strait.

The

strait will

aircraft will

provide two maritime aircraft per week to patrol

only patrol the waterway and will not be allowed to

over the land. While the maritime patrol aircraft would be allowed to
other participating nation's waters in the
nautical miles
will

from

that country's land.

It

strait,

was

they must

fly

no

fly

less

fly

above an-

than three

also agreed that each patrol aircraft

Team (CMPT) on

board, consisting of a

from each of the participating nations. The

CMPT will establish a

have a Combined Maritime Patrol

military officer

litto-

comprehensive surface picture over the patrol

area.

During the

initiative stage for

the implementation of the maritime air patrol program, only the three littoral
States

and Thailand can participate. But the implementation of the second phase of

the "Eyes in the Sky"
tions,

program could involve participation by extra-regional na-

such as the United

littoral States

must be

States, subject to the principle that the sovereignty

respected.

launched in September 2005,

it

173

of the

Although the "Eyes in the Sky" program was

was not until April 2006 that the three littoral States

signed an agreement on the formation of a joint coordinating committee on the

Malacca

Straits Patrols

nated Patrols.

174

(MSP) and Standard Operational Procedures on Coordi-

Under the agreement, cross-border hot pursuit cannot be

out without prior arrangements between the

littoral States.

carried

While Singapore and

Indonesia, as well as Malaysia and Indonesia, have bilateral agreements allowing

and Malaysia have no such agreement and

for cross-border hot pursuit, Singapore

must seek permission before entering each other's territorial waters.
out that the tripartite patrol agreement
ties for

the international

is

community to

It

was pointed

an "open arrangement with opportuni-

participate," but only with the consent of

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

175

logue, held in Singapore, both India

and Japan expressed their willingness to

In June 2006, at the 5th Shangri-La Dia-

the littoral States in patrolling the Strait of Malacca.
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assist
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Regional Responses and Efforts in Helping Improve Security in
the Malacca Strait

Regional Maritime Security Discussion in the Shangri-La Dialogue

Maritime security in the

Strait

of Malacca has become one of the important issues

discussed at the Asian Security Conference, organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies

and dubbed the "Shangri-La Dialogue." At the 3rd

Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore in June 2004, the US-proposed

RMSI and

the concept of sending American troops to help patrol the Strait of Malacca were

heatedly discussed. Malaysia opposed strongly an enhanced
in defending the strait

and Southeast Asia from

ples of shared intelligence

US

terrorists

and blocking terrorists'

US

military presence

but agreed to the princi-

financial

and logistical networks.

defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in his speech at the same meeting, de-

scribed the global
stressed the

war on terrorism

need to cooperate and share intelligence to

At the same time, he sought to ease
ticularly Malaysia

The

as a battle against ideological

it

fight terrorism effectively.

among the Southeast Asian nations, parRMSI might encroach on their sovereignty.

fears

and Indonesia, that

secretary clarified that the initiative

plications that

extremism and

was

still

in

its

infancy and that

"

[a]ny im-

would impinge in any way on the territorial waters of some coun-

would be inaccurate." 177
The American-proposed RMSI and the possible involvement of foreign powers
in the management of security in the Strait of Malacca were continuously discussed

tries

at the

4th Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2005. At the conference, the participating

defense ministers agreed that regional maritime security, particularly in the Strait

of Malacca, was a matter of

common

concern in the region.

reached based on three broad principles:

A

consensus was

the littoral States

must shoulder the

primary responsibility for the security of regional waterways,

(2) the user States

and the international community have

and

erative

(

1

)

a significant role to play

(3)

new coop-

measures should be forged in a manner that was respectful of sovereignty

and consistent with international law. Nations in the region recognized the need to
enhance practical forms of maritime security cooperation
principles.

178

in accordance with these

In June 2006, the participating defense ministers at the 5th Shangri-

La Dialogue discussed ways to advance maritime security cooperation. However,
the discussions were strictly off the record. 179
States

and user

States (particularly the

It

United

seems clear that both the
States) of the

Malacca

littoral

strait are

adopting an approach of closed door consultations and collaboration to enhance

maritime security in the

Strait

of Malacca.
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Tripartite Ministerial

Meeting of the Littoral States on the Malacca and

Singapore Straits
In August 2005, ministers of foreign affairs of the three littoral States

met in Batam,

Indonesia to discuss matters relating to the safety of navigation, maritime security

and environmental protection

in the straits of

Malacca and Singapore. 180

A Joint

Statement was issued after the meeting, in which the three nations reaffirmed their
sovereignty and sovereign rights over the Malacca and Singapore

defined under the 1982
tion.

The ministers

LOS Convention

stressed that the

environmental protection in the

main

as straits

used for international naviga-

responsibility for the safety, security

straits lies

with the

emphasized that measures undertaken in the

this

understanding that the three

user States

littoral States

and relevant international agencies and the

to the straits.

littoral States.

straits in

cordance with international law, including the 1982

on

which are

straits,

The

and

ministers

the future should be in ac-

LOS

Convention.

acknowledged the

It is

based

interest of

role they could play in respect

Moreover, in recognition of the importance of engaging the States

bordering the funnels leading to the Malacca and Singapore

straits

and the major

users of the straits, the three littoral States supported continuing discussion

on the

overall subject of maritime security in the Southeast Asia region within the frame-

work of ASEAN and ARF. They also acknowledged the good work carried out by
the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG) on Safety of Navigation in the straits
of Malacca and Singapore and recognized the efforts of the Revolving Fund Committee (RFC) in dealing with issues of environmental protection in the

straits.

181

The ministers recognized the importance of the Tripartite Ministerial Meeting
on the straits of Malacca and Singapore in providing the overall framework for cooperation among them and supported the convening of the chiefs of defence forces
of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand Informal Meeting in Kuala
Lumpur on August 1-2, 2005. More importantly, the ministers agreed to address
the issue of maritime security comprehensively, which includes trans-boundary
crimes such as piracy, armed robbery and terrorism. They also perceived the need
to address the issue of trafficking in persons, smuggling of people and weapons,
and other trans-boundary crimes through appropriate mechanisms. In recognition of the interest of others in maintaining the safety of navigation, maritime secu-

welcomed the
assistance of the user States, relevant international agencies and the shipping community in the areas of capacity building, training and technology transfer, and
other forms of assistance, provided that the main responsibility of the littoral States
in managing the straits is respected and that the assistance is offered in accordance
with the 1982 LOS Convention. The ministers expressed their displeasure with the
decision of the Joint War Committee of Lloyd's Market Association that declared
rity

and environmental protection

in the straits, the ministers
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to the

and Singapore a high-risk zone for piracy and terrorism with-

out consulting with the littoral States and taking into account the existing anti-piracy

and anti-terrorism measures undertaken by them.
special

meeting on enhancing

Malacca and Singapore

safely, security

straits to

Finally, the ministers

welcomed

and environmental protection

be held in Jakarta in September 2005.

a

in the

182

IMO Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing
Safety, Security

Due
the

and Environmental Protection

to a genuine concern over possible terrorist attacks in the Strait of Malacca,

IMO Council decided in November 2004 to convene a high-level conference to

consider ways and means of enhancing safety, security and environmental protection in the

straits.

183

Accordingly, the

Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing

IMO

on the

Jakarta Meeting

Safety, Security

IMO, pointed out in

his

secretary-

opening remarks that

[w]ith regard to the question of security versus sovereignty (or vice versa), while

understand and

fully respect the sensitivity

that, whilst States

of

and Environmental Protection

was held in September 2005. At the conference, Mr. Efthimios Mitropoulos,
general of the

Straits

of any State over the issue,

have the right of non-interference in their internal

have concurrent responsibilities towards their

own

people,

I

can

also believe

affairs,

the

I

they also

international

community and their international engagements. Whatever the answer to this, there
can be no excuse for inactivity, whether the danger is clear and present or perceived as a
future possibility. 184

Accordingly, the secretary-general called
the straits of Malacca

stakeholders to

dence in any

on

and Singapore, user States of the straits, industry and all other

work together to produce an outcome conducive to building confi-

efforts

undertaken jointly to enhance

mental protection in the

straits.

The

eration of the littoral States concerned,
all

safety, security

secretary- general also

action undertaken in the future should be based

role in

the three littoral States bordering

made

it

tion.

clear that

any

on the consent, support and coop-

which should be invited

to play a principal

developments. In addition, any action undertaken must be consistent

with international law, including the relevant provisions of the 1982
185

and environ-

The meeting produced the

LOS Conven-

Jakarta Statement,

and the user
States while respecting the littoral States' sovereignty, and to establish a mechanism to
facilitate cooperation between them to discuss issues relating to the safety, security and

which emphasizes the need to balance the

environmental protection of the
possible options for

Straits

interest of the littoral States

of Malacca and Singapore, including exploring

burden sharing. 186

128

Yann-huei Song

For the purpose of enhancing the
of the Malacca and Singapore

safety, security

straits,

and environmental protection

the thirty-four nations participating in the

meeting agreed

work of the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG) on Safety of
Navigation in enhancing the safety of navigation and in protecting the marine
•

that the

environment

in the Straits, including the efforts of the

implementation of Article 43 of the 1982

TTEG

LOS Convention

in relation to the

in the Straits, should

continue to be supported and encouraged;
•

that a

mechanism be

established

by the three

regular basis, with user States, the shipping industry
safe navigation

through the

Straits safe

and open

meet, on a

and others with an interest

Straits, to discuss issues relating to

and environmental protection of the
keeping the

littoral States to

in

the safety, security

Straits, as well as to facilitate

cooperation in

to navigation, including exploring the possible

options for burden sharing, and to keep the

IMO informed, as appropriate, of the

outcome of such meetings;
•

that efforts should be

made through the three littoral States to

establish

enhance mechanisms for information exchange within and between

and

States,

on existing arrangements, such as TTEG mechanisms,
so as to enhance maritime domain awareness in the Straits and thus contribute to
the enhancement of co-operative measures in the areas of safety, security and
where

building,

possible,

environmental protection; and
•

promote, build upon and expand co-operative and operational

to

arrangements of the three littoral

States, including the Tripartite

Technical Expert

Group on Maritime Security, coordinated maritime patrols in the Straits through,
inter alia,

maritime security training programs and other forms of cooperation,

such as maritime exercises, with a view to further strengthening capacity building
in the littoral States to address security threats to shipping. 187

The
States,

and

IMO

has also been invited to consider, in consultation with the

convening a

series

prioritize their needs,

spond

to those needs,

ing, training

of follow-on meetings for the

and

littoral States to identify

for user States to identify possible assistance to re-

which may include information exchange, capacity build-

and technical support, with

cooperative measures.

littoral

188

A Memorandum

among the governments of the

a

view to promote and coordinate

of Understanding

three littoral States

and

IMO

(MOU) by and

for the

implementa-

Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) demonstration project in
of Malacca and Singapore (MEH MOU) and a Memorandum on Ar-

tion of a regional

the straits

rangements by and among the three

littoral States,

IMO,

International

Hydro-

graphic Organization (IHO), International Association of Independent Tanker
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Owners (INTERTANKO) and International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) to implement specific activities of Article 4 of the MEH MOU were signed. 189 Also at the
meeting, China, South Korea and Norway were encouraged to join Japan in making financial contributions to the Malacca Straits Council.
five years

or so, the

US$100 million

Over the past

thirty-

Nippon Foundation of Japan had contributed more than

to the council. 190

Tokyo Ministerial Conference on International Transport Security
In January 2006, the Ministerial Conference on International Transport Security
was held in Tokyo, attended by the transport ministers of the G-8 members and
six

Asian nations, namely, Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and

South Korea. The purpose of this conference was to discuss international transport security issues.

A ministerial declaration and three ministerial statements on

security in the international maritime transport sector, aviation security

transport security were adopted by the conference.

The

and land

Ministerial Statement

on

Security in the International Maritime Transport Sector stressed the importance

of ensuring continued compliance with the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the 1974
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

(SOLAS Convention) and

December 2002 and entered

the ISPS Code, which were adopted in

into force in

191
July 2004.

The

participants in the conference

col to the 1988

welcomed

the adoption of the 2005 Proto-

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the

Safety of Maritime Navigation

(SUA Convention), and

the 2005 Protocol to the

1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.
the 1988

SUA Convention in Article 3

lence against persons

which are

Among the

unlawful acts covered by

are the seizure of ships

by

force, acts of vio-

on board ships and the placing of devices on board

likely to destroy or

damage

it.

192

In addition, the

a ship

IMO was invited by the

transport ministers

[t]o

consider,

in

cooperation with

development and adoption,

WCO

[World Customs Organization], the

as necessary, of appropriate

measures to enhance the

security of the maritime transport of containers in the international supply chain,

while respecting efficiency and international harmonization;

to undertake a study and

make,

as necessary,

recommendations to enhance the security

of ships other than those already covered by SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, in

an

effort to protect

them from becoming targets of acts of terrorism,

piracy, or

armed

robbery and to prevent them from being exploited or used as means for committing

such

acts.

193
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May 2006,

In

given

by

initial

the

IMO

acceptance to

satellite to fight

announced

that parties to the

SOLAS Convention had

new security measures, which require ships to be tracked

terrorism and to prevent the introduction of

WMD into the

new Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) regulation, which is expected to become effective in January 2008, merchant ships will
supply chain. Under the

be required to transmit information about their identity, location and date and
time of their position through satellite-based technology. 194 The

LRIT
tion,

is

included in the 1974

through which LRIT

ships, including

and upwards,

is

SOLAS

new regulation on

Convention's Chapter V on Safety of Naviga-

introduced as a mandatory requirement for passenger

high-speed craft and cargo ships of three-hundred gross tonnage

as well as

mobile offshore drilling units on international voyages. 195

The Plan to Establish the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center
To help enhance safety and security in the Strait of Malacca, Japan launched an initiative in 2001, aiming to set up an anti-piracy cooperative framework among

ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. As
Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was concluded in Tokyo in November
2004. 196 The agreement was opened for signature by Bangladesh, Brunei, Camboa result, the Regional

dia,

Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and

China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam, and enters into force ninety days

South Korea,

Sri

after the date

on which the tenth instrument of notification by

above, indicating the completion of its domestic requirements,

ReCAAP

is

mentioned

submitted to the

197

As of June 2006,
had signed, and with the exception of Brunei, had ratified the

government of Singapore, the depository of the agreement.
twelve nations 198

a State

agreement, which entered into force on September

4,

2006. 199

A key pillar of the ReCAAP is the Information Sharing Center (ISC), which will
be established in accordance with Part
gapore,

is

II

of the agreement. The ISC, located in Sin-

an international organization with major functions of facilitating com-

munication and information exchanges between the

member

nations and

improving the quality of statistics and reports on piracy and armed robbery against
ships in the region.

It

was reported that one of the major reasons

for the failure of

Malaysia and Indonesia to sign the agreement to date was their displeasure with the

up the ISC in Singapore. However, it should be noted that it was
mentioned in the Batam Agreement that Malaysia and Indonesia "take note of the
ISC, and agreed to cooperate with the center. 200
decision to set
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The Role of Existing Regional Mechanisms Promoting Maritime
Security Cooperation

ASEAN and ARF
Cooperative measures to deal with the problem of piracy and maritime security

among member States of the ASEAN 201 and participating nations in the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 202 had been sought long before the announcement
of RMSI by the US Pacific Command in May of 2004. As early as November 2001
threats

ASEAN adopted a declaration on joint action to counter terrorism. 203 In May 2002
a special ASEAN ministerial meeting on terrorism was held in Kuala Lumpur in
which a joint communique on terrorism and the Work Program to Implement the
ASEAN Action Plan to Combat Transnational Crimes were adopted. 204 In August
2002, the United States and

ASEAN,
205

ASEAN, and in January 2003 the European Union and

issued joint declarations of cooperation to

member

combat international

terror-

ASEAN, including the three littoral States of the
Strait of Malacca, were called upon to solidify governmental efforts in areas of in-

ism.

All

States of

formation exchange, training,

law enforcement, institution building

legislation,

and extra-regional cooperation. In December 2003, the ASEAN-Japan Seminar
on Maritime Security and Combating Piracy was held in Tokyo. This was followed by another

ASEAN-US Workshop on Enhancing Maritime

and Counter-terrorism Cooperation

On May 9,
at

2006, the

which the

first

ASEAN

Region held

in

Manila in

issues of

defense ministers meeting was held in Kuala

human

security

To

and transnational crimes such

and cooperation

terrorism, piracy, trafficking, smuggling
discussed.

ASEAN

206

April 2004.

Lumpur,

in the

Anti-piracy

deal with these issues, considered as

for disaster relief

ASEAN's immediate

as

were

security

challenges, the ministers agreed

in

promote regional peace and
defense and security;

through dialogue and cooperation

•

to

•

to give guidance to existing senior defense

and cooperation

stability

in the field of defense

and military

and security within

officials'

dialogue

ASEAN and

with

dialogue partners;
•

to

defense

promote mutual
policies

and

trust

threat

and confidence through greater understanding of
perceptions,

security

challenges

as

well

as

enhancement of transparency and openness; and
•

to contribute to the establishment of the

Concord II and
Vientiane Action Programme. 207
stipulated in the Bali

to
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as

promote the implementation of the
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As
in

far as efforts

undertaken by the participating nations of ARF are concerned,

June 2003 the Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to

Maritime Safety was adopted
participating States

at the

tenth

ARF

meeting. 208 In the statement, the

and organizations recognized

that "[pjiracy

and armed rob-

bery against ships and the potential for terrorist attacks on vulnerable sea shipping
threaten the growth of the Asia-Pacific region, and disrupt the stability of global

commerce,
crime."

209

particularly as these have

They

become

tools of transnational organized

also recognized that "[mjaritime security

is

an indispensable and

fundamental condition for the welfare and economic security of the

and

that

a

[e]nsuring this security

particular the

ARF

countries."

210

is

ARF

region"

in the direct interest of all countries,

They promised

to achieve effective

tion of relevant international maritime instruments that

aim

to

and

in

implementa-

enhance the safety

and security of shipping and port operations. The relevant instruments include the
1982

LOS Convention,

the 1988

SUA and its

Protocol for the Suppression of Un-

on the Continental Shelf,
the 1974 SOLAS Convention and the relevant amendments to that convention,
and the ISPS Code. ARF member nations are encouraged to become parties to the
relevant international maritime conventions, if they had not yet done so. 211 At the
lawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located

1

lth

ARF meeting, held in July 2004, the participating ministers affirmed that "ter-

rorism, irrespective of its origins, motivations or objectives, constitutes a threat to
all

peoples and countries, and to the

security

common interest in ensuring peace, stability,

and economic prosperity in the region and beyond." 212 They also adopted

ARF Statement on Strengthening Transport Security against International Terrorism, which expressed the determination of the ARF participants to take con-

the

crete

and cooperative measures in safeguarding their means of transportation from

terrorist threats. 213

In September 2004 the

ARF Workshop on Maritime Security was held in Kuala

Lumpur, Malaysia. During the

discussion, the participants identified piracy, trans-

national organized crimes (such as smuggling)

and

terrorist activities as

major

214

They concurred that there was no single nation that
could handle maritime security alone and therefore cooperation, based on international law, is a must to manage maritime security effectively. In the context of
the Malacca strait, the participants welcomed the coordinated sea patrols among
threats to maritime security.

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore,
that this
straits

was

in line with the

and other bilateral cooperation with India, noting

primary responsibility of the three littoral States of the

of Malacca and Singapore. They also noted that the proposed Maritime

Highway to be applied in the straits could enhance the transparency of
navigation and overall traffic control and also provide the basis for intensive moniElectronic

toring of the real-time navigational situation. 215 During the discussion
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to
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enhance cooperation on maritime

lective effort

is

vital to

the

US Proposal

security, the participants recognized that col-

address maritime security threats. However, the collective

should be undertaken on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty,

effort

rial integrity

tional law.

territo-

and in accordance with the UN Charter and other recognized interna-

The use of bilateral and regional agreements was believed to be

method to enhance maritime security.

It

was

also pointed out that there

is

a useful

need for

comprehensive action, including enhancing cooperation on fighting piracy and

armed robbery in the region between ARF participants' shipping and international
organizations. The meeting was divided into three breakout sessions to further
discuss the issue of maritime security. Breakout Session

I

(Managing Maritime

Challenges and Threats) highlighted the need to establish intergovernmental

agreements, such as standard operating procedures, and to develop a regional contingency plan where and

when

possible

and appropriate. 216 Breakout Session

III

(Enhancing Cooperation on Maritime Security) identified four areas for enhancing cooperation

on maritime

security,

namely, cooperative frameworks;

common

understanding of threats; information exchange mechanisms, policies and procedures;

and national

capacities. 217

March 2005 Singapore and the United States co-hosted a meeting on an ARF
Confidence Building Measure (CBM) on Regional Cooperation in Maritime Security in Singapore. In his speech at the meeting, Singapore's Defence Minister Teo
Chee Hean urged that "[i]t would be useful for the ARF to move beyond dialogue
on maritime security and work towards conducting an ARF maritime security exercise in the near future." 218 During the discussion at the meeting, some particiIn

pants suggested that maritime security cooperation in the region should be

formulated in accordance with the following three broad principles:

mary

responsibility for the safety

and Singapore

straits

and

(1) the pri-

security of key waterways like the Malacca

should lay with the

littoral States; (2)

due

to the multiplicity

of stakeholders, and the complexity of the task at hand, there should be a role for

all

stakeholders, including interested nations, international organizations like the

IMO,

the shipping

community and even multinational

organizations;

and

(3) the

cooperative effort should proceed on the basis of consultation and in accordance

with international law. 219 Meeting participants agreed that ARF should play an important role in forging regional cooperation in maritime security, given that

membership encompasses the key stakeholders
July 2005, at the 12th

in regional

maritime

its

security.

wide
220

In

ARF meeting, the participating ministers welcomed ARF's sus-

tained efforts in promoting maritime safety and security and noted the following
four areas for future cooperation: multilateral cooperation, operational solutions to

maritime safety and security, shipping and port security, and application of technology for maritime safety and

security. 221

134

They

also

adopted the

ARF

Statement

Yann-huei Song

on Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and
Security in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Other Transnational Crimes. 222 The establishment of a Regional Marine Training Centre had also
been discussed

at the

ARF workshops and the ARF

Senior Officers Meeting. 223

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

The Council

for Security

Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was established
1993. 224

The CSCAP Charter was adopted in
December 1993 and was subsequently amended in August 1995. 225 The purpose of
setting up the CSCAP was to provide a structured process for regional confidence
building and security cooperation among nations and territories in the Asia- Pacific
meeting in Kuala

at a

region.

Lumpur in June

Working groups

are the primary

working groups were established
time cooperation,

Northeast Asia,
tive

(2) the

(3)

mechanism

in 1993-94.

CSCAP

for

These were concerned with

enhancement of security cooperation

in the

(1)

North

confidence- and security-building measures, and (4) coopera-

and comprehensive

security. In

December 2004,

a restructuring of the

environment in the region. Consequently, the four

no longer
for

active. Instead, six

CSCAP
strate-

CSCAP working groups are

study groups were established:

Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia

ation of

mari-

Pacific/

working groups was undertaken to better reflect changes taking place in the
gic

Four

activity.

Pacific, (2)

(

1 )

Capacity-building

Countering the Prolifer-

WMD in the Asia Pacific, (3) Future Prospects for Multilateral Security

Frameworks

in Northeast Asia, (4)

and Peacebuilding, and

(6)

Human Trafficking,

(5)

Regional Peacekeeping

Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign Against

International Terrorism with Specific Reference to the Asia Pacific Region. These

CSCAP

study groups were to complete their functions in December 2006.
general meetings before 2003

on

a regular basis in accordance with

its

held

charter. In

December 2002, it was decided to change the term "General Meeting" to "General
Conference." The first CSCAP General Conference was held in December 2003,
but was referred to as the 4th CSCAP General Conference. The 5th CSCAP General
Conference was held in December 2005.
A number of non-binding documents had previously been adopted at different

CSCAP working group
and shipping
States.

226

meetings to address the issues concerning maritime safety

security before the

September 11th

CSCAP Memorandum No.

1,

terrorist attacks in the

for example, encourages

United

CSCAP members

to undertake "[cooperative efforts to ensure the security of sea-lanes

and sea lines

of communication, with the enhancement of capabilities and maritime surveillance, safety,

dum

and search rescue operations." 227 Paragraph

3 of

No. 4 encourages member nations to become parties to

CSCAP Memoranthe 1982 LOS Con-

vention and other relevant international instruments, recognizing that this will
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contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, cooperation, sustainable devel-

opment and

friendly relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Paragraph 15 of the

Memorandum
ratification,

CSCAP member

encourages

same

nations to consult with regard to the

implementation and participation in relevant international conven-

CSCAP Memorandum No.

tions

and instruments concerning maritime

urges

member nations to adopt measures that would promote law and order at sea

safety.

5

and reduce the incidence of maritime crime, which includes piracy and maritime
terrorism.

Since the September 11th terrorist attacks,

CSCAP Memorandums No.

No. 7 were adopted in December 2002 and July 2003

respectively,

228

and

6 and

a "Report

on International Terrorism" was issued in March 2002 after the CSCAP Study
Group Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in February 2002. CSCAP Memorandum No. 7 recognizes the importance of the concept of human security and
encourages CSCAP member nations to, inter alia, endorse and implement relevant UN conventions and protocols, and supporting regional agreements, against
terrorism and transnational crimes. The Report on International Terrorism
identifies the elements of a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism in the
Asia-Pacific region.

It

urges

CSCAP working

agendas in order to advance collective

groups to coordinate their research

efforts in

combating international terror-

UN conventions in relation to transnational crimes and related issues, adopt the UN resoluism.

CSCAP member

nations are encouraged to ratify the various

on terrorism and implement international and regional resolutions on
transnational crimes and terrorism. In addition, it is stated in the report that the
CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation will continue to examine the
following issues: 1 the vulnerability of naval and commercial shipping, offshore platforms, ports and harbors and coastal settlements to terrorist attack;
tion

(

(2) the threat

hicles for
abilities

)

of maritime terrorism generally, including the use of ships as ve-

conducting terrorist attacks; and

and countering the

At the 5th

CSCAP

threat

from maritime

reducing vulner-

terrorist attacks. 229

General Conference, emerging security challenges in the

Asia-Pacific region were widely discussed,
ficking, the

(3) the potential for

which included terrorism, human

development of WMD, maritime security threats, natural

traf-

disasters

and

the recent threat of infectious diseases in the region. Maritime security is one of the

seven topics chosen to be discussed at the conference. In addition, one of the special

speeches delivered at the meeting was on the Indonesian perspective of security

in the Strait of Malacca.

During the discussion, there were

common

concerns

among Indonesia and other States which are also stakeholders in the security of the
Strait

of Malacca, which included the safety of navigation, the protection of the

marine environment, the need to cooperate on search and rescue, contingency

136
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plans against pollution, elimination of piracy and

armed robberies, and preventing

maritime terrorism. Based on experience over the

three decades,

last

it

was the In-

donesian view that
•

the problems of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore could be solved

through practical/technical mechanisms and cooperation;
•

cost

and burden sharing

in

promoting

safety

and

possible with the cooperation of Japan,

and security of navigation are

and

are increasingly necessary

essential;
•

user States should voluntarily cooperate with the coastal nations to

the safety of navigation and to protect the marine environment in the

promote
straits, as

well as in law enforcement activities;
•

what

is

needed

now

is

a

more

authoritative

and permanent

institution to

follow up on previous measures; and
•

while cooperation and assistance from user States are needed and required

under the 1982 LOS Convention, there are certain situations with which
Indonesia would not be comfortable, such as the stationing or hiring of foreign
navies or marines, arming commercial vessels with offensive weapons,
patrols of foreign navies in the straits.

During discussion

after the speech, the

with user

States.

joint

debate about the relationship between

piracy and terrorism was raised. There was also a discussion
cially linking issues

and

230

on

sovereignty, espe-

such as the resistance towards foreign navies, and also relations

231

APEC
In October 2001,

APEC

leaders meeting in Shanghai signed a statement

counterterrorism in which they pledged to cooperate
nication

fully,

and cooperation among economic policy and

through close

APEC

leaders in Los Cabos,

commu-

financial authorities, to en-

sure that international terrorism does not disrupt economies

October 2002,

on

and markets. 232 In

on Recent
which they condemned ter-

Mexico issued

a Statement

APEC Members Economies, in
rorist acts in the APEC region, including those that occurred in Bali, in the Philip-

Acts of Terrorism in

pines and in

Moscow

earlier that

month. They

also

encouraged joint

efforts

of

APEC

economies

fected

economies and called for strengthened international cooperation to support

in mitigating the adverse

efforts to eliminate terrorism

and

terrorist attacks in the af-

restore confidence in the region. 233

on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth, adopted on
2002, APEC leaders declared their intention to work together to secure

In the Statement

October 26,

impact of
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to, inter alia,
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promote ship and

port security plans, install automatic identification systems on certain ships, and

enhance cooperation on righting piracy in the region between APEC fora and organizations such as the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center

the

IMO. The Secure Trade in

the

APEC Region (STAR) program aims to increase

container and port security and to develop mechanisms to track shipments
effectively

throughout the supply chain. In addition,

and

rorists

implement quickly and

to

and

their supporters

called for in

STAR III

UN

APEC

decisively

all

measures needed to prevent

from accessing the international

235

lanes such as the straits of Malacca

•

financial system, as

and provided suggestions
It

APEC

means of cooperation among APEC

economies and relevant international organizations

specific perspective.

ter-

held in Incheon, Korea, February 25-26, 2005, Maritime

Security Panel 3 discussions explored possible

piracy,

countries are asked to

Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1390. 234 At the

Conference,

more

Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-

ratify the International

ism,

and

in protecting

and Singapore from terrorist

key

attacks

in relation to trade implications

APEC
and

sea

acts of

from an APEC-

was concluded that

APEC should provide proactive law enforcement support in the search for a

long-term solution to deal with maritime security,
•

various levels of cooperation are required,

•

APEC

economies should endeavor to share information and

intelligence,

and
•

an "Assistance Fund" that brings

helpful.

all

stakeholders together

would be

236

The Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the Five Power Defence
Arrangement
The basic structure of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) 237 and the
Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), 238 with their traditional focus on military security, precluded dealing with non-conventional security threats, such as piracy

and maritime terrorism. However,
security environment, both

of some of their

activities.

Razak stated that for the
with

new threats

in the

also agreed that the

in response to the

changing regional maritime

WPNS and FPDA felt the need to reconsider the focus

In June 2004, Malaysia's deputy prime minister Najib

FPDA to stay relevant, it has to be "reconfigured" to deal

form of terrorism. Australian defence minister Robert

FPDA

counterterrorism training.

should extend the scope of

239

its activities

At the 3rd Shangri-La Dialogue, held

June 2004, the need to expand beyond traditional

138
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to include

in Singapore in

territorial threats to deal

with
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non-conventional security threats such as maritime terrorism was recognized.

was believed that maritime security

FPDA armed

the

forces. 240

As

exercises could

a result, in

soon be commonplace among

September 2005 the

joint naval exercise in the waters off Malaysia

and Singapore

wage conventional war. The

tackle terrorism rather than

growing concerns in Southeast Asia and, in particular, the

problem of piracy and

the

Australia, Britain

and

terrorist attacks.

New

241

In

It

that

powers held a

was designed

to

exercise reflected the
Strait

March 2006

Zealand, the three non-littoral

five

of Malacca over

was proposed that

it

member

States of the

FPDA, be invited to join the "Eyes in the Sky" program as long as the sovereignty of
the littoral States of the Malacca strait

The WPNS

is

respected. 242

is

also slowly adapting to the

new maritime security environment in

the Asia-Pacific region, in particular dealing with the threat of piracy, sea robbery

and maritime
to consider

terrorist attack.

To

adjust

WPNS may need

focus of activities, the

its

how the maritime security environment is changing and how to engage

with coast guards so that regional maritime security issues can be effectively addressed. 243

mand

as

More importantly, the WPNS might be selected by the US

Pacific

an alternative regional forum to discuss maritime security

Com-

issues. 244

by the WPNS in WPNS Workshop 2006
be held in Hawaii June 25-29 and October 29 to Novem-

Possible adjustments were to be addressed

and
ber

in the 10th

WPNS to

2006, respectively.

2,

Positive Results from Littoral States' Responses to the US-Proposed

Within such a short period of time, about three years since
rity in

RMSI

May 2004 until today, secu-

the Strait of Malacca has been improved significantly mainly because of the

cooperative efforts undertaken by the littoral States in response to the US-pro-

posed

RMSI and the likelihood

help patrol the

strait,

and also

of American unilateral deployment of its forces to

in response to the decision

by the British-based Joint

War Committee of Lloyd's Market Association to put the strait on its list of war-risk
areas in June 2005. According to the figures released by the 1MB in its 2005 Annual
Report on Piracy Against Ships, the number of pirate attacks in the Malacca

dropped from

thirty-eight in

2004 to only twelve attacks in 2005.

reported pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca from January

compared with
cies,

eight in

"Indonesia in particular, has increased
force in

known

its

March

31, 2006,

strait,

has continued to be effective" and

1MB

In addition to the Malsindo joint sea patrols
trols,

There were no

"Action by law enforcement agen-

efforts to defeat piracy

(pirate) hotspots," said the

to

strait

246

2004 and four in 2005.

notably in Indonesia and the Malacca

1

245

in April 2006.

and the "Eyes

by way of a show of

247

in the Sky" joint air pa-

launched by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in July 2004 and in September
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2005, respectively, a

and
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anti-piracy

programs have

bilateral cooperative

to the

US Proposal

and anti-terrorism measures

been developed to safeguard the

also

New national organizations or units such as Malaysia's Maritime
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and Singapore's Accompanying Sea Security Team
Strait

of Malacca.

(ASSeT) were established to be responsible for maritime security matters. The

ReCAAP Information Network System was launched in April 2006 and the
ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre was to be established after the entrance into
force of the ReCAAP Agreement. Moreover, bilateral cooperation between the litand user

toral States

States, in particular, the

United

States,

been strengthened to help improve maritime security in the
in Southeast Asia.

by user

The

the littoral States will receive
States, including

more

financial

Strait

of Malacca and

Indonesia, have received the offer

littoral States, especially

States of technical aids, patrol training

Japan and India, has

and equipment.

and technical

It is

expected that

assistance

from the user

China and South Korea in the future. At the same time,

it

has been

and

reiterated that the sovereignty of the littoral States will be respected. Regional

international concerns over safety

and security

in the Strait of

Malacca

con-

will

tinue to serve as an important external policy factor in the process of enhancing se-

and

curity in the strait

in the region.

enhancing maritime security in the

and

Continued discussions on the
of Malacca under the

Strait

in the existing regional security organizations, such as

APEC, FPDA,

IMO

issue of

framework

ASEAN, ARF, CSCAP,

WPNS and the Shangri-La Dialogue, are anticipated.

Challenges Ahead for the Management of Security in the Malacca Strait

many positive developments

Notwithstanding the

in relation to the

management

of security in the Strait of Malacca since June 2004, there are challenges lying ahead
for

both

littoral

and user

States.

One

of the challenges

is

to petition the Joint

War

Committee to remove the Strait of Malacca from its list of war-risk areas. The shipping industries of the three
mittee to change

its

of the

strait

have been asking the

but without

avail.

Unless the

littoral States

risk assessment,

littoral States are

able to prove the effectiveness of their coordinated patrolling programs,
that the strait will remain

The

on the

time security analyst

programs:

(

1

)

littoral States

and

likely

programs

A Singaporean mari-

listed three limitations to the effectiveness

of the cooperative

the nations view independence and sovereignty very strongly and

tive activities; (2) there is a

and

sea patrolling

has also been questioned.

therefore generally are reluctant to agree to participate

capacities;

it is

list.

effectiveness of the tripartite coordinated air

agreed to by the three

Com-

more

actively in coopera-

gap between the nations with regard to law enforcement

(3) there exists political suspicion
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among them,

in addition to the
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lack of political

frameworks that could

facilitate

more cooperative maritime

secu-

rity efforts.

Ironing out their differences over the seriousness of the maritime secu-

rity threats

and the possible association between piracy and maritime terrorism

in

and in Southeast Asia will be a challenge to the littoral States.
It has been pointed out that the law enforcement capacities of Malaysia and Sin-

the Strait of Malacca

gapore are good, but Indonesia's

difficult

resource problems need to be resolved

piracy and possible maritime terrorist attacks are to be dealt with effectively.

It

if

re-

mains to be seen to what extent and how soon these problems can be resolved, either

by significant investment provided by the littoral States themselves or by financial
and technical aid from user States, such as the United States, Japan and India now,
as well as Australia,

closer strategic

China and South Korea

The development of a
littoral States and foreign

in the future.

and military cooperation between the

powers, in particular, the United States, could help justify the decision to offer

more assistance to help the littoral States enhance their maritime security capabilities. The United States and Indonesia have resumed military ties, but progress towards greater accountability and complete military reform in Indonesia remains to
be seen. The governments of Indonesia and Malaysia could reconsider their position

on the

PSI, such as

by partially or

selectively participating in the PSI activities.

A positive development in this regard is the announcement made by the US
ernment that

it

gov-

"stand [s] ready to help Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore and

Thailand to secure the

Straits

of Malacca." 248 In addition, the signing of the Strate-

Framework Agreement between the United States and Singapore in July 2005
could be welcomed by the other two littoral States as a positive development helpful to the enhancement of maritime security in the Strait of Malacca in particular
and in Southeast Asia in general.
Another challenge to the effective management of security in the Strait of
Malacca is how to find an acceptable approach that can compromise between the
littoral States' sovereign concerns and the user States' demand for a more direct ingic

volvement in security matters in the

strait.

This requires that both sides reach

agreement on establishing a burden-sharing mechanism or a multilateral/international cooperative security
lish a

mechanism

in the Strait of Malacca area.

burden-sharing mechanism, there

LOS Convention

for the

is

a

To help estab-

need to amend Article 43 of the 1982

purpose of expanding the scope of burden sharing to

clude those costs associated with the

management of

in-

security in the Strait of

Malacca. The early establishment of a regional marine training center or a piracy/

would be seen as another important test of
the political will of the littoral States and the concerned nations in the region to enhance security in the Strait of Malacca and in Southeast Asia.
terrorism information sharing center
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Finally,

it

would be important

the

become contracting par2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Con-

for the littoral States to

IMO's 1988 SUA Convention, the
vention, and the 2004 ReCAAP agreement. At present, among the
ties to

the

the Malacca

strait,

only Singapore has ratified the 1988

littoral States

of

SUA Convention and the

ReCAAP

agreement.

ratify the

aforementioned maritime security-related international

It

US Proposal

remains a challenge to have both Indonesia and Malaysia
treaties.

Conclusion

Under

the pressure spreading outwards

through the proposal of

RMSI and

from the United

the consideration of deploying forces to deal

with potential maritime security threats in the
Asia, the three littoral States

States, in particular

Strait

of Malacca and Southeast

—Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore—were forced

to

adopt additional domestic anti-piracy and anti-terrorism measures and to develop
tripartite

coordinated sea and

programs

air patrol

to

improve security in the

strait.

New governmental agencies or units, such as the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement
Agency, the Singaporean Accompanying Sea Security Team, and the Indonesian

Maritime Policy Unit, have been formed to be responsible for managing security in
the

strait.

More patrol boats have been acquired and new monitoring systems have

been set up to help strengthen the littoral States' control over traffic in the strait. Bilateral

cooperative programs have also been developed between the littoral States

themselves and between the
States,

littoral States

and user

States,

such as the United

Japan and India, and perhaps in the future with China, South Korea and

other nations, to keep the region's important waterways

safe.

A number of important political statements, such as the Batam Agreement, the
Jakarta Agreement of 2005 and the first ASEAN Defence Ministers' Statement of
May 2006 have been adopted or issued, in which both littoral and user States are
urged to take more cooperative actions to help enhance security in the Malacca
strait. It

seems that a more

effective, collaborative

time security matters in the Malacca

oped since the

first

half of 2004.

international maritime
rely heavily

on

It is

strait

and

approach to deal with the mari-

in Southeast Asia has

believed that this development will benefit the

community and,

in particular, the shipping industries that

safe navigation of the Strait

of Malacca. However, piracy and mari-

time terrorism and other transnational crimes in the
are likely to

been devel-

strait

and

in Southeast Asia

remain a major maritime security concern for governments and ship-

ping industries for some years to come.

To deal effectively with maritime security threats in the Strait of Malacca, a
number of challenges need to be overcome. These include the effectiveness of the
implementation of the agreed

tripartite

coordinated sea and
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air patrols

programs,

.
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and the

littoral States' ratification

of the maritime security-related international

ReCAAP agreement, the 1988 SUA Conven1988 SUA Convention. There is also a need to es-

conventions, in particular, the 2004

and the 2005 protocol to the

tion

tablish a burden-sharing
States.

agreement that

But the challenge to be overcome

War Committee remove

is

as

acceptable to both the littoral and user

soon

the Strait of Malacca

as possible

from

its list

is

to have Lloyd's Joint

of war-risk areas.
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VIII
Actual and Future Threats Emanating

from the Commons: A Chilean Approach

Francisca Moller and Jorge Balaresque*
Introduction

Strategy is

about solving problems

—

in fact, the best strategy

way of looking
be solved must be

tion to that problem. This very simple

very complex. The problem that needs to

is

the best solu-

at strategy

is

well defined

in itself

and un-

derstood and the strategic solution has to be feasible with the means that are in

hand.

To complicate

probably

all

things further,

most of the

we

all

know

that

is

need solving are

problem may be simply

"in the future." Additionally, the

"terrorism," but

situations that

stated as

not enough. Apart from some novelist,

who

could have conceived that commercial airplanes could be used in such a horrible

manner

as they

were on September 11?

This "solution" must also

fit

scenarios that themselves will undoubtedly differ

from region to region throughout the world, even from country to country. A resolution that

is

good

for

when in 1947,
member his name?

Thus,

1

one region or country

a Chilean lawyer

—presented

may

from Vina

his theory of an

del

not be applicable to another.

Mar

—does anybody today

expanded

re-

coastal State territorial

* Francisca Moller is Professor of International Law, Chilean Naval War College ( Academia de
Guerra Naval). Rear Admiral Jorge Balaresque, Chilean Navy (Ret.), is Professor and Head of the
Strategy Department, Chilean Naval War College. The views expressed in this article are those of

the authors alone

and do not

necessarily represent the views of the Chilean

Chilean Navy or the Chilean Naval

War

College.
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would evolve

now

into the 200-nautical-mile exclusive eco-

universally accepted? In 1947, he

was presenting

a

solution for the risk to the national whaling industry as foreign whalers operating

Chilean shores were very quickly exterminating the mammals.

just off

Solutions also have their own levels of responsibility: the political or grand strategic level

decision makers have to be able to recognize the problems, state their objectives
create the necessary

means

—and perhaps

—

the legal structure

to attain them.

and

On the

other hand, the "means" or forces that will implement the policies need clear-cut instructions as to

what they can or cannot do

with regard to threats
seas

and

at sea, there will

certain control measures that

in resolving the

problem. As we

all

know

always be a conflict between the freedom of the

would help

to confront the threats effectively.

Globalization has resulted in the rapid advance of communications capabilities

and technology,
barriers

a great mobility of humans

and capital,

more permeable and

the world economies

vantages and disadvantages that this entails.

are

and opportunities, but

still

weakening of commercial

and the creation of important multinational corporations, which every day

acquire a greater importance in international

efits

a

affairs. All this

has

made borders

more interdependent, with all the adGlobalization provides enormous ben-

also has negative effects. Unfortunately the benefits

it

concentrated in a few nations, creating

false expectations, rivalries, tensions

We know that

today most conflicts are intra-State

and divisions among the
conflicts.

rest.

These originate for multiple reasons, including lack of governance, cor-

ruption and ethnic and religious problems. All of these are causes of instability,

civil

war, social disorder, systematic violations of human rights, massive migration and
frontier tensions. These effects not only create instability in the States where they oc-

cur but also have the potential to cause negative repercussions within the region or

throughout the whole international system. The world has seen a polarization of

who

who oppose

The former focus on the
possible benefits associated with participating in the global economy. The latter are
concerned that they are too far removed from the level of economic development
that would permit them access to globalization's benefits, or they consider globalthose

support and those

ization to be the cause of all their

ation of moral values

State

—

new

at least

—the

loss

of national identity, the relax-

and the weakening of the principle of sovereignty of States.

In a globalized world,
giving rise to

problems

globalization.

risks

we have not only the

traditional threats, but

new threats

have emerged. These are not planned or organized by a

not openly. These risks

rise

from the proliferation of international

criminal organizations, piracy, cyber attacks, small arms trafficking, the spread of

weapons of mass destruction, drug
tion potential

AIDS and bird

flu

trafficking

and terrorism.

pandemics and natural

lems, such as droughts, floods, soil degradation
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We must also men-

disasters

and other prob-

and overexploitation of natural
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resources. All these

phenomena

and Jorge Balaresque

are considered transnational, as they cross inter-

national boundaries.

show the
importance of the sea to Chile as a maritime nation and how turning to some "old"
ideas may help find an effective and efficient way to create the indispensable coopWriting from the perspective of a distant country our objective

eration needed to confront the

"new"

to

is

threats that affect the world.

The New Threats at Sea

The

sea has always contributed to

human development through

its

main atas a means of

four

means of transportation and trade,
exchanging information and, finally, as a source of power and dominion. 2 In the
past, the maritime resources of most States were mainly dedicated to pursuing their
national interests relating to military power and dominion. Today the new threats,
tributes:

its

resources,

particularly those

fronted in a

addressed

its utility

as a

which threaten the environment and transportation, must be con-

new way. "Good order at sea" 3

effectively:

maritime awareness, maritime policy and integrated maritime

governance. Simply reflecting on the

wide base of understanding

Today
than

requires three very important issues to be

if

we

titles

of these issues indicates the need for a

are to succeed in

combating the new

threats.

commons presents much more complex problems
as a "wide common" by Admiral Mahan late in the

the use of the global

when

it

was referred

to

4

nineteenth century. Today the threats and risks cover a very wide range.

only discuss some that

As addressed

at the

we

We will

consider especially important.

ASEAN Regional Forum in

from time immemorial, has now emerged

in a

2003, piracy, which has existed

new form:

"Piracy and

armed rob-

bery against ships and the potential for terrorist attacks on vulnerable sea shipping
threaten the growth of the Asia- Pacific region and disrupt the stability of global

commerce,

particularly as these have

crime." 5 Other threats from and
trafficking, illegal

become

on the

tools for transnational organized

commons include smuggling, drug
human smuggling and slavery, environ-

global

immigration, banditry,

mental attack, trade disruption, and weapons proliferation, including weapons of

mass destruction and terrorism. 6
Chilean Maritime Interests

Chile, with

but

its

its

unique shape,

length entitles

zone waters.

If you

it

add

is

to a

not a very large country in terms of its land territory,

huge expanse of

territorial

and exclusive economic

to this Chile's geographical position in the world, plus an
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economic system that is outward looking, you can understand that for Chileans the
sea

is

of great importance.

From 1990 to 2005, Chile's foreign trade by sea rose from thirty million metric tons
to seventy million tons. In 2005, 85 percent of Chile's foreign trade
year, Chilean exports transported

by ship

$9.8 billion to Europe, $7.6 billion to

was by

totaled $14.5 billion to Asia

North America and $125 million

That

sea.

and Oceania,
to Africa. 7

removed from many areas of the world, events occurring
elsewhere can quickly and negatively impact Chile. As an example, although the
rise in foreign trade was generally steady from 1990 to 2005, the 1997 Asian economic crisis, which had nothing to do with Chile, led to a decrease in Chilean shipAlthough Chile

far

is

ping and hardships for the Chilean economy that lasted for several years.

Key

Vulnerabilities

on its sea lines of communication. Nearly 90 percent of its
increasing foreign trade must travel by sea, 100 percent of fuel imports come by sea
and by 2009 most of the natural gas needed will come as liquefied natural gas on
ships whose cargoes can themselves be a weapon of mass destruction in the hands
Chile heavily depends

of terrorists and

of course, require special security.

will,

Although Chile

is

in a geographic region that to date has not

government

serious terrorist threats, the
presents. This

is

why

Chile

is

party to

latest international treaties ratified are

ternational effort to
Illegal fishing

and Chile

is

aware of the dangers that terrorism

is

numerous

international conventions. 8

The

an expression of our agreement with the

combat terrorism following the 9/11

in-

attacks.

and overexploitation of fishery resources are a worldwide concern

no exception. To address

on Chilean

been the subject of

fishing

Presential Sea, but

it

companies that

these, the
fish in

government has imposed quotas

our exclusive economic zone and

has not been possible to prevent

terprises that are obviously overexploiting

some

illegal fishing

areas

by foreign en-

and endangering

certain

highly migratory and straddling stocks.
Pollution of our seas

is

also a

major threat to Chile. As one example, Chile

is

one

of the most important producers of salmon, which require clean water.

The Panama Canal

is

of primary importance for Chile. Chilean shipping

fourth largest world user and largest South American user of the canal.

is

the

Any inter-

ruption to the flow of shipping through the canal will immediately affect our econ-

omy and

Chilean exports

may become

uncompetitive because of increased

shipping costs and times.

The

Strait

of Magellan and Drake Passage, although not the busiest sea lanes in

the world, are of great importance as an alternative to the
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of these passages

growing yearly
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as a

consequence not only of the increase in

world trade, but also due to the increase in post-Panamax vessels (those too large to
transit the

Panama Canal), vessels carrying dangerous cargoes prohibited from ca-

nal transits,

and technology advances

that

now

These increases in the use of the

latitudes safely.

allow larger ships to
Strait

sail

the high

of Magellan and Drake Pas-

sage raise the risk of collisions.

Chilean Policy

—

Chilean defense policy recognizes that

apart

from providing the

of protecting the citizens and national interests and safeguarding

—

and sovereignty

a

modern view must

factors that affect Chile's

dissuade any threats,

it

traditional aspects
territorial integrity

include international security and stability as

own national security. 9 Although oriented in the first place to

recognizes that defense forces

must be prepared

to act coer-

cively in defense of national interests if dissuasion doesn't work. It also quite definitely

expresses that Chile

is

prepared to cooperate with other

States,

10

especially

under

UN

mandates, as the best way to address non-conventional threats.
In the near term, Chilean foreign policy has the challenge of increasing Chile's
place in this

has

left

new globalized and interdependent world.

behind

its

to try to influence

Chile

today a nation that

is

traditional insularity, and, faced with globalization, has chosen
it

so as to minimize

Accomplishing these objectives

its

risks

and to take part in

its

will require diversified strategies.

Taken together Chilean defense and foreign

opportunities.

11

policies present three challenges:

first,

contributing to international peace and security; second, participating in

Latin

American governability and

social cohesion; and, finally,

becoming

a bridge

and platform between Latin America and Asia.
In meeting these challenges, the Chilean

Navy

is

prepared

—no easy

task,

considering the size of the area to protect, the limited assets available and the

growing maritime

interests

—not only

to

fulfill

the traditional naval role of national

defense, but to participate actively in preserving Chile's other maritime interests.

In that regard, in Chile the functions normally performed

by coast guards

in

other nations are the responsibility of the navy. Finally, the navy also participates
in international cooperation initiatives with other countries, particularly, as indi-

cated previously, in operations conducted under

For

many years,

UN auspices.

the navy has participated in multilateral

and

bilateral exercises

with other navies to develop the interoperability necessary for effective operations
in the

maritime environment.

amanian Maritime Force

An interesting example was the sponsorship of Pan-

training,

cises to increase security in the

and creating and participating

Panama Canal
161

area.

in special exer-

—
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The Chilean navy is today a very efficient armed service comprised of a sound
and modern organization of men, infrastructure and the technical means to provide effective

command and control. It is a navy that is fully capable of the necessary

and indispensable

ment

—coordination

specialized agencies.

in

The navy

operations with international and govern-

its

effectively covers Chilean territory

from the

maritime boundary with Peru in the north to the Antarctic in the south and

equipped with the
risdiction

and our

and ships

aircraft
littoral

and

to control the

open waters under Chilean

is

ju-

internal waters.

Chile has developed a maritime power appropriate for

its

level

of development

and a navy that is organized and equipped consistent with the principle that "a fleet

on maintaining a presence on the high seas and patrolling in suplanes of communication is far more effective in identifying and

that concentrates

port of the sea

countering threats to one's national security than a coastal-defense

fleet."

12

Confronting the New Threats

It is

important to point out

first

century,

it is

tion

ing

and responses

that are consistent with international law.

the law of the sea, the flag State has the responsibility of exercising jurisdic-

and control over vessels

it

confronting the threats of the twenty-

necessary to find appropriate responses to those threats within

the international system

Under

initially that in

registered

flag

and has the obligation of carry-

own national legislation, the 1982 United Nations
Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention) 13 and international

out in accordance with

Convention on the

under its

its

conventions approved within the International Maritime Organization (IMO)

framework. The 1982
that jurisdiction

LOS Convention

permits a State that has reason to believe

and control have not been executed properly regarding

a specific

communicate this to the flag State, which
and take any necessary actions to remedy the situation. 14

vessel registered with another State to

to investigate

Recognizing that the

flag State

has not always effectively

of exercising jurisdiction and control over
State control

empowers

is

fulfilled its obligation

the principle of port-

provided for by various international conventions. 15 This principle

their port State to inspect foreign shipping in their ports. In addressing

port-State control, special

Port Facility Security
is

its flag vessels,

is

mention must be made of the International Ship and

Code (ISPS Code). 16 The primary objective of the ISPS Code

to strengthen the security of international shipping, ports, waterways

and the

high seas by directing governments, shipping companies and port operators to en-

hance the security of the maritime enterprise. The ISPS Code also places responsibility

on port

authorities to undertake detailed security assessments, including

response plans, to identify threats and vulnerabilities. 17
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LOS Convention

provides explicit rights to the

regarding fishing and to prevent, reduce and control

18
conventions that permit a
pollution of the maritime environment. There also are
International Intervention
coastal State to act beyond its EEZ, such as the

pollution
Convention 19 in instances in which an accident beyond the EEZ causes
Convention for Search and Resthat may affect the coastal State, the International
20
cue (SAR) and others.

The Presential Sea as a Useful Tool for Confronting the New Threats
the Presential Sea concept was

When

first

advanced, the threat was uncontrolled

exploitation of fishing stocks, particularly migratory
sources.

Today the

threats are far

more

diverse,

fishing re-

but we believe the Presential Sea

an alternative that can be useful in confronting these
But,

and straddling

new threats.

what is the Chilean Presential Sea? Geographically,

it is

is

21

that part of the ocean

economic zone and
space between the outer limits of Chile's continental exclusive
Island's continental
the meridian which, passing through the western edge of Easter
shelf,

Pole.

South
extends north to the international boundary with Peru and south to the

22

It is

depicted as follows:

.-:..,'.,'
:

'.

.i.

Figure

1.

Chilean Presential Sea and
163

SAR Area of Responsibility 23

.

Threats Emanating from the

The

Presential Sea

is

Commons: A Chilean Approach

an area in which Chile maintains a presence to protect the

national interests and takes part in economic activities that will contribute to national development. "This concept expresses the will to be present in this part of

the high seas with the
international

aim of projecting maritime

interests regarding the rest of the

community, watch over the environment, preserve the natural

sources, with exact adherence to International Law."

The Presential Sea

The concept of the
were

critics

who

is

Presential Sea

Consistent with International

was

first

Law

articulated in 1991. Immediately there

expressed concern that the Presential Sea was an attempt to assert

Chilean jurisdiction beyond those limits established in the 1982

One writer

re-

24

described

Professor Vicuna,

it

LOS Convention.

as "a very disturbing precedent." 25

who

served as president of the Chilean Delegation to the

Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-1983), responded
to those critics:

The meaning and
developments
interest

extent of the Presential Sea can be explained in the light of the

set forth

of the coastal

above since

many other geographical
participation in

it

closely responds to the expression of a special

State, in this instance Chile,

situations throughout the

but which can also be applied to

World.

... [I]t involves firstly the

and surveillance of the activities undertaken by other States in the high

seas areas of particular interest to the coastal State. In this regard

it is

not a question of

excluding any State from such areas, but, on the contrary, of ensuring the active
inclusion of the coastal State concerned.

There

is

no question of exclusive

.

coastal State rights involved in this concept, or the

drawing of new maritime boundaries in a
such

activities

.

legal sense; neither

should participation in

be understood as a kind of compulsory intervention by the coastal State

in the activities

undertaken in by other countries, but only as ensuring

its

own right to

The concept expressly safeguards the legal status of the high
It follows
seas established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
that the approach has been conceived in a manner entirely consistent with the current
operate actively in the area.

status of the

Law of the

Sea.

26

who headed the Fijian delegation to the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea and served as chairman of the conference workSatya Nandan,

ing groups

on the

exclusive

economic zone, delimitation of maritime boundaries

and the high seas, in addressing the accomplishments of the 1982 LOS Convention,
believed:
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A

major achievement of the 1982 Convention was to rationalize different uses and
thereby reconcile the competing interests of states. The balance thus attained has
greatly reduced the proliferation of incoherent regimes, as states adopt national

conform to the regimes of the Convention. In that sense, the Convention
has had a stabilizing effect, reducing uncertainty and instability in the peaceful use of

legislation to

27
the oceans.

He

continued:

For the future, the interest of

all

nations in a peaceful order of the oceans

lies

in

uniform and consistent application of the principles established in the Convention.
Differences between parties and non parties to the Treaty, and even between non
parties, may be resolved by observing the norms of cooperative conduct and
international

resolution

established

by the Convention.

confrontations and unilateral assertions of

new

Open

jurisdictional

conflicts

regimes will not

contribute to the stability and certainty necessary in the international

toward the rule of law.

and

movement

28
.

.

.

Jane Dalton observed a few years later that

[T]he

Mar

aspirations.

Presencial

The

a juridical concept offered to support Chilean national

is

challenge to Chile

and the international community

is

to attain

Chilean aspirations within the framework of the existing Convention regime. The
Presencial

may be the tool that enables Chile to do so.

It

Mar

must not be the tool by which

the erosion of the regime begins. 29

Beyond the fact that Chile desires a greater participation
ties,

in Pacific

Ocean activi-

whether those are international trade, protection of the maritime environ-

ment, conservation of

from

its

waters,

it

its

resources or addressing threats arising

on or coming

has never been Chile's intention to act unilaterally, but through

active participation in international organizations, specifically, the

the Organization of American States

United Nations,

and the International Maritime Organization.

Maritime Domain Awareness
It is

interesting to note

oped by the United

(MDA).
at the

30

how a similar concept to the Presential Sea has been devel-

States,

which has labeled

it

Maritime Domain Awareness

Admiral Thomas Collins, commandant of the US Coast Guard, speaking

US Naval War College,

stated:

From a risk- mitigation perspective,

MDA

is

perhaps the highest return element of our

application of maritime power. Simply put,
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awareness of the vulnerabilities, threats, and all matters of interest on the water. It
means having extensive knowledge of geography, weather, position of friendly vessels
and potential threats, trends, key indicators, anomalies, intent and the activities of all
vessels in an area of concern, including the innocent. ... If knowledge is power, and

MDA provides us the requisite knowledge of the maritime
the key to maritime power.
forces to respond with

[spectrum], then

MDA

is

MDA, and the knowledge it will bring, will allow maritime

measured and appropriate force to meet any threat on, below or

above the sea and, taken to an ultimate

state, will

provide the necessary awareness to

create "nonevents," proactively preventing incidents, challenges,

International Cooperation

and devastation. 31

and Voluntary Agreements

Vice Admiral John Morgan, deputy chief of naval operations for information,
plans and strategy, and Rear Admiral Charles Martoglio, director of the Strategy

and Policy Division,

in the

US

Navy's Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in

describing the importance of the seas and the interests of all nations in ensuring the
security of the oceans, stated:

Promoting and maintaining the security of the global maritime commons is a key
element because freedom of the seas is critical to any nation's long-term economic
well-being. The impact of the commons on trade, international commerce, and the
movement of people is significant, making security on the high seas, and in the world's
littorals, harbors, and ports, a cornerstone of prosperity. Likewise, the exploitation of
the maritime domain by nations, groups, or individuals must be considered a global
challenge. Policing and protecting the maritime commons against a wide spectrum of
threats is a high priority for all nations interested in the economic prosperity and
32
security that comes from a safe and free maritime domain."

Admiral
described

power

Collins, in his

how

2003 address

at the International

9/11 forced the United States to rethink

in the context of

maritime security

its

Seapower Symposium,
approach to maritime

as resting purely

on

military

power

indicating:

[Mjaritime security

is

a concerted effort that encompasses

more than

the nation's national interest against hostile nations, clearly.

It

just protecting

includes protection

against terrorist attacks; protection of our sovereign natural resources, environment,

and the like. To reduce these risks in this new security environment, it requires a special
application, I think, of concerted, integrated maritime power at four major areas of
emphasis: to (1) increase our awareness of all activities and events in the maritime
environment; (2) very importantly, build and administer an effective maritime
security regime both domestically and internationally; (3) increase military and civil
in our ports and coastal zones and
operational presence
persistent presence

—

—
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beyond, for a layered security posture; and
event a security incident does occur.

The twenty-three

improve our response posture

in the

States attending the

2003

ASEAN

Forum empha-

Regional

importance of national and regional cooperation to the maintenance of

sized the

maritime

To

(4)

33

security:

deal with this increasingly violent international crime,

it is

necessary to step

up

broad-based regional cooperative efforts to combat transnational organized crime,
including through cooperation and coordination

such as naval units, coastal patrol
crews,

Such

and port

efforts

among

and law enforcement

all

institutions concerned,

agencies, shipping companies,

authorities;

must be based on relevant international law, including the 1982 Law of the

Sea Convention;

It is

important that there be national and regional cooperation to ensure that maritime

criminals and pirates do not evade prosecution;

Effective response to

maritime crime requires regional maritime security strategies and

multilateral cooperation in their implementation;

and International efforts to combat terrorism also enhance the
combat transnational organized crime and armed- robberies [sic] against

National, Regional
ability to

ships.

We

34

think international organizations have an important role, particularly the

International Maritime Organization (IMO), which effectively addresses a wide
variety of maritime affairs, in furthering international cooperation. International

instruments and recommendations/guidelines have been approved for the suppression of piracy and

armed robbery against

ships

and

fixed platforms, including

the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of

Maritime Navigation 35 and

its

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf36 the 1974
;

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
ter XI-2, the International

col of the

37

particularly the

Ship and Port Facilities Security

Code 38

;

new Chap-

the 2005 Proto-

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of

Maritime Navigation 39 and the Protocol of 2005 for the Suppression of Unlawful
;

Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. 40
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measures adopted to enhance maritime security have greatly contributed to
strengthening international maritime security.

The contributions of

international organizations have been recognized in a

range of international conferences; for example, in January 2006, the Tokyo Ministerial

Conference on International Transport Security "welcomed and supported

the vigorous maritime security activities undertaken

by relevant international

ganizations, particularly, the International Maritime Organization

World Customs Organization (WCO)."
Also, the Ninth Asia Pacific

or-

(IMO) and the

41

Heads of Maritime Safety Agencies (APHMSA) Forum,

held in Vina del Mar, Chile from April 18-22, 2006, 42 stressed that the fight against
international terrorism

and criminal acts at sea constitutes a goal for all States, with

the purpose of assuring people's integrity and development through safe and free
trade,

and

among member

that cooperation

these non-traditional threats.

States

is

imperative in addressing

During the forum, the US delegation explained the

meaning of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). The communique issued
conclusion of the forum addressed MDA as follows:

at the

was also acknowledged by the Forum that for MDA to be effective, information from
all maritime mission areas must be integrated, and that the sharing of maritime
information among international partners, particularly among APHMSA members, is
It

essential in achieving transparency.

Noting the great potential for

.

.

MDA to contribute to many aspect

[s]

of maritime

safety,

SAR, environmental protection, as well as security, the Forum suggested further work
should be carried out or discussed at [a] future meeting regarding the precise benefits
which can be derived. 43

There are a number of voluntary agreements created by the United States
9/11 that are designed to address threats

Container Security

Initiative (CSI),

44

from and on the

sea.

These include the

the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 45

and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), 46 directed
Strait

after

of Malacca. While the international

community supports

specifically at the

their objectives,

[They] have received a mixed bag of responses from the maritime nations.

The PSI

raises some fundamental issues under the United Nations Convention of the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). Maritime specialists argue that under the customary international

law

all

vessels

have the freedom of movement on the high seas and therefore the

freedom of navigation on the high seas is absolute. Therefore, there is no justification
in boarding and searching a ship if it has a nationality, not engaged in piracy or slave
trade. Analysts doubt the right of the powerful nations to violate the basic principles
The daunting challenge however, is how to
and norms enshrined in the UNCLOS
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in

a
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comprehensive, yet cost-effective way,

without

47
challenging sovereignty issues and dramatically restraining the flow of commerce."

Another author's concerns were not

and PSI but with

their focus

by which they were
So

far,

many

just

with the legal issues raised by the CSI

on protecting US

interests

and the

unilateral process

created:

states

have gone along with CSI and PSI. However, the high costs of

compliance evoke images of colonialism and hegemony. The stationing of U.S.

Customs officials in the sovereign ports of foreign states might be seen as intrusive. PSI
and CSI may also limit the rights of commercial vessels operating internationally to
remain free from arbitrary search and seizure. The initiatives are directed exclusively
Further, they exclude
and related
toward safeguarding U.S.-bound shipping
shipments by the U.S. to its allies. On the whole, CSI and PSI lack transparency,
reciprocity, and accountability; they are unilateral U.S. measures prompted by the 9/11

WMD

attacks.

It

may be

first

that this

is

the necessary cost of increased maritime security in the twenty-

century. If many countries are willing to accept this type of non-consultative

and

would indicate a very significant change in the way
and implemented. It would constitute a major

unilaterally- driven process that

international regulations are framed

from negotiated multilateralism of the post-war system
War American hegemony. 48

shift

to

cooperative

unilateralism under post- Cold

We believe that necessary changes or modifications to international legislation
must be accomplished within the framework of the United Nations. The history of

new international conventions or modify existing ones has shown,
however, that this can sometimes be a lengthy process. In the face of the new
threats and the dangers they create, the international community must be prepared
efforts to create

to act

and

promptly to adopt procedures that provide

effective responses to terrorism

proliferation.

The law of the sea has developed and evolved over centuries of the use of the
oceans. Sometimes those changes can occur rapidly; other times
and more fre-

—changes require

quently

tion of piracy as

unchanged

change the law, the

An example of the latter is the definiLOS Convention, 49 a definition that has

a lengthy period.

appears in the 1982

it

existed essentially

—

for

hundreds of

political advisor to Striking

In recent years, efforts have been

years. In addressing the

Force

need to

NATO observes:

made to loosen the restrictive UNCLOS definition

[of

The 1988 Rome Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea (SUA)
dropped the high seas and private act limitations of Article 101, but SUA focuses on
jurisdiction, not enforcement. The signatories are required to criminalize such acts,
piracy].
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and to either exercise jurisdiction over persons in their territory, or to extradite them to
another state with a valid stake in the action. Crucially,

it

does not authorize hot

pursuit.

What then, can

On

states

the high seas,

and

navies, legally do?

and within one's own

under the universal jurisdiction
nationality.

.

waters, boarding

rubric, or

where the

and

arrest

can be exercised

pirates are of that state's

.

Also relevant are recent anti-terrorist

initiatives,

convention that allow states to agree that others

such as the 2005 revisions to the

SUA

may board vessels flying their flag after

notification.

and maritime terrorism may be indistinguishable, the
fact. Thus initiatives to suppress
the fight against piracy, and vice versa. 50

In practice, acts of piracy

question of intent usually determined after the
terrorism

may assist

in

We believe a more straightforward approach is to make proliferation of weapons of mass destruction a global crime,

like slavery or piracy.

Today

the law pro-

vides that warships of any nation have the right to visit a ship where there

is

reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship

is

stateless.

51

Given the new threats,

it is

is

engaged in slavery or piracy or

not reasonable that action cannot be taken in

cases of terrorism at sea.

Conclusion

Chile

is

dependent on the

sea.

In our opinion, Chile recognizes the threats created

by the current international environment to the use of the oceans and

is

forward

looking in identifying future circumstances that could affect the nation. The Chil-

ean government has developed and articulated policies that provide appropriate
guidance to government agencies in directing their organizations to carry out
those policies. Specifically in the case of the navy,

means towards

the objectives established

Effective responses to

ternational

illicit

it

has developed and adapted

its

by the government.

acts require multilateral cooperation at

both the

in-

and regional level. While the possible solutions to the new threats are to

be found principally working with the United Nations and the International Maritime Organization,
vate agencies

we must look beyond them to various

and organizations

national public and pri-

that are in charge of maritime security.

solutions adopted to date are properly focused
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but also shipping companies, port authorities, customs
guards,

officials, navies,

coast

etc.

We believe that ensuring "good order at sea" worldwide requires an improved
level

of awareness, effective policy and integrated governance. The United Nations

must be the structure within which
work.

States act to develop the

long-term

legal

frame-

We recognize, however, that there must be a mechanism, such as that pro-

vided by the International Maritime Organization, there to provide the short-term

guidance required for the maritime power of States to effectively confront the
threats not just as they arise, but hopefully before they appear.

The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention has been the vital legal structure to keep
order at sea. Even if the prerogatives of the flag State are irreplaceable, port-State
control has become an efficient complement. Even so, we think that whatever prerogatives the law of the sea confers upon individual States, the Presential Sea concept

is

a useful tool for the surveillance of the high seas adjacent to the exclusive

economic zone.

It

provides an "area of responsibility" for States to provide the

control of that sea space necessary to address the
the least the freedom of the seas.
the seas

and makes

On the

that use safer for

new threats, without

contrary,

it

affecting in

preserves the freedom to use

mankind.
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PART IV
PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND THE LAW

*

.

IX
Piercing the Fog:

National Security, Media and the Government

Harvey Rishikof
Introduction

At

War College's 2006 Global Legal Challenges conference, I sat as a
member of the Public Perceptions Under the Law panel. The panel was
the Naval

charged with the following questions:

1

How does the media shape public perceptions of the law? Does the media
generally shape such public perceptions in an accurate way?

media understand the law well enough
legal issues

—and

to

—such law?

recitation/analysis of

inform the public of

—surrounding such
Does the
understand— and then provide an accurate

the related law

media have an obligation

to accurately

Does the

issues?

Is

there any responsibility

on

the part

of the government to "educate" the media concerning legal issues and
the law?

2.

Do public perceptions of the law ever serve to help shape national policy
decisions? Should policy makers be attuned to the public's perception of

the law affecting a particular legal issue? Or, can policy makers effect
* Chair,

Department of National Security Strategy and Professor of National Security Law,
National War College, Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the
National War College, the Department of Defense or the US Government.
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decisions

on the

Media and

3.

Is

actions are

Government

basis that the "national interests" concerns of the

American populace will often outweigh

US

the

—or

are not

—

its

concern as to whether certain

lawful?

the general public generally well or

ill

informed on

legal issues?

Should

the government play an active role in "educating" the public

on such
issues through the media? For example, should the government act to
correct an incorrect media analysis of the law affecting a current event?
Does the government itself have a responsibility to accurately reflect the
law? That is, to what extent should the government advocate a particular
analysis of a legal issue

applicable law?

Is

What

role

there are clearly differing views of the

the American public's view of/respect for the law affected

by its perception of its
4.

when

elected representatives' "respect" for such law?

do other "players"

in the international

shaping the public's view of the law, that
British, the Chinese, the

5.

What

role should

is,

Russian and Korean

community

the Arab, the

street?

Israeli,

How?

itself as a

counterweight to any governmental

attempt to "shape" the public's perception of the law?

—or

the

academia play in "educating" the public on the law?

Should academia see
productive

play in

divisive

—

role that

Is

this

a

academia might play?

My article answers these provocative questions in four parts: The Media— Pro-

—

Government and Media: Public Law Diplomacy Facts and
Fictions; The International Community and the Public: The Image Struggle; and
The Academic Community The Proper Role? My goal is to provide perspective
on the issues and raise some provocative points for future discussion and analysis.
fession or Business?;

—

The Media

—Profession or Business?

The media is a critical shaper of public opinion about the law. But the definition of
media has evolved. In the modern era we have become inundated with law and media from general press publications, specialized press publications, general television shows, Court TV, movie documentaries, "mockumentaries," Hollywood
movies, fiction thrillers, news magazine shows (e.g., Frontline), websites and, the
newest, the blogosphere. Since legal opinions on complicated subjects can easily be
50 to 100 pages in length, the logic of legal opinions are hard to summarize for the
general public. In the end, the final result of
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some

cases

is

—

clear

guilty or not

Harvey Rishikof

guilty, constitutional

or not constitutional.

Many other

much

however, are

cases,

more subtle and deal with the nuances of congressional fact-finding and the deference owed to judicial review. These cases construe the inner workings of separation
of power, federalism and/or political power. Easy and facile summaries usually distort the meanings. Increasingly fact and fiction, entertainment and education
merge, and the lines between advocacy and information blend and blur.
In many cases involving the Supreme Court, there may be vigorous dissents and
multiple concurrences in the majority. Sorting out the holding or the center of
gravity of the logic of the analysis can be challenging. Television

usually given

two or three minutes

to explain the case. Print

but, unless the case addresses a "high-profile" issue, there

the day the opinion

is

handed down, and then

Perhaps the Sunday papers

will

little

follow

commentators are

media has more

space,

is

immediate coverage

up

editorial discussion.

have a more in-depth analysis or the Sunday talk

up the issue. Although law reviews remain the serious vehicle for
the legal academic community, their style and format condemn them to the
rarified communities of law students and professors.
shows

will take

Occasionally a "news magazine show,"

e.g.,

60 Minutes,

will

do an extended 20-

minute segment. These shows will help shape the "general" sense of the meaning of
the case or issue. Increasingly, websites
place of extended

conversation

What

is

question.

commentary,

among a

select

and blog pages have become, by default, the

analysis

and

group of the

focus.

But

a first proposition,

and

the end,

is

a limited

"legal elite chattering class."

the media's obligation or responsibility?

As

this, in

at the risk

To my mind,

this

is

a tricky

of being overly controversial,

let

us

conceive of the media as a business, not a profession. Reporters, journalists and

producers work for corporations that need to

sell

their products. Print

media

is

under severe attack by the new emerging technologies. Print reporters for national
papers, magazines, blogs

lowings.

and

Some media

and journals have gained personal reputations and

or commentators claim to be "neutral" in their reporting

analysis; others clearly reflect a bias or

viewpoint and write with a "spin,"

"Activist liberal judges are rewriting the Constitution

Particular

fol-

e.g.,

and should be impeached."

commentators stand out and have become "opinion makers." Their

as-

sessments carry weight, and often in conversation one notes the dialogue: "Did you
see X's

a

(column, commentary or blog)?

number of factors

—

Do you agree?" Their influence turns on

quality of analysis, accuracy in reporting, position in the

media, insightfulness and clever commentary. The marketplace determines their influence;

some markets

prefer reinforcement, others accuracy

and some

satire, e.g.,

The Daily Show.
Rather than a "profession," however, the media are more akin to skilled
sans, writers

and performers commenting on the law and
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legal events, giving
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section

and views. Although there

Media and

some

is

the

distinction

Government

between the "op-ed"

and "news" sections of the media, increasingly the market place

what once was an arguable separation. The obligation of the media
There

is

no

First

—no one can

Amendment

interests

eroding

to "inform."

constitutional or statutory requirement for "accuracy or analysis." Re-

porters are not sanctioned or regulated

profession

is

is

them

arrest

by the

State

and

are not disbarred

from the

for practicing without a license. In fact, the

protects the media/press function

from the preying regulatory

of Congress:

Congress

shall

make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof; or abridging the

the people peaceably to assemble,

freedom of speech, or of the

and

to petition the

press; or the right of

government

for a redress of

grievances.

Both rumor and

fact are protected

doctors have no such protection

but for public figures the bar

and well

in the

United

—imagine

if

clauses.

Lawyers and

they did? Albeit there are

libel suits,

The concept of "if it bleeds, it leads" is alive
Moreover, US news and commentary crowds out

is

States.

by the speech and press

high.

news from other parts of the world.

War correspondents have a particular challenge.

Reporting the truth

may dam-

age the war effort. Revealing military mistakes undermines confidence in the overall

ability

of US forces. Yet once embedded with the troops, the identification with

the effort and the fact that the troops are protecting the reporter has to have an
fect.
it

Giving the "soda straw" perspective

is

ef-

powerful, immediate and visceral, but

relevant to the grand campaign? Finally, a hard professional question for the

is

US

media is the following hypothetical. Imagine a situation whereby Osama bin Laden
contacts a

US

reporter and offers an exclusive interview to

in a third country location

—not

in the

tell

United States or in

his side of the story

Iraq.

Would

a

US

re-

Would the US reporter agree to have
a "global positioning" chip embedded in or on his person? Would a foreign journalist, offered the same opportunity, make the same choices as the US journalist?
Are US reporters reporters, US nationals or professionals?
porter contact the military to

tell

of the offer?

—Facts and Fictions

Government and Media: Public Law Diplomacy
Faced with a media that

is

Amendment that protects the inhow should a government respond? What is

a business

forming function, broadly defined,

and

a First

the government's role in the public perception of the law? Should the government

play an active role in "educating" the public on such issues through the media? For
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example, should the government act to correct an incorrect media analysis of the

law affecting a current event?

What

is

the appropriate role for the government in

responding to the shaping of the legal message for the public?
First,

the concept of

posed of the executive,

government must be defined. Our government

legislative

branch has not involved

dicial

and judicial branches.

itself in

Historically, the federal ju-

public information or public diplomacy

campaigns. State judges, some of whom compete for public
"active" in explaining themselves during election periods.
ever,

com-

is

office,

US

have been unique in the restraint they have shown as

have been more

howcontroversy mounts
federal judges,

about the role of federal judges or the interpretation of an opinion. Although
judges have written books, articles and law reviews, they rarely consent to be inter-

viewed and refuse to comment on current
case speaks for
ple, the

This

is

not true in

all

Often

heard the

is

legal jurisdictions. In

refrain,

"The

Canada, for exam-

Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice will hold press conferences to

meaning of a case recently handed down. This would be unprecedented

explain the
in the

itself."

cases.

US

federal system.

Judicial

independence

nizations, think tanks

is

protected by bar associations, nongovernmental orga-

and law schools speaking on behalf of the

attacking judges' independence has been a recurring historical

judiciary. In fact,

phenomenon in the

United States and public opinion heretofore has been mobilized to prevent other

government from disciplining the

parts of the

courts.

The

defeat of the proposed

Franklin Delano Roosevelt "court packing" plan in the 1930s resulted in even

independence being granted to the judiciary. Prior to the
1

submitted

its

more

failed plan, the judiciary

budget through the Department of Justice and the Attorney General

of the United States.

Once

the plan was defeated, Congress passed legislation so

that the judiciary submits

its

budget independently and directly to Congress

through the Office of Management and Budget.
This leaves the executive and the legislative branches.

government

is

often the case that the

divided, with one party controlling the presidency

controlling one or both houses.
ings,

It is

The legislature, with

its

and the other

power to hold public hear-

can address judicial opinions directly with extensive deliberations. Scores of

witnesses

—

experts, pundits

and academics

oath and render their opinions about

—can be

called to testify even

critical legal issues.

under

A legislative record is cre-

and these proceedings are covered by the media and commentated upon. Virmedia frenzies can be created with daily interviews, stories and gavel-to-gavel

ated,
tual

coverage of high-interest committee hearings.

members of the House of Representatives have enormous power
public debate through this process. The legislature can fill the public

Senators and
to shape the

space with interviews, studies and research papers and conduct behind-the-scenes
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lobbying and negotiating with the executive branch. In
tive

branch can be subpoenaed and forced to

views.

testify

Although the President can invoke executive

and media

the

fact,

Government

members of the execu-

about events, positions and

privilege, the Congress, public

carefully scrutinize such tactics.

The executive has an enormous array of tools at its disposal to "spin" legal issues
and positions taken by the President. It is now a well-established Sunday morning
ritual to have the President's men and women fan out across the talk shows with
the same song sheet and present the White House position. The President's press
conferences and ability to address the nation from the Oval Office, to "go directly"
to the people over the heads of the media,

is

a powerful tool to influence the debate

on legal policy issues. Pronouncements on legal issues by the President carry significant weight since

it is

assumed the leading legal minds of the administration have

researched those issues and support the positions being taken.

Recently the prosecution of "leaks" of even high-ranking government

and the subpoenaing of reporters by US attorneys

officials

for the identity of sources

have

demonstrated a new weapon by the executive to control the flow of information.

The

revelation

by syndicated columnist Robert Novak of Valerie Plame Wilson

an undercover CIA
for the

Northern

officer,

as

and the subsequent investigation by the US Attorney

District of Illinois, Patrick

J.

Fitzgerald, involving

I.

Lewis

"Scooter" Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's former chief of staff and national
security adviser,

and the holding of Judith Miller of the

tempt in not revealing her source is

New

York Times for con-

clear evidence of the executive's

power to shape

the terrain for the flow of information.

Moreover, the prosecution of the American

(AIPAC) director of foreign
Weissman,

in addition to

Defense (DoD),

will

Israel Public Affairs

policy, Steve Rosen,

and an Iran

Lawrence Franklin, an Iran analyst

be the

first

Committee's

specialist,

at the

Keith

Department of

time the federal government has charged two pri-

vate citizens with leaking State secrets. According to the indictment,

Rosen and

Weissman repeatedly sought and received sensitive information, both classified
and unclassified, and then passed it on to others in order to advance their policy
agenda. In the case, it is alleged that Rosen and Weissman received the information
from a DoD official, Franklin, who wanted the information passed on to other officials. For some legal experts, the prosecution threatens political and press freedom
by making the flow of information and ideas a crime. Federal prosecutors are using
the Espionage Act for the
ficials,

first

time against Americans who are not government of-

do not have security clearances and, by all indications, are not a part of a for-

eign spy operation.

The prosecution of the

strategic leak

whereby one part of the

executive charges another part of the executive raises the question of who

whom in the process of shaping opinion.
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The

press

and the

legal

communities are carefully watching these cases to

see

how the courts will strike the balance between leaks, information flow, national security, the First Amendment and the right to know. The resolution will help shape
the debate for the future.

The International Community and the Public: The Image Struggle

What

role

public's

do other "players"

view of the law

—

that

in the international
is,

the Arab, the

community have

Israeli,

Russian and Korean street? The issue of the public

is

in shaping the

the British, the Chinese, the

best understood in the context

of public diplomacy to include the several publics involved, for example, in the

War on Terrorism (US, European, Afghani, Iraqi, other Middle Eastern). Since 9/
11, the US public's approval rating for the Iraqi conflict has steadily trended downward from 90% to about 40%. The world media are central to shaping public perceptions, but the expectation that the

media will simply be "fair"

is

misplaced.

How

much the US public is affected by foreign press is unclear. Aljazeera loops pictures
of noncombatant Palestinians being killed by Israeli forces and then cuts to US
The number of Iraqi dead is still
not fully reported in the US media, but the world community opposed to the war
focuses on the civilian casualties. The world media approaches the subject with its
own views and that is the way it is and should be.
Covering the war by leaving Baghdad's Green Zone is a dangerous enterprise.
According to Reporters Without Borders, the war in Iraq has proved to be the deadliest for journalists since World War II. As of November 2006, a total of 135 journalists and media assistants have been killed in Iraq since the war began on March
20, 2003. This is more than the number killed during 20 years of war in Vietnam or
the civil war in Algeria. Iraq is also one of the world's biggest marketplaces for hostages, with 38 journalists kidnapped in three years. Five of them were executed.
Three are still being held by their abductors. Around 63 journalists were killed in
Vietnam during the 20 years from 1955 to 1975. A total of 49 media professionals
were killed in the course of their work during the war in the former Yugoslavia
from 1991 to 1995. During the civil war in Algeria from 1993 to 1996, 77 journalists
and media assistants were killed. 2
One can have only admiration and deep respect for those reporters and comforces in Iraq

and noncombatant

mentators willing to
lic

accurately

Iraqi corpses.

sacrifice their lives to tell the story

of Iraq. Informing the pub-

on legal issues emanating from the conflict is even more problematic,

especially given the

US and European views on relevant inlargely a topic of conversation among elites,

growing gap between

ternational law questions.

The gap

is

however, and the participation of the media and the public
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not central. The 2006

Media and

the

Government

election demonstrates, however, that the status of the

war

affected the
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US

can people and coverage and commentary was

But there are

critical cultural differences

critical.

between the United

world. Europe, for example, believes that the death penalty
rights while the

part of

US

seph Nye, 3

is

States

and the

a violation of human

United States and the Supreme Court hold that the death penalty is

and

culture
is

Ameri-

heritage. In this sense, "soft power," as

not effective

if

understood by Jo-

the message runs counter to world opinion.

phenomenon; they and other shapers of
public perceptions are delivering information very rapidly and in ever-new ways
technologically. Commentators on the blogosphere now have tremendous power,
as do the dominant images that ultimately become adopted as emblems of a conLegal commentators are a new, vibrant

flict

war

in the public consciousness.

—the

statue of

Which

picture will be the iconic

Saddam Hussein coming down? Or

the

emblem of the

hooded detainee from

Abu Ghraib? Or the pictures of the long lines of a free and democratic Iraq voting?
For Vietnam, the pictures of Saigon police chief Nguyen Ngoc Loan's raised pistol to the

the

temple of a suspect and of the young

girl,

Kim Phuc, who ran naked from

napalm attack on her village became the public's images of the war frozen in the

minds of the US population.
These pictures of Vietnam captured what appeared
tional law,
different

and became metaphors,

right or

to be violations of interna-

wrong, for the war. Reality may be very

from the image or perception. Recently, Dominic Johnson and Dominic

Tierney have argued that the Tet offensive of January 1968 was actually an unmitigated disaster for the communists (no targets were held and approximately 40,000

Vietcong were

killed),

but the attack was viewed as a defeat for the United States

due to the previous overblown expectations of public opinion that victory was near
following President Johnson's expansive rhetoric before the offensive, the fact the

US embassy was placed under direct fire, and the way the media portrayed the offensive

and the Vietcong resurgence. 4 The fog of battle can cloud press coverage

and portrayal. As has often been noted, truth is the
is critical.

When

the stakes are high, however,

first

casualty of war. Perception

and pictures and

contradict the government's portrayal of reality, the public's

facts

of casualties

mood can swing dra-

matically, particularly in election season.

— The Proper Role?

The Academic Community

What
demia
lic's

role should

academia play

in educating the public

see itself as a counterweight to

perception of the law?

Is this

on the law? Should

aca-

any governmental attempt to shape the pub-

a productive

might play?
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—

role that

academia

Harvey Rishikof

The academic

role in educating the public

search for long-term truths

and guiding

is

often equivocal: the academic

principles does not often yield informa-

tion that readily impacts public perceptions. Increasingly, academics are flooding

and documentaries, and giving on-the-spot commentary. The

the airwaves, blogs
O.J.

Simpson

trial

began a trend that has continued

of John Stuart Mill, this

is all

good

—

in force.

From the perspective

more speech in a democracy the better. Let
cacophony of voices. Often the same "usual

the

the marketplace of ideas sort out the

show up for the pithy quote in the article by the well-known journalist or
commentator. (I must confess to pleading guilty on this charge.) Other academics
have chosen to start their own blogs where they keep a running commentary on the
suspects"

under their expertise.

legal issues that fall

preme Court

It is

only a question of time before the Su-

blog as a source of authority for an opinion.

cites a

Independence and tenure give academia a special voice in the

legal debates.

When the legal community uniformly disagrees with the government's position, it
has an impact on the public's sense of propriety.

Moreover, the most significant question

is

what

How much

effect the

impact

is

unclear.

community has on

the

court deciding the issues. Are judges or justices swayed by amicus briefs from re-

community overwhelmingly agreeing on a position?
More often than not, the community will be divided, with respected voices on both
sides of the "vs." The judge's own independence is the final arbiter, not the academic community. The academic community acts more like a searchlight illuminating the different paths. The court must choose the route, and then be held
spected

members of the

legal

responsible.

Conclusion

So where does

this leave the

debate of national security, media and the govern-

ment? Piercing the fog of confusion
racy is open debate.

crets Act,

and

never an easy task. Essential to our democ-

Our cacophony, like our democracy, is the best approach given

the alternatives. Unlike the United
5

is

Kingdom, the United

States has

no

Official Se-

although the combination of the Title 18 provisions criminalizing fraud

related activity in connection with

tied to prosecutions

computers 6 and the State-secrets

under the Espionage Act, 7 brings such a regime

privilege,

closer.

Faced

with such a threat, some have called for a federal shield law for reporters and Senators Richard Lugar, Arlen Specter, Christopher

Dodd and

sored the Free Flow of Information Act of 2006.
Until such time

when such

remains one of no prior

a

Charles Schumer spon-

8

United Kingdom approach takes hold, our system

restraints,

few media regulations

(e.g.,

the Federal

Com-

munication Commission), private law suits for defamation, a private multi-faceted
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media, an independent legal system, unregulated

the

Government

new worldwide

communication, a ship of State that "leaks" from the top and a
True,

it is

literate

audience.

an audience more interested in Monday Night Football, Judge Judy, The

Daily Show, and Dancing with the Stars, but
the ability to engage

dom

technologies of

and become involved

of the press. Warts and

all,

the best

it is

if it

an audience that has the right and

so chooses.

remedy

is

We call

it,

in short, free-

more commentary,

to para-

phrase John Stuart Mill.

Notes
1.

FDR

allegedly presented the Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937 to relieve the

work-

The bill would have allowed FDR to appoint one judge for each sitting
months with at least ten years of experience. FDR could have appointed
six more Supreme Court justices immediately, increasing the size of the court to 15 members. A
Congress dominated by Democrats would have been expected to appoint judges friendly to FDR
and his New Deal agenda. The measure was opposed by senior leaders of the Democratic party
and defeated. Controversy still surrounds the reason why Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts
changed his vote, prior to the bill's defeat in Congress, on a minimum wage law, but his vote became known as "the switch in time that saved nine."
2. This information is compiled from the Reporters Without Borders website. See http://
www.rsf.org/special_iraq_en.php3 and http://www.rsf.org/article. php3?id_article= 16793 (both
last visited Dec. 27, 2006). The numbers of journalists and media killed in Iraq are continually
increasing. For example, by December that figure had risen from 135 in November to 139.
3. See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS
load of elderly judges.

judge over age 70 and

six

(2004).
4.

Nov.

See

Dominic Johnson

28, 2006, at
5.

&

Dominic Tierney, The Wars of Perception,

A23.

Official Secrets Act, 1989.

7.

US Code sec. 1030 (2000).
Public Law No. 65-24, 40 Statutes

8.

S.

6.

18

at

Large 217 (1917).

2831, 109th Congress (2006).
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The Military and the Media in Perspective:
Finding the Necessary Balance

James

P.

Terry*

reviewing the recent events
Iraq and the War on Terrorism
the
Inmedia,
the one obvious question asked by
Americans today, including those
in

vis-a-vis

all

in military service,

is

who do

the

media represent.

Do

the American people, or do they represent a defined
in the political landscape in the

United

they represent the voice of

elite

concerned with a change

States?

Recent Background to Current Contentiousness

Two

recent incidents,

military

I

believe, are indicative of the current

and the media and force us

to reflect

unease between the

on who and what

the

media repre-

on military activities. In early 2005, Newsweek, owned by
the Washington Post Company, published a story by Michael Ishikoff claiming
that a copy of the Koran had been flushed down a toilet by an American interrogator at Guantanamo, Cuba, in front of Muslim interviewees. When evidence was
produced that showed it to be false, Newsweek belatedly retracted the story but only
sents in their reporting

after

much damage

to the

US

military's

image occurred

in those countries with

whom we must cooperate in the War on Terrorism. More importantly, the rioting
1

that followed resulted in 16 deaths in Afghanistan
* Colonel,

United States Marine Corps

(Ret.).

and elsewhere. Newsweek,

The Military and the Media
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Finding the Necessary Balance

moreover, wanted no part of the White House's request that
age.

it

help repair the

dam-

And, unfortunately, no journalist from any major news organization wrote

that they should.

The current reporting of the Haditha story also bears mentioning. The rush to
judgment of the Marines involved by the US media without waiting until the facts
are determined has been viewed by many as simply reflective of the media's tendency to believe the worst. More

significantly, the fact that the incident

that the

civilian deaths

contemporaneous with the

incident,

and

squad involved has consistently claimed that they followed their rules of

engagement

in clearing the buildings

from which they took

fire,

have

veniently overlooked by the mainstream media in their reporting.

all

been con-

More impor-

has been no investigative reporting on standard procedures for

tantly, there

clearing buildings
in

re-

command

ported immediately to superiors by the Marines involved, that those in

were made aware of the

was

from which

fire is

taken and no interest in reporting the context

which these deaths occurred.

What

is

most

difficult to

understand

is

why the

press,

most of whom have not

served in the military, so often chooses to believe foreign sources proven incorrect
in the past,

and disregard the voices of fellow Americans who

themselves in harm's
ask

why

way

for

our nation's foreign

are daily placing

interests. Military lawyers also

the press ignores the basic legal principles that apply in irregular

belligerencies

where unlawful combatants are engaged with national forces

—

in

new Iraqi government. We must also ask
why there is such a bent to discredit and criticize US efforts rather than understand
the rationale behind coalition actions aimed at ensuring we can "stay the course" in
this case coalition forces

Iraq

and the reasons

and

for the

forces of the

immediate actions

in support thereof.

With that said, our charge must be to assess the relationship between the media
and the military as it relates to an understanding and articulation of the legal parameters of the current conflict in Iraq as covered by the press that is, Operation

—

Iraqi

Freedom. Our goal should be to increase mutual understanding

at

both the

personal and institutional levels of what the legal regime actually represents with

War on Terrorism and the
being pursued. One would

respect to the military's operational requirements in the
legal

framework under which the current

conflict

hope that the effort here today can help lead to
in

communication between the two.

we maintain

a vibrant, robust

Finally,

is

practical solutions to areas of friction

our ultimate quest must be

how can

freedom of expression while protecting the nation's

capacity to fight our wars effectively.
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The Legal Principles Underlying Irregular Belligerencies:
Often Ignored in the Reporting on Iraq

The Nature of the Current Violence
As discussed below in

detail, the

surgents," or "insurgency,"

is

media's use of the

both factually and

now firmly ingrained term, "in-

legally incorrect

and

reflects the

media's misunderstanding of the conflict.

The Global War on Terrorism was clearly not contemplated when the four
Geneva Conventions, addressing wars between national entities, were signed in
1949. 2 The violence in Iraq currently perpetrated by al Qaeda and elements of the
former regime is being spearheaded by individuals under no known national authority, with no command structure that enforces the laws and customs of warfare,
and with no recognizable, distinguishing military insignia. More importantly, they
represent no identifiable national minority in Iraq. Their attacks have injured and
killed civilians of all ethnic groups, as well as more than 2,500 US military personnel attempting to assist the democratic government in Baghdad to succeed. Their
use of children and women as lookouts and information gatherers is reminiscent of
Vietnam and raises serious questions about the status of those individuals when
acting on behalf of terrorist fighters in Iraq. The fact that this status is seldom, if
ever,

acknowledged by the press

forts to assure the public
It is
its

raises serious

concerns for the military in their

of our adherence to the law of war.

important to understand that terrorist violence provides no

perpetrators.

in Iraq are

to internal

The

found

critical international

in the 1949

armed

ef-

conflicts

legal gloss for

law principles applicable to the violence

Geneva Conventions

in

Common Article 3

and the principles enunciated

in the

3

relating

two Additional

Protocols to these Conventions negotiated in 1977. 4

The minimal protections afforded by Common Article 3, for example, include prohibitions on inhumane
treatment of noncombatants, including members of the armed forces who have
laid down their arms. Specifically forbidden are "murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment," and extrajudicial executions.
Provision must also be made for collecting and caring for the sick and wounded.
The 1977 Geneva Protocols had their roots in wars of national liberation following World War II. Colonial powers, to include the United States, France, Great
Britain, and the Netherlands, had engaged these liberation movements militarily,
often with little regard for the law of armed conflict. In the 1974 conference
hosted by the Swiss government in Geneva, the need to regulate conflicts of a
non-international character was addressed in Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol

and

is

the subject of Additional Protocol
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liberation organizations to participate,

but not vote.

The

participation of non-State actors helped shape the drafting of Article 96,

paragraph 3 of Additional Protocol I. This section provides that a party to a conflict
with a State army can unilaterally declare

and the 1977 Protocols

it

wants the 1949 Geneva Conventions

to apply. This would, of course, offer greater protection for

members of national liberation movements. Under Article 96, however, parties
authorized to make such a declaration had to establish that they were involved
"armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of
in

self-determination." 5 In Iraq, however, terrorists are trying to unseat the govern-

ment
has

that has

made no

These

been overwhelmingly approved by the people. Moreover,

statement that

terrorists,

it

desires the

Geneva Conventions

al

Qaeda

to apply.

or unlawful combatants, however described, have no juridical

existence other than as

common

criminals. Additional Protocol

I,

Article

I

con-

flicts,

or those between a nation and a recognized insurgency seeking a legal status,

differ

from the present

terrorist violence in that participants in Article

I

conflicts

opposing government forces are required to meet certain minimum requirements.
These

are:

(

1

)

that they operate

under responsible

command and are subject to in-

ternal military discipline; (2) that they carry their

arms openly; and

(3) that

otherwise distinguish themselves clearly from the civilian population.

they are accorded certain protections

when

captured.

It is

6

they

In return

doubtful that those per-

petuating violence in Iraq today meet these criteria for the status of insurgent.

Moreover, they are exploiting every ethnic group for their

own vicious ends, with-

out regard for these requirements.

The fact that these terrorists have no recognized and protected status under the
Geneva Conventions or their Protocols, and employ methods completely banned
by the laws of armed conflict, is likewise seldom articulated by mainstream reporters. In addition, al Qaeda's failure to adhere to the most basic tenets of international law on the battlefield is never addressed. What is addressed is every claimed
violation of the law by American service members, often responding to acts of savagery by Muslim extremists claiming to act on behalf of Allah, not on behalf of a
national or sub-national entity. The fact that these claimed violations of the law of
war by Americans are often subsequently found to be without substance seems to
never appear in print.

The

Qaeda and Other Anti-Government Participants
today insists on calling these terrorists "insurgents" the

Status of the Al

While the press

fact that

they are the basest of criminals, and not insurgents with minimal juridical status
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under Article I, Protocol I,

as discussed above,

is

never recited. The fact that they do

not represent even a significant minority of the Sunnis, Shiites or Kurds

is

never ex-

(We know this because 70% from all sectors voted in the December 2005
elections for a democratic government.) And there is never a call in the press for the
Iraqi people to stand up and denounce these perpetrators of violence who are even
now sucking the lifeblood from the fledgling Iraqi Government.
plained.

The law of armed conflict is based largely on the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Unfortunately, in Iraq, the clear distinction normally
witnessed in conflict (i.e., belligerents on the one hand and the civilian populace on
the other)

is

significantly blurred.

Nor are all elements that are perpetuating the vi-

olence today working toward the same ends. Baathist operatives within the Sunni

who were

elite

fledgling

formerly within Saddam's inner circle are trying to prevent the

democracy from succeeding. The

ing the Western influences

from Iraq and

the current coalition effort to help the

Certain

members of the

gime

until

it is

Qaeda leadership

it is

new

Shiite leadership

to settle scores while at the

al

is

likewise targeting

Iraqi

focused on driv-

any supporters of

government sustain democracy.

have used the turmoil as an opportunity

same time refusing to commit completely to the new re-

determined that

it

can succeed. Shiite religious leaders

like Sistani

The Kurds have opted to remain on the sidelines in the north
and take a wait and see approach while at the same time ostensibly supporting the
new regime. Then there are the local rivalries, and in Iraq, all politics are local. I saw
that in Fallujah in late 2004 and in early 2005 when I was there on behalf of the Secare remaining silent.

retary of State.

The point is that the Marines under scrutiny at Haditha responded to attack in a
very complex environment. The key question had to be whether they followed the
legally scrubbed rules of engagement and, equally important, whether the rules of
engagement followed,
the

ground

if in fact

they were followed, actually applied to the facts on

as they presented themselves to the

Bargewell, the investigating officer,

is

Marines involved. Major General

now carefully examining these questions on

behalf of the Secretary of Defense.

These cross currents, and the

fact that

our Marines and Army forces are dealing

with a period of carefully orchestrated violence, need to be more accurately por-

The fact that individuals, including women and children, who
actively and directly in support of combat activities (such as providing

trayed by the media.
participate

combat

intelligence, physically shielding

combatants,

etc.)

themselves

become

combatants and are legitimate targets of attack, needs to be explained. That
it is

so critical that reporting

on events such

review and careful attention.
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Finding the Appropriate Military-Media Relationship

We

must ask

then,

struggle in Iraq?

what

the appropriate balance in reporting in the current

is

How can the media report events

can the military do to provide the

in a

more

accurate way?

legal insights necessary for the

media to

derstand the operational legal issues that have and will arise? There

is

What
un-

fully

no question

more specifically, perceived violations of the
law shape national policy decisions. This was never more true than in Vietnam,
where the My Lai murders helped to sour the Vietnamese public on our continued
presence there, and the US public on our continued participation in that conflict.
that public perceptions of the law and,

In the present conflict in Iraq, the allegations concerning the alleged murders at

Haditha and other similar incidents are even
sions. It

now

shaping national policy deci-

was no accident that when President Bush

visited

Baghdad on June

13,

2006 he met with the new Iraqi Prime Minister and expressed support for contin-

ued US presence on the one hand, while urging the
their

own

There

forces

is

also

and

to take the lead in their

no question

that the climate

dia operate has intensified since

September

own

move quickly to train

defense.

under which the military and the me-

1 1,

A 2005 Gallup Poll found that

2001.

large majorities of both the military respondents
stories

Iraqis to

and the public

believe that

about the military tend to be too negative. Members of

military,

7

media and the

public, however, believe that

all

news

three groups,

embedding the media within

the operational forces enhances the public's understanding of the war, helps the

morale of the troops, improves the public's perception of the military and improves the credibility of the media coverage.

It is

the understanding which flows

from embedding, not mere information, which makes the difference between
coverage and something

fair

less.

The Practical Effects of Embedding
It

was during the Bosnian peacekeeping operation

authorized and assigned to accompany

in

1995 that reporters were

first

US forces as part of an authorized compre-

hensive program. This was short-lived, however, as a sensitive conversation be-

tween a commander and
parties to the conflict

his

men

concerning

was reported by

racist attitudes

of one of the Balkan

a Wall Street Journal reporter

(Tom

Ricks).

The program was robustly adopted, however, by US military commanders in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The more than 600 reporters who were approved
for the program received a week-long "boot camp" of sorts aboard ship and at sites
such as Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; Fort Dix, New Jersey; and facilities
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8
in Kuwait.

New York

Times journalist Andrew Jacobs found

enlightening, entertaining, horrifying,

While nearly all reporters involved

it

to be "alternatively

and physically exhausting." 9

in the

program during Operation

Iraqi Free-

dom believed it gave them a greater feel for the war and a better understanding of
and experience, there were concerns by

the military as a result of their training

publishers that negative stories by

embedded

reporters never caught the public's

attention. These included stories of failed supply planning, civilian casualties, fratricide

and

theft.

believe that this lack of traction for negative stories can be largely

I

attributed to the

overwhelming success of the initial campaign and the belief on the

part of most Americans that the coalition force

had done

a remarkable job, despite

the reported negative events.

While the embedding program was not institutionalized during Vietnam and
earlier,

ing

one only has to recall the excellent reporting of Ernie Pyle in the Pacific dur-

World War

II

embedding of individual reporters has

to understand that the

who

long and proud history. In Vietnam, Joe Galloway,

subsequently wrote

Major General Hal Moore, spent 25 years

Were

Soldiers Once, with

close

and personal" with military units

traveling

a

We
"up

—primarily Marine and Army infantry

commands. It was his reporting in the la Drang Valley (pronounced Na Trang) in
November 1965 with an Army Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division facing overwhelming odds which catapulted him onto the world stage. Galloway described his
feelings on his reporting this way:
mud, is where war is most visible and easiest understood. There no one
will lie to you; no one will try to put a spin on the truth. Those for whom death waits
around the next bend or across the next rice paddy have no time and little taste for the
There, in the

games that are played with such
sounds of the guns. 10

relish in the rear.

The commitment by the media
waned. While
units,

at

today that

embedding

one ever

lied to

me within

the

their reporters in Iraq has

now

hundred reporters were assigned to operating
number stands at no more than 25. More than 40 media personone time

nel, to include reporters,

ing the

to

No

several

cameramen and

assistants,

have perished in attacks dur-

War on Terror. When a newsperson is attacked, as has happened recently in

Bob Woodruff and others, the story becomes their injuries and their
prognosis and not that of the American servicemen who may have died in service
to his or her nation while providing them protection. That aspect of the militarymedia relationship and the related reporting has not been ignored by the American
the case of

people.

What marked

the initial success of the

fact that the additional

embedding

process, in

my view, was the

experience and training provided these reporters enabled
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them to turn the situation into an educational opportunity for their audience.
Through their understanding of the events in the context of the operational requirements of the

were

conflict, they

less likely to resort to

cha" reporting and wildly negative predictions. As

McClane has suggested

quick criticism, "got-

Navy Commander Brendon

in an excellent recent article in Parameters magazine, the

next step should be to bring trusted reporters into the operations center to gain a

needed context for their stories. 11 While this would have to be carefully tailored depending on the

and the

conflict

conclude that reporters

like

sensitivity of the information,

one can reasonably

Rick Atkinson, Major Garrett and Ted Koppel, with a

long history of trust by commanders, would be likely

first

candidates.

Access to the operations center would also give access to an understanding of
the rules of engagement approved for

engagement, although highly

and employed by the

classified, nevertheless

force involved. Rules of

provide the legal and opera-

roadmap for our military's response to attack, both geographically and with
regard to weapons systems and procedures. The understanding of these approved
operational procedures, which are trained to by our forces, would preclude un-

tional

founded claims of violations, because these
the legal restrictions applicable
individuals engaged.

and after a careful review of the combatant status of

When a civilian woman or child is acting as a combatant, the

fact that the individual

no longer enjoys

by every journalist reporting the

When

rules are drafted after careful review of

a civilian family

is

story,

civilian protections

should be understood

even

personally distasteful.

if

that fact

is

harboring a terrorist in their house

who

is

firing

on US

troops serving in Iraq and representing the interests of the democratically elected

government,
that the

as

is

alleged to have

happened at Haditha, the reporters need to know

home is no longer a protected place but has become a safe haven for the en-

emy. These are the

basics,

but they often seem not to be within the lexicon used by

the fourth estate.

When we have reporters who understand the law, have good judgment and have
integrity, their reporting tends to be clear, more accurate and in context. When
they do not exhibit these

traits, their

tends to frustrate the military and, as
fective dialogue in future military

reporting can be misleading and worse,

we witnessed after Vietnam,

preclude an

it

ef-

engagements.
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60 Minutes Wednesday in late 2004 concerning President Bush's Air National Guard service have
soured

many Americans on

the credibility of the press with respect to military reporting.
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National Security, the

Law and the Media:

Shaping Public Perceptions

Linda Robinson*

The American news media

play a significant role in shaping public percep-

tions of national security policies

and

their legality,

and therefore have

a

great responsibility to carry out their function with the highest possible degree of

professionalism. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
sensitive issues involving national security

and the law have

creased the challenge for the news media to perform
curacy.

Some

liberties,
lic

its

many complex and

arisen,

and

ac-

role with diligence

of the cases reflect inherent tensions between principles of

and debate can

civil

when pub-

conflict with national security imperatives that

require secrecy for success of a policy that aims to protect citizens.

may

A given policy's

may be called into question, or there may be no settled law or legal interpre-

tation governing that policy.

can provoke controversy,

it

While media coverage of national security

can also result in

to clarify legal gray areas. This has

legislative, judicial

terrorism. In
partial or

some

cases, the

policies

or executive action

been the case with detention and interrogation

policies for those captured in Iraq, Afghanistan,

media

is

and

in connection with the

war on

alleged to mislead the public with distorted,

erroneous characterizations of national security policies or events. This

issue has arisen with regard particularly to the coverage of the
*

in-

privacy rights, due process and national security; for example

disclosure

legality

which have

Senior Writer, U.S.

News

& World Report.

war

in Iraq.

Media
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and government practices may contribute

to the perception that the "full story"

not being told. Systemic trends in the news media business have made
cult in
ally

it

is

more diffi-

many instances to meet professional standards, which have been tradition-

embraced but

are not formally codified. Finally, a polarized

political climate in the

and partisan

country has contributed to a public discourse marked by

more heat than light.
The press sees itself as performing a watchdog function to protect the public's
interest and to inform the public on the vital issues of the day. It has been a hallmark of the news media to guard its independence and to investigate alleged
wrongdoing, particularly on the part of government and those in positions of
power. Such a predisposition should not, however, become a presumption of
wrongdoing. Journalists should aggressively pursue the facts and let them speak for

When covering national security issues, journalists may encounter di-

themselves.

lemmas over handling classified information or information that may provide assistance to those who would do the country harm. While there are certainly many
cases

where information

knowledged
to carefully

in the 9/11

overly classified with scant justification, as was ac-

commission

report, 1 the

news media have a

weigh the consequences of publishing

Two news
rity law.

is

responsibility

classified information.

amply illustrate the challenges of reporting on national secu-

stories

The New York Times reported

that the National Security

Agency (NSA)

was conducting warrantless surveillance of Americans inside the United
lying

on a classified legal opinion that it was legal to do so when the NSA had reason
was

to believe that the person

in contact with a suspected agent of a foreign

or terrorist entity. The article reported concerns by other
icy,

States, re-

which was adopted after the 9/11

Surveillance Act (FISA)

2

attacks, violated the

US officials that the pol1978 Foreign Intelligence

by not obtaining warrants from the FISA

requires warrants for eavesdropping

power

on "U.S. persons," but the

court.

The law

policy's legal pro-

ponents considered that the executive branch has the authority needed so long as

one of the

parties

was outside the United

In this very complicated case, there

is

States. 3

a clear legal gray area that

is

now under re-

view by the Justice Department, and which was questioned by the head FISA court
judge and by some legislators

who were briefed on the policy. Technology has also

evolved since the 1978 law was written and subsequently amended. Yet the admin-

by Congress or judicial review for fear of compromising the secrecy it felt the program required. The New York Times withheld
publication of some details that the executive branch argued would harm US naistration did not seek

its

revision

tional security interests, but

it

disagreed with the government's contention that the

very disclosure of the program would render
the story.

4

The extremely

it

ineffective

and decided

sensitive nature of the case led the executive
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restrict the

explanations

it

Bush administration decided

to Congress. In

2007 the

to submit requests for surveillance warrants to the

FISA court rather than contest the

legality

Another news story that generated
lades, for like the

and

offered to both the public

of its program.

a great deal of controversy (as well as acco-

NSA story, it too won a Pulitzer prize)

revelation that the Central Intelligence

was the Washington

Post's

Agency (CIA) had been holding suspected

terrorists at secret detention sites in several countries since 9/1

1.

5

The policy of ex-

traordinary renditions has been in effect since the previous decade, but in the days

to keep

them out of the US

manded to
in

US territory
Those suspects have now been re-

branch decided to detain

after 9/11 the executive

courts' jurisdiction.

US

their countries of origin or transferred to

Cuba, to a US detention

facility

run by the

suspects outside

Guantanamo Bay Naval Base

US military and monitored by the In-

Committee of the Red Cross. Court rulings led to legislation establishing new legal processes for detainees, and military policy on interrogation tactics
has been changed to explicitly prohibit some of the practices (such as simulated
ternational

drowning or "waterboarding")

allegedly used at the

There has been no determination in the
practices of rendition

CIA

US justice

sites.

system of the

legality

of the

and secret detention, although some of the detainees are pur-

suing the matter in court. Investigations were also conducted in Europe, where

some of the

US and

secret sites

were allegedly located. The exposure of a practice in which

foreign intelligence agencies have cooperated has led to controversy

strains in those countries.

niques by the

CIA also coincided with

and detention practices
Iraq, as

The description of alleged

in Iraq.

and

coercive interrogation tech-

the ongoing controversy over interrogation

The abuses of detainees

recorded on digital photos that a

some of the US

US

at

Abu Ghraib

prison in

soldier turned over to investigators,

The photos had already
been circulating among soldiers, but the publication and dissemination of them
caused widespread outrage and attention to the issue. Investigations and congressional hearings brought to light many of the administrative and policy shortcomled to prosecution of

soldiers involved.

ings that contributed to the occurrence of the abuses.

While the issuance of new

may help prevent recurrences and
mitigate the perceptions created abroad, the Abu Ghraib scandal and the wide covrules for detention

erage

it

and interrogation

practices

received remains one of the symbolic events of the Iraq war.

There have been criticisms more generally that the press coverage of the Iraq

war has been inaccurate and has undermined Americans' support
addition,

US

effective use

officials

have been frustrated in their

efforts to

of media by adversaries in Iraq and in the

pronouncements and

respond to the very

Qaeda movement. Their

on US soldiers or of their capway onto the Internet and the airwaves, enabling the

their videotapes of attacks

tives quickly find their

al

for the war. In
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many instances,

adversaries to disseminate their message and, in

give the

ac-

first

count of events.
Regarding the quality of American news coverage of the war in Iraq, the

allega-

tion of bias in coverage can be partly attributed to a "shoot the messenger" phe-

nomenon, since the war effort has been bedeviled by numerous setbacks and errors
of commission and omission. In this reporter's judgment, however, the media can
also be fairly criticized for emphasizing violent attacks over less salacious and often
positive events such as reconstruction efforts. But the more serious lapses have occurred either through media ignorance of military affairs or a failure to seek and
weigh all the relevant data and analyses to produce in-depth, comprehensive examinations of the war's conduct. The public policy debate would greatly benefit
from more sustained efforts to understand what is an extremely complicated conflict

that has eluded easy answers.

The US government, including the US military, has lamented that it is losing the
"battle of ideas" and that it often has a much longer response time than its adversaries.

Frequently, the decision-making chain regarding release of information

is

long and cumbersome. Yet the military in particular has adopted some effective
policies that help provide

news media with

and other events and voices

access to the battlefield, senior officials

that merit coverage.

Embedding media with

military

units has provided journalists with firsthand information that they cannot obtain

elsewhere. While the process of embedding

means

media has been

criticized

to control journalists, in this reporter's experience, the

by some

ground

rules

as a

im-

posed primarily restrict the timing of news dispatches to protect operational security

and,

in

some

instances,

compromised by detailed

specific

description. In

tactics

some

in

effectiveness

would be

any event, embedded reporting provides

one avenue for reporting and should not be the

commanders have

whose
sole

means of news

gathering.

US

cases taken extraordinary steps to provide access or in-

formation, allowing selected reporters wide access to battlefields and commanders'
deliberations. In

one case the commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq

leased video footage of a Predator that
fuller

was tracking insurgents

news coverage of an attack on the US embassy

in

in order to provide

Baghdad, when the

coverage had led the news media to dwell on the attack even after

had been

identified

and apprehended.

re-

its

partial

perpetrators

6

more access and information often helps the press produce better informed and more in-depth coverage and analysis, provided that it invests the necessary
Providing

time to take advantage of the opportunity for sustained research. Unfortunately,
pressures within the

news business today

times the news media

is

many

militate against such "best practices."

At

driven by competing pressures, and while journalists should
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always

insist

on the time and resources

they can be forced into

less

to

do work that meets professional standards,

than ideal compromises.

There are several developments and trends that

news gathering and

affect the

nature and quality of

many of which are not widely known or underSome of the country's largest newspapers, which

interpretation,

stood outside news media

circles.

have suffered declining circulation, have been sold or are for
continued double-digit profit margins continues despite the

The quest

for

revenues are

fact that

Most notably, the number of personnel and

shrinking along with advertising bases.
the size of budgets for

sale.

news gathering have declined markedly

in the past decade.

News organizations now rely more heavily on contract and freelance personnel known as "stringers" and "fixers" and contract video footage. These contract personnel, who are
Foreign news gathering has been de-funded to a significant degree.

may not

sometimes foreign nationals,

fessional standards that prevail in the

Even

as personnel

mainstream US media.

have been reduced, the

evolution of the media has produced

news "content":

have the same training, experience or pro-

more

typically a journalist will

demand

for output has

outlets that have to be supplied with

file

stories to his or her

primary publica-

tion or broadcast show, but be required as well to supply stories to
websites, blogs, newsletters,

grown. The

and commentary or

analysis to other

one or more

media

outlets

which may be owned by the parent company or merely as part of the growing phe-

nomenon known

as

"media convergence." Fortunately, senior reporters

tional publications can often secure the time

and resources necessary

for

at

na-

complex

and sensitive stories, but the pressures are real and growing. The rise of 24-hour cable

news and now the Internet's proliferating platforms have created enormous de-

mand for

"content" which must be supplied and updated regularly.

Commentary frequently fills this demand since it costs virtually nothing to procompared to reported content. All "expert" opinion is not equal, however,
and often the commentators do not fully understand the complex issues on which
duce,

they speak. Ratings pressures can also feed this tendency toward opinion journalism,

which was ushered

in

by the

rise

of talk radio stations. While the news media

have always included columnists and
practitioners feel that opinion

and editors are not

and

editorials,

which feature opinions, some

bias can creep into

news coverage

vigilant in maintaining the traditional distinction

portage and opinion writing.

if

reporters

between

re-

7

Americans' sources of information have diversified in the past decade, but the
traditional
analysis

news media remain

a

primary source of and conduit for information,

and commentary about national

media such

as blogs

security issues, even as nontraditional

and webzines continue

to grow.

The continuing influence of

the "mainstream media," particularly large-circulation daily newspapers, national
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newsmagazines and network and cable news
in

is

such that they play a powerful role

framing the national debate, defining top news stories and shaping public opin-

ion through the approaches they take to these stories. In cases where the news
dia breaks a story, they single-handedly inject a

and force others

to react to the issue as

fluence that the news

new topic

into the national debate

framed by the media. The tremendous

media wields makes

it

incumbent on them to practice

according to the highest standards of professionalism.

craft

ceived as inaccurate or biased,

it

me-

will lose credibility

If the

media

is

in-

their

per-

and find its ability to perform a

useful societal function greatly diminished.
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From the beginning of
to

ment's

this

Administration, Secretary Rice has

made very clear

me that, in addition to providing first-rate legal advice to the State Depart-

officials,

she expects the Office of the Legal Adviser to play a key role in our

public diplomacy dialogue. Secretary Rice
the United States to international law

September

11th,

is

aware that the historic commitment of

and the

rule of law has

been questioned

after

and she has personally and repeatedly reaffirmed our respect

for

and adherence to the rule of law, and our strong commitment to meeting our international legal obligations. "The United States," she has said, "has been

and

will

continue to be the world's strongest voice for the development and defense of international legal norms." She said that
tions

we

respect our international legal obliga-

and international law and we will continue to do

discussion, she

added

this:

so.

And, apropos

for today's

"We're going to continue to make that very clear to the

world."

me to ensure that I and my staff play a lead role in this
garner support around the world for US positions. I have

Secretary Rice has asked
effort, as

therefore

we work to
made it one of my top

priorities as Legal Adviser to ensure that

we

effec-

communicate our message to the rest of the world so that the international
community understands our commitment to international law and the rule of law,

tively

Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State of the United States.
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and

as well as the carefully considered legal bases

decisions

made by the United

rationales underpinning policy

States.

Countering Myths
This task

is

We hear increasingly that the United States is
international law and international institutions. We

not always an easy one.

not strongly committed to

hear that the United States acts "lawlessly" on the world stage. The United States
refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.

drew from the ABM
ternational law.

Treaty.

And we

We

"unsigned" the

Rome

Statute.

We with-

We went to war in Iraq without a legal basis under in-

have violated the Geneva Conventions by holding

Guantanamo without

them lawyers or charging them with
crimes. This is a troubling pattern of criticism, but US experts in international and
national security law, including the lawyers in my office and many of you, are well
positioned to explain why none of these acts were "lawless" and why many of these
terrorists in

giving

criticisms are simply wrong.

Of course, there are some challenges in public legal communications that do not
necessarily exist with respect to our public

communications

for example, to maintain applicable legal privileges

discuss exactly
gic

how we came to

communications

is

a particular position.

about persuasion and

ways able to counter the

Moreover, while

need,

we can

legal strate-

our commitment to stating
say. Likewise,

underlying a legal debate because

facts

We

and cannot therefore always

listening,

the law correctly provides a firm limit to what

generally.

we

are not al-

we cannot

discuss

information that could compromise the success of intelligence, law enforcement

and military operations. This dilemma has made the job of explaining our legal position

on renditions

particularly difficult. Before asserting legal positions,

need to consider carefully whether and
sitions or options.

also

how this might prejudice future policy po-

For example, one difficulty with publicizing lawful interroga-

tion techniques to help address concerns of allies

might

we

is

that this public disclosure

facilitate terrorists' training activities.

Another challenge unique

to legal

communications

is

identifying

ing to policy differences that are recast as disputes about law.
for example, often criticized for not supporting international

to sign or ratify a treaty. This

happened with respect

to the

and respond-

The United

States

law because

it

is,

failed

Kyoto Protocol, which

sound public policy and would harm the US
ratify the Protocol was made on that basis and per-

the United States did not think was

economy. The decision not to
fectly legal

under international law.

With that background, I want to
efforts

describe

some of the specific public diplomacy

of the Office of the Legal Adviser, and
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US

military
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and other government lawyers and

officials participating in this

colloquium to en-

work

gage in strategic dialogue about important legal issues as part of your

Bush has

international arena. President

every

member of his Administration, and

Diplomacy and Public

Affairs

diplomacy

said that public

Under

has directed

is

in the

the job of

Secretary for Public

Karen Hughes to ensure that every agency and de-

partment gives public diplomacy the same high

level

of priority that he does. By

—

—

more clearly and more often about our legal positions, as Secretary Rice
has said we must do, we can dispel myths, correct misunderstandings, and share
and communicate some of America's most basic values.
talking

The Broader Context

The

State Department's overall

imperatives.
vision of

Our

hope

first

that

is

objective

communications strategy involves three
is

to offer people throughout the

strategic

world a positive

rooted in America's belief in freedom, justice, opportunity

and respect for all. President Bush and Secretary Rice have emphasized
around the world should know that we stand

for

human

rights

that people

and human

free-

dom everywhere. Second, we seek to isolate and marginalize violent extremists and
confront their ideology of tyranny and hate.

undermining the

efforts

in conflict with Islam.

respect for

common
tries,

Muslim

interests

cultures

and

One

of the chief ways

we do

this

is

by

of extremists to portray the United States and the West as

We work to empower mainstream voices and demonstrate

cultures

and contributions.

Finally,

we

seek to foster a sense of

and values between Americans and people of
faiths

different

coun-

throughout the world.

Work of the Office of the Legal Adviser
Communications about our
ment's overall strategy.

legal positions are

Some

an important part of the Depart-

of the key communications challenges in our war

Qaeda and the Taliban, and the conflict in Iraq, illustrate the point. For example, my office has had a central role in explaining the legal basis for our detention operations in Guantanamo and Iraq. We have also responded to the terrible
abuses at Abu Ghraib and recent allegations of misconduct by US Marines at

with

al

Haditha.

More

generally,

I

have personally participated in numerous meetings,

conferences, symposia and similar gatherings in the United States and abroad re-

garding important legal topics relating to the conflict with
sues,

and I have

led several delegations of US

conferences in Geneva.
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and my staff talk about the law to help our counterparts in ministries of foreign affairs around the world, as well as international orgaIn each of these instances,

non-governmental organizations, opinion makers and the public,

nizations,

understand our
tion, to help

the

I

legal rationales and, in nations that lack a strong rule

of law tradi-

people understand the importance of law in forming good policy. At

same time, we listen to what

colleagues, opinion

By listening to their views and paying
concerns, we show respect for them and we ultimately provide

around the world are saying about the
attention to their
better advice to

makers and the general public

our

law.

clients.

Detention Operations

Let

me turn to my first example of how the Office of the Legal Adviser has engaged

in public
egy,

diplomacy to advance the Department's overall communications

namely our

strat-

central role in explaining the legal basis for our detention

operations.

The

Office of the Legal Adviser

is

clearly

aware of the concerns people have

raised with respect to our detention operations, especially the detention facilities at

Guantanamo Bay and our

rendition of terrorists in limited circumstances.

personally engaged directly with
legal positions

I

have

my counterparts around the world to explain our

on these matters and

to discuss

terrorist attacks, gathering intelligence

our shared

and bringing

interests in preventing

terrorists to justice.

I

have

numerous European capitals to meet with legal advisers and other representatives from foreign ministries, the EU and international organizations, and
conducted press events and roundtables with those that have a key influence on
public opinions and policies. My main goal has been to explain more clearly the legal bases for our detention activities and address the legal concerns that have been
raised over the last few years, including by our friends and partners. To do this, I
have had to do three main things. First, I have explained with specificity how the
US government complies with its Constitution, its laws and its international legal
obligations in its detention activities. Second, I have worked to clarify misconceptions about various decisions by our government as well as misunderstandings
about various aspects of international law and the Geneva Conventions. Finally, I
have emphasized that the US government recognizes that many issues relating to
our detention of captured enemy fighters remain a matter of concern in Europe,
and elsewhere, and promised to talk more often and more clearly about the issues;
at the same time, I have asked that responsible officials and commentators in Europe promote more balanced discussion within their own nations, among themselves and with the United States about the issues.
traveled to
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With
for

respect to compliance with our legal obligations,

it

has not been enough

me to reiterate that the US government complies with its Constitution, its laws

and

its

treaty

many hours sitreporters and commentators explaining the various US

commitments

ting with lawyers, officials,

in

its

detention

activities. I

have spent

criminal laws and international legal obligations that prohibit torture, and describing
I

how US courts have interpreted those laws in specific circumstances.

Likewise,

have talked about specific cases of unlawful treatment of detainees and described

how the United States vigorously investigated and, where the facts have warranted
it,

prosecuted and punished those responsible. Unfortunately,

criticism about a

complex

matter in a

legal

Guantanamo no-man's land" or "US

capture
easy
—
pithy sound
"prisoners
camp
Guantanamo" —but

torture

its

teners that the position of the
to

at

it

re-

how the United States is, in fact, com-

legal obligations.

In each of these discussions

"method"

a

linger in

bite

quires paragraphs of explanation to describe

plying with

to

it is

I

emphasize

that,

US government

what some perceive

as

even
is

if I

cannot persuade

my lis-

clearly correct, at least there

is

our "madness," and that the positions we have

taken are legally defensible.

One particular area that has been largely misunderstood by Europeans is the
way in which the United States applies the Convention Against Torture's prohibition against sending a person to a country "where there are substantial grounds
that he

would be

Human

in

danger of being subjected to torture." The European Court of

Rights has interpreted this prohibition such that

it is

impermissible for

members of the Council of Europe to remove a person to a country where that person might be tortured. Our Senate, on the other hand, has opted for a standard that
it is impermissible to remove a person to a country where it is "more likely than
not" that that person would be tortured. Both of these standards are valid and each
ensures compliance with the relevant Convention Against Torture obligation.
It

has been extremely helpful to describe our standard in detail to

and

colleagues

when our

to explain that

our standard emerged from a democratic process

Senate ratified the Convention Against Torture in 1990 and was not de-

veloped by this or any other Administration.
to the point that
ered,

my European

Many Europeans have been receptive

our standard, although different than theirs, was carefully consid-

promulgated by our Senate and intended to

Convention. Also,

I

fulfill

have emphasized that we share

our obligations under the

common values

— above

all

on torture and on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of any
and common objectives in our counterterrorism efforts, including

a prohibition

detainee

—

gathering potentially life-saving intelligence from captured terrorists. And,

pointed out that

we have

foiled a

number of deadly plots against
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in

Europe and elsewhere

as a result of

our law enforcement and intelligence

cooperation.

Another area of concern with respect

our detention

to

activities

has involved

our use of the concept of unlawful combatants. Certain academics and others have
asserted that the term

vented by

this

is

not found in the Geneva Conventions but rather was in-

Administration.

I

consistently point out that these criticisms are

wrong: the concept of unlawful combatants

is

well recognized in international law

and by international legal scholars. By citing specific

by courts,

in military manuals

historical

examples of the use of the term unlawful combatants and showing that

the United States did not simply

persuaded

many European

make up

this

term for

its

own

purposes,

I

have

colleagues that the term does, in fact, describe a long-

standing category of actors.

Some

of these colleagues, of course, continue to dis-

agree with our application of the concept, but they

know that our legal

analysis

is

rigorous and that we are genuinely concerned with ensuring that our detention activities

comport with

all

of our relevant legal obligations.

Another important misconception that

I

have tried to correct involves Presi-

dent Bush's signing statement in bringing into law the Detainee Treatment Act, the
legislation that includes the

well-known McCain Amendment. The President's

signing statement included a standard statement indicating that he would interpret
the Act consistent with his authorities under our Constitution. Critics argue,

and it

has almost become urban legend, that the President's statement "proves" that he
intends to rely

In response,

I

on

his constitutional authority to ignore the

McCain Amendment.

point out that the President's signing statement reflects a frequently

used executive branch position about the execution of laws within the context of
the President's constitutional responsibilities,

and was not meant

to indicate that

the President planned to ignore the provisions of the Act.

Our detention

activities involve

complex legal questions and people around the

world have raised concerns about those

activities.

Often, our job

is

not so

much

a

matter of explaining the Geneva Conventions or international legal principles,

about which foreign audiences tend to be reasonably well informed
times with different views

—

as

it

is

albeit

some-

about communicating our commitment to

those principles and explaining clearly

and practices.

—

US law and the bases for our legal decisions

We talk about how US law comports with our international legal ob-

how US legal positions are well considered by all branches of our government, and we offer alternative explanations for what may seem to be substantive
legal differences. When people understand our strong commitment to treating deligations,

tainees in accordance with
ligations,

our constitutional, statutory and international legal ob-

they understand that we stand for the proper treatment of all people in

contexts.
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Abu Ghraib and Haditha

A second example of how the Office of the Legal Adviser has engaged in public diplomacy

to

advance the Department's overall communications

is

our work in

re-

sponding to the terrible abuses at Abu Ghraib and recent allegations of misconduct

by US Marines
I

at

Haditha.

have personally engaged in outreach on both of these subjects

at

home and

abroad, in coordination with the Department of Defense and other relevant agencies,

and people have appreciated hearing candidly from the

Department's

State

Legal Adviser that the United States takes these incidents very seriously, acts

on

them promptly, investigates thoroughly and holds the wrongdoers accountable for
their actions.

We know that one of the great strengths of our nation is its ability to

its failures,

plain that

we continue

most

them and

deal with

recognize

to

do

basic values for people

act to

just that in the

make

war on

things better.

terror,

we

around the world. In addition,

When we

ex-

reaffirm one of our

as a practical matter,

lawyers play an important role in responding to events like

Abu Ghraib and

Haditha because we can discuss with authority the

procedures to in-

vestigate the incidents

specific legal

and prosecute wrongdoers. Since extremists take

full

advan-

Abu Ghraib and Haditha to portray the United States as evil,
concerned about human rights and in conflict with Islam, we

tage of incidents like

only rhetorically

undercut the

terrorists' efforts

by addressing abuses and

head-on and

allegations

describing our investigative and prosecutorial procedures.

With

Abu Ghraib and

respect to crises like the abuses at

the allegations of mis-

conduct

at

Haditha, one of the most important elements of our communications

strategy

is

speed. In an age of

United States

is

competing for attention and

spark riots and protests, as
report regarding a

whether

it is

mass media and electronic communication, the

US

we saw

in

by

facts or

around the world and across the

time when rumors can

connection with the inaccurate Newsweek

soldier flushing a

substantiated

credibility in a

Koran down

a toilet,

and information,

based on mere rumors, spreads instantly

Internet. In these circumstances,

we need

to act

quickly to counter misinformation and undermine the efforts of extremists to portray us as

One

evil.

of the key ways

we

achieve speed at the State Department

is

through our

rapid response unit, a recent initiative of the Secretary and Karen Hughes. Early

each morning our rapid response unit meets to determine what the
issues for that

to them.

Our

media

day are around the world and what our strategy should be to respond
lawyers

work

sues are properly addressed
are accurately

critical

closely with the rapid response unit to ensure legal

and that the legal bases

and appropriately communicated.
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Whether we are responding to

a crisis like

Abu Ghraib or Haditha or working to

explain our legal positions to audiences around the world, talking directly to the
press

is

an important element of our communication

strategy.

important role in shaping perceptions around the world

meet privately with government

The media plays an

so, just as

it is

necessary to

NGOs and opinion makers, we need to

officials,

speak publicly to the press to explain our positions. Outreach to Arab media has

been especially important

after

September

1

1th

and I have reached out

gal positions

and

my tenure. The foreign

the foreign press center generally, as often as possible during
press, including

to them,

Arab media like al- Jazeera, has been very receptive to hearing our le-

and replaying them

in the

Arab and Muslim world and elsewhere.

Delegations and Meetings

Before closing,

let

me briefly touch on

the final example where

I

and

my staff en-

gage in public diplomacy as an important part of the Department's overall com-

munications strategy

—an example

that actually cuts across

diplomacy efforts. In addition to the

strategic dialogues

all

of our legal public

about critical issues of mu-

my European colleagues that I mentioned, I have made it a priorurging of Secretary Rice and Under Secretary Hughes, for me and my

tual interest with
ity, at

the

staff to talk

more often and more clearly about legal matters around the world. We

look for opportunities and have increased our budget to attend meetings, conferences,

symposia and similar gatherings to

respect for important issues

listen carefully to

and international law and

plain clearly the legal bases for our policies

and

institutions generally; ex-

actions;

to convince other nations to cooperate with us

our colleagues; show

and

and advocate
live

up

forcefully

to their

own

commitments.
Since becoming Legal Adviser,
Society of International Law, the

I

have spoken

at events

hosted by the American

American Bar Association, the Atlantic Council

Law School, Princeton Unithe Round Table on Current

of the United States, George Washington University
versity

and other

institutions. Last year,

I

spoke

at

Problems of International Humanitarian Law in San Remo,
mier conference in the

field. I

around the world to the
est.

Whenever

possible

State

Italy,

which

is

the pre-

have invited numerous groups and colleagues from

Department to discuss

and appropriate,

I

critical issues

of mutual inter-

have tried to involve the Secretary and

other colleagues in our international legal public diplomacy efforts.

might have heard or read the Secretary's remarks

at the last

Many of you

two Annual Meetings

of the American Society of International Law, the American Bar Association's recent Rule of Law

Symposium
the Washington Foreign Law

in

Washington, DC, or the Diplomatic Reception of

Society at the State Department last year.
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I

have led two delegations to international conferences in Geneva to work to en-

able the Israeli national society, the

Magen David Adorn,

to join the International

Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. In May 2006, 1 led another delegation of senior US government officials to Geneva where we presented our second
periodic report to the

UN Committee Against Torture, and then responded to the

Committee's subsequent report, which contained

mendations to the United

The

its

main

findings

and recom-

States.

Office of the Legal Adviser's leadership of the delegation to the

mittee Against Torture

is

UN Com-

an excellent example of how the Department's lawyers

contribute to the Department's overall communications strategy by effectively
participating in meetings, conferences

and delegations around the world.

We pro-

vided the Committee with an extensive report and thorough answers to the

commitment not only

questions they posed, demonstrating our

many

to fulfilling our

obligations under the Convention Against Torture, but to engaging in a productive

dialogue with the Committee. Moreover, by sending a high-level delegation to

Geneva

to present

our report and engaging in a dialogue with the Committee, we

demonstrated our respect for our obligations under international law and our

commitment

to the Convention's principles.

Conclusion

Our

legal public

diplomacy

efforts

have not gone unnoticed. Following our Con-

vention Against Torture presentation, for example, the Economist newspaper de-

voted an entire

article to describing

the Bush administration."

"some welcome

signs of a change of tone

They commended our delegation

for fielding

from

tough

questions

on

and

our discussion with European colleagues on renditions and other deten-

cited

tion issues.

the treatment of detainees with unusual candor

The Economist was unwilling

and even deference,

to applaud our policies, but they

were

willing at least to say that "public relations are improving."
I

hear time and again from people around the world that they are grateful for

our increased dialogue about
agree in
for

some

critical

cases, the dialogue

is

—even we only agree
People want
know what we stand
—or worse, extremists—

matters of law

essential.

to dis-

if

to

and why. And if we do not tell them, our critics

will tell

them for us. This is why I and my staff will continue to work to communicate effectively

our message to the

rest

of the world so that the international

community

understands our commitment to international law and the rule of law, as well as
the carefully considered legal bases

courage each of the
future lawyers

US

military

and officials

and

rationales underpinning

our actions.

and other government lawyers and

—here

to review your
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too, can play a role in

our public diplomacy dialogue. As the President has

public diplomacy is an important part of each of our jobs.
selves as international

diplomats as

We each need to see our-

we conduct our work.
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CHALLENGES OF
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

XIII
Strategic

Communications and the Decline of

US Soft Power

Gene E.

Bigler*

Abstract

Four strategic communications practices tend to build on one another in contributing to the widely noted

and continuing decline

in

US

soft

power.

First

By neglecting them as we prosecute the
war on terrorism, the war of ideas seems to swell more with critics and combatants
than allies. Second, recent approaches to strategic communications tend to emphasize process and consistency in uniting messages, but the role of the national
executive in achieving convergence maybe more crucial. That is, sending identical
or even reinforcing messages may not be as important as making sure that the mesis

the problem of inattention to audiences.

sages are consistent with audience expectations about

ment of

State

incrementally,

(DoS)

if that,

financing

for

public

US

policy. Third, Depart-

diplomacy has increased only

while the Department of Defense

(DoD) weight

in the total

flow of strategic communications, as in foreign policy generally, seems to have escalated along with

its

budget.

The continuing

deterioration of opinion suggests

mix of communications is not working, and it
advice on the resources needed for public diplomacy.

that the

Finally, the

certainly contradicts expert

growing concern about the militarization of US foreign policy may

reflect the rejection

of the "military as messenger" for the United States, even

if

* Visiting Professor-Practitioner of International Relations, University of the Pacific, Stockton,

California.

Strategic

civilians actually
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make

the policy.

The US affirmation of the preemptive use of

force puts the military at the forefront of US strategic policy, just as the conflicts in

Afghanistan and Iraq have overwhelmed and tended to color the perception about
the rest of our policy. Thus, the increasingly

dominant

role

and resource endow-

ment of DoD in strategic communications might actually worsen the impact on US
soft power. While general flaws in US policy and deficiencies in the work of DoS

may also

contribute to the deterioration of America's international image, recent

experience suggests that
eign policy in general,

DoD dominance of strategic communications, and of for-

may be

increasingly responsible for the deterioration of US

international standing.

Opinions of the United States and American Soft Power
Continue to Decline Together
Notwithstanding the global outpouring of sympathy for the United States follow-

on the World Trade Center and the
downturn in public support for the United

ing the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks

Pentagon,

many

observers noted a

States during

2002 that reflected widespread deterioration

United

The Pew Research Center

States.

cember 2002

for People

that images of the United States

in the publics of

in opinions of the

and the Press reported

in

De-

had become increasingly tarnished

NATO allies, former East European nations, developing nations

Muslim nations and on a variety of dimensions. That report went
on to detail how pluralities had become critical of American unilateralism, but
this did not extend to rejection, except in Muslim nations, of the approach the
United States was taking to the war on terrorism. On the other hand, the report
and

1

especially

was prescient

in recognizing that a potential

war with Iraq might "further

fuel

anti- American sentiment."

As the Pew Center expected, important policy
Iraq, apparently

titudes,

even

actions, such as the invasion of

caused a further deterioration in opinions of the United

among

allied nations,

toward the

terrorism also turned sharply negative, and despite

US approach

States. At-

to the

war on

some break in the trend during

2005, the overall slide in global opinion of the United States continued to worsen

and spread. 2 Of course,
variables

this

is

a heavily

and the particular circumstances of each nation

also characteristic of the factors
ability to attract

and persuade

orientations at a specific

Professor Joseph
is

nuanced phenomenon, and

S.

others.

moment

Nye,

also highly situational.

which are

3

Jr.,

lots

of other

are important. This

is

closely related to soft power, a nation's

Opinions are

really a

snapshot of people's

in time.

and a number of others have shown

that soft

While acknowledging the influence of other
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contribute to anti-Americanism and the decline in soft power, Nye's perspective

concurs with the observation of Australian foreign policy commentator Paul Kelly
that:

war having
failed to win a broader military coalition or UN authorization. This had two
consequences: a rise in anti-American sentiment, lifting terrorist recruitment; and a
higher cost to the US for the war and reconstruction effort. 4
[T]he lesson of Iraq

is

that the US's soft

Americanism and deterioration

power in other

is

in decline.

Bush went

in opinions of the

United States

will influence

our

on human rights
and Germany no lon-

contests as well. For instance, recent research

shows that majorities

in

such

allied nations as

Great Britain

ger see the United States as an effective advocate of human rights. 5

ing into details,

to

power to influence the situation in Iraq, the growing anti-

Besides the loss of soft

soft

power

it is

Without

enter-

not surprising to hear corridor concerns and read blogger

speculation about declining

US

soft

power

eign policy problems as cooperation in

as a contributor to

such differing for-

managing nuclear confrontations with Iran

and North Korea, the improvement of multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Darfur, or even the

This forum

macy,

is

strategic

not the place for a

advancement of America's trade agenda.
exegesis of the

full

way in which

communications and propaganda are intertwined

public diplo-

in wielding soft

power. The broad tendencies of interest here and the degree of consensus about the

them was manifest in the use of a common frame of reference for our conference discussions provided in a timely article by Linda Robinson. 6 In that article, Robinson describes a visit Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld made to the Army War College in March 2003 in which he lumped all
interconnectivity among

these concepts into a broad "war of ideas" in

very poor job: "If I were grading,

how well we're

country as to

world today.

Not
tions

doing a

would say we probably deserve a D or D plus as a

doing in the battle of ideas

that's taking place in the

.

.

some

Rumsfeld has followed up

specific actions to study

and improve the

his expression of constrategic

morass in which America has been entrapped for several

gard, his reaction has

communica-

years. In this re-

been concrete and definitely action oriented because of his

executive authority, but the realizations that
lar to the

is

." 7

surprisingly, Secretary

cern with

I

which he believes America

prompted

his action are

not dissimi-

concerns that motivated the production of over thirty studies and rec-

ommendations within the US government over the last few years to address the
problem of public diplomacy. Nor indeed has DoD been alone in trying to deal
with the issue. In fact, prior to the recent actions in DoD, much of the effort had
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been concentrated

at

DoS through

the appointment of high profile individuals to

take charge of the public diplomacy effort. Prominent advertising executive

Charlotte Beers was appointed under secretary for public diplomacy and public

December 2002. She was followed by former

affairs in

person Margaret Tutwiler, and then

State

Department spokes-

after a two-and-a-half-year vacancy, the presi-

dent called on his campaign and White House communications adviser Karen

Hughes

to take the job

and launch

yet another reform effort in the

fall

of 2005.

some important new initiatives, many of
volume is being published. Despite the good

In 2006, Secretary Rumsfeld proposed

which

will

only get under

intentions of

way as

this

those involved (and in which the author was also personally en-

all

gaged until July 2005), the hypothesis that informs
tegic

communications

the increasing efforts

worsening of the

effort in

the

and new leadership

communications
soft

8

new stra-

by demonstrating

problem centers on the increasing

we

may even be possible

DoD will actually aggra-

is

one of policy. This analysis

that a fundamental part of the pol-

visibility

America's global communications. Indeed,

at

It

power problem. As suggested by

study in 2002, the fundamental problem

America's loss of soft power as

that the

DoS, actually be prelude to further

US image and a greater loss of soft power.

takes that idea a step further
icy

at

and further spread and deepen America's

Pew

is

DoD may, as we have seen to a certain degree with

that the increasing effort in strategic

vate

this analysis

this

and ubiquity of the military

may be

shall see later.

in

increasingly at the root of

9

Audience May Be as Crucial as the Message

As mentioned previously, policy

is

the crucial issue for the deterioration in opin-

ions of America

and American soft power. 10 Yet strategic communications plays an

important

and despite the increasing

States, a

role,

good deal of the

problems

is

effort

may

overall effort put forth

even be counterproductive.

by the United

One

of the key

simply an inattention to audiences or attention to the wrong audi-

ences, especially at the highest levels of government. Implicitly, the

US

Executive

Branch and Congress appear to have decided that they don't care about the opinion of most of the English-speaking world and traditional American
ern Europe. Congress has pushed
drastic reductions of public

sonnel,

and

West-

and the Executive has complied with, the

diplomacy spending, cut back or transferred out per-

curtailed the broadcasting of the Voice of America to countries that

have been traditional friends and
States

for,

allies in

allies.

Not

surprisingly, opinions of the

United

have declined markedly in most of these countries. Expanding private-sector

communications, increasing tourism and trade, and even the popularity of
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American

films

and

TV shows obviously does nothing to stem nor reverse this in-

creasing trend.

The private sector has, however, helped us understand and become more aware
of just how bad the opinion trends are because they have learned, especially from
the once path-breaking work on global public opinion performed by the United
States Information Agency (USIA), that tracking what people think around the
world is important. The Office of Intelligence and Research (INR) in DoS inherited
this tradition, and it continues to do technically respected, policy relevant research,
but not much of it in comparison to yesteryear. 11 Today, there is a lot more publicly
available data in the private sector

American

attitudes

Italian or

toward the United States are changing, so

broad sense of what's happening.

The problem

on how German or

for policy

is

Spanish or Latin

at least

we do have

a

12

that these private studies provide only a tiny

window

on the broad trend in audience opinions. The research needed for the formulation
of a communications strategy is much more complicated and expensive. INR still
does some of this research, but rather than showing the way to the private sector,
the work that INR does now on DoS's global audiences is just a fragment of what is
done

for

most international private- sector marketing campaigns or

elections in

have

far

many

in presidential

countries. Candidates for governor or senator in

more research resources

available for shaping their

most

states

campaigns than do

US

embassies in important posts over a two- or three-year span. Most of the studies

about improving public diplomacy place a

lot

of emphasis on the need for more

public opinion and other types of audience research, but overall funding for research has increased only incrementally over the
available have

been concentrated

much more on

last

few years. The funds that are

the Middle East

priority regions and, even with the increases, the overall effort

tention to audiences in the

and

a few other

and systematic

at-

US government has declined greatly since the Cold War

began to wind down.

The audience problem has also become more complicated because of changing
technology. Without entering into detail, it has to be recognized that speeches delivered by the president and other high administration officials are often intended
more for a domestic audience than overseas publics. However, words intended to
arouse patriotism in the United States often have different,
effects overseas,

if

not always opposite,

but virtually any speech or op-ed piece or other public position

taken by senior American

United States than in and

officials is
is

often disseminated

outside the

readily available for hostile exploitation. For

the Middle East, the "war of ideas" to which

itself.

it

has been wickedly portrayed, as a

In the context of a war
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many in

many US officials have made reference

has been misunderstood, and partly because

confrontation with Islam

more widely

on terrorism

in

which the

Strategic
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support of foreign publics
ric at

home

is

is vital,

where the United

media

Power

more cautious and restrained rheto-

obvious.

Technology complicates the

a

the need for

Soft

States has

issue further, especially in Iraq

and Afghanistan

suddenly opened the doors, not just to freedom, but to

diversity that those people have never before experienced.

Hussein used nearly universal access to

terrestrial

Saddam

TV broadcasts, while repressing

TV, computer/Internet and every other form of media access, to
down and shape the information that people had in his "brave new

radio, satellite

dummy

world." The freedom provided by the United States after the invasion included a

sudden explosion of exposure to information and the
love, as

shown by the meteoric spread

ticipation rates in polls
tricity

and

in the use of satellite

election turnout.

new media

TV and their high par-

Whenever even

could be had, the availability of inexpensive

Arab, Iranian and lots of other

right to opine that the Iraqis

satellite

a

few hours of elec-

dishes also brought

sources. Afghanistan also

opened up

dramatically in comparison with the past, albeit the geographic, economic and

other limitations are

much more

severe than in Iraq so the opening has not been

nearly as pervasive.
Still

most

another dimension, and in the long run in Iraq and Afghanistan perhaps the

serious of the audience problems,

is

that insurgents intermingle with other

groups of people ranging from the actual supporters of enemy combatants to sympathizers with the
flict,

United States. In these nations and those on the margin of every con-

DoS and elements of DoD are separately engaged, have different missions and

separately conduct political

communications operations

dress overlapping populations. This

is

much

less a

in the

same arena and ad-

problem of DoS than

it is

for

DoD and our military units in the field because the nature of the DoS message is, in
fact,

public diplomacy.

The intention

is

goodwill and so on. For military units,

to be persuasive, arouse sympathy, create

much of the time,

the purpose of the unit's

combat or combat support or force protection. All these missions, by
their nature and before there is any communications per se, at least partially convey
a message of potential threat and danger. By early 2004, polls in Iraq consistently
presence

is

showed that most Iraqi people did not want the United States to withdraw forces because of their fear of anarchy, but they also didn't want

them anywhere nearby be-

cause of the danger of those forces being targeted or engaging in combat.

This paper cannot do

more than

raise a serious

concern about the audience

sue in combat zones, but experience in Iraq also suggested that

is-

we may not have

paid as close attention to the importance of not contaminating messages to the

noncombatant population with those actually intended for the enemy. Discussions
with officers involved in information operations in Iraq
especially

when

hostilities

became

first

raised this question,

particularly widespread or prolonged in a given
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area. After

all,

at

both the practical

overriding mission of the

level

armed forces

emy, not win hearts and minds.

is

and conceptually,

in the military literature

the application of force to subdue the en-

all

condition conceptually

is fairly

that operationally the difficulty

a thoughtful article

application of Von Clausewitz's traditional
to distinguish at

this

and suggests

would be much greater. For instance,
fails

combat zone, the

13

Evidence for the difficulty of separating out

common

in a

war theory

by William Darley on the

to information operations

between the mission of compelling an enemy and the

problem of that enemy being in the midst of a population that we seek to make our
friends.

That

is,

in writing

about examples related to Desert Storm where the

United States was and departed as an invading

force,

he

fails

to

mention the

all

per-

become an occupying power trying to befriend the
Iraqi people as we are during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 14 In another far more complex study that centers on information operations during the 2004 combat that
raged in Fallujah, the authors pay more attention, and rightly so, to enemy informa-

vasive distinction of our having

tion operations. 15 Yet, the study lacks as careful attention to the actual

the audience both before
Iraqi

and after the

attack, thus

engagement of

implying that the deterioration of

opinion afterwards was largely due to the success of enemy information opera-

tions.

However, given the predisposition of the Iraqi people toward intensive combat

operations of the sort launched in Fallujah, opinion

may have declined even without

the enemy's apparently successful information operations.

Legal issues in the national security arena raise particularly thorny problems for
strategic

communications because of

their complexity.

consideration centers on the capacity of the audience to

Here the chief audience

comprehend

comparison with the likelihood that a few simplistic images
the perceptions

the issue in

will totally

dominate

and conclusions of the mass public and most other audiences. The

debate over whether adherence to the Geneva Conventions should be included in
the

US

military code of conduct or the treatment of detainees

Certainly lawyers and political leaders

may

is

a perfect example.

perceive ambiguity in the text of the

Geneva Conventions, but what most people understand

is

simply that the Geneva

Conventions have symbolized a globally accepted minimal standard of conduct in

war

for generations.

Getting

On

the

Same Page Counts Less Than Whose Page We Are On

Rear Admiral Thorp initiated

this

panel with an articulate analysis of the impor-

tance of "process" for strategic communications in order to keep

an organization in harmony with respect to "a good policy."
importance of consistency

in policy

all

the elements of

He emphasized

the

and actions and the extraordinary difficulty of
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this in the context

of national security, public diplomacy and inter-

beyond the natural emphasis of his remarks on
developing a "culture of communications" within DoD. In my view that approach
is analogous to the problem of ensuring that all the elements of an organization are

national relations, thereby going

on the same page, and I would agree with that approach for a single, even very complex organization, such as

DoD. However, I think it

interrelatedness required for our national strategic

falls

short of the nature of the

communications and the

rela-

tionship of DoD to the national undertaking. 16

For the strategic communications of the United States to function properly in
advancing our national
actions of at least our

interests, especially in the soft

power

arena, the policy

and

most visible national organizations and disparate actors must

be understood "to converge" on a single purpose. In the myriad reports related to
America's public diplomacy problem, this concern has generally been related to
the need to integrate the public diplomacy effort with the executive leadership for
foreign policy. For instance, in a Defense Science Board report, this

is

described as

"leadership from the top":

A unifying vision
White House

of strategic communication

leadership, with support

starts

with Presidential direction. Only

from cabinet

secretaries

and Congress, can

bring about the sweeping reforms that are required.

and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national
more powerfully than the President's statements and actions, and

Nothing shapes U.S.
security objectives

those of senior

policies

officials.

17

In another excellent analysis and proposal by the Public Diplomacy Council

about what needs to be done, the
the presidency that are needed.
bers one

and four

—

stress

Two

is

more on the institutional connections to

of the

that are advanced focus

five

on

major recommendations

—num-

this concern:

and the National Security
Council process, the U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (USAPD), to manage the
U.S. government's civilian information and exchanges functions and to coordinate
all U.S. government public diplomacy efforts.
1

.

Establish

an agency within the Department of

.

State

.

by Presidential Directive an Interagency Committee on Public
Diplomacy at the Cabinet Level to coordinate and direct the national public
diplomacy strategy, with a permanent secretariat and associated working groups, cochaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor for Communication and the

4.

Establish

Director of the

new USAPD Agency. 18
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The concern here could also be understood as one of process if that involves making sure that the entire US government strategic communications effort converges
on the
and

direction that the president,

its

and through him, the National Security Council

key components provide for the comprehensive enterprise. 19 However, the

American experience since the

start

of the

US effort to respond in earnest to the Sepbroader definition of convergence

tember

1 1

needed.

One of the remarkable consequences of those attacks was the sense of global

terrorist attacks suggests that a

still

is

empathy that they evoked. In an obvious allusion to President Kennedy's quip to the
beleaguered people of Berlin, Paris' Le

were around the world in

its

Monde showed just how

September 12 headline, "we are

all

strong the feelings

Americans!" Yet not

long after the Bush Administration began to prosecute the war on terrorism and to

hunt the perpetrators of the

Although there

may

attacks,

opinion of the United States began to decline.

have been widespread sympathy for the United

also appears that there

were some definite expectations about

how

States,

it

the United

would conduct the war on terrorism that were rapidly frustrated, and that
this type of frustration definitely escalated and spread antipathy. Accordingly, conStates

vergence in strategic communications needs to be concerned with more than simply getting

all

the messages

favorable impact they

on the same page as the president's, but for these to have a

must

those producing them. Thus

and DoS and
these
that

all

DoD

also

be in harmony with people's expectations about

it is

not just that the messages from the White House

need to be consistent with those from the presidency,

as that

need to harmonize with people's expectations about the actions and values

America represents. Convergence, then, speaks to the coincidence between

message and behavior in order to enable

strategic

persuasive capacity or provide the desirable

Many early frustrations
vividly

West

about the

communications

model

US conduct

to achieve the

that creates soft power. 20

of the war on terror came most

and boisterously from Muslim nations and Muslim people

as a result of the

sudden dramatic increase

the negative profile always involved them.
terrorists

suddenly intruded on the

The

lives

living in the

in security operations in

characteristics of the

which

September

1

of tens of thousands of students,

businesspeople, international travelers and immigrants, and, despite the over-

whelming sympathy of most of these people
it

suddenly called into question the sincerity of the

human and

civil rights, as

and ethnic

well as religious

war on terrorism,

for prosecuting the

US commitment

to respect

tolerance.

Gradually, a series of other actions by the United States further contradicted val-

ues that the United States was expected to honor and advance in the world arena.

For instance, the open questioning by senior
the protections under the

US officials about the applicability of

Geneva Conventions long before

about abuses was not expected. After

all,

actual revelations

the United States had already been the
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overwhelming global military power

for the better part of a generation, so if the

Geneva Conventions did not apply to the United
to anyone.

The recent harsh

tional Criminal

Conventions

rejection

States,

then why should they apply

by the Bush Administration of the Interna-

Court (ICC) was quickly linked to the questioning of the Geneva

as a sign that the

having represented

itself as

United States was putting

itself

above the law

after

one of the leading advocates of international law for over

fifty years.

Despite the fact that

it

was under the Clinton Administration

that the United

had opted out of joining both the Kyoto Protocol and the ICC after taking
part in their negotiation, the way the Bush Administration opted to harden the US
States

position

seemed

sudden increase

to represent a

in

US

unilateralism,

and

that in-

creased resentment. Since the United States was viewed as the supreme power of
the era,

it

appeared to be rebuffing

its

global responsibilities

eign perceptions of institutions that provided for the

and undermining

common

good.

Google "truth President Bush" and immediately find harsh, partisan
president that

may not,

21

for-

Anyone can

criticisms of the

however, be recognized as partisan by outside observers. 22

Once the war in Iraq got under way,

this pattern

of perceptions in foreign audi-

ences was repeatedly reaffirmed by events which seemed to constitute prima facie
contradictions of the
terrorism.

Media

engagement

in

US

stories

assertion of lawfulness in the conduct of the

appeared

all

war

against

over the world about ambiguity in rules of

combat and how individual troops interpreted them or

said they

The revelation of the abuses of Abu Ghraib prisoners was just the most sensational of a series of cases in which US troops were
brought up on charges of misconduct and while that perhaps should have been expected, the majority of the Iraqi people reacted with surprise and disappointment
that American troops had proven just as fallible as any others might be. Finally, the
long-running saga of Guantanamo scandals, court reversals of government practices, and the Administration's widely lampooned discussion of alternative procedures and other euphemisms for torture communicated a sense of American
disdain for the protections of the Geneva Conventions. Rather than converging to
demonstrate the consistency of American behavior with the rhetoric we projected,

were taught to interpret them.

23

may have been

whatever consistency there

overwhelmed by contradictions

in

in

our messages was being completely

our performance. 24

When Resources Matter
Nearly

all

the major reports

the allocations available for

on

fixing public

diplomacy

call for

major increases in

DoS and for the functions that used to be performed by

USIA. The Defense Science Board Report
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calls for

the current resources (both

Gene E. Bigler
funding and personnel) of DoS to be tripled, 25 but neglects the subject of additional
resource needs of DoD to support strategic communications almost entirely.

The

recommends a 300-percent increase in personnel and a
program budgets over a five-year period. 26

Public Diplomacy Council
four-fold increase in

Such reports

image around the world to
cess

US voice and the declining public
funding, pointing out how despite the suc-

directly attribute the loss of the
a decline in

during the Cold War there was a subsequent pattern of neglect. 27 Certainly, the

constantly declining overall resource base and the constraint

it

placed on public di-

plomacy activities was a major consideration at every stage of my career experience
in the field. On the other hand, organization, coordination and technique seem to

DoD and the work of its professionals in
the field of strategic communications. And while my personal experience in direct
discussion of strategic communications with DoD and military colleagues was
have been the more important issues for

largely limited to four years of service in Italy during the Balkans conflicts

and on

other theater-wide issues that promoted extensive collaboration and during the
last

few years in Iraq and Washington, DC,

I

don't recall that declining resources

was ever a major concern of theirs.

Of course,

part of the answer for this difference in perspective

able simply to the fact that the

may be

attribut-

DoD budget is dozens of multiples of the size of the

foreign affairs budget, before even counting the costs of Iraq

and Afghanistan. 28 In-

deed, the order of magnitude of the difference in resource availability probably has
a great deal to

do with the reasons

sophomoric mistake could be made

that a

in

DoD to enable the Lincoln Group to pay journalists in Iraq for writing friendly stories,

thereby undermining the credibility of any favorable information that might

appear. 29

And

during the days of the Coalition Provisional Authority

sources were carefully husbanded for public diplomacy operations per

when

se,

re-

a British

production company could be paid millions of dollars out of military funds to run
vague, feel-good-about-democracy advertisements on Iraqi television. 30

The tendency

to confuse strategic

communications with advertising may be

part responsible for the tendency in the

munications
plomacy.

31

relatively lavishly in

Every

advertising can be

member

in

US government to fund DoD strategic com-

comparison with the starvation

of Congress

and vaguely recognizes

understands

that

DoS

how

diet for public di-

expensive

media

does not engage in that activity

because the broadcasting function was handed off to the Broadcasting Board of Governors
to

when USIA was merged into DoS. Moreover,

additional ad hoc funding goes

DoD for direct support of military operations. All this means that strategic com-

munications becomes the umbrella for consideration of resource allocations and

moves all the further from public diplomacy. Yet it also means that the broader concerns of public diplomacy and its practitioners will be harder to integrate into the
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frameworks for orienting and controlling
speaking, this also explains

why there were no

direct chain of command over the "feel

More

strategic

communications. Practically

public diplomacy specialists in the

good" advertising

in Iraq.

on strategic communications is the problem of
whether it is the strategic communications or the public diplomacy effort that actually breeds the soft power. With a few exceptions, I think that this point is often
lost

basic than the focus

because of the failure to understand the fundamental difference between the

way soft power

is

developed and used. Strategic communications tends to be con-

sidered within the context of the achievement of a relatively specific government
objective, while public
in the context of the

admiration.

32

diplomacy includes such communications but places them

broader relationship of societal

trust,

empathy and,

hopefully,

Since a broader objective and a non-specific time frame are also in-

volved in public diplomacy, this makes

it

harder for the government to fund

it

as

part of the traditional annual appropriations process.

Thus, the budgetary process disfavors the needed funding of public diplomacy,

but in doing

so,

it

may

also prejudice strategic

why the Bush Administration

drive

is still

communications, or help explain

not bearing

fruit.

That

is, I

think

it

rea-

some of the more important, straexistence of a somewhat favorable

sonable to hypothesize that many, and certainly
tegic

communications objectives require the

climate of opinion for the messages to be credible and effective. Accordingly, the
neglect for the longer-term public diplomacy effort
strategic

may doom even a very intense

communications campaign.

Undermining the

Credibility of the Military as Messenger

The Bush administration's conduct of the war against terrorism has given rise to an
increasing chorus of concern about the militarization of US foreign policy over the
last

few years. Of course, some of the most articulate voices, such

Johnson's, had begun to raise concerns and link
cially

about American imperialism, and

them

as

Chalmers

to historic arguments, espe-

how the conduct of American

policy had

been associated with antipathy toward America in a given region, especially East
Asia and the Philippines, in response to specific actions, such as the expansion of
the

Vietnam

basic

conflict,

even before the September

argument and expands

terrorism 34 and

it

Andrew Bacevich

1 1

attacks. 33

Johnson pursues

in the light of developments in the

his

war on

provides a broader focus on military history to

develop parallel concerns focused on the Middle East. 35 The problem in Johnson's

view

is

that
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[s] lowly

but surely the Department of Defense

Department of

is

obscuring and displacing the

primary agency for making and administering foreign

State as the

policy. We now station innumerably more uniformed officers than civilian diplomats,

aid workers, or environmental specialists in foreign countries

lands to which they are assigned.

Our

States prefers to deal with other nations

commerce,

negotiations,

US image,

or can even

when

it is

fix.

37

on the

and through

military-to-military, not

36

While the militarization of policy may be responsible
the

a point not lost

through the use or threat of force rather than

or cultural interaction

civilian-to-civilian, relations.

—

garrisons send a daily message that the United

for the deterioration of

not something for which the military bears direct responsibility

The problem

akin to that which each military unit

is

now faces

they enter the field in Iraq. Most Iraqis fear having any contact with or even

being in the vicinity of the

US

military, not because they

have personally had a

bad experience, but because they are aware that Americans are the targets of attacks that are dangerous to anyone near them and that the response to attacks has
led to great

damage

the crux of the

US

in the

surrounding areas, whether intentional or not. Indeed,

problem,

at least for the

war on terrorism, may be

in the strat-

egy that the United States elected for pursuing the war on terrorism. That
the decision to justify the preemptive use of force for defending

is,

in

American

interests.

President Bush's speech at the opening of the United Nations General Assem-

on September

bly

12,

2002, provided the

first

for the use of preemptive military force

public exposition and justification

by the United

States against

Saddam

Hussein's regime in Iraq. That speech unleashed a wave of global controversy

and debate because the US position seemed to hark back to a classical legitimating of war that was supposed to have been superseded by the creation of the
United Nations collective security system. Within a few days, the Congressional
Research Service,

much

better

known

for the quality than the celerity of

its

work, issued a report stating that "the historical record indicates that the United
States has never, to date,

nation."

engaged in a 'preemptive' military attack against another

38

Yet on September

19, 2002, the

preemptive use of military force was incorpo-

US national security strategy and the war on terrorism
and thereby set the stage for the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Despite
the initial military success in Iraq, the reaction of much of the international comrated as a cornerstone of the

munity continued
States
ist

to

worsen and harden despite any

by the United

about the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction or links to terror-

organizations that had attacked the United States.

the

justification

US

Not only were

the ethics of

position questioned, but the gradual debunking of every rationale for the
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attack except the spread of
trine.

39

democracy further weakened the preemptive doc-

According to foreign policy analyst Julia Sweig, the US loss of global respect

was due to the imposition of US hegemony on the world community in the way
that it had long exercised power in Latin America.
had been one thing for the global powers that once held a stake in the region to yield
grudgingly to U.S. hegemony with the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. But it was quite another for the United States to subject the entire
world community including former and aspiring world powers to the fast-andloose approach to diplomacy, military intervention, sovereignly, and international law
that had long been the U.S. currency in America's regional sphere of influence. 40
It

—

—

Other commentators have emphasized graver problems than the unilateralism and
arrogance represented by the

US

action. Stanley

eral international analysts link the

preemptive

of a sense of international order and
rity strategy

define

its

chaos."

41

preemptive

More

how

notes

by Henry Kissinger

cites a

Hoffman comments on how sev-

strike doctrine to the deterioration

commentary on

the

US

national secu-

to that effect: "if each nation claims that right to

rights, the

absence of any rules could

to the point for this analysis, British

the negative impact of the loss of

US

spell international

commentator David Mepham

credibility directly

undermines

public trust in the United States and actually increases the sense of insecurity in the
global

community that

the United States

is

supposedly making

safer.

42

Conclusion

The discussion of the

first

cussed in this analysis was

three areas of strategic communications practices dis-

made

in the spirit of offering experience-based sugges-

tions for improving foreign opinions of the United States

achievement of policy objectives. For instance, a more

and supporting

explicit focus

better

on the nature

of the understanding that an audience brings to an issue should provide the frame-

work

for shaping of messages for

it,

especially given the complexity of legal issues

and lawyerly discourse. However, the observation
building
actually

that these practices tend to be

upon one another is intended to suggest how limited
be for improvement in any area to make a difference

trend overall. That
tions effort in

is,

the prospects
for the soft

may

power

simply transferring resources from the strategic communica-

DoD to the public diplomacy work of DoS probably won't begin to

reverse the negative trend.

The

crucial consideration

now probably relates

to the

way the world has come to consider the exercise of power by the United States. Until we show that we are less inclined to rely on the use of our military or the use of
preemptive military force in the face of strategic frustrations, the improvement in
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our

strategic

power or

to

communications

craft will

improve our long-term

not actually serve to increase

advance our

ability to

US

soft

interests.

Notes
What

1.

the

Center for People

World Thinks in 2002, PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT (The Pew Research
& the Press, Washington, DC), Dec. 4, 2002, http://people-press.org/reports/

pdf/165.pdf.

America's Image Slips, But Allies Share

2.

US Concerns About Iran, Hamas, PEW GLOBAL AT-

TITUDES PROJECT (The Pew Research Center for People

& the Press, Washington, DC), June

13,

2006, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252.
Since developing the concept of soft power in 1990, Professor

3.

number

of works. The most comprehensive

Success in

World Politics

is

JOSEPH

S.

Nye has returned

NYE, SOFT POWER: THE

to

it

in a

MEANS TO

(2004).

THE AUSTRALIAN (Sydney), July 26, 2003, at 1, cited in id. at 127.
Europe and India See US as Violating International Law at Guantanamo,

4.

Paul Kelly, Power Pact,

5.

Publics in

WORLD PUBLIC 0PINI0N.ORG, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/
btjusticehuman_rightsra/229.php?nid=&id=8cpnt=229.
6.

Linda Robinson, The Propaganda War, U.S.

7.

Id.

What

NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 29, 2006, at 29.

World Thinks in 2002, supra note 1.
9. This conclusion has been partially influenced by the growing literature on the
militarization of America's foreign policy, but it has also been developed empirically. It was originally inspired by observations and experience as the counselor for public opinion and polling
for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad during 2004. That prompted the inquiry and
findings reported here. The results of these polls have not been widely disseminated, but a few
well known public accounts are available, such as Robin Wright, Iraqis Back New Leaders, Poll
Says, WASHINGTON POST, June 25, 2004, at A19 and John Solomon, Poll of Iraqis Reveals Anger
Toward U.S., ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 15, 2004, available at http://www.commondreams.org/
8.

the

headlines04/06 15-08.htm. Militarization will be discussed further below.

Leon Hadar

10.

ridicules the idea of using

marketing and communications gurus and ap-

proaches to address such a fundamental issue as the loss of American credibility, and perhaps the
greatest

wash.

anti-Americanism yet experienced, with the quip: "You can't

It's

the policy, stupid." See Leon Hadar, Innocent Abroad,

19, 2005, available at
1 1

sell

a soap that doesn't

AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, Dec.

http://www.amconmag.com/2005/2005_12_19/article2.html.

The author was on the

staff of USIA's Office

of Research from

1

984-88.

My work as the

counselor for public opinion and polling for the Coalition Provisional Authority during 2004

was

closely coordinated with the current Office of Research in

INR.

been cited {supra notes 1 & 2), but there are
from organizations that mainly provide access to polling data
from others, such as http://www.angus-reid.com, to organizations that do their own research,
e.g., http://www.latinobarometro.org, to those that combine these functions and a lot more, e.g.,
12.

many

Pew Research Center

studies have already

excellent sources ranging

http://worldpublicopinion.org.

The report of the Defense Science Board makes this point more generally with respect to
the special problem of the terrorism frame of communications that marginalizes other significant issues and obscures the difference between tactical and strategic considerations. See Office of
13.

the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science

231

Strategic

Board Task Force on

Communications and the Decline of US
Strategic

Communication

Soft

Power

17 (2004), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/

dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf.
14. William M. Darley, Clausewitzs Theory of War and Information Operations, 40 JOINT
Force Quarterly 74 (2006).
15. The most important reference to noncombatants was to the successful effort made to get
them to leave the city. Thomas F. Metz et al., Massing Effects in the Information Domain: A Case
Study in Aggressive Information Operations, MILITARY REVIEW, May-June 2006, at 26, available

at http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/july_2006/7_06_2.html.
16.

The emphasis here

is

on DoD, but DoS does not

differ in

emphasizing unity of message.

For instance, Luanne Traud highlights the emphasis Karen Hughes placed on the creation of a

new rapid response unit to get the US government on the same page. See Luanne Traud,
Course; Speak on Message,

ROANOKE

May

TIMES,

17,

Stay the

2006, at B9, available at http://

uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/johnbrown_detail/060519_pdpr/.
17.

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, supra

note 13,
18.

at 3.

Public Diplomacy Council,

a Call for Action on

Public Diplomacy 3-4

(2005), available at http://pdi.gwu.edU/merlin-cgi/p/downloadFile/d/7536/n/off/other/l/name/

ACALLFORACTIONONPUBLICDIPLOMACYO -2005prin/.
19. A significant step in this direction was taken in 2005 with the establishment of the Policy
1

Coordination Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications and the position
of deputy national security advisor for strategic communications and global outreach as part of
the reorganization of the National Security Council. Karen

of the creation by

DoS

Hughes emphasizes the importance

of a rapid response unit as a measure that

"literally gets the U.S.

govern-

ment on the same page." See Traud, supra note 16. Yet the argument here is that even getting the
entire US government on message is still not the crucial consideration.
20. Intellectual discourse about public diplomacy has grown rapidly in recent years and is
from outside the United States. Jan Melissen has been
one of the more significant international contributors. Although his focus tends to be more on
actions centered in the foreign ministry, the concept of "societization" of public diplomacy that
he has advanced is similar to the idea of convergence mentioned here. While Melissen also
stresses the increasing significance of two-way communications in the field, he does not include
the two-way perspective within the concept of "societization." See Jan Melissen, Reflections on
Public Diplomacy Today, Remarks Before the Conference on Public Diplomacy (Feb. 6, 2006),
benefiting

from

significant contributions

available at http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vpO 1 .cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=7&paper=2655.
21.

Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy

15 (David

M. Malone

& Yuen

Foong

eds.,

2003).
22.

This

is

consistent with the underlying

subject of the brilliant analysis in

problem of fragmentation of political

culture, the

Donna Oglesby's paper, A Pox on Both Our Houses, delivered at

on International Communication and
2005. Oglesby suggests that the problem is still more profound because of

the American Political Science Association Conference
Conflict

on August 3 1

,

the fragmentation of political culture.
23.

See, e.g.,

Rod Nordland & Babak Dehghanisheh, Rides of Engagement, NEWSWEEK, Nov.

29, 2004, at 24, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6542346/site/newsweek/.
24.

This discussion has concentrated on legal issues and

of strategic communications. Within Iraq

itself,

is

concerned with the global context

the discord, rather than convergence, between

communications and perceptions was much less concerned with legal matters. Polls in 2003-04
repeatedly demonstrated that the failure of the United States to deliver the promised benefits of

232

Gene E. Bigler
improved peace and security and quality of life, including availability of electricity, jobs and so
on, was strongly related to the steady increase in negative attitudes toward the United States.
25. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, supra
note 13, at
26.

27.

8.

A CALL FOR ACTION, supra note 18, at 3.
Stephen Johnson & Helle Dale, How to Reinvigorate

TAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, No.

U.S. Public

Diplomacy 2-6, HERI-

1645, Apr. 23, 2003, available at http://www.heritage

.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bgl645.cfm.

DoS may have been the original source of its own funding disadvantage in the foreign
policy arena when it joined with the still fledgling DoD to endorse the call for a dramatic buildup
28.

of military forces in the famous National Security Council Report No. 68, United States Objectives

and Programs

for National Security, Apr. 14, 1950, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/

offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm. Describing the resource imbalance that had been developed thirty

Department of State you have the glory of the office,
and to appear at international meetings. But you don't have the clout.
The Secretary of Defense spends money while the Secretary of State begs for money." Quoted in
DAVID ROTHKOPF, RUNNING THE WORLD: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
Council and the Architects of American Power 181 (2005). Of course, as the merger of
USIA into DoS was undertaken during the 1990s, the overall post-Cold War decline in funding
for public diplomacy first accelerated and then kept deteriorating until at least 2004, despite the
statutory safeguards for Fulbright exchanges and a few favored programs, the appointment of
politically prominent under secretaries, and the many studies that called for more funding.
29. A DoD inquiry led by Rear Admiral Scott Van Buskirk concluded that propaganda efforts, including the paying of reporters, could damage US credibility and should be stopped. Dayears later, Zbigniew Brzezinski said: "In the
to fly around in a big plane

vid

S.

Cloud, U.S. Urged

available

at

to

NEW YORK TIMES, May 23, 2006, at A19,

Stop Paying Iraqi Reporters,

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/24/world/middleeast/24propaganda.html?ex

= 1306123200&en=87f776e901aal26a&ei=5088&partner=r. Of course, military public affairs
manuals have always taught this, and the many competent, hard-working military public affairs
officers at the field grade level and above that I have known have been well aware of this precept.
Accordingly, I am left with the impression that there was inadequate military supervision of the
activity or such an abundance of resources that the decision may have been made at a lower level.
30. One commercial upon which much hope was based showed Iraqi youth of apparently
different backgrounds joyfully playing soccer together as an apparent metaphor for the task of
national unification. Unfortunately, the use of the spot had to be curtailed abruptly when news
got out that it had been produced in a neighboring country with local children, presumably because security conditions in Iraq prevented filming
31.

it

there with Iraqi children.

In a survey of embassy public affairs officers in 2003, half reported to the

ment Accountability Office (GAO)
macy activities. See Jess T. Ford,

US Govern-

that they lacked sufficient officers to carry out public diploState

Department

Elements and Face Persistent Challenges (May

3,

Efforts

Lack Certain Communications

2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/

GAO, was testiSubcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce,
and Related Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations.
32. For instance, Professor Nye argues that one of the most successful of all soft power episodes was the Cold War exchange program that brought Alexander Yakovlev to the United States
in 1958 and exposed him to the pluralist ideas that later influenced the development oiglasnost
and perestroika. This, and most of the other classic episodes of public diplomacy described nicely

new.items/d06707t.pdf. Mr. Ford, the Director, International Affairs and Trade,
fying before the

233

.

Strategic

Communications and the Decline of US Soft Power

on http://www.softpowerbeacon.blogspot.com by Mark Safranski, emphasize the long-term
framework in which successful public diplomacy takes place.
33. Chalmers Johnson's book, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN
EMPIRE (2000), focuses specifically on the unexpected consequences of America's overseas military presence and actions. Stuart C. Miller's work, BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION: THE CONQUEST
OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1899-1903 (1982), is more limited in scope. Both analyses are rooted in a
concern for overseas expansion through military action that harks back to Charles Beard, WilAppelman Williams, Richard Van Allstyne and others.

liam

34.

Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End

of the Republic
35.

Andrew

duced by War

(2004).

Bacevich, The

New American

Militarism:

How

Americans Are

Se-

(2005).

ian

JOHNSON, supra note 34, at 5.
Further evidence for Bush Administration preference in the use of the military over civilresources in the conduct of foreign policy came out just as this paper was being completed.

See

Mark

36.
37.

Mazzetti, Military Role in U.S. Embassies Creates Strains, Report Says,

TIMES, Dec. 20, 2006,

at

NEW YORK

A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/20/washington/

20embassy.html?ex=1324270800&en=e8eb89f0fecldf44&:ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&:emc=rss.
Mazzetti reported that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff had just completed a report

showing that "the expansion of the Pentagon's presence in American embassies is creating frictions and overlapping missions that could undermine efforts to combat Islamic radicalism." Id.
38. See Richard F. Grimmett, U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force, Congressional Research
Service (Sep. 18, 2002), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/13841.pdf.
39.

The Carnegie Council organized

a high-level debate

on the question of evaluating the

preemptive use of force that was the subject of an entire issue of volume

ETHICS

AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Howard

4,

2004, at

of their journal

On the deepening of the controversy,

1,

see

MONI-

available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0204-03.htm.

Julia E. Sweig, Friendly Fire: Losing Friends

American Century
41

1

LaFranchi, Bush's 'Preventive War' Doctrine Under Seige, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE

TOR, Feb.
40.

(Spring 2003).

17, no.

and Making Enemies

in

the Anti-

53 (2006).

Stanley Hoffman, The Foreign Policy the U.S. Needs,

THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
Hoffman quotes Henry
TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES, Apr.

(Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19217.
Kissinger's statement in American strategy and pre-emptive war,
13,

2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/13/opinion/edkiss.php.
42.

LaFranchi, supra note 39, quotes the associate director of the London-based Institute for

on by going to war in Iraq on
and made the world more inse-

Public Policy Research as saying: "The lack of credibility brought
the basis of inaccurate intelligence has

undermined public

cure."

234

trust

—

XIV
Strategic

Communications and

the Battle of Ideas

Mari K. Eder*
[I]

have been commenting on the challenges our country

ernment— but our country

not just our gov-

new media age. And
while the enemy is increasingly skillful at manipulating the media and using the
tools of communications to their advantage, it should be noted that we have an
advantage as well: and that is, quite simply, that truth is on our side and ultimately

.

.

.

war

in this

truth wins out.

/ believe with every
tion, will,

faces in fighting a

bone

my body that free people,

in

over time, find their

way

exposed

to sufficient

informa-

to right decisions.

Donald Rumsfeld

This quote and other

comments in

1

months have served to reignite
the public debate about strategic communications, propaganda and how
our government communicates, at home and to the world.
A great deal of that frustration centers on the existing capability of current public affairs

like

communications structures

communications." This situation

is

recent

to deliver the nebulous benefits of "strategic

not unique to the Department of State, the De-

partment of Defense (DoD), the Army and the other military Services or elsewhere
in the executive

branch of government. Yet

as

our government works on trans-

forming to meet the requirements of a new age, the question of how to transform

and

strategically

develop communications

Brigadier General,

US Army.

is

one of great concern.

Communications and the Battle of Ideas

Strategic

At issue

the concern that America does not

is

world. Oftentimes there
sages" or

fails

to clearly

communicate clearly with the
the US government sends "mixed mescommunicate policy. While this has the

concern that

is

and consistently

potential to frustrate allies

and confuse both potential

conveys weakness in the national

will to

friends

and enemies,

also

it

any nation seeking to understand the

tent of the United States with regard to international relations.

in-

The recent Supreme

2

Court ruling on tribunals is a case in point. Did the Court's ruling that military tribunals are

illegal

convey a

strategic or

mixed

political

message to international

audiences?

A review of international news in the days following the ruling reveals reactions
ranging from appreciation of the American democratic process to cautious opti-

mism or even outright skepticism. BBC News from London bluntly termed the ruling a "Stunning rebuff to President Bush,"
a similar

and the French press generally followed

theme of "Supreme Court Disavows Bush." German national radio hailed

the ruling as a "Victory for the Rule of Law." Civilian news media from Spain
Italy to

and

Pakistan and China agreed, while in Sweden editorial writer Henrik

Bredberg, in the liberal South Sweden newspaper Sydsvenskan,

commented "Now

power has put a check on the executive power. Thanks for that." 3
The Arab press reaction was more skeptical. In London's Al-Hayat Arabic news-

the judicial

paper, columnist Jihad al-Khazin

commented,

was reported by all American and international
media outlets and continues to draw reactions until this very day, but none of it is true,
or, if we wish to be accurate, will never see the light of day, because on the same day that
the Bush Administration declared its commitment to the Supreme Court's ruling, the
Senate Judiciary Committee was holding hearings on the treatment of accused

This was

all

terrorists.

In
fairs

great news, so great that

it

4

March 2006, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public
Karen Hughes gave a speech on transformational public diplomacy at

Baker Institute for Public Policy. In her remarks she talked about

which transformation
does business. She

is

first

six

Afthe

key areas in

fundamentally changing the way the State Department

discussed

how funding is

increasing for programs that are

working. In particular, she mentioned international exchange programs, a direct

form of community outreach,

come

here see America,

home with

a different

Hughes went on

albeit

make up

on

their

and much more

a global scale.

own minds about

She noted, "People

who

us and almost always go

positive view of our country." 5

to discuss the State Department's

emerging strategy concern-

ing public communications. While acknowledging the rapidity of global
nications, she touted the Department's
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commu-

—not

new Rapid Response Center

a

.
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new

completely

concept, but a hybrid based

partment of Defense public

affairs

on the

successful

model used by De-

during the kinetic phases of the recent wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq. The Center monitors daily communications worldwide and
provides a

summary to

diplomatic outposts, along with America's message in re-

sponse. This information enables American government representatives to be

more effective advocates

for

US policy. Additionally,

hubs to position spokesmen in key media centers
greater presence

and

reach.

service officers greater

Hughes has

the establishment of regional

Dubai

like

will

likewise given ambassadors

freedom to reach out, both

directly

ensure even

and foreign

and through the

civilian

news media.
Finally,

Hughes

said the State

Department

public diplomacy to shape policy.

always shaped programs to
"

[The President has]

From

make

..

.

then

make

placing greater emphasis

travels,

on using

she learned that America hasn't

their benefits clear to average people.

She

said,

now instructed us to look at ways to make our programs more

effective, to set clearer goals, focus

tor

her

is

our programs and partner with the private sec-

we communicate what we

sure

the intersection of public diplomacy

and

policy."

are doing

—

a perfect

example of

6

Defense Communications Strategy
In his recent speech to the Council

on Foreign

Relations, Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld commented on the Defense Department's view of the way
ahead:

[Gjovernment public affairs and public diplomacy efforts must reorient staffing,
schedules and culture to engage the full range of media that are having such an impact
today.

Our

Command,

for example, has launched an online communications
news updates and a links campaign, that has resulted in
hundred blogs receiving and publishing Centcom content.

U.S. Central

effort that includes electronic

several

The

U.S.

government will have to develop the institutional capability to anticipate and
same news cycle. That will require instituting 24-hour press operation
elevating Internet operations and other channels of communications to the

act within the

centers,

equal status of traditional 20th century press relations.
reliance

It

will result in

much

on the traditional print press, just as the publics of the U.S. and the world
on newspapers as their principal source of information.

less

are

relying less

And

it

will require attracting

government

service.

.

more

experts in these areas

.
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We need to consider the possibility of new organizations and programs that can serve a
similarly valuable role in the

guidebook

new

...

no roadmap

challenges.

war on

... to tell

terror in this

new

our hard working

century.

folks

what

to

.

.

do

.

no
meet these

There's

to

7

DoD efforts to focus on the need to improve public affairs were brought to the
"Tank brief

forefront in 2004 during a

public

affairs.

That session was held

the frustration of

been

ill

Ernest

J.

as the result of a continuing debate centering

commanders with

defined, but

little

to the Service chiefs of staff on the subject of

a

understood.

communications process that had not only

It is

King, Chief of Naval Operations,

early days of WWII, "I don't

on

reminiscent of the

comment by Admiral

who reportedly said the following in the

know what the hell this 'logistics' is that Marshall [Army

Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall]

is

always talking about, but

I

want some

Many felt the same about strategic communications although few knew what
it was or how it should work. To this day, strategic communications remains potenof it!"

tially

8

the

most misused and misunderstood term

Following that session,
capability

and

in the military lexicon.

DoD began to move to grow a strategic communications

structure, supported

by the findings of the Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR). Recognizing the importance of applying strategy to communication, the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Joint

(DASD(JC))was created

DoD-wide

in

December 2005. This

processes, policy, doctrine, organization

communication supporting
affairs,

capabilities of the

was established

to

"Shape

and training of the primary

Department. These include public

defense support for public diplomacy, visual information, and information

operations including psychological operations." 9
lished for the creation of this position state that

communicate

bility to

represents the

advocate

first

it

The terms of
exists to

reference estab-

maximize DoD's capa-

an aggressive and synchronized manner.

in

It

clearly

formal recognition of the need for a military communication

at the highest level.

One of the primary tasks of the DASD(JC)
mation

billet

Communication)

is

to drive

communications transfor-

DoD and to implement decisions from the 2006 QDR to improve all asstrategic communications. A working roadmap is being developed to

in

pects of

provide strategic direction, objectives, milestones and metrics for success. Just as
importantly, the

communications

roadmap

program and budget implications of strategic
There are three overarching objectives the roadmap

identifies

initiatives.

10

seeks to achieve:

1

.

To define roles and develop

Strategic

Communications doctrine

communication supporting capabilities: public affairs,
military diplomacy and defense support to public diplomacy.

for the

primary

information operations,
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Resource, organize, train and equip the DoD's primary communication support

2.

capabilities.

Institutionalize

3.

DoD

a

process

which

in

Communication

Strategic

is

incorporated in the development of strategic policy, planning and execution.

There has never been a validated joint requirement for public

quirement had been established for a public

affairs capability to

combined/expeditionary operations. The consequences of

groundwork

for failure in

communicating operations

on the

media

What commanders

global

stage.

detailed fashion so the Services were

own

doctrine; thus there should be

mands

left

no

this

affairs.

No

support joint/

omission

set the

and

that developed rapidly

expect/want

is

re-

not described in any

to estimate requirements through their

surprise that capabilities did not

match de-

or expectations.

Along with the establishment of the position of the DASD(JC),
to formally assign responsibility for

DoD took steps

communication proponency,

joint structure to provide a rapidly deployable

to establish a

communications capability and to

build a capacity to develop both communications doctrine and materiel. These
capabilities

were embedded

Command-based

in the mission set

Joint Public Affairs

and function of the

Joint Forces

Support Element (JPASE).

The evolving JPASE organization exists to support the integration of communications into warfighter training, to develop operational public communications
programs and policies to support the warfighter and to provide the combatant

commander with

a rapidly deployable military public affairs capability at the begin-

ning of an operation,
potential to be

most

when public communications

much

of the existing public

communications

most

critical

and have the

effective.

In the past several years,
ability

are

Army has centered on the inserve the Army with a strategic

discussion in the

affairs structure to

capability. In fact, the function

had not been empowered and has

been barely resourced to succeed. Despite repeated recommendations from studies
such as the McCormick Foundation's report America

s

Team; The Odd Couple

Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military

11

following the Gulf

War, the Army did not

prioritize the public affairs resources necessary for

serve as the information

combat force multiplier it can

Richard Halloran explained

it

The most important element
[public affairs officer]

open

attitude

his job.

is

this

way more than

in the relationship

—and should

PAO

PAO's commander. A commander with an
and enables the PAO to do
palace guard will get it, and with it, most likely, a
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to

be. Journalist

between a journalist and a

that tone to his subordinates

A commander who wants a

it

fifteen years ago:

the policy of the

communicates

—A
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bundle of bad press clippings.
reach go wrong, and they

from above,

just as

.

will,

.

.

Equally important,

the

when

commander must

he would protect another

staff officer.

beyond the PAO's

things

protect

him

against the wrath

12

The Army public affairs field not only failed to improve in the years following
the first Gulf War, its stature even declined. How did this happen to a career field
that seemed to be advancing well, as recently as a few years ago? It happened sur-

—of Army

prisingly in plain view

ences the

Army serves.

It

and the audi-

leaders, public affairs practitioners

happened despite a plethora of studies on the

"military-

media relationship," although nearly all of these deal with the relationship between
military leaders

and the media. Very few ever address the actual communications

business of public affairs or the public affairs professionals
ships

on both

who

facilitate relation-

sides of issues.

The balance may have changed as the role of Information Operations began to
rise and gain influence and recognition, at the expense of the less- well-funded and
operationally regarded public affairs organization. This occurred concurrently

with the advent of the term strategic communications and
appeal and stature.
erations

and

It

subsequent growth in

seems that one reason for the appeal of both information op-

strategic

communications

its

communications

that use of the

lies in

the inherent nature of the one-way

term invokes.

Many

senior

Army

operators, as

they have historically, don't trust the press and by association, similarly distrust
their press officers.

And while some believe Information Operations, by its very na-

ture, doesn't necessarily require or involve interaction

with public

affairs

or the

media,

it is

absolutely essential that public affairs professionals have complete ac-

cess to,

and

situational awareness of,

information environment.

communication
Even

as the

It

any communication interaction

in the global

most seemingly

insignificant

can be,

after

all,

the

that can have international or strategic consequences.

QDR addressed the need to implement a culture of strategic com-

munications within the Department of Defense via the Strategic Communications
Execution Roadmap, the Services were beginning to

move forward

of a concept that has been broadly but poorly defined, and often
In the

Army, the concept of developing

initiated in

a strategic

sense

understood.

communications process was

Army Staff.

While the team's charter required linking communications
priority programs,

level that

little

make

2004 with the establishment of a Strategic Communications team

within the Office of the Director of the

and

to

it

to

Army

strategy

has taken nearly two years for the effort to mature to a

can best be described as "walk" in the "crawl, walk, run" paradigm. Since

then, the responsibility for

all

Army strategic communications planning was trans-

ferred to the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, along with the attendant staffing
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and funding

for contract support.

Army, the new staff is tasked

tions across the
ter;

Using an enterprise approach to communica-

develop relationships with Headquarters

to understand

and define

strategists, subject

their char-

matter experts and

other communicators; and create the structure, processes, culture and image to

communicate the Army's story. Through the Strategic Communications Coordination Group they moved to develop plans and associated products, such as the
Army Communications Guide, furthering understanding of significant Army
themes and messages, campaigns and events by a variety of audiences.
Today, there

is

growing senior

staff-level

support for the application of strategy to

communications and acceptance of collaborative planning processes
jor

in crafting

ma-

communications campaigns. This initial framework for public affairs is serving as

a sense-making device, a construct that allows us to

make

sense of a

new idea.

The progress to date cannot be described as grand strategy on the national level,
or even DoD-level application of strategic communications. The impact of strategic communications planning and processes at the Department of the Army is that
strategic communications has become well-nested in the Army's strategy for transformation and solidly linked to the National Military Strategy (Addendum, Figure
1). This is significant. By beginning the hard, detailed, day-to-day work of establishing coordination and development/design processes for communications
planning first at the Headquarters, and in the next year, throughout the Army's
subordinate commands, the Army has taken the initial difficult steps of building an
understanding of what strategic communications is and how strategic communications planning can work.

These

efforts

have already paid dividends in linking communications to the

Army's long-term programs and processes

in supporting transformation

(Adden-

dum, Figure 2). As national concepts of strategic communications planning mature
and the Department of Defense implementation of strategic communications processes evolve, the

Army's

and complement those

efforts to date will

ensure the

Army is

ready to support

efforts.

Former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Larry DiRita said the headache of transformation is worth it: "The old-fashioned idea that you develop the
policy

and then pitch

it

tinually thinking about

opment

process."

13

over the transom to the communicator

is

over. You're con-

communication throughout the course of the policy devel-

This

is

the baseline for,

and well-codified

in,

the recent

QDR.

The Public Affairs Officer
At the unified commands, public

affairs capabilities

ished through restrictions in force

and grade
241

had been

structure.

A

historically

dimin-

colonel/captain-level
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(PAO) serving on the Unified Commander's staff absolutely
cannot compete on a level playing field with the two-star J-3s and J-4s for the Commander's time and attention. The senior communicator on a four-star combatant
commander's staff must be, at a minimum, a one-star flag officer. Otherwise, the
message is that the communications function is significantly less important than
the other command and staff functions.
An effort to remedy this situation through a proposal for brevet promotions did
public affairs officer

not advance this past year

at

DoD, but shows promise

dations supporting this change

first

for the future.

surfaced over fifteen years ago and, while the

recommendations have great merit, they have languished

ronment

as being "just too

Recommen-

in a zero-growth envi-

hard" to accomplish.

Freedom Forum First Amendment Center's report, America s Team;
The Odd Couple, focused on the relationship between the media and the military.
The study was extensive and the recommendations detailed and exacting. The report recognized the need for strategic public affairs leadership at the unified comIn 1995 the

mands,

stating, "In

major

and the Chairman of the

conflicts

such

as Desert

Storm, the Secretary of Defense

Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider assigning an officer

of flag or general rank in the combat theater to coordinate the news media aspects
of the operation under the

commander of U.S.

military forces." 14

Command in the early days of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. As operations in the Central Command theater began to generate operaThis did occur at

tional velocity

on the

US

Central

international stage,

it

became apparent the public

onel did not have the staff muscle to serve the

Admiral Craig Quigley, a career public

command at that required level. Rear

affairs officer,

was detailed from the Office

of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs to Central
Director of Public Affairs.

affairs col-

Command to

serve as the

Upon his retirement, Jim Wilkinson, a White House ap-

pointee with general officer-commensurate rank, was assigned to take his place.

When

Wilkinson

left at

the conclusion of major

ground combat operations, US

Command looked for a civilian of his stature, experience and connections
take his place. That search was unsuccessful and the Central Command public

Central
to

affairs

effort slowly

began to revert back to

its

pre-war configuration and

capability.

By the summer of 2004, US Central Command's public affairs staff complexion
had changed drastically from what it was at the height of the conflict. From a staff
of 70, headed by a general officer or civilian equivalent, to a staff of barely ten, the
office remained functional despite the split operations between Tampa, Florida
and Doha in Qatar. Obviously, such a limited staff was unable to deal with the
tempo of communications requirements, either with American or international
audiences, that had increased since the end of the conflict. This was not due to a
242
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on the part of the staff, but was a direct result of the immense
nature of the continuing demands of the global information environment.
Information Operations began to expand to fill that void, although later the
overlap in mission sets was largely resolved with an expanded staff in the public affairs office. That office generated a strategic communications approach to reaching
American, allied and Iraqi audiences and initiated an aggressive communications
lack of proficiency

outreach focus.

The Army's position is that all general officers are both senior leaders and senior
communicators. The Army focuses on the need to broaden the baseline communications skills of all Army officers and make them all communicators. Those who
choose the Public Affairs Functional Area career path must understand this reality.
Following DoD's lead, Army public affairs proponency is likewise reviewing the career paths, training and education for all its public affairs officers. For example, advanced degree opportunities are much broader, including such disciplines as mass
communications,

strategic

communications, diplomacy, international relations or

even public administration. The

Army recognizes its communications profession-

need to be more broadly capable, culturally aware and able to operate

als

tile,

in vola-

uncertain and stressful information environments.

The PAO is grounded in the operational Army through a base career as a soldier
and a leader, commander and staff officer. Once entering the communications
career field, this pentathlete can provide a broad range of communications capabilities to a commander. The PAO typically manages a portfolio that spans the full
spectrum of information delivery, from internal product development, to staff
participation in the military decision-making process, to outreach innovation, legislative liaison, crisis

communications, speech/testimony writing and communica-

tions operations, as well as strategic

Army public
ons, translators

communications planning.

affairs officers are already leaders,

spokesmen and Army champi-

and advocates. They are

communications planners and

strategic

independent thinkers and decision makers. Future plans are to broaden their experience base to ensure that

PAOs are agile, flexible, culturally aware, sophisticated in

emerging communications technologies and savvy in dealing with
Additionally, the notion of "broadening" career experiences for

expanding through the

Joint,

an

officer

with

this

broad skill

all

types of media.

Army officers is

Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational

(JIIM) opportunities program. There are a
for

all

set to

number of other natural

opportunities

pursue: recruiting/marketing, legislative

li-

aison, strategist, scholar or interagency fellow.

Of late, both
tional

the

backgrounds

Army and

the Air Force have placed individuals with opera-

in the position of chief of Service

Bacon, a former reporter

communications. Kenneth

who became Pentagon spokesman
243
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commented on

Navy and the
Marines have been the most successful at public affairs," he said. In the Navy in
particular, he added, "They get these guys as young lieutenants, they work their
way up through the system, and they know one of them is going to end up as Chief
of Naval Information [the top Navy spokesman] ." 16 This is not true in the Army or
administration, has

"By

this recent trend.

far,

the

15

the Air Force.

House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Rear Admiral Frank Thorp
agreed. "The Navy ... is the only military service to consistently promote Public AfIn his recent testimony before the

And now, "Only one

professionals to flag rank," he stated.

fairs

of the four services

communication efforts are led by a career-qualified communication professional." 17
So while the

officers

Bacon said,

now

heading Air Force public

affairs

have made "a good

you need to make it
a productive career path: Build a strong cadre of young officers and promote them
up the chain until one of them becomes the top person in public affairs." 18 The adstart,"

"if you really want to

improve public

affairs,

vent of broad-based strategic communications processes and the pentathlete con-

makes

cept for officer career development certainly

Army's public

this

outcome

possible for the

affairs career professionals.

Vision

The emergence of

strategic

communications

as a

concept around which

we can

build solid, meaningful and timely national communication of policy is logical and
ripe for development.

from the

and

seat of

in collaboration

communications

allies

is

the recognition that

evolving as a process, one of necessity

is

and integrated into every operation emanating from the na-

tional security strategy of the

ernment,

asset

government, communications must be tied to national strategy

policy. Strategic

born

At the national level our greatest

United

States.

we must be able to communicate

Within the executive branch of gov-

consistently

and clearly with America's

and foes, with international audiences across the world stage and remove the

haze of suspicion born of mixed, changing or incomplete messages.
In

DoD, our most promising efforts

ongoing

efforts to organize, equip,

and

port change in the communications

range of capabilities this joint

munications
tie,

is

not public

field

affairs,

center

on the evolving

QDR Roadmap and

train career public affairs officers

field,

and sup-

while educating the force as to the broad

can offer the joint commander. Strategic com-

but what

it

brings to public affairs

is

the strategic

focus and structure.

Army, the advent of strategic communications offers the resurrection of a
historically marginalized career field, providing both challenge and

In the
small,

244
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opportunity for sophisticated career communications professionals. The door

open

for these pentathletes to

fulfill

the need for strategic communications plan-

and broaden the communications

ning, to teach awareness

is

capabilities across the

Army, and to provide strong communications support to the warfighter. This is the
potential for strategic communications
to offer insight and understanding of

—

how to

apply information as a formidable element of national power.

Strategic

communications

is

the process that serves as our route to the future,

an acknowledgement of the need to
sight,
It is

and necessary ties to national
by career public

logically led

capability

and potential

make

to

craft

communications with forethought,

strategy

and US government policy objectives.

affairs officers
it

in-

who have the training,

experience,

successful.
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Challenges of Strategic Communication

Michael A. Brown *

Successful

strategic

abroad and at
dals

communication

is

vital to

ensure the success of US policy

home and to restore global credibility damaged by recent scan-

and our inability to compete in a global market for American ideals on a timely

and relevant
scope,

basis.

The United

and how we deal with

States

is

issues like

constantly under the international micro-

North Korea, Iran and the recent outbreak

of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel

is

debated, discussed, supported and vili-

community on a daily basis. It is critical that we do not fall
into the realm of "Do as I say, not as I do" as we craft our strategic message to the
global community. Too often the actions we take speak louder than what we say
most especially when those actions are not consistent with our strategic message.
We need to consider many points of view when dealing with the issue of stratefied in the international

gic

communication, with generational,

ideological, religious, global

and regional

impacts requiring a consistent and coordinated theme or message. Strategic com-

munication

is

about shaping choices

at

many levels

to avoid crisis or lessen crisis,

defeat propaganda, explain a position (legally, morally or ethically)

and shape the

The message is dynamic, continually requiring assessment and change, and
requires an agile and coordinated approach both horizontally and vertically
through all levels of government. We can no longer focus on single areas of responsibility
every action or inaction has the potential to be global in nature. The wider
future.

—

Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

Challenges of Strategic Communication

coordination of strategic communication as a consideration into
itary

aspects of mil-

planning and operations will not only enhance military effectiveness as a tool

US strategic interests, but will heighten awareness of both legal and eth-

to advance
ical

all

considerations that are vital in allowing the United States to regain, then main-

high ground in global perception management. This

tain, the

challenge

lies.

We

must ensure

common

a

is

where our

understanding of strategic goals/

themes/messages with cooperation and message alignment across

legislative liai-

and information opKey considerations are

son, interagency coordination, public affairs, fleet operations
erations, while

remaining credible and garnering

trust.

balancing credibility with ethical, legal and political considerations to create effective strategic

communications

and undermines what

is

policy.

Slow

"official"

eventually released.

We

response damages credibility

must plan from the beginning

with an effects-based model derived from our strategic goals.

What are our liabilities when employing the news media, public opinion and the
weapons of war? Who coordinates all the information activities under
the strategic communication umbrella? How is it synchronized? Should it be
Internet as

through designated personnel in the
State

Department where sometimes

what point does trading speed

field

or at senior levels in the Pentagon or the

sensitive policy decisions

for "the right answer" hurt

can be made? At

our overall

strategic

when our enemies are capable of responding faster and
faster? Timeliness has become critical; the hostilities in Lebanon being a prime example. Since the cessation of hostilities, Hezbollah has already made news as they
begin to rebuild the damage done by Israeli missiles and provide services and funds
communication

effort,

to the people of southern

United Nations
regarding a

is still

Lebanon who

are returning to their

homes, while the

struggling to reach a satisfactory agreement with

all

parties

UN peacekeeping force.

Coordinating a coherent strategic message
outlets such as blogs, chat

rooms and

ferred sources for information

groups, and

—

is

further complicated

text messaging,

which are becoming pre-

—

regardless of validity

make "managing" information

by new media

in

some demographic

release impossible. Yet they also offer

new opportunities to influence key audiences and undermine adversaries. How are
we to compete in this Infosphere? What is the role of the military and how do we
synchronize within the government? The globalization of media and the abbreviated news cycle (anyone with a

transform

all levels

bilities (e.g.,

phone can become

a potential "reporter") can

of military operations into potentially devastating strategic

lia-

murder of Iraqi civilians by US marines in Haditha in
The public will accept some level of moral ambiguity if the stakes

the alleged

November 2005).
are high.

cell

However,

if

there

is

not a jointly negotiated, practical ethical standard of
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conduct, and despite the overall legality of the undertaking, the operation can result in a tactical

win but

a strategic loss.

In the end, strategic communication, via public affairs, information operations

and other

capabilities, involves

national level coordination.
for

all

and develop

a process

complex

legal issues requiring careful

We must divine the proper roles

and

review and

responsibilities

which is both timely and meets the needs of all partici-

pants in the Department of Defense and the rest of the government. Considering
the stakes involved in "fighting the long war" 1 against dispersed, global terrorist

networks, the balance between ethical considerations, credibility and gain
potential reduction in

all

the

US casualties, damage to infrastructure, domestic and global

economies and deterrence of enemy actions) makes
for

(e.g.,

—ambassadors, Foreign

strategic

communication a job

Service Officers, Cabinet officials

and members of

Congress, as well as those of us in the Department of Defense. 2

Notes
1.

Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 9-18 (Feb

6,

2006), avail-

able at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.
2.

An Around-the-World Review of Public Diplomacy: Hearing Before

the

House Committee
Under

on International Relations, 109th Congress 34-42 (2005) (statement of Karen Hughes,
Secretary for Public

Diplomacy and Public

Affairs,
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US Department of State).

PART VII
GLOBAL DISASTERS

XVI
Global Disasters: Pakistan's Experience

Ikram ul Haq*
Introduction

The

earthquake that struck Pakistan on October

8,

2005

left

behind wide-

spread devastation and enormous loss of life with extensive damage to eco-

nomic assets,

infrastructure

and social service

The devastation was spread

delivery.

over 30,000 square kilometers of Himalayan terrain.

It

affected half a million

households, destroyed most of the educational institutions in the affected area and
killed over 73,000 people, including 18,000 children.

units collapsed,
tial utilities

The majority of health

communications infrastructure was rendered unusable,

all

care

essen-

were disrupted and the area was strewn with two hundred million tons

of debris. Families lost their breadwinners, senior citizens were
for themselves, children lost their parents

and parents

are

still

left

alone to fend

mourning

lost

and

injured children. Infrastructure that took years to construct, disappeared in six

minutes. The misery did not end there. Hundreds of post-earthquake tremors

The administrative machinery that could have
helped the victims survive the disaster, itself collapsed and perished. The rugged
mountainous terrain made it more difficult and winter in the Himalayas threatmultiplied the shock and trauma.

ened the

lives

of the survivors, already traumatized. This, the worst natural calam-

ity in Pakistan's history,

will take

has changed the

many years and

* Brigadier General, Pakistan

at a cost

lives

of millions and

is

one from which

it

of billions of dollars to recover.

Army. The views expressed

in this article are those of the

author

alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Pakistan government, the Pakistan

Defence Force, or the Pakistan Army.

Global Disasters: Pakistan's Experience

This article will focus on an assessment of the damage caused by the disaster, an

examination of the impediments and challenges faced in the conception and conduct of relief operations, and the lessons that were learned.

Damage Assessment
The earthquake struck Pakistan without warning at 8:50 am (local time) on the
morning of October 8, 2005. With its epicenter several miles northeast of the city of
Muzaffarabad, the earthquake registered 7.6 on the Richter scale, similar in intensity to the

earthquake that devastated San Francisco in 1906. Widespread destruc-

tion occurred throughout Pakistan-administered Kashmir, Pakistan's

Frontier Province

North-West

(NWFP) and the western and southern parts of the Kashmir val-

ley in Indian-administered Kashmir.

A total

of 147 aftershocks were experienced

throughout that day. By October 27, that number had swelled to 978 and included
aftershocks reaching intensities of up to 6.2

on the Richter

scale.

By early Novem-

government estimate of Pakistani dead reached 73,338,
with 128,304 being injured, many very severely. The earthquake triggered landber, the official Pakistan

slides that literally buried entire villages
tial

and roads. Some 59 percent of the residen-

structures in the region were leveled, including 67 percent of education

institutions in

Health care

which 18,095 children perished

facilities

in collapsed school buildings.

were similarly devastated, with 63 percent of the region's

medical capacity being damaged or destroyed. Rescue and recovery operations in

hampered by the destruction of up to 37 percent of the
road infrastructure, including critical bridges. Government services were equally
impacted with estimates of damage to electric capability reaching 60 to 70 percent,
telecommunications 30 to 40 percent and water supply 30 to 40 percent.
the mountainous area were

1

Response Challenges

Among the major challenges that were faced in the immediate aftermath of the disaster

were both institutional and informational vacuums. With respect to the

mer, Pakistan had a National Crisis Management Cell
institution lacked the necessary resources

Pakistan,
ability

it

was soon

of the

(NCMC), but

forthis

and capacity. Once the earthquake shook

realized that the gravity of the disaster

had overwhelmed the

NCMC to handle the situation. As a result, we were pretty much left in

an institutional vacuum to deal with the enormity of the

crisis.

This institutional

was compounded by the informational vacuum. The scale of devastation
and human trauma, coupled with the idiosyncrasies of the mountainous terrain
and weather, and the administrative paralysis that engulfed the region, led to an
failing
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the appropriate response to generate.
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and extent of the damage and,

in turn,

Among the major challenges faced were the

rescue of the injured and the location and removal of the dead, facilitation of the

rapid induction of disaster relief forces, and reaching out to remote villages, while

confronting chaos in the impacted

cities.

was determined that some 470,000

tents

To

illustrate the

scope of the problem,

it

were immediately needed to shelter the

multitudes rendered homeless.

Conception and Conduct of Relief Operations

At the National Level

The

ability to organize a swift

tion

and

suffering

response to the enormous magnitude of the destruc-

was made even more
poor or

difficult

by the

reality that the existing in-

frastructure

was

disaster, the

government immediately established the Federal Relief Commission

(FRC) with

a

either very

mandate

to

manage

totally destroyed. Realizing the gravity of the

the entire spectrum of relief efforts. All national

agencies concerned with the relief and rehabilitation efforts, including the
forces, the cabinet ministries of health, interior

and foreign affairs,

armed

as well as corre-

sponding communication and information divisions, functioned through the

and formed a part of the national team. FRC served

as the

tween the government and international organizations,

FRC

primary interface be-

as well as foreign authori-

ties

and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focusing on the

and

rehabilitation of the stricken area.

relief

The FRC was organized to work with two distinct wings, the civilian and the
military. The civilian wing, comprised of ministerial representatives and coordinators, looked after the inter-department and inter-agency issues, while the military
wing was responsible for the operationalization of rescue and relief efforts.
The disaster response concept consisted of four complementary strategies, i.e.,
search, rescue, relief and recovery; consequent management; rehabilitation; and
reconstruction. The FRC focused on the first two strategies while the rehabilitation
and restoration domains were addressed by the Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA). The entire effort was undertaken under one leadership platform, thereby ensuring judicious distribution of disaster relief through a

synergized operation.

and restoration and

The maintenance of law and order,

the revival of civic order,

early recovery aspects of the concept

were the main thrust

The FRC was fully supported by the nation, key players and stakeholders. The
decisive vision and leadership by the government throughout the crisis provided
ideal working parameters and impetus to the FRC, foreign governments, individual donors, the public and all of the governmental departments.

lines.
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The approach adopted

at the national level to

several distinct but interfacing considerations.

principle of a

"one-window operation" with

meet the

crises

was premised on

The FRA functioned on the

accessibility to

all.

basic

This ensured the

maximum possible coordination at both the national and operational levels to
alize

an economy of effort in achieving the desired

results.

"Reaching out" in

re-

all af-

means of transportation, to
include foot movement, animal transport, motor vehicles and helicopters, were
used to "reach out" to affected people to provide systematic, timely and equitable
distribution of relief goods and services. Of immediate concern as the weather deteriorated was the implementation of a strategy for the speedy construction of temporary shelters and a functioning logistic chain that extended to the forward-most
places. For the first time, the government put into practice the UN "cluster approach" to managing various aspects of disaster management. 2 Of particular utility
was the Strategic Leaders Forum consisting of the heads of the main international
relief and non-governmental organizations, and individual donors.
fected areas

was given top

priority. All available

At the Operational Level

The Pakistan Armed
responsible for
lief efforts.
tial

all

Forces, in general,

and the Pakistan Army in

particular,

were

operational aspects of multi-agency and multi-organization re-

Two Army infantry brigades were deployed within 24 hours of the ini-

shock, and within 48 hours a

full

division

had been deployed. The decision

deploy three divisional headquarters was taken within the

enormity of the task became

clearer.

first

to

72 hours as the

By the end of October, over 80,000 troops

were deployed in the disaster zone.

At the operational

level,

the relief operation was conceived and executed in

three stages, with each stage gradually blending into the subsequent stage,

considerable overlap in

some

and with

areas.

One (October 8-20) was the immediate rescue and relief operation. The
main focus of Stage One was the rescue of survivors, the location and removal of
Stage

dead bodies from the debris, the evacuation and treatment of the injured and the
provision of food and shelter to those most in need. Special emphasis was placed

on providing
Stage

Two

for the care

and protection of vulnerable

(October 20-December 31) concentrated on creation of stability in

the face of widespread chaos.
against time,

women and children.

i.e.,

It

was a very crucial effort,

as Stage

Two became a race

about 3.5 million homeless people had to be adequately

provisioned and protected against the

endeavor was reflected in the

approaching winter. The urgency of the

fast

fact that the

United Nations and other

relief agencies

were predicting a second wave of deaths due to exposure of the vulnerable population to the harsh winter.

The main

activities
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this stage

were the
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provision of shelter (tents and robust transitional shelters) and the creation of tent
villages;

providing food and medical support; distribution of monetary compensa-

tion for the dead, the injured

and damaged homes; restoration of civic and

social

amenities and institutions, with priority given to health and education sectors;
and, perhaps most importantly, bringing local government and administration

back to

its feet.

1-March 31) sought to ensure that the stability created
during the previous stage was maintained throughout the harsh winter. Key elements of Stage Three included monitoring the provision of critical support activities to ensure that food, shelter and medical services were sustained throughout the
Stage Three (January

winter and into the spring, and working to ensure a smooth transition from provision of relief to the reconstruction

and rehabilitation of devastated urban and rural

areas.

Reconstruction and Rehabilitation

After six months, the emergency relief phase was over

and focus shifted towards

re-

building the shattered areas. The Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation

Authority (commonly known as
tor

ERRA) was established to plan, coordinate, moni-

and regulate reconstruction and

fected areas.

The ERRA developed

rehabilitation activities in

livelihood in earthquake- affected areas.
first

earthquake

af-

a comprehensive three-year plan involving

eleven development sectors, with special focus

purpose, effective as of the

all

Some

on housing,
$3.5 billion

health, education

was earmarked

and

for that

week of April of 2006.

The National Response
The spontaneous outpouring of compassion and generosity by the people of Pakistan,

both

at

home and abroad, on

ernment meet

fiscal shortfalls.

a scale never witnessed before, helped the gov-

Pakistanis

from

all

walks of

life

stepped forward,

demonstrating our nation's highest values of caring and sharing that brought consolation
cal

and hope to the

NGOs,

affected.

From soldiers and voluntary relief workers to lo-

the people of Pakistan stepped forward to protect

and nurture the

earthquake victims.

The International Response
The people of Pakistan were overwhelmed by the generosity of the response of the
world community and voluntary organizations. Simply put, they have been of
great support to us.

the

I

take this opportunity to praise in the highest possible terms

work of the volunteers, men and women, foreign governments, armed forces of
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friendly countries, the aid workers, the international organizations,

global civil society who

who

suffered.

NGOs and the

worked tirelessly and selflessly to make a difference to those

We are also deeply grateful for the generous support and assistance

of individual donors worldwide in providing desperately needed relief to the earth-

quake victims.
United States

had the opportunity to personally observe US relief efforts while at the US Central
Command (CENTCOM). The United States responded immediately and generI

ously to Pakistan's

call for assistance

following the earthquake.

The US military was

on October 10, just two days after the earthquake. At the peak of the
initial relief efforts, more than 1,200 personnel and 25 helicopters provided vital
transport, logistics, medical and engineering support in the affected areas. US helicopters, nicknamed "Angels of Mercy," changed the dimension of relief efforts and
in Pakistan

helped save hundreds of lives.

To

have not the words to begin to thank the United

I

you some idea of the assistance provided by the
United States, a total of $510 million was pledged for earthquake relief and reconstruction efforts. Over 250 US military and civilian cargo airlift flights delivered
more than 7,000 tons of medical supplies, food, shelter material, blankets and resStates for

its

assistance.

give

cue equipment to Pakistan. Approximately 5,200 helicopter missions were flown,
delivering 15,000 tons of supplies

and transporting more than 18,000 people. US

medical teams treated approximately 35,000 patients, while
40,000 tons of debris, built a
tation projects

US

engineers cleared

camp for displaced people, completed numerous sani-

and adopted

a village that included building five schools

homes. Moreover, the United

States

donated an 84-bed Mobile

Army

and 50

Surgical

Hospital and established two forward-area refueling point systems to increase helicopter efficiency during reconstruction.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO was a vital part of a very large effort aimed at providing disaster relief in Pakistan. In total, some 1,000 NATO engineers and supporting staff, as well as 200
medical personnel, worked in Pakistan during the operation. NATO airlifted supplies, donated by NATO member and partner nations, as well as by the UN High
Commissioner
critical effort

supplies.

for Refugees, via

required 168

NATO

two

air

bridges from

Germany and Turkey. That

NATO flights that delivered almost 3,500 tons of relief

helicopters transported

more than

1,750 tons of relief goods to

and evacuated over 7,650 disaster victims. A NATO
hospital treated approximately 4,890 patients and conducted 160 major surgeries,
while mobile NATO medical units treated 3,424 patients in the remote mountain
remote mountain

villages
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also contributed significantly to the

World Health Organization

immunization program that has helped to prevent the outbreak of disease.

NATO

engineers were active in repairing nearly 60 kilometers of roads and removing

commerce and huPakistan Army in Op-

over 41,500 tons of debris, thereby enabling the flow of aid,

manitarian assistance.

NATO engineers also supported the

Winter Race, by constructing 110 multi-purpose

eration

population living in the mountains.

and thirteen

tures were completed

An

additional nine school

tent schools erected.

ation fuel farm in Abbottabad, which carried out
civilian

for

shelters

and health

the

struc-

NATO also set up an avi-

some

1,000 refuelings for

and military helicopters.
Lessons Learned

Combating the disastrous earthquake has been a unique and challenging experience, which fostered many lessons that can serve as guidelines for dealing with such
a calamity in the future.

Among

the lessons that have universal application are

those concerned with government institutions, disaster

management

strategy, ex-

peditious acquisition of information, the role of the media, mobilization and de-

ployment of friendly
capacity building

forces,

cooperation with friendly armed forces and nations,

and the development and enforcement of design codes.

Institutions

Creation of the

FRC

within the Prime Minister Secretariat, which works directly

under the prime minister, has been a success

story.

A proposal is now under active

consideration to create a permanent National Disaster

(NDMA),

work directly under the Prime
Similar disaster management capabilities are likely to be es-

with appropriate

Minister's Secretariat.

Management Authority

legislative authority to

tablished at the provincial level, to include control centers with requisite

Each

will

be maintained by a small nucleus

during a

crisis.

Disaster

Management Strategy

A

staff,

facilities.

which can be suitably augmented

well-thought-out and comprehensive disaster

management

strategy,

encom-

passing the likely scenarios, delineation of responsibilities and capacity-building
guidelines

must be evolved.

Expeditious Acquisition of Information

Expeditious acquisition of information regarding the extent of damage to essential
infrastructure can greatly assist in the provision of rapid
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and

effective relief

and
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rescue.

It

soon became apparent that serious information

Our

system.

shortfalls existed in

our

experience demonstrates that up-to-date data pertaining to housing,

civic facilities

and other

details

about each area should be available in the national

would be most

damage assessment.
Some capability to undertake rapid mapping and damage assessment in the disas-

database. Clearly, this

ter

useful for rapid

zone should be created. High-resolution

satellite

imagery/aerial photography

could prove crucial to ascertaining the location and nature of the damage
sustained.

Role of the Media

The media can make a major contribution in any relief operation. The main areas
of media contribution during the earthquake relief operation in Pakistan included
the transmission of graphic images of the destruction and the miseries of the affected populace and timely, on-scene reports of the progress of relief and recovery
operations. Media reporting of the devastation stirred up great emotions within
the country, which created a flood of relief activity. Similarly, the international
media was able to mobilize the relief effort at the international level.
Local media acted as a potent watchdog on the progress of the relief and recovery operation. Although at times unfairly critical, the media helped in keeping us
on our toes. Lastly, sustained media coverage proved instrumental in keeping donors, both national and international, motivated to continue their generous
support.

Mobilization and Deployment of Friendly Forces

management is basically a race against time. Mobilization and deployment of some friendly forces took as long as two months because of the limited capability of the providing nation to mobilize sooner. It is recommended that
Disaster

nations and alliances having the potential

—and the —

assistance develop the capability for rapid

deployment for timely disaster response.

will

to provide

much needed

Cooperation with Friendly Armed Forces and Nations

The support received from friendly nations and their armed forces proved to be extremely useful. This reality highlights the need to formalize mechanisms for more
effective cooperation and coordination should the need arise in the future. To that
end, peacetime agreements with friends and
saster

management and

strikes.

the willingness to

allies

with the potential to

do so must be

assist in di-

in place before disaster

These agreements should include memoranda of understanding between

participating nations pledging delineated capabilities. This, in turn, will facilitate

the conduct of joint

mock disaster

relief exercises.
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multinational forum to share disaster relief and recovery experiences with

each other should be created.
cent past. There

much

is

Many nations have suffered major disasters in the re-

that can be learned through the sharing of each other's

experiences.

Capacity Building

Although some agencies
to assist in disaster

in Pakistan

management,

it

had the experience and appropriate potential

became

painfully apparent that they did not

possess the expertise nor were they equipped to handle a large-scale earthquake.

Accordingly, additional capacity must be created, both in trained
in

equipment, for

manpower and

specific disaster relief and rescue tasks.

Development and Enforcement of Design Codes
The extent of damage in a major calamity can be greatly reduced

if

residential

and

commercial buildings are constructed in accordance with proper architectural designs.

There

is

a clear

upon rigorous

and impelling need

to develop building design codes based

scientific studies. Effective

enforcement through

legislative

provision must then be

made

for their

measures.

Conclusion

As noted previously, Pakistan was overwhelmed by the caring and enthusiasm of
the world

community and voluntary organizations which have been so generous in

providing desperately needed

from the

relief

and

crisis

relief to the

earthquake victims. Having transitioned

control stage to the rehabilitation and reconstruction

phase of the recovery, the Government of Pakistan

is

maintaining

its

thrust to rein-

troduce the normalcy of life through the revival of essential infrastructure and the
order. At the

civil

agement Agency"

same time, we

are brainstorming a

for preparedness

permanent "Disaster Man-

and coordination of a coherent response to any

future challenge.

Notes
1

Depictions of the widespread

human and physical devastation caused by the earthquake

are available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Kashmir_earthquake (last visited Mar. 12,

2007).
2.

See Action Aid International,

the Pakistan Earthquake: an

The Evolving

UN

Cluster

Approach

in the

Aftermath of

NGO Perspective, available at http://www.actionaid.org/pakistan/

images/ ActionAid%20Report%20on%20UN%20Cluster%20Approach%20April%202006.pdf
(last visited

Mar.

12, 2007).
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XVII
Australian Defence Force Experience with

Non-Government Organizations in
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Operations

Evan Carlin *

Recent experience suggests that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations are a growth industry for military forces. In the
alone, the Australian Defence Force

last

(ADF) has provided emergency aid

12

months

to victims

of the Pakistan earthquake; the Indian Ocean tsunami; the Nias, Indonesia earth-

quake

(in

which nine

ADF

personnel died in a helicopter crash); and Cyclone

Larry, a category 5 tropical cyclone that tore across the north

Queensland coastline

of Australia in early 2006.

World Health Organization's Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters show that from 1990 to 2003 there was a 180% increase in the
number of people affected by natural disasters: 255 million people in 2003 up from
Figures from the

90 million in 1990. Between 1990 and 2000 in Asia alone there were 215 so-called
1

"non-complex"

relief

operations (floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions,

where host nations were the primary responders).

* Lieutenant Colonel, Australian

2

Defence Force. The author

etc.,

Operation Shaddock, for

is

not authorized, nor does he

purport, to speak for the Australian government or the Australian Defence Force.

NGOs in Humanitarian Operations

Australian Experience with

ADF come to the aid of Papua New Guinea following a tsunami

example, saw the

on

July 17, 1998 that killed over 3,000 people.

Complex

on

relief operations,

tarian assistance to societies riven

displacement, any or
a natural disaster.

humanitarian

the other hand, involve the delivery of humani-

by warring

factions, civil disorder or population

of which problems might be

all

compounded by the misery of

One example is the multinational force led by the ADF to render

aid,

provide security and

instill

the rule of law in guiding Timor-

become the first new nation of the twenty-first century.
However one might categorize emergency relief operations, it is traditionally
the case that military forces are called upon to provide the humanitarian or disaster
Leste to

aid required often with

little,

or indeed no, notice. Military forces have the re-

hand to quickly reach inaccessible places. But increasingly, some nongovernment organizations (NGOs) rival the capacity of military forces to transport
large volumes of supplies in relief operations. The Brookings Institution cites a case
sources at

in point:
ter

"During the highly visible

airlift

of 2001-02, the U.S. military delivered only a tiny fraction of the total brought

through conventional operations by

in

of food into Afghanistan during the win-

like

IRC

[International

deliver aid

Perhaps

Red Cross]

where required
relief

ence of some

." 3

—they can do

lief unencumbered

as

[World Food Program] and

NGOs

Not only do such NGOs have the capacity to

operations should be

NGOs, such

WFP
it

left

cheaper than military forces.

NGOs. This is the preferwho seek to provide aid re-

to specialist

Medecins Sans Frontieres,

by politics and military association. This would permit military

on their core function of warfighting. Military forces
usually are only too pleased to hand over the reins of relief operations as soon as
practicable to NGOs or UN agencies. For some time the United States has been uneasy about the resources of its armed forces being diverted from its core function,
forces to maintain their focus

as

noted by the

US

Congressional Research Service (CRS):

For over a decade, some Members of Congress have expressed reservations about U.S.
military involvement in peacekeeping.

the

commitment of U.S. troops to

The Bush Administration's decision

to reduce

international peacekeeping seems to reflect a major

concern: that peacekeeping duties [defined by the

CRS

to include "providing security

for humanitarian relief efforts"] are detrimental to military "readiness,"

i.e.,

the ability

of U.S. troops to defend the nation. 4

Certainly there

is

no shortage of NGOs around the world ready and willing to assist

in relief operations.

It is

estimated that within three weeks of the 2004 Boxing

tsunami in Southeast Asia there were over 109
Sri

Lanka and 35

in Thailand.

5
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The fact remains, of course, that military forces are indispensable for relief operations in hostile or uncertain security environments. Moreover, despite the capacity

of NGOs for economical long-term lease of aircraft in

forces are

unmatched

ularly in the

tion plant in

in their ability to rapidly deliver aid to

maritime environment. The day

soldiers departed for

Sumatra and within

tions

a

after the

week had

remote

places, partic-

2004 tsunami, Australian

established a water purifica-

Banda Aceh. Military forces have the capacity to bring instantaneous

infrastructure to a devastated area.
trine:

relief operations, military

As simply stated

in

Royal Australian Navy doc-

"Naval forces are self-supporting and do not create

logistic

burdens

where infrastructure has been destroyed or severely damaged."

The NATO Review neatly assessed the

in situa-

6

military contribution to relief operations

in these terms:

The

recent disasters in the United States

certain

military

overwhelmed. Strategic

commercial

can

capabilities

aircraft

airlift is

and Pakistan have highlighted how useful

when

be

first

responders

crucial to transport urgently

needed

themselves

find

relief supplies as

are not always available in sufficient numbers.

helicopters have proven essential in the

first

phase of a disaster-relief operation

roads are often too badly damaged to be passable and
sustaining the relief effort in a

more

Moreover,

cost-effective

when

sealift capabilities are critical to

way

in the

weeks and months

following a disaster. Rapidly deployable military hospitals and medical personnel can
also help out

overburdened

first

responders. In addition, military engineers, water

and search-and-rescue teams all have the
improve crisis-response capabilities and save lives. 7

purification units

skills

that can greatly

Whether wrought by climate change or happenstance, the world has

recently

witnessed a succession of natural disasters of such scale as to pose transnational
challenges that require international cooperation

was

clearly evident in the

and understanding. This need

most devastating of these disasters, the Indian Ocean tsu-

nami of Boxing Day 2004. 8 The tsunami was triggered by an enormous undersea
earthquake (9.3 on the Richter scale) that ruptured the earth's crust for over 1,000
kilometers, releasing tremendous energy. This, the second most powerful earthquake ever recorded, 9 generated a tsunami whose destruction in the immediate region was shocking, and a global tragedy.

What frameworks
lief

operations?

exist for civilian-military

On December

19, 1991,

and international cooperation

in re-

UN General Assembly Resolution 46/1 82

10

created the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, designed to strengthen the coordi-

nation of humanitarian emergency assistance.

The

resolution outlined 30 guiding

principles "in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality
ity"

11

for the provision of relief aid.

It

and impartial-

reaffirmed the primary responsibility of States
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to care for the victims of natural disasters within their borders but asserted that

"the United Nations has a central

and coordinating the
fected countries."
in

12

and unique

role to play in providing leadership

of the international

efforts

The resolution makes

it

community

to support the af-

clear that coordination

is

the key tool

humanitarian operations.

The

UN Charter makes no specific reference to the use of military forces in hu-

manitarian operations. There

is

an inherent tension between the

roles of civilian

agencies and military forces in relief operations. This was evident, for example, in

1994 during Operation Restore
ian aid agencies

overcome
in Zaire.

Hope in which US military and international civil-

worked through

a Civil Military Operations Center

their "cultural differences" for the

(CMOC)

to

common good of Rwandan refugees

13

In a perfect world there should naturally be complementarity between military
forces

and

NGOs

in relief operations.

The Geneva Conventions and

tional Protocols 14 refer to impartial relief societies

humanitarian aid and the protection of
vides

relief

their

Addi-

concerned with the provision of

agency personnel. Surely

this

pro-

common ground with military forces whose duty it is to protect civilians un-

der the law of armed conflict.
In 1994 the Oslo Guidelines
Disaster Relief
military

and

15

on the Use of Military and

Civil

Defence Assets

in

were adopted by various nations to provide effective interaction of

civilian actors in disaster relief operations. In

subsequent years, the

Oslo Guidelines were developed by the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). After a review of a

ceded that in a range of international

number of operations, OCHA con-

relief operations:

[T]he coordination between the international military forces and the responding

UN

humanitarian agencies and other international

civilian actors has been critically
examined by a number of participants and observers and found to be in need of
improvement. The success that was achieved in the use of military resources and
coordination was due largely to the extraordinary efforts of the personnel in the field. 16

Also in 1994, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent

Movement pub-

17

Code of Conduct for disaster relief operations. This code stipulates ten
that aid should be given on the
principles founded upon the need for impartiality
lished

its

—

basis of and in proportion to

need alone.

The conduct of civil-military relief operations requires impartiality and cooperation but also cultural sensitivity and political sagacity. This was evident no more
so than in the international relief operation in the wake of the 2004 Boxing Day
tsunami.
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About 250 kilometers from the epicenter of the earthquake, Aceh suffered the
full brunt of the tsunami's force. This was a catastrophe in one of the most isolated and politically charged areas of Southeast Asia and a source of political instability for

more than

a century. 18 Before the arrival of international aid workers,

the Indonesian government

clashed with the Free

had quarantined Aceh. Indonesian

Aceh Movement, or

GAM,

rebels.

The

devoutly Muslim as anywhere in the world and Sharia law
three decades,

Aceh was embattled,

silent

and closed

off

local
is

forces regularly

population

is

as

in force. For nearly

from the outside world.

The earthquake and tsunami left survivors devastated and prey to the entreaties
of al-Qaida and Jamah Islamia, whose members, undoubtedly, were gathering to
hand.

The first foreigners on the scene and with the greatest lift capacity were forces
from Australia, Singapore and the United States. Troops were unarmed and relied
upon Indonesian security to conduct relief operations. As an Indonesian commander remarked, "If you want to carry a weapon, you'd better choose a side."
During the three months that the ADF conducted relief operations in Aceh, some
200 people were killed in skirmishes between GAM and Indonesian forces.
It was into this situation that thousands of troops and hundreds of civilian relief workers descended. While foreign forces and NGOs scurried to organize
themselves, stoic Indonesian soldiers set about the grimmest of tasks, tirelessly
clearing waste

and debris and disposing of the dead

in

accordance with local prac-

Many of these soldiers had themselves lost loved ones. Many had no family or
homes to which to return. When the tsunami struck, Indonesian troops were con-

tice.

ducting an amphibious landing exercise. All those soldiers perished, along with

some 1,000 of their comrades at their headquarters at Banda Aceh. Offshore the
USS Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group and USS Abraham Lincoln
provided considerable muscle and heavy lift. US Navy aviation assets were crucial
to the aid effort.

The ADF's primary concern was to ensure that the relief effort was in accordance with Indonesian priorities. The view that Indonesians knew best what Indonesians required was a fundamental precept of Australian, Singaporean and
American forces. Through the Civil- Military Aid Coordination Conference

(CMAC)
The

this

view was shared by other foreign forces and the majority of NGOs.

CMAC met daily in Medan, the transport hub of northern Sumatra. An Indo-

nesian colonel, with an Australian lieutenant colonel as deputy, chaired the meetings.

The

CMAC

was the principal means of sharing information about the

progress of the mission, road conditions, security concerns, aid priorities, bottle-

necks and expectations.
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Expectation

management was

a

prime concern for the

of military and civilian aid workers
the desire to help.

The mood was

NGOs in Humanitarian Operations

who descended upon

reflected

CMAC. The

thousands

Indonesia burned with

by Dr. Fiona Terry, founder of the Aus-

tralian section of Medecins Sans Frontieres:

"Humanitarian action

more than

is

technical exercise at nourishing or healing a population defined as in need;

it is

a

a

members of humanity." The role
of the CMAC (and its Secretariat comprised initially of ADF, Singaporean and US
officers, with representatives of the Australian Government Aid Program
(AUSAID), the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UN
Joint Logistic Centre (UNJLC)) was to manage the prosaic but crucial tasks of setmoral endeavor based on

solidarity with other

ting priorities, allocating scarce air assets
ciently

and

19

and ensuring that relief supplies were effi-

effectively distributed.

In those early weeks of the operation, certain misconceptions about the needs of

Aceh proved

difficult to dispel. It fairly

suffered relatively few serious injuries

and equipment
and nurses

for their needs.

to the region.

ronmental health

The

officers to

It

real

quickly

and

became evident

that the survivors

were

medical

that there

sufficient

proved challenging to stem the

staff

tide of doctors

needs were engineers for reconstruction, envi-

counter disease and qualified

NGOs

to

manage

the

camps of displaced persons.
A considerable amount of aid donated from around the world was undoubtedly
well intended but misguided. The warehouses in Medan were brimming with
sweaters, Western-style tinned baby food, hillocks of canned

boiled fruitcake and

mounds of precooked meals

for

baked beans,

crates of

which the people of tropical

Aceh had neither the need nor the appetite. Truckloads of disposable diapers were
a mystery to these people and contributed yet more waste in a region blanketed in
litter. The pressing need was, in fact, for dried fish, rice noodles, powdered milk
and cloth

The

diapers. 20

best

NGOs were informed,

ticular, the International

organized and relatively

self-sufficient. In par-

Organization for Migration (IOM) had vehicles and was

The World Food Program (WFP) had aircraft and their own temporary accommodation. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
Medecins Sans Frontieres were experienced, politically informed and focused on
well organized.

finding solutions, and Caritas efficiently directed

its

energies to pastoral care.

The NGOs who experienced the most frustration and were perhaps less effective
were those who were impractical, ignorant of Sharia law,

failed to calibrate security

concerns into their plans, complained that the Indonesian government did not understand them and failed to appreciate that a humanitarian disaster must be addressed in

its

context.

that the consent of

Some NGOs, in their callow enthusiasm, failed to appreciate
any nation to welcome
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and diverse numbers of
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international military

and

civilian relief workers

is

rarely unconditional

and open-

ended. The most egregious error by a few naive aid workers was to unilaterally
off for

set

Aceh by road through Sumatran jungles only to break down and themselves

become "secondary victims" of the disaster requiring assistance.
The most effective NGOs were not necessarily the large, established organizations. A capable group of well-connected volunteers from a Sydney suburban
council proved effective. Surfers Without Borders diligently hired boats and accessed the otherwise inaccessible parts of western Sumatra to paddle ashore with
supplies.

And, improbably, Save the Sumatran Orangutans delighted the

by arriving with a sumptuous swag of donations to put

ADF

The

completed

its

to

good use

—

for

CMAC

humans.

mission in Aceh in three months. "Completed," of

The measure of success in relief operations is a matter of
delivering the greatest good in the time available. The CMAC worked efficiently,
certainly diligently, and aid was directed purposefully and quickly. It proved an effective mechanism, as OCHA describes, for bridging the "humanitarian gap between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the
resources available to meet them." 21
course,

is

a relative term.

Notes
1.

Salvano Briceno, Director, United Nations Inter-agency Secretariat of the International

Strategy for Disaster Reduction

(UN/ISDR), Statement at the Conference on Education, United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International Bureau of

Education (IBE), Geneva (Sept.
2.

9,

2004).

Report from the Conference on Evolving Roles of the Military in the Asia-Pacific (Mar.

28-30, 2000), Honolulu, Hawaii, hosted by the Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, available at http:/ /www. apcss.org/Publications/Report_Evolving_Roles.html.

SECURITY BY
Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty and American Leadership (Lael
3.

Steven Hansch, Humanitarian Assistance Expands

Brainard
4.

ed.,

in Scale

and

Scope, in

2006).

Nina M.

Serafino, Peacekeeping

and Related

Involvement, Congressional Research Service (Oct.

4,

Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military

2004), available at http://www.senate.gov/

~hutchison/IB94040.pdf.
5.

Commander, US Navy Warfare Development Command,

Tactical

Memo

3-07.6-05,

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations Planning 4-2 (2005), available at

http://

www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/tm_3-07-6-05_navy_ha&dr_ops_plng.pdf.
6.

ed.,

Australian Maritime Doctrine

-

RAN Doctrine

l -

2000, ch. 7 (D.J. Shackleton

2000), available at http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/amd/amdintro.html.
7.

Maurits Jochems,

NATO's Growing Humanitarian

Role,

NATO

REVIEW, Spring 2006,

http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issuel/english/art4.html.
8.

The 2004 Boxing Day tsunami is listed by the Congressional Research

deadliest natural disaster since 1900:

273

Service as the sixth-

Australian Experience with

Date

NGOs in Humanitarian Operations
Event

Location

Estimated
Fatalities

July 1931

China

Flood

3.7 million

July 1959

China

Flood

2 million

July 1939

China

Flood

500,000

Bangladesh

Cyclone

300,000

July 27, 1976

China

Earthquake

242,000

Dec. 26, 2004

Indian Ocean

Earthquake and Tsunami

224,495

Nov.

1970

12,

[Note: Other figures estimate the tsunami death

May 22,

toll

at between 229,866

and 275,000]

1927

China

Earthquake

200,000

Dec. 16, 1920

China

Earthquake

180,000

Japan

Earthquake

143,000

China

Flood

142,000

Sep.

1,

1923

1935

Daniel Kronenfeld

& Rhode Margesson,

The Earthquake

in

South Asia: Humanitarian Assistance

and Relief Operations 20, Congressional Research Service (Mar. 24, 2006), available at http://
www.whprp.org/NLE/CRSreports/06May/RL33196.pdf.
9. The most powerful earthquake recorded was one measuring 9.5 that struck Chile in
1960. Seth Stein & Emile Okal, Size and Speed of the Sumatra Earthquake, NATURE, Mar. 3, 2005,
at 434, 581.
10.

Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the

United Nations, G.A. Res. 46/582, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/182 (Dec.
11. Id., Annex, Guiding Principles, para. 2.
12.

Id.,

Annex, Guiding Principles, para.

19, 1991).

12.

13. John E. Lange, Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons from
Rwanda, PARAMETERS, Summer 1998, at 106.
14. See, e.g., Common Article 3 of Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [Geneva
Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [Geneva Convention III]; and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [Geneva Convention IV]; all reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) at 197,
222, 244 and 301, respectively. See also Article 17 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; and Article 18 of Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; reprinted in id. at 419 and 481,

respectively.
15.

and

An updated (November 2006) version of the

Civil

Defence Assets in Disaster Relief

is

1994 Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military

available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/

db900SID/AMMF-6VXJVG/$FILE/OCHA-Nov2006.pdf?OpenElement.
16.

OCHA, http://ochaonline.un.org/

(last visited

274

Aug. 27, 2006).

Evan Carlin
17.

See

NGOs in

Code of Conduct

for the International

Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and

Disaster Relief, available at http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/codesofconduct/ifrc-codeconduct

.html.
18.

son

In

at the

1

883

when Krakatoa exploded in the Sunda Strait, the noise impelled the Dutch garri-

other end of Sumatra to battle stations, they having assumed that Achinese insurgents

a local fort. See SIMON WINCHESTER, KRAKATOA: THE DAY THE WORLD EXPLODED 264 (2003).
19. Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action

had blown up

244 (2002).
20. For further discussion of these

pands
21.

in Scale

and

Scope, in

November 2006

issues, see Steven Hansch, Humanitarian Assistance ExSECURITY BY OTHER MEANS, supra note 3.

version of the 1994 Oslo Guidelines, supra note 15, at

275

7.

—
s

XVIII
Disaster Response:

Key Legal Issues for US Northern Command

Kurt Johnson*
Introduction

During Labor Day weekend 2005, Hurricane Katrina had
Colorado Springs, Colorado. Over 100
ish

at

own impact in

men and women worked at a fever-

pace in the Joint Operations Center and the

Center

its

Combined

US Northern Command (NORTHCOM)

as

Intelligence Fusion

New Orleans residents were

threatened by floodwaters creeping up to their rooftop safe havens. Similar scenarios

were repeated for days.

As

this

was the

first

time within the United States that a natural disaster of this

proportion had involved

NORTHCOM,

unique issues arose regarding the use of

Department of Defense (DoD) resources and
relief

support of hurricane

operations within the United States. This article discusses

missions, authorities
civil

capabilities in

NORTHCOM'

and significant legal issues associated with defense support of

authorities during disaster relief operations.

Dual Missions

NORTHCOM

is

a unique geographic combatant

command as it has dual missions

—

homeland defense (HLD) and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA)
must be performed in our nation's homeland. The legal authority
Captain, JAGC,

US

Navy.

that
for
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NORTHCOM's HLD mission is rooted in Article II, Section 2 of the US Constitution: the President's authority as

Commander-in-Chief. The legal authority for the

DSCA mission is based in statute. An example is the Stafford Act.

1

Legal Authorities

Stafford Act

The

Stafford Act

is

the primary legal authority for federal emergency

assistance to state, local
lief

may be

and tribal governments. Under the Act,

disaster

federal disaster re-

initiated in four circumstances:

major disaster 2 at the request of a governor, 3

a.

Presidential declaration of a

b.

Presidential declaration of an

c.

Secretary of Defense

emergency4

at the request

of a governor, 5

(SECDEF) utilization of DoD resources, upon
request of a governor and at the direction of the President, to perform
emergency work for the preservation of life and property during the
immediate aftermath of an incident (before the President makes a major
disaster or

d.

and

emergency declaration), 6 or

Presidential declaration of an

emergency when the affected area

is

one

in

which "the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility

and authority" under the Constitution or laws of the United
President

may make

this declaration

on

his

own

States.

7

The

volition without a

governor's request.

In the

first

two circumstances, the Stafford Act requires

that the governor of an

major

disaster or emergency.

affected state request a presidential declaration of a

The governor's request must be based on a finding that the disaster "is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state
and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary." 8 The
governor must certify that he or she has executed the state's emergency plan and
will comply with the cost-sharing requirements of the Stafford Act. The President

may then declare that a major disaster or emergency exists.
Upon the declaration of a major disaster or emergency,

the governor and the

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Regional Director execute a
FEMA-state agreement. 9 The agreement describes the incident, the period for
Federal

which assistance will be made available, and the type and extent of the
tance.

It

also contains the

commitment of the
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state

and
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federal assis-

government(s) with
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respect to the

amount of funds to be expended. An emergency is an event that does

not qualify under the definition of major disaster. 10 Assistance authorized by an

emergency declaration

is

limited to immediate

and public health and

to save lives, to protect property

the threat of a catastrophe.
laration

may

not exceed

11

will

assistance essential

or to lessen or avert

safety,

Total assistance provided in any given emergency dec-

five million dollars,

continued emergency assistance

immediate

and short-term

is

except

immediately required; there

risk to lives, property, public health

and

not otherwise be provided on a timely basis.

The third circumstance occurs

when FEMA determines

in the

safety;

is

that

a continuing

and

and necessary assistance

12

immediate aftermath of an incident which

may ultimately qualify for Stafford Act assistance but before the President actually
makes a major disaster or emergency declaration. The governor may request DoD
work on public and private lands that is essential
for the preservation of life and property. 13 "Emergency work" is defined as including "clearance and removal of debris and wreckage and temporary restoration of
essential public facilities and services," 14 but may also include search and rescue,
emergency medical care and reduction of immediate threats to life, property and
public health and safety. 15
The fourth circumstance that initiates federal disaster relief does not require a
request from a governor. 16 The President may declare an emergency and provide
resources to perform emergency

federal assistance to the governor

when

the affected area

is

one

in

which "the

United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority." 17

The President is required to consult the governor, if practicable, to determine if an
emergency exists. President Clinton exercised this authority in the aftermath of the
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. 18 This was
the first and only use of this authority since its inception in 1988 and was likely used
because the Murrah was a federal building housing multiple federal agencies.
In comparing the power of the federal government with that of the states in
terms of disaster response and assistance, one must consider the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution, which reads, "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." State

and

local

governments derive

their

authority to respond to disasters and emergencies and to enforce law from their
"police power,"

which is inherent in the sovereignty of every state and is reserved to

the states through the Tenth

Amendment. The

Stafford Act affirms the primacy of

the state's role in disaster response, because federal assistance

quest from the state governor and

where the

federal

government

is

not imposed on the

exercises exclusive or

area affected.
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state,

is

premised on a

re-

except in those cases

preeminent authority over the
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dual missions present an interesting spectrum of authority

The line between civil support and homeland defense is not
easily distinguishable and often one leads into, or overlaps with, the other. In responding to a major disaster or emergency, authorities must decide if DoD's role is
one of civil support or homeland defense, which of course depends on the nature
of the major disaster or emergency. One can think of a number of scenarios where
this determination could go either way. Without limiting DoD's national defense
mission, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 establishes a presumption that domestic incidents including "terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies" shall be addressed by the US government in a single, comprewithin which to

act.

hensive response, with the Secretary of Homeland Security acting as principal federal official

and coordinating

all

federal operations in response

and recovery. 19

National Response Plan

Where DoD's

civil

support mission

Plan (NRP). 20 Under the

and emergency medical

NRP,

is

clear,

it

begins with the National Response

incidents begin as local events with local police, fire

services as the first responders. If these first responders are

The governor
may choose to deploy his/her state's National Guard to assist, and may also rely on
assistance from other states if an Emergency Management Assistance Compact
overwhelmed, they request assistance from the governor of the

(EMAC)

state.

exists.

An EMAC

is

an agreement among

ments and procedures

member

states that outlines the legal agree-

for providing assistance to other

of an emergency or disaster.

It

was established

member states in the event

in 1996, has

weathered the storm

when put to the test, and stands today as the cornerstone of mutual aid. The EMAC
mutual aid agreement and partnership between
canes to earthquakes, wildfires to toxic waste
cal

states exist

spills,

because from hurri-

and terrorist attacks to biologi-

and chemical incidents, all states share a common enemy: the threat of disaster.
Since being ratified by Congress and signed into law in 1996, 50 states, the Dis-

trict

of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to

become members of EMAC.
be

ratified

by Congress

EMAC is the first national disaster-relief compact to
and Disaster Compact of 1950.
and the quality that distinguishes it from other plans

since the Civil Defense

The strength of an EMAC
and compacts lies in its governance structure, its relationship with federal organizations, states, counties, territories and regions, and the ability to move just about
any resource one
If the state is

state has to assist

another

state,

including medical resources.

overwhelmed or the governor determines

needed from the federal government, the governor
staff

and request

a declaration of

major

specific assistance

will call the President or his

disaster or emergency.
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will
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Homeland Security, who will take the appropriate action
for incident management. The primary federal agency, most often FEMA, may request military support through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) will evaluate the request based on legality,
turn to the Secretary of

lethality, risk, readiness,

give the mission to
eral

is

only a plan.

If

approved,

SECDEF

will

NORTHCOM and NORTHCOM will support the primary fed-

agency as directed.

Plan

budget and appropriateness. 21

It

It

should be clearly understood that the National Response

does not provide statutory authority under which

expend federal funds and take

DoD may

action.

Posse Comitatus Act

Although

civil

support within the homeland

is

not

new to

the military, the nature

of support needed during the 2005 hurricane season presented some unique issues
for

NORTHCOM. Whenever military operations are conducted within the home-

land, authorities

must consider the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). 22 Since the Con-

stitution leaves police

power

Force are not used as a police power.

Corps by

DoD

The

policy.

PCA ensures that the Army and Air
The PCA applies to the Navy and Marine

to the states, the

PCA

restrictions essentially prohibit the direct, active

participation of military forces in enforcing civil criminal laws. This includes prohibitions against arrest, search
to the Coast

Guard.

23

It

and seizure, and detention. The PCA does not apply

also does not apply to the National

duty (SAD) or Title 32 (Federally Funded)

statuses.

Guard

in state active

Congress has provided

many

PCA, most notably the Insurrection Act. 24 Although there has
been much discussion of amending the PCA, NORTHCOM's position is that its
ability to execute its mission is not adversely affected by PCA restrictions.
exceptions to the

Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order

The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007

(NDAA

FY07) changed the name of chapter 15 of Title 10 from "Insurrection" to "Enforce-

ment of the Laws

to Restore Public Order." 25

as the Insurrection

to the
sion.

Act

statutes, 10

Formerly and commonly referred to

US Code 331-333 provides statutory exceptions

PCA that could involve the execution of NORTHCOM's civil support mis-

During Hurricane Katrina,

police were gone, looting

was

early

news coverage depicted a

city

of lawlessness:

common and violence was rampant. This news cov-

erage led to discussions about whether the President should invoke the Insurrection Act.

As the Insurrection Act

Katrina disaster,

it

statutes existed at the

time of the Hurricane

did not appear that legal authority existed for the President to

invoke the Insurrection Act.
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statutes describe three triggers that allow the President to

use military force to suppress insurrections. The

was done

in the 1992

Los Angeles

riots.

26

first

The second

trigger

trigger

is

is

a state request, as

when unlawful ob-

structions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the

United States make

it

impracticable to enforce federal law. 27 This was done in the

1957 and 1963 public school desegregation cases. The third

trigger,

now expanded

Year 07 National Defense Authorization Act,

as a result of language in the Fiscal

al-

lows the President to restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States

when,

as a result

of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health

emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United States, the President determines that domestic violence has oc-

curred to such an extent that the authorities of the State or possession are incapable

of maintaining public order, and such violence results in a condition that deprives
the people of constitutional rights or obstructs execution of US laws. 28

dent

may also do

The

Presi-

so to suppress in a state any insurrection, domestic violence, un-

lawful combination, or conspiracy,

if such

insurrection, violation, combination or

conspiracy results in a condition that deprives the people of constitutional rights or
obstructs execution of US laws.

Where the President invokes the "Laws to

Restore Public Order" because public

order cannot be maintained and the violence deprives people of constitutional

may federalize the National Guard and Reserve for not more
He may also direct SECDEF to provide supplies, services and equip-

rights, the President

than 365 days.

ment to affected persons (independent of the normal process under the Stafford Act).
Although the new provisions of the
thority, the provisions

would not

NDAA FY07 expanded the President's au-

necessarily have completely addressed the "law-

lessness" situation that existed in

New Orleans

during Hurricane Katrina. Under

new provisions, the President would have had two significant hurdles to overcome before he could invoke the "Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Or-

the

der" provisions that

now exist and send in Title

absent a request from the governor. While the

10 troops over the objection of or
first

hurdle would have been met

(authority to act in public emergencies such as natural disaster) in the absence of
effective

government, the second hurdle (finding deprivation of constitutional

would arguably still have presented problems. Although Katrina-like situaare now clearly contemplated in statute, the President must still find an asso-

rights)

tions

ciated deprivation of constitutional rights.

desegregation) has been willing to

No President since

make such
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Unity of Effort
stated earlier, the federal government's ability to respond to an

As

emergency

is

constrained by the constitutional provisions which reserve police power to the

The

states.

states

have authority to

call

forth militias (the National

Guard) to sup-

press insurrections, quell civil disturbances or respond to natural disasters

own militia, it is
10 forces in the homeland to achieve unity of command with a

other catastrophic events. Given that each state sovereign has

impossible for Title
state's militia.

However, unity of effort

is

a goal that can

its

be achieved through im-

proved communication and coordination. The "Forces for Unified

memorandum 29
tween

and

Commands"

envisions the establishment of a "coordinating authority" be-

Title 10 forces

and non-federalized National Guard

forces so that this unity

may be achieved. This authority is not command authority or authority to
compel agreement, but rather authority delegated to a commander for coordinatof effort

more forces. It is an authority
to require consultation. This type of coordination would give SECDEF insight into
how Title 32 funds are spent and give NORTHCOM and the National Guard situaing specific functions

and

involving two or

activities

tional awareness of each other's missions, locations, platforms, capabilities
rules for the use of force,

promoting unity of effort among

nation could be a condition precedent to

Dual-Status

SECDEF

all

and

forces. This coordi-

approval of Title 32 funding.

Commander

Another way to achieve unity of effort is through the establishment of a dual-status

commander,

a

command

arrangement discussed, but not used, during the 2005

hurricane season. There are two types of dual-status commanders.

One

involves

providing a Title 10 officer a commission in a state National Guard thereby allowing

him

or her to exercise

and

forces

command and

state status (Title

placing a National

Guard

control over federal status (Title 10)

32/SAD) National Guard

officer

on

forces.

The other

involves

Title 10 orders, while allowing that officer to

retain his or her state authority, thereby enabling unity of command of both federal

and

32

state status forces.

US Code

315 authorizes the

detail

of regular

members of the Army and Air

Force to duty with a state National Guard by the Secretary of the Army or Secretary
of the Air Force. With permission of the President,
officer to accept a

commission

ernor of the respective
cers to exercise

32

state.

ity was

control over National

authorizes a National

local area of operations to

used in the 2004

Guard

allows an
if

such

is

Army or Air Force
offered

by the gov-

This authority has been used to authorize Title 10

command and

US Code 325

in the National

it

Guard

Guard

offi-

units.

officer familiar

with the state and

command in both a federal and state status. This author-

G8 Summit, the 2004 Democratic and Republican national
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conventions and Operation Winter Freeze, a five-month
late

NORTHCOM mission in

2004 and early 2005, which occurred on the northeast border of the United
This

States.

is

also the

command arrangement that will be used for the Ground Based

Midcourse Missile Defense units of the Colorado and Alaska National Guards.

Both options provide unity of effort, rather than unity of command, allowing
both federal and

There

is

state military forces to

no formal approval process

enhance

for either situation.

informal coordination between the state and
cers at

with a

It

usually begins with

NORTHCOM. Typically, action offi-

NORTHCOM

and the National Guard discuss various courses of action
recommendation for the use of a dual-status commander. Then the state

National Guard staff and

from

their situational awareness.

NORTHCOM staff determine whether to seek approval

their respective chains of command. In

status National

Guard

officer

four 2004 events in which dual-

arrangements were approved, the governor sent an

approval package, including a signed

dent and/or

all

SECDEF for signature

Memorandum

of Agreement, to the Presi-

(for certain events, the President has delegated

approval to SECDEF).

The

dual-status

commander arrangement does not simultaneously

the use of Title 32 funding
Title 32

funding approval

30

is

for National

Guard

authorize

forces for operational missions.

a separate process. Moreover, this arrangement does

not "dual status" the forces or

staff,

whether federal or

state status,

commanded by

commander. The dual-status commander has two reporting chains
and must consider the implications of the different rules and restrictions for each
force under his or her command. It is likewise important that staff members,
whether Title 10 or National Guard, understand their separate roles and missions.
the dual-status

DoD as Lead Federal Agency
Could DoD ever be tasked by the President to be the lead federal agency in a catastrophic event? Clearly, the

Homeland

Security Act of 2002 31 confers statutory re-

sponsibility for federal response to catastrophic incidents to the

Homeland

Security (DHS).

One could argue that DoD could lead a component of

the federal response as long as

sponse as a whole.

Department of

DHS

maintained overall responsibility for the

re-

One could also conceive of a situation in which an incident is of

such magnitude as to jeopardize national security, such that the President, under
his Article II authority, could place

Conceptually, there

is

DoD in the lead.

a critical void in the

saster (for discussion purposes, the first

local responders are incapacitated or

sistance

forces

is

immediate aftermath of a major

48-72 hours

di-

after a disaster). Conceivably,

busy attending to

their

own families; state as-

forthcoming, but will take time to assemble sufficient National Guard

and other responders into

effective units; the
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take a short period of time for the National

if requested, it will

federal assistance or,

Response Plan to gear up and provide that
lives are at risk.

in constant

DoD has the capability to respond quickly with well-trained units

communications unaffected by the disaster, and to sustain

The overarching question
and critical void.

nitely.

early

meantime, American

assistance. In the

is

whether

DoD

itself indefi-

has legal authority to

that

fill

Immediate Response Authority
There are situations that allow
chain of command.

to

respond without prior approval from the

When imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil

emergency or attack

exist

and time does not permit prior approval from higher

headquarters, local military

components

DoD

commanders and

are authorized to take necessary

requests of domestic

civil

responsible officials of other

and immediate action

authorities in order "to save lives, prevent

DoD

to respond to

human suffer-

ing or mitigate great property damage." Such actions are generally referred to as

"immediate response." 32
Ordinarily, assistance to civilian authorities

ment basis. However,

it

Military

provided on a cost reimburse-

should not be delayed or denied because of the inability or

unwillingness of the requester to
tionally, those

is

make

a

commitment

to reimburse

DoD. Addi-

providing immediate response are required to notify the National

Command

Center

(NMCC), through

the chain of

command,

practical of the request for assistance, the nature of the response

as

soon

as

and any other rele-

vant information related to assistance provided.
Generally, notice should reach the

NMCC within hours of the decision to pro-

vide assistance. Immediate response has generally been contemplated as assistance

provided in response to a natural disaster or other catastrophic incident. The
tance provided

is

in support of local officials

generally limited in terms of time

and

at their request.

assis-

This response

is

and geographic proximity of the commander

and/or the requested capability to the incident.
Incident Awareness and Assessment

One

of the most sensitive issues in the homeland

is

the use of intelligence assets

during domestic operations. Consider the ramifications of flying a U-2 reconnaissance plane over the Gulf Coast during hurricane disaster relief operations. Beyond
perceptions, one

must consider

if

there

is

authority to use intelligence capabilities

for non-intelligence missions (such as search

and rescue and damage assessment)

following a natural disaster. "Incident Awareness and Assessment" (IAA)

term used to describe the use of intelligence assets,
lance

and reconnaissance (ISR)

assets, in

the

specifically intelligence, surveil-

support of disaster
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Foreign intelligence (FI) and counterintelligence (CI) are the only authorized
"intelligence activities" of the

DoD

intelligence

community and must be con-

DoD Directive 5240.1 and DoD 5240. 1-R. 33 In essence, this
means that whenever DoD conducts an "intelligence activity," there must be a forducted consistent with

nexus,

eign

as

by the

required

counterintelligence.

DoD

SECDEF may approve

definitions

of foreign

and

intelligence

community officials have opined that
intelligence component capabilities for mis-

intelligence

use of

DoD

sions "other than intelligence activities" because the

SECDEF has inherent author-

DoD to complete a DoD mission. In
those instances, the mission must be a valid DoD mission, and SECDEF must approve both the mission and specific use of the DoD intelligence component
ity to

use any assets or personnel within the

capabilities.

Essentially, in order to use

DoD intelligence component capabilities (personnel,

units, planning, collection, analysis,

there

must be

production) for non-intelligence

a Request for Forces (RFF) submitted

Joint Staff for review

through the

activities,

command to

the

and approval by SECDEF. The request must identify the mis-

DoD intelligence component capability requested. The resulting execute order will be approved by SECDEF and specify what DoD intelligence

sion

and specify the

component capabilities maybe used and any operational parameters or limitations
on the use of that capability.
These procedures give
sions.

SECDEF

the flexibility to use

DoD

assets for dual mis-

For example, during a hurricane disaster support mission, the

gence components could be conducting intelligence
existing authorities. Additionally,

DoD

intelligence

activities (FI

component

DoD

intelli-

and CI) under

capabilities could

be used for a non-intelligence mission by doing planning, tasking, analysis and

production in support of search and rescue (SAR) and damage assessment. The

second mission could involve a Request for Assistance (RFA) from a primary federal

agency to DoD. In

this situation,

SECDEF approval would authorize the use of

intelligence assets for non-intelligence purposes. Mission direction

dinated with the primary federal agency. Additionally, the
service" operation.

the

The primary

federal agency

would be coor-

RFA process is a "fee for

would agree

to

pay for the cost of

IAA employment.
Leaders, at

all levels,

frequently seek to build situational awareness. Building

sit-

uational awareness requires data to be collected by a combination of satellite, air-

borne, and ground sensors. The key is to create a means to bring all of this disparate

The
mak-

data together into one coherent picture for decisionmakers and planners.

amount and type of data required differs depending on whether the leader is
ing strategic, operational or first responder decisions. The requirement
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situational awareness

and

must be evaluated

carefully, so that

IAA

assets are efficiently

effectively used.

Sensitive Information

The use of information about US persons and non-DoD persons and organizations
is restricted depending on the mission of the DoD component involved. During disaster relief operations, force protection

into a joint operating area.

While

this

is

is

always a concern

when sending

troops

true whether operating overseas or in the

homeland are more restrictive. Sensitive information
falls into two major categories. The first category deals with information on US
persons subject to intelligence oversight (IO) rules. The rules for this category of
information apply only to DoD intelligence components. 34 The second category
deals with information concerning the activities of persons and organizations not
homeland, the

DoD. The rules for this category apply to everyone except DoD intelcomponents. The policy set forth in a 1980 directive, DoD Directive
with

affiliated

ligence

rules in the

5200.27, applies. 35

The general rule for this second category is that collecting,

reporting, processing

or storing information concerning individuals or organizations not affiliated with

DoD
50

is

non-DoD

persons/organizations within the

the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,

US territories and non-DoD affili-

not permitted. This includes

states,

ated

US

citizens

Information

anywhere

in the world.

There are exceptions to the general

rule.

maybe gathered if it is essential to the accomplishment of the follow-

ing defense missions:
•

Protection of

threats to

DoD

functions and property. This exception encompasses

DoD military and civilian personnel and defense activities, installations

and property. Only the following

activities justify acquisition

of

non-DoD

persons/organizations information:
•

Subversion of loyalty, discipline or morale of DoD military or civilian

personnel by encouraging violations of law, disobedience of orders or
disruption of military activities;
•

Theft of arms, ammunition or equipment; or destruction or sabotage

of DoD

facilities,

equipment or records;

•

Unauthorized demonstrations on

•

Direct threats to

DoD

DoD active or reserve installations;

military/civilian personnel in connection with

their duties or to other persons authorized protection
•

Activities

endangering

facilities that

have

DoD

resources;

classified defense contracts

or that have been officially designated as "key defense
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•

Crimes

DoD

which

for

has

responsibility

for

investigating

or

prosecuting.
•

and
•

Personnel security. Investigations regarding clearances for members of DoD

DoD applicants and persons needing access to classified information.
Operations related to

SECDEF and

there

is

disturbances.

civil

authorized by

If specifically

a distinct threat of civil disturbance exceeding the law

enforcement capability of state and local authorities.
Information collected under

DoD

stroyed within 90 days unless retention

drawing the

must be deotherwise authorized. The dilemma is

Directive 5200.27 authority
is

between information needed for force protection purposes and

line

information that

is

more

appropriately handled by local law enforcement.

International Assistance

The United States has extensive experience providing assistance to other nations in
the wake of disasters, but there is little recent precedent for the United States to receive international assistance following a homeland disaster. During Hurricane
Katrina,

many

foreign countries offered assistance. For example,

ground troops, Mexico sent

a

Canada

sent

mobile kitchen to provide food, and Germany and

Denmark offered water pumps.

Federal regulations, however, hindered the provi-

some cases. US Department of Agriculture regulations preuse of food from foreign nations whose health regulations did not meet

sion of the assistance in

vented the

US

standards. In addition, the process to accept these "gifts" of assistance often

meant

assistance did not

come

as quickly as

it

was needed. In the case of foreign

troops on the ground assisting in relief efforts, issues regarding the rules under

which they would operate

arose.

Examples include

rules for the use of force

and

medical credentials. The United States clearly has to resolve these issues as the par-

adigm of international

assistance has changed.

Conclusion

As new hurricane seasons approach,
these legal issues
relief situations.
sibility,

and others

that arise

NORTHCOM will continue to grapple with
from various manmade and natural

While homeland defense

the mission to support

civil

is

NORTHCOM's number one respon-

authorities

forefront of NORTHCOM's daily activities.

is

very important, and often at the

NORTHCOM

is

upon on a regand man-made

called

ular basis to assist other federal agencies in responding to natural

disasters at the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense.

support

is

often unique,

NORTHCOM will continue to
288

disaster

Because

DoD

coordinate with federal,

.
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state

ever

and

local authorities to provide assistance, as directed,

whenever and wher-

needed.

it is
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available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d52401_042588/d52401p.pdf, con-

DoD intelligence components for the collection, retention and dissemination
US persons. Department of Defense, DoD 5240. 1-R, Procedures
Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons

tains guidance for

of information concerning

Governing the
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(1982), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/52401r_1282/p52401r.pdf,

contains detailed procedures to enable

DoD intelligence components to carry out their assigned

functions while ensuring their activities that affect
that protects the constitutional rights
34.

individuals are carried out in a

By

directive,

DoD

DoD

manner

and privacy of such persons.

Executive Order No. 12,333, 46 Federal Register 59,941 (Dec.

5240.1, supra note 33; and
35.

US

5240. 1-R, supra note 33,

IO

4,

1981);

DoD

Directive

rules apply.

establishes policy, limitations, procedures

and operational guidance

pertaining to the collecting, processing, storing and disseminating of information concerning

persons and organizations not

affiliated

lent of intelligence oversight rules.

with

DoD.

It is

the non-intelligence

Department of Defense,

component equiva-

DoD Directive 5200.27, Acquisition

of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of

Defense (1980), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d520027_010780/
d520027p.pdf.
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XIX
The Law of International Disaster Response:
Overview and Ramifications
for Military Actors

David Fisher *

As

military lawyers are well aware, the international legal

framework

protection and assistance of civilians in conflict situations

is

well developed

and deeply integrated into the ways lawyers and laypeople think and
war.

The Geneva Conventions of

tarian law (IHL), have

now

talk

1949, the cornerstone of international

achieved universal adhesion;
2

have formed national commissions on IHL; and IHL

is

1

for the

about

humani-

over seventy nations

being studied and written

about in universities, military academies and other forums around the world. In
contrast, the law of international disaster response, referred to in recent years as

"International Disaster Response Laws, Rules

and Principles" or "IDRL," has been

described as "neglected" 3 and "far from complete," 4 with no centralized regime
equivalent to the Geneva Conventions, few academic resources dedicated to the

sue and, until recently,

little

attention

from the international

is-

disaster relief

community.

*

Senior Legal Research Officer for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

Societies' program on International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles. The views
and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent

those of the International Federation.

The Law of International Disaster Response
Yet, over the last thirty- five years, there have
conflict disasters worldwide, resulting in

been over fourteen thousand non-

more than

2.3 million deaths

and

affect-

ing an astonishing 5.8 billion persons. 5 In the overwhelming majority of these disasters, the

governments,

civil

society

and communities of the

affected States have

borne the brunt of relief and recovery themselves. However, international response
activities

have also necessarily been frequent 6 and are increasing in proportion to

number and

the growing

severity of disasters in recent years. 7

tional disaster operations can
relief,

nel,

sometimes be

commonly involving barriers

Moreover, interna-

just as legally challenging as conflict

to the entry

and

effective use

of relief person-

goods, equipment and transport vehicles, as well as regulatory dilemmas for

fected States

—

particularly in light of the

af-

growing number and diversity of

international disaster responders.

For their part, military actors have long been engaged in disaster relief, 8 but their

involvement

at the international level also

engagement has led
pitfalls

involved,

9

to a greater concern

as well as

appears to be on the

among

rise.

This increased

military lawyers about the legal

concerns in the humanitarian community about the

consequences of the "militarization" of international disaster assistance.
This paper will sketch the history and broad outlines of the current international legal

framework

for transborder disaster relief

and recovery 10 and discuss

some of the most common legal problems that arise in international operations. It
from a civilian's perspective at some of the ramifications for milwill then look
itary actors. It will conclude with some thoughts on where the international com-

—

—

munity might choose

to go

from

here.

Historical

Background

While there are early precedents for international relief in peacetime,
til

the mid-nineteenth century that

momentum

it

was not un-

slowly began to build toward in-

ternational systems to address national calamities. 11 For example, in 1851, France

convened the

first

of a series of international sanitary conferences to negotiate

agreements to combat the cross-border spread of diseases. 12 In 1869, a resolution
of the second International Conference of the Red Cross affirmed the role of na-

Red Cross societies in providing relief "in case of public calamity which, like
war, demands immediate and organized assistance." 13 In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, multilateral telegraph and telecommunications treaties
were adopted with specific provisions about emergency communications, 14 and
maritime agreements were reached codifying customary norms on rescue and astional

sistance to vessels in distress. 15

-
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It

was under the auspices of the League of Nations that the

was made

to create a

first

comprehensive approach to international disaster

and

1927, a conference of forty- three States adopted the Convention
16

tablishing an International Relief Union (IRU).

the

IRU should

serious attempt

The Convention

In

relief.

Statutes Es-

stipulated that

serve as a centralized operational agency, funneling international

funds and support in disaster settings, coordinating other actors and promoting
study and research on disaster management. 17
eventually attracted thirty
its

ability to

command

disasters

had already
until 1967.

member States. However,

it

was never able

to effectively

mission, due mainly to the crippling lack of funds incident to

carry out

two

entered into force in 1932 and

It

regular contributions

from member

States.

18

It

its

in-

intervened in

and sponsored several scientific studies, but by the late 1930s, the IRU

effectively ceased to function,

though

it

was not

officially

terminated

19

on disaster relief developed in a
fragmented and mostly unplanned manner, and institutional mandates were
shared among a number of actors. In the 1950s, several States, notably the United
After the failure of the IRU, international law

States,

A

began concluding

bilateral treaties regulating the delivery

second and third wave of

assistance,

Europe.

21

bilateral treaties,

mainly concerned with mutual

were agreed upon in the 1970s and the 1990s respectively, mainly in

Moreover, a number of multilateral

(such as customs harmonization,
protection

of relief goods. 20

24
)

22

marine and

treaties in other sectors
air

transport

23

of the law

and environmental

began to include provisions relevant to international disaster

re-

sponse, and recent decades have seen an upsurge in disaster-focused instruments

(both "hard" and "soft"), particularly at the regional

level.

A second attempt to develop a comprehensive treaty on disaster relief was made
in 1984,

when

the United Nations Disaster Response Office

(UNDRO),

the fore-

runner to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), devel-

oped

a "Draft

Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Assistance"

and presented it to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 25 The Draft Convention sought to

set

out basic rules for the entry and operation of international di-

saster relief from States
visas,

and humanitarian organizations, including with regard

customs clearance, transport

rules,

communications and
26

ECOSOC

UN's Second Committee, which, despite expressions of
States, 27 took no official action on it, and the convention was

referred the text to the

support from several

liability.

to

never adopted.
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The Current International Legal Framework
As a

result of the foregoing, the current international legal

and

institutional frame-

work for IDRL is dispersed, with gaps of scope, geographic coverage and precision.
Still, there are a number of instruments that are worth highlighting
both for their

—

potential uses

and

for their weaknesses.

Global Treaties

One

of the most successful disaster law instruments in terms of ratification

Convention on Assistance

in the

wake of the Chernobyl

28
,

Adopted in the imme-

accident, the Nuclear Accident

garnered ninety-six State parties.

the

Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emer-

gency of 1 986 (hereinafter Nuclear Accident Convention)
diate

is

29

It

Convention has

lays out basic rules for the initiation, coordi-

nation and operation of international assistance operations in case of nuclear or radiological events, touching

on the

transit

and immunities, and costs. However,
clear

and

radiological emergencies

of major disasters.
tional

30

—

Moreover, by

of equipment and personnel, privileges

name indicates, it is relevant only to nuamong the least frequent of the various types

its

as

its

terms,

it

applies only to States, the Interna-

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other "inter-governmental organiza-

Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-State actors have played in the
recovery from the Chernobyl disaster. 31
In contrast, the two global customs treaties with specific provisions on disaster
response both apply to "relief consignments" regardless of their source. They are
tions," despite the essential role that the

thus relevant to the
B.3

and

J. 5

full

range of international

relief actors. Specifically,

of the Convention on Simplification and Harmonization of Customs

Procedures ("Kyoto Convention") as amended in 1999 32
"relief

Annexes

consignments" from

tions. Similarly,

many normal customs

call

on

States to

exempt

and

restric-

processes, duties

Annex B.9 of the Convention on Temporary Admission

("Istanbul

Convention") of 1990 33 provides for exemptions from customs duties for certain
types of equipment intended for re-export after a disaster relief operation.

How-

34

membership is quite small, and, in particular, includes only a handful
of the most disaster-prone States. 35
Another recent convention that applies to the full range of international disaster responders is the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations of 1998. 39 The
Tampere Convention calls for the elimination or reduction of regulatory barriers
to the importation and operation of telecommunications equipment and personever, their

nel for disaster response purposes.

It is

the only instrument of its kind that extends
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privileges

and immunities, equivalent

NGO personnel
tions).

to those granted to the

(though only those directly connected to

United Nations, to

relief

telecommunica-

40

The Tampere Convention entered into force on January 8, 2005, and its first test
came in Sri Lanka (which had ratified it in 1999) with regard to the response to the
December 26, 2004 tsunami. Unfortunately, it appears that its provisions were invoked neither by the government nor by international relief providers, although
some of them encountered problems with regard to the import and use of telecommunications equipment. 41 On the other hand, some practitioners have reported
success in referring to the treaty, even with regard to operations in States not party
to

it,

as evidence of

an international consensus on the need to

telecommunications in

relief.

42

Still,

like the

facilitate

the use of

customs conventions, membership

in

Tampere Convention remains limited 43 and currently includes only four of the
twenty-five most disaster-prone States. 44
In 2000, the International Civil Defence Organization drafted a Framework
Convention on Civil Defence Assistance 36 to improve mutual assistance between
civil defense organizations in international disaster response operations. The
Framework Convention sets out mechanisms for the offer and acceptance of assisthe

tance, regulations for

how such assistance should be carried out, provisions for the

reduction of administrative and customs barriers and "necessary" privileges and

immunities for responders, and commitments to
units. It also calls

ments

facilitate transit

its spirit.

37

Though

it

thirteen States have ratified or acceded to

it,

cluding twenty-one States and the European
Originally adopted in 1967,

most recent of which was
aid

47

to be provided

including no Western States. 38

in 1999.

it

It sets

(twenty-two parties, in-

Community45

)

is

the

out annual quotas of certain types of food

by each member (whether

non-emergency situations.
in

It

also sets out a

which food aid should be

Food Aid Con-

has gone through several revisions, the

bilaterally or

through

"multilateral channels") to certain recipient States, covering both

manner

defense

has twenty-six signatories, to date only

A further IDRL convention with limited membership
vention.

civil

on parties to supplement its provisions with more detailed agree-

to carry out

46

of

NGOs

or

emergency and

number of guidelines as to the type and

delivered, including adherence to "basic hu-

manitarian principles," international quality standards and local dietary habits,

and attention

to the particular needs of women

groups, as well as potential harmful effects
Critics

on

and children and other vulnerable

local harvests

have charged that the Food Aid Convention

food aid because quotas have been

set

fails

and markets.
to effectively stabilize

very low (substantially below the total

amount of food aid given by most members) and have been repeatedly renegotiated downward in periods of tight supplies and that little effort is made to monitor
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the quality requirements. 48

2007,

if it is

The convention

not extended or renegotiated.

Limited membership

is

is

currently set to expire

on June

30,

49

problem

unlikely to be a

for the revised International

Health Regulations (IHR) adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2005 and
scheduled to enter into force in 2007, 50 inasmuch as the constitution of the assembly provides that

all

instruments adopted by that body will be binding on

ber States unless they explicitly "opt out."

communications
radical

failures in the

51

The

revised

IHR were prompted by

It

expands the scope of its prede-

cessor instrument (which only applied to three types of disease)

on

threat

all

mem-

SARS outbreak of 2003 and has been described as a

development in international health law. 52

parties to report

all

diseases that

might constitute

by obligating

State

a transborder public health

and by greatly expanding the authority of the World Health Organization

(WHO)

upon information of outbreaks. Significantly, this includes formalizing WHO's authority to receive and act upon reports originating from nonto act

actors. 53

Beyond this preventive aspect, the IHR's provisions requiring national public health restrictions on import of goods to be kept to a reasonable

governmental

minimum

in line with the potential threat

might

also

be of use in a disaster

re-

sponse setting in which goods and personnel must quickly cross borders.

Regional

Law

Each of the major regions has

though there

is

also

great variation in

adopted

its

scope.

at least

As

some law on

disaster response,

in other areas of international law,

Europe boasts the most elaborate framework of agreements. These include, among
others, the Fourth

Lome Convention of 1989, 54 which sets out guidelines for assis-

tance by Europe to African, Caribbean and Pacific States; the Council of Europe

Open

Agreement (EUR-OPA) Major Hazards Agreement of 1987, which
created a framework of regular high-level meetings to improve cooperation in diPartial

saster response

Mechanism,

and prevention; 55 the European Community

first

adopted in 2001, which helps to coordinate the

work of civil protection

offices; 56 the

Industrial Accidents of 1992,
sasters;

57

Civil Protection
extraterritorial

Convention on the Transboundary Effects of

on man-made dithe Agreement between Denmark, Fin-

one of the most important

subregional instruments such as

treaties

Norway and Sweden on Cooperation across State Frontiers to Prevent or
Limit Damage to Persons or Property or to the Environment in the Case of AcciT
dents of 1989; 58 and the Agreement among the Governments of the Participating

land,

Economic Cooperation (BSEC) on Collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters of
States of the Black Sea

1998 (hereinafter

BSEC Agreement). 59
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In the Americas, the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assis-

tance was adopted in 1991 60 with a
reaucratic

was only

number of provisions designed

to lower bu-

and other barriers to easy entry of foreign disaster assistance; however,

ratified

by three

States.

61

it

Greater success was seen with the agreements

creating subregional inter-governmental

mechanisms

for disaster response, in-

cluding the Coordination Centre for Natural Disaster Prevention in Central America

to

(CEPREDENAC), 62 the Andean Committee for the Prevention and Response
Disasters (CAPRADE), 63 and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response

Agency (CDERA). 64
In Africa, there has been
saster response.

65

ment (IGAD),

66

little

systematic lawmaking at the regional level

on

di-

One exception is the Inter-Governmental Authority on Developoriginally

created

with the primary purpose of building

cooperation to address issues of drought and desertification. Moreover, in recent
years, proposals

have been discussed to adopt a disaster-specific instrument in the

Community (SADC). 67
IDRL treaty was adopted in

Southern African Development

Asia in the wake of the
The most recent regional
2004 tsunami. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation Agreement on Disaster Management and
Emergency Response of 2005 (not yet in force) (hereinafter ASEAN Agreement) 68
covering disaster risk reduction, relief and reis remarkable for its broad scope
covery and addressing all types of international disaster responders as well as for
its attention to some of the key problem areas, including visas, customs, transport
and coordination issues in international operations. It will also create a dedicated

—

—

"Asian Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance" with broad responsibilities to

share information and assist in coordinating disaster assistance to

mem-

ber States both in the region and from international actors.

Bilateral Treaties

and Agreements

The overwhelming bulk of existing international IDRL instruments are bilateral
agreements between States and between States and international humanitarian organizations. There are well over one hundred bilateral treaties, most of them in Europe. 69 In general, they tend to cover issues of initiation of assistance, entry of

personnel and goods,

command and

costs (generally to the receiving State),

control of response teams, assignment of

and guarantees against

liability

(always in

favor of the responding State). Bilateral agreements with humanitarian organizations (mostly with international organizations, such as
creasingly, with

major international NGOs) tend to

set

UN agencies, but also, inout the parameters of the

organization's long-term activities in the nation as well as any applicable legal
privileges.
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Soft Law, Guidelines

and Models

Beyond the "hard law" described above, there are an important number of relevant
"soft law" instruments,
as well as guidelines,

such as resolutions or declarations of international bodies,

models and codes developed mainly by experts or by the hu-

manitarian community itself.

Some of these, though admirably crafted, have been

mainly forgotten. However, others have formed the basis for systems of international cooperation in disaster response that are certainly as important as

rently based

Among

on "hard

law."

UN General Assembly Resolution 46/
out general parameters for UN humanitarian assistance

the best-known resolutions are

182 of 1991, which sets

and the

any cur-

role of the Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),

on

and 57/150 of 2002, which

called

international urban search

and rescue teams

States to facilitate the entry

and operation of

in disaster settings and, in turn, called

on those teams to comply with the quality standards set out in guidelines developed and facilitated by an international advisory group. The Hyogo Framework for
Action, adopted by an international conference in 2005 70 and later affirmed by a
resolution of the UN General Assembly, also includes institutional and regional

among

its

primary

priorities, 71

been emphasized in the follow-up

activities

of States and the United Nations.

preparedness for

relief

but

this

element has not

An important resolution that is less well known today is the Measures to Expedite International Relief,

Cross and the
detail

adopted by both the International Conference of the Red

UN General Assembly in

1977. 72 This resolution discussed in

some

some of the most practical types of legal facilities governments should ensure

for international disaster assistance providers. Unfortunately,

it

has rarely been

evoked in modern operations.

A number

of "off-the-shelf models and guidelines have also been produced

with the intention to speed agreements between affected States and international

on the
2006 and

actors wishing to provide assistance. For military actors, the Oslo Guidelines

Use of Military and

Civil

Defence Assets in Disaster

discussed in greater detail below,

can be found in the

is

the

Relief, as

updated in

most important example. Further guidance

UNITAR Model Rules for Disaster Relief of 1996 and the Max

Planck Institution Draft International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance of
199 1. 73 However, few of these latter documents are well

known by

disaster re-

sponse professionals.

The most important instruments relating to the responsibilities of disaster assistance providers are the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief of
1994 and the Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
Disaster Response as updated in 2004, both developed by humanitarian
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organizations to serve as
saster relief. 74

minimum standards

of behavior and performance in di-

Both have been well disseminated, and most established humanitar-

ian organizations have indicated that they use them. However, the absence of any

formal mechanism for monitoring and verification of these claims renders an

sessment of their impact

Institutional

as-

difficult.

Mandates and

Privileges

In addition to these disaster-specific instruments, the international

community

number of institutions with formal mandates to engage in humaniincluding in disaster situations. The intricacies of this institutional

has provided a
tarian relief,

structure have been described elsewhere 75

and

will

not be explored here, except to

note that they include both global and regional institutions. At the global
these include

level,

UN agencies and organs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement

among others. At the regional level, organizations such as ASEAN, the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),
nity Civil Protection

Mechanism,

IGAD,

the European

Commu-

CEPREDENAC and CDERA have also been ac-

corded important roles with regard to the coordination of international disaster
response.

To

a varying extent, these entities have also been provided specific facilities per-

tinent to their operations. For example, the
nities

Convention on

Privileges

and Immu-

of the United Nations of 1946 76 and the Convention on Privileges and

Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of 1947 77 provide the basis for the recognition of domestic legal personality of
to

normal

UN entities, as well as important exemptions

systems. Similar privileges

and immunities have been accorded to the international

components of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement
with

States.

in bilateral agreements

78

NGO sector lacks a formal international legal mandate for its

Importantly, the
activities,

and other regulatory

rules concerning visas, customs, judicial oversight

although

its

effectiveness

and prominence

is

and growing,

large

as dis-

cussed further below.

Summary
In short, there are a

number of international instruments

relevant to disaster re-

sponse but their proliferation has not resulted in a coherent legal system. Likewise,
it

has been argued with regard to institutional mandates that "there

tional relief system per se, as the diverse set of actors displays

dependence [and

lacks]

a

common

little

component may on occasion contribute to the relief process."

no

interna-

structural inter-

boundary, other than the
79

is

fact that

each

OCHA is currently

leading a process of reform to address structural coordination and cooperation
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problems among UN agencies and

humanitarian partners; 80 however, the

community has

ternational humanitarian

harmonization of the

their

legal

yet to

pay

in-

significant attention to the

framework.

Legal Problems in International Disaster Response

The absence of
topic

a comprehensive system of international law

not necessarily a reason for concern. The question

is

problems of a

legal or regulatory nature that

international disaster response

there are indeed a

is

have been

and constitute

effectiveness. In significant part, these

whether there are

this

question

arise consistently in

a substantial drag

on

particular

unaddressed. Insofar as

concerned, the answer to

number of such problems that

national operations

left

is

on any

is

major

that

inter-

their speed, efficiency

and

problems can be attributed to the absence of

previously established laws, regulations and institutional structures focused

on

in-

ternational assistance at the national level. Thus, for example, the Pakistani gov-

ernment has acknowledged that "Pakistan suffered from the lack of a pre-existing

Management Authority" and applicable legal structure when the
earthquake struck in October 2005. 81 Likewise, the United States Government Accountability Office issued a report in the wake of Hurricane Katrina concluding
National Disaster

that

"FEMA and other agencies did not have policies and procedures in place to en-

sure the proper acceptance

and distribution of in-kind

assistance

donated by

for-

eign countries and militaries." 82

Typical problems in international response can be roughly divided into two

main categories: legal obstacles to the entry and operation of international relief;
and failures of monitoring, coordination and regulation of international aid. Problems of both categories usually coincide in the same disaster operations. This section will provide a few recent examples.

Obstacles to Entry and Operations

The

initiation of international disaster assistance

can be

difficult for political,

some governments have been reluctant to request or
of appearing weak or dependent, to avoid publicity for a

rather than legal, reasons, as

accept needed aid for fear
disaster,

and/or to demonstrate their disapproval of the offering party. 83 Govern-

ments are likewise sometimes unwilling

to provide basic information about a di-

saster for similar reasons, leaving potential responders at a loss as to
react.

84

On the

other hand,

it

how best

has also been the case that foreign donors have pres-

sured governments to accept assistance they did not really need. For example,

reported that a large
pitals

to

it

was

number of foreign governments insisted on sending field hos-

and medical personnel to Indonesia in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, despite
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pleas

from the Indonesian government and the World Health Organization

they were not required.

Frequently, however, the problem

some provision

that

85

more

is

technical.

While many

law as to which department (frequently the

in their

States

office

have

of the

may initiate a request for international disaster assis-

prime minister or president)

making the determination that outside
and communication about specific needs is

tance, the lack of standardized systems for

help

is

needed has led to long

delays,

86

often imperfect. Thus, for example, after Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005,
it

was reported that

a

Swedish government plane loaded with water purification

and telecommunications equipment was kept on a runway for
eleven days awaiting clearance to fly to the United States. 87 By the time permission
was granted and the plane was able to depart, none of the supplies it carried were
gear, blankets

still

needed.

Sometimes, entry visas for international disaster response personnel have been
either delayed or refused

tional assistance has
ica

by the governments of affected

States,

relief personnel

due to heightened concerns about

after interna-

States in Central

Amer-

from other parts of Latin America,

in part

been requested. For example, several

have refused visas to

even

illegal

immigration. 88 In most cases, however,

response personnel have been able to enter affected States on tourist or short-term
visas,

but problems have emerged

tional personnel responding to the

later in the operation.

For instance, interna-

2004 tsunami in Thailand and Indonesia were

required to frequently exit and re-enter those nations in order to renew short-term
visas,

incurring both significant expense and disruption to their operations. 89

Regulations on the passage of relief transport vehicles and customs delays on in-

coming goods and equipment are other critical barriers in many operations. 90 For
example, one year after the tsunami struck Indonesia, over four hundred contain91
In
ers of relief goods were still awaiting customs clearance in Jakarta and Medan.
the meantime, many of the perishable items rotted, medicines expired, and some
items that were needed at the onset of the response operation (such as tents and
surgical

United

equipment) were no longer required. 92 After Hurricane Katrina struck the
States, the British

Ministry of Defence sent

Ready to Eat" (MREs) by civil aircraft.

93

However,

five

hundred thousand "Meals

after their arrival in Arkansas,

it

was determined that they contained meat products prohibited by US health regulations,

and they were therefore stored

number of months pending

in a

warehouse

at significant

distribution to other countries.

expense for a

94

Delays can also arise before goods even reach the borders of the affected nation.

For example, in August 2006,

after strong

winds

in Swaziland left thirteen

thousand

persons homeless and exposed to ongoing heavy rains, the IFRC's regional delegation in Harare,

Zimbabwe

sent a shipment of tarpaulins
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and

tents. 95

However, the
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shipment was delayed

at the

border with South Africa for

five

days before they

could proceed to the destination nation, due to problems with customs. Analogously, overflight of transit States can occasionally raise difficulties, as

when

Paki-

stan reportedly refused to allow flights of Indian aid to Afghanistan to cross
airspace.

Sometimes customs delays cause headaches over and above the obvious
forestalling the intended use of the affected
ter the

its

96

1999 earthquake in Turkey,

it

issue of

goods and equipment. For instance,

was reported

af-

that relief goods delayed in cus-

toms beyond the statutory storage deadline had been summarily nationalized. 97

Somewhat analogously, in Indonesia, storage fees for tsunami relief cargo awaiting
customs clearance mounted so high due to delays that they sometimes exceeded
the value of the relief consignments themselves. 98 Charges of this type, as well as

customs duties and other types of taxes,

tolls

and

fees

on

disaster operations,

have

dramatically increased their costs and lowered their effectiveness. In Sri Lanka, for

example,

Oxfam was

required to pay a £550,000 customs duty in June 2005 to im-

port twenty-five four-wheel vehicles for

Another
is

common

issue that

some

its

tsunami rehabilitation operations. 99

international disaster responders encounter

obtaining recognition of their domestic legal status in the affected State. In Thai-

land, for example, international
cult to navigate that nearly

had

difficulty

and applying

NGOs found the local registration process so diffi-

none were

successful in doing so. 100

As

a result,

opening bank accounts, obtaining work permits, hiring
for tax exemptions.

some

local staff

101

Similarly, obtaining recognition of the foreign qualifications of medical person-

nel has frequently proven difficult. In Nepal, for instance,

[wjhilst

some

it

was reported that

organisations were aware of the process of obtaining permission from

the Medical Council of Nepal, the process was a lengthy one

and not

easily

adapted to

emergency situations. Other organisations were not aware of the necessary processes,
and in at least one instance a prominent medical NGO was asked to cease activities
102
altogether for failing to comply with the regulations.

Furthermore, foreign actors lacking diplomatic or inter-governmental privileges

and immunities find themselves exposed to the risk of civil and/or criminal li-

On

ability in unfamiliar legal systems.

and termination reportedly provide
saster response operations as

the speedy

and short-term

operations.

concern.

104

103

the

civil side, local

particularly fertile

employee recruitment

ground

domestic labor laws generally

staffing

for litigation in di-

fail

to

accommodate

requirements of international disaster response

Medical malpractice has also been identified

Exposure to criminal investigation was raised
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an area of particular

an issue by a number
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of disaster responders to the 1999 earthquake in Turkey, and one that substantially
affected their operations. 105

Problems of Quality and Coordination
Closely related to entry and operation barriers are issues of quality and adequate
coordination of international relief and recovery assistance. In the absence of effective international

mechanisms of control,

affected State

governments have often

struggled to address the flood of external actors responding to those major disasters

with the highest media attention. 106

Perhaps the most important quality issue
wanted, unneeded and inappropriate
fill

airports

is

the arrival of vast quantities of un-

relief goods,

which embroil customs

offices,

and warehouses, and block the flow of needed goods. For example,

each of the largest disaster operations of 2005

(e.g.,

in

the tsunami in Indonesia, Thai-

land and India; the earthquake in Pakistan; and Hurricane Katrina in the United
States),

heaps of used clothing appeared. In tropical

and

ter coats

hats, dress shoes,

Sri

Lanka, these included win-

pyjama tops (without bottoms) and even "thong

underwear." 107 In Muzaffarabad, Pakistan,

piles

of useless warm-weather clothes

were burned for warmth. 108 As noted by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)

—
—
nami
report

a

major multiagency study of the international response to the 2004

"assistance" in the

cines, inappropriate

form of used

needed for
tional

medi-

food (such as canned pork sent to Muslim Indonesia), and

other assorted eccentric items
tive value. It

clothes, expired or poorly labeled

tsu-

is

"not just worthless to the recipients;

occupies storage and transport space at the very time

real aid. It

then requires special handling to dispose of

burden on a response."

it

has a nega-

when

—

all

this

is

an addi-

109

In addition to increased shipments of goods, major disasters are attracting

numbers of international actors on the ground. The growth in the numbers
of NGOs becoming involved in disaster response has been particularly impressive.
For example, after the December 2004 tsunami, it was reported that there were two
hundred NGOs working in Aceh. 110 In India, nearly three hundred NGOs were relarger

ported to be working in Nagapattinam District alone. 111 While particularly pro-

nounced after the tsunami, this trend can be seen in other highly televised disasters
as well. 112 In addition, more UN agencies, Red Cross and Red Crescent societies,
private companies and unaffiliated individuals are travelling to disaster sites seeking to help. 113

Among these new actors, many are

inexperienced and

some

act without suffi-

cient understanding of, or regard for, international standards of quality in disaster

response.
far

too

As noted by the TEC report,

"

[t ]

here

is

general agreement that there were

many agencies present in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The low entry barrier to
305

The Law of International Disaster Response
the system permits the entry of inexperienced

"[experienced agencies are not

and incompetent

immune from low

higher with inexperienced actors."

114

quality

and while

actors,"

work

.

.

.

the risks are

Thus, for example, an unidentified

NGO was

Banda Aceh, Indonesia after the
tsunami, leaving no records and no way to determine who had been vaccinated and
who had not. 115
found to have vaccinated children

Many

in a village near

humanitarians in tsunami-affected nations were also

"traditional"

shocked to find themselves working alongside "Scientologist trauma care" workers

who purported
hands.

116

To

to heal

tsunami victims by influencing energy waves with

their dismay,

and

noted in one media report from India, "[i]n the

as

eyes of the local public, [Scientology's] operations are indistinguishable

of UNICEF and

their

CARE and the Red Cross."

117

from those

Other purportedly "humanitarian"

organizations were accused of proselytizing in several tsunami- affected nations,

and even conditioning aid on
Probably the most

religious conversion. 118

common

complaints in disaster operations revolve around

problems of coordination and sharing of information between the various

The

proliferation of international responders has

done nothing

to

actors.

improve these

problems. In the tsunami operations, for example, "[ajchieving adequate repre-

among even

sentation and consensus

the larger, mature

agencies was not easy; but with such a large

ground

in the first six

INGOs and Red

Cross

number of smaller agencies also on the

months, coherent joint planning and implementation was

119

Aceh was dubbed an "information black hole" where overfunded humanitarian agencies competed for beneficiaries, overserving some communities
unlikely."

and ignoring the needs of others. 120
International

among

coordination

mechanisms remain

largely

—even

voluntary

UN agencies—and have struggled to prevent irregular coverage of disaster-

affected persons. 121 For their part, national institutional

frameworks

for

monitor-

ing and coordination of international relief were overwhelmed in both Indonesia

and

Sri

Lanka, leading to multiple structural changes over the course of the

and recovery operations
However, even with

a

in

both nations.

relief

122

more modest international

intervention, governments of

the affected States have experienced significant difficulty in the absence of strong

regulatory and institutional mechanisms. For example, after Tropical Storm Stan

caused massive flooding in Guatemala in October 2005,
that the national disaster

it

was widely recognized

management network "CONRED" and

its

secretariat

were unable to track and coordinate the activities of the several dozen foreign organizations

and

detailed legal

States that arrived to provide assistance. 123 In contrast, in

and regulatory structure was put

after a

in place for international relief,

coordination problems were noted in recent disaster operations.
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Ramifications for Military Actors

How does

all

of this relate to military actors?

number of nations
both on a

bilateral

becoming increasingly keen on international disaster relief,
and multilateral basis. As noted by the United Nations, "Mem-

mestic response, are

who do not give a primary role to their military forces in donow using their military capacity for relief operations on a

global basis." 125 For example, in 1992, Japan
saster relief to provide a specific role for
126

in operations ever since.

US

noted above, militaries in a

are

ber States, even those

manent

First, as

disaster response

its

amended

law on international

di-

which have been

active

Canadian military created

a per-

military forces,

Similarly, in 1996, the

team

its

to be used for foreign disaster operations.

127

The

mandated to participate in international disaster relief, has also
increased its emphasis on "humanitarian" activities in recent years. 128 For instance,
its contribution after the 2004 tsunami was its biggest operation in the Asia-Pacific
military, long

region since the Vietnam War. 129

The Americans, Japanese and Canadians joined

no less than thirty- two other national militaries that responded to the tsunami. 130
Similarly, in 1998

tion Centre

NATO created its Euro- Atlantic Disaster Response Coordina-

(EADRCC) and

has also embraced a "growing humanitarian role" in

disaster response operations, including for

and the October 2005 earthquake
negotiate
cilitation

its

own memorandum

of civilian

relief

Hurricane Katrina in the United States

in Pakistan. 131

NATO has even gone so far as to

of understanding with

personnel and materiel.

raised for regional military cooperation

132

member

States for the fa-

Proposals have recently been

mechanisms

in Central

America and Asia

to facilitate military involvement in disaster relief. 133

Second, military responders experience

many of the same legal

issues

and con-

cerns as civilian actors in disaster response operations, as well as issues uniquely related to the

commonly

strict

international operations

domestic regulation of their mandates and roles in

and the

special sovereignty

presence of foreign troops raise for affected States.
the "lessons learned"

from NATO's intervention

and security concerns

134

As noted

in

one summary of

in Pakistan, "[t]he

working with host governments must not be underestimated.

that the

importance of

Many issues must be

resolved before operations forces arrive, including terms of entry, force protection,
legal status,

communication channels,

liaison arrangements, contracting arrange-

ments, use of land for basing and translators." 135
Third, military responders face a similarly patchy normative framework.
existing disaster-related treaties

make

Few

specific reference to military involvement,

though many of their more general provisions

on facilitating entry of
goods and personnel) should also apply to military responders. Those that do have
specific reference, such as the ASEAN Agreement, 136 the BSEC Agreement, 137 and
307

(for example,

The Law of International Disaster Response

the

Agreement of 1974 between Sweden and Norway concerning the Improvement

of Rescue Services in Frontier Areas 138

command

relationship between the assisting

tion of foreign forces

(e.g.,

tions.

number of the

139

and

seek to address issues of the

affected State forces, identifica-

When

they are in

status offerees agreements or

MOUs ad-

uniforms) and the carriage of arms.

place, bilateral or regional (e.g.,

dress a

commonly

NATO)

issues that

might

However, they are limited

arise for military actors in disaster opera-

number and

in

difficult to negotiate at the

outset of a disaster.

The pre-eminent

"soft law"

instrument on military involvement in disaster

re-

on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief. First developed by the United Nations and endorsed by an international
conference in Oslo in 1994, the Oslo Guidelines were updated and "relaunched" at
lief is

a

the Oslo Guidelines

new

conference in

November

2006. 140 Particularly as updated this year, the

guidelines stress that military relief assets should be considered a last resort

no

civilian alternatives are available.

141

They

also

encourage (though do not

quire) military and civil defense forces to act "under
tions.

They set out minimum

142

facilities

that should be offered

by

sorts of issues as

also include a

affected States,

and security, and

coordination structures and basic principles to which military and

They

re-

UN control" in disaster opera-

in areas such as legal status, customs, visas, overflight

erations should adhere.

when

civil

also set out

defense op-

model agreement addressing

these

an annex.

The emphasis in the Oslo Guidelines on civilian control reflects the current ambiguity in the humanitarian community about the increasing role of the military in
disaster operations. On the one hand, the capacities and achievements of military
actors in international disaster relief particularly in the areas of transport and logistics

—

—

are undeniable. For instance, the international military contributions to

the tsunami relief have been described as pivotal to the success in avoiding the
feared "second tsunami" of starvation
assistance

On the other hand,

—sometimes many times more
sources — and
provided by
144

civilian

with humanitarian
acute in

disease. 143

expensive

is

services are

and

its

thorny policy

activities raises

armed conflict settings, when

costly than

identification

issues.

when

military

the

same

and integration

These are particularly

military attempts to "win hearts

and minds"

can confuse the distinction between military and humanitarian agencies, rendering the latter

more

liable to attack.

close identification has
trality

been seen

145

as

However, even

an overly

dangerous for public perceptions of the neu-

of humanitarian actors. Moreover, there

close integration

in disaster settings,

is

concern that precedent

between military and humanitarian actors
146

maybe difficult to alter in a later situation of conflict.
call for "direct assistance" to be provided as much as
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set for

in a disaster setting

Thus, the Oslo Guidelines
possible

by humanitarian

David Fisher

actors, with militaries instead providing "indirect assistance" (such as transport

and logistical aid) and "infrastructure support" (such
erating power).

as rebuilding roads

and gen-

147

Conclusion and Prospects for the Future

It

seems plain that some improvements

tance

is

generally facilitated

in the

way that international disaster assis-

and regulated would be

desirable.

While every disaster

some ways unique, and the very nature of the enterprise (particularly in
sudden-onset disasters) lends itself to some level of improvisation, the fact that a
consistent set of legal problems tends to crop up in disaster settings around the
world suggests that better regulation may have a role in improving the outcome of
setting

is

in

disaster relief operations.

At the national level, a workable balance

between

sufficient

fectiveness of a relief

and

remains to be struck in most States

openness to allow quick entry and easy operation of interna-

and

tional disaster assistance

military)

still

sufficient control to ensure the quality

and recovery

affected State

governments have suffered

alike

issues

disasters in

through their

2005

activities

At the international
could be

are beginning to

imbalance,

do

so,

—

particularly those struck

and others might be led to

it

pursuant to the Hyogo Framework.
level,

much improved.

in the current

—

this

and adopt appropriate legislation

and regulations prior to being struck by a disaster. Some
by major

from

and

To address this, more gov-

to the detriment of efficient support to affected persons.

148

overall ef-

International actors (both civilian

effort.

ernments need to thoroughly analyze such

and

149

the dissemination

Even

if this

and use of

existing instruments

occurs, however, there are significant gaps

framework when measured against the

common problem

areas.

Nevertheless, one commentator, noting the spotty historical development of inter-

national
cently

norms

in this area,

ongoing State concerns about sovereignty, and the

enhanced emphasis of the international community on

re-

disaster risk

reduction has concluded that "the direct role of international law with respect to
the policy on natural disasters will not

grow significantly." 150 On the other hand,

as

described above, recent years have seen significant "hard" and "soft" law develop-

ments, including the ASEAN Agreement, the International Health Regulations, the
entry into force of the Tampere Convention, the
reaffirmation of the Oslo Guidelines. In
to address

some of the

fact,

NATO MOU and the revision and

there seems to be

no shortage of will

relevant issues, but rather a continuing lack of coherence

and comprehensiveness among current initiatives.
Looking to the future, the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent, a forum including all State parties to the Geneva Conventions as well as
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components of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, is scheduled to

the various

on the issues described in this paper in November 2007 particularly with regard to what States might be encouraged to include
in domestic law and policy. The consultation process leading to that conference,
take

up

a set of recommendations

—

including regional forums organized with governmental and inter-governmental

partners around the globe, has already begun generating greater publicity and
attention to these issues. 151 Moreover, the International

body whose
law and

its

object

is

hope

(a

UN

the "promotion of the progressive development of international

codification" 152 ) recently decided to place the issue of the "protection of

persons in natural disasters" on
to

Law Commission

its

long-term program of work. 153 There

that there will be greater progress

on

is

thus reason

these issues in the near future.
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transition period,
tion, Position as

Regards Ratifications and Accessions
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or those approved by the

list,

http://
is

Food Aid Committee. See Food Aid Con-

XXII.

The Food Aid Convention

ment of 1995, Apr.

13, 1999,

is one of two components of the International Grains Agree2073 U.N.T.S. 135, availa ble at http://www.igc.org.uk/en/downloads/
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available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/57JPJD (providing examples).
access to victims of natural disasters,

84.

See, e.g.,
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See

85.

Water-not-hospitals-needed-in-Aceh/2005/0 1/09/ 1105205983764.html.
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